6. The title dajiangjun is translated "supreme commander" in military contexts; in earlier chapters it was translated "regent" or "regent-marshal." Since Cao Zhen had responsibility for the heir, the translation "regent-marshal" is used in his case.
7. "Submerged dragon" suggests a potential sovereign.
8. Liu Bang suspected Han Xin of disloyalty and on the pretext of a pleasure tour went to Yunmeng to see him. There Liu Bang tricked Han Xin into receiving him, and then arrested him on the spot. Later Liu Bang released him and made him lord of Huaiyin. See Ssu-ma Ch'ien [Sima Qian], Records of the Grand Historian of China (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), 1: 109, 229.
9. Mao: "Kongming's instruction to the Second Emperor concerns two institutions, the palace and the ministries. If the Emperor lets the palace [or court] officials become too intimate, and the ministerial [or bureau] officials become estranged, then opportunists will have access to him but worthy men will not. This is how emperors Huan and Ling came to grief."
10. Xiang Chong was the only commander to bring his forces home intact after the disastrous campaign against the Southland.
11. Slightly amended, following the text in Zhuge Liang's biography in the SGZ, p. 920.
12. Mao's introductory note says: "The Gangmu headline reads, 'The Han prime minister, Zhuge Liang, lord of Wuxiang, orders the army to wage just war on Wei. ' Thus, this memorial first expresses the great principle [dayi] of smiting the traitor [Cao clan]." According to the Wei calendar, it was the third month of Tai He (Grand Harmony) or a. d. 227. The Wei reign title changed with the accession of the new emperor, Cao Rui.
13. Qiao Zhou was the mentor of Chen Shou, author of the SGZ.
14. These offices mainly replicate the Han bureaucracy; most bureaucratic innovations were made in the Wei kingdom.
15. The fourth or fifth day of May in a. d. 227.
16. According to Pei Songzhi's interlinear note to the biography of Li Yan, citing Chen Shou's Zhuge Liang ji (SGZ, p. 999), Li Yan urged Zhuge Liang to assume the Nine Dignities (i. e., become king, or wang). Zhuge Liang rejected the idea and reiterated his dedication to the Second Emperor. On the awarding of the Nine Dignities to Cao Cao, see chapter 61 n. 5; on the awarding of the Nine Dignities to Sun Quan, see chapter 82.
17. Xiahou Yuan died in battle in a. d. 218 when Liu Bei drove Cao Cao's forces from Hanzhong.
CHAPTER 92
1. Summer, the fourth month of the fifth year of the Shu-Han reign period Jian Xing (a. d. 227) (TS, p. 885).
2. Cao Cao's son-in-law.
3. I. e., Chang'an.
4. Wei Yan is a character of particular importance for understanding the last years of Kongming's career as well as the events after his death. Liu Bei had made him responsible for Hanzhong, or "East Riverlands," the crucial region between Shu and Guanzhong, and he knew the terrain well. See Shen Bojun, "Lun Wei Yan," in LWJ, p. 176.
5. Mao (introductory note): "In this chapter we find the military exploits of Zhao Zilong, which are the 'consummation of his purposes. ' What does this phrase mean? When the First Ruler assumed the throne, Zhao Zilong urged him to attack Wei at once. When the First Ruler attacked Wu [instead], he put Zhao Zilong in the rear because his heart was not in waging war on Wu. But in the campaign against Wei, Kongming put Zhao Zilong in the van because the warrior's heart was in it."
6. Mao (introductory note): "In Jiang Wei the Riverlands had someone who ultimately took up arms against the Wei as an heir to Kongming's policy. Even before Kongming's Qishan campaigns against the Wei, the author inserts the man who will campaign against the Wei [after the six Qishan campaigns]. Intending later to use a character positively, the author introduces him in a negative light—as an enemy of the Riverlands in the service of the Wei.... Thus, we come to a realization of the author's method of narrative organization."
CHAPTER 93
1. Mao (introductory note): "Kongming used Jiang Wei's mother to control him in much the same way that Cao Cao used Shan Fu's mother to control him. But Cao Cao forged the mother's letter to lure the son; Kongming did not have to forge a letter.... Shan Fu yielded only to his mother, but not to Cao Cao. Jiang Wei yields not only to his mother, but also to Kongming."
2. Imperial and nonimperial locutions are mixed here. Three Kingdoms refers here to Cao Rui as zhu (ruler) instead of di or tianzi (emperor), and uses his ming (name) in order to deny his universal (tianxia) legitimacy.
3. Wang Lang's death is dated by the ZZTJ to the second year of Tai He, eleventh month, i. e., late 228 or early 229. The cause and circumstances are not mentioned, but it is unlikely that he accompanied Cao Zhen on this campaign. Indeed, judging from the ZZTJ as well as Cao Zhen's biography (SGZ, p. 281), the revolt of the three towns is followed directly by the crucial defeat of Kongming's picked commander Ma Su. Why has Luo Guanzhong interposed a dramatic rhetorical duel between Kongming and Wang Lang?
It was Wang Lang who, together with Hua Xin, persuaded Cao Pi to create the Wei regime; Lang's long years of loyal service to Han and Wei and his intrepid opposition to the "Shu traitors" (SGZ, p. 411) are detailed in his biography. Advancing his death one year and giving Kongming a memorable moral victory over the venerable Wei vassal perhaps cushions the humiliating defeat at Jieting—which came at a time of growing doubt in the Riverlands about Kongming's pursuit of Liu Bei's original quest.
CHAPTER 94
1. I. e., in February of a. d. 228.
2. The Palace of Enduring Peace was where Liu Bei had passed away.
3. Sanqi changshi is a Wei title. "The Qin dynasty appointed sanqi, detached cavalry, and chang-shi, regular attendants. The former rode behind the imperial carriage; the latter had personal access to the sovereign. Both offices were held in addition to another appointment [jia guan]. Early in the Eastern Han the position of sanqi was abolished, and all changshi positions were filled by eunuchs.
Now the sanqi has been reestablished and combined with the changshi to form one office whose function is to offer moral remonstrance, not to take charge of administrative business. "From note to ZZTJ, p. 2178, under Huang Chu 1, the first reign year for Cao Cao (a. d. 220).
4. Mao: "Meng Da's murder of Liu Feng is avenged." Sima Yi captured Xincheng and killed Meng Da between February 23 and March 23, a. d. 228.
5. Mao (introductory note): "Had the Wei ruler not employed Sima Yi again, Meng Da would have survived and the two capitals [Chang'an and Luoyang] could have been attacked. If the two capitals had been attacked, the Cao dynasty, Wei, could have been destroyed. That the dynasty was not destroyed then and there was Sima Yi's achievement. Nonetheless, the saving of Wei led directly to the usurping of Wei. So by using the Sima Yi to counter Han [Shu, or the Riverlands], the Wei barred the tiger at the front only to admit the wolf at the rear. At the outset of Sima Yi's renewed service to the Wei, the author introduces Yi's brave and forthright sons not, it would seem, because they aided the Wei, but rather because they foreshadow its doom."
Meng Da's last stand is treated differently in the PH (p. 133): Meng Da agrees to rejoin the Riverlands camp; Sima Yi marches against him. Meng Da writes Zhuge Liang for help; Zhuge Liang does not come. Meng Da writes Liang a second time; still he does not come. Meng Da realizes Zhuge Liang's purpose and speaks of falling into his trap; Meng Da hangs himself.
In the longer view, the civil wars between Wei and Shu created the conditions for Qiang and Di (another non-Han people) dominance in northern China in the fourth century.
CHAPTER 95
1. Mao (introductory note): "With this chapter the opposition between Sima Yi and Kongming begins. Engagement is in Kongming's interest; avoidance of battle works to Sima Yi's advantage."
2. Mao (introductory note): "The previous chapter told how Meng Da lost Shangyong by ignoring Kongming's advice. This chapter tells how Ma Su lost Jieting by ignoring Kongming's advice. The loss of Shangyong left Kongming without hope of advancing. The loss of Jieting nearly left him without a place of retreat. Why? Without Jieti
ng, Yangping Pass was not secure. If Yangping Pass was not safe, advance became fruitless and retreat costly.... Thus, Nan'an, Anding, and Tianshui had to be sacrificed; Winnow Basket Gorge had to be evacuated; and the stores at Xicheng had to be removed. The previous victories, from the capture of Xiahou Mao... to the defeat of Cao Zhen [all that Kongming had achieved since returning from the southern expedition against the Man] now came to naught. Alas."
The Zi-Wu Gorge was a passage cut in the Wang Mang era across the Southern or Qinling Mountains, which divide Guanzhong from Hanzhong to the south. See Pan Ku [Ban Gu], History of the Former Han Dynasty, trans. Homer H. Dubs (Baltimore: The Waverly Press, 1938-55), 3: 212.
The historical Sima Yi was not at the western front for the "vacant city ruse" but at the more important southern front with the Southland. Sima Yi did not come to the western front until Kongming's fourth offensive (see chap. 100). The fictional tradition tends to attach more importance to the Wei-Shu conflict than to the Wei-Wu conflict, and Three Kingdoms accordingly builds up the Kongming-Sima Yi rivalry and the events of a. d. 228.
CHAPTER 96
1. Gun was executed for failing to control the floods, but his son Yu (or Great Yu), mastered the waters and subsequently succeeded Shun as emperor. The SGZ (p. 984) says that Ma Su died in prison. Historically, the defeat at Jieting may have cost Kongming a speedy conquest of Chang'an. The defeat resulted directly from his assignment of Jieting's defense to Ma Su. In making this assignment, Kongming not only went against Liu Xuande's warning about Ma Su; he also ignored the majority of his advisers who had argued that Wei Yan, not Ma Su, be given authority to defend Jieting. Ma Su was the younger brother of Ma Liang, with whom Kongming had had an extremely close relationship; see the note by Pei Songzhi, SGZ, p. 983.
2. In 206 b. c., at the start of his campaign against Xiang Yu, Liu Bang needed to slip his forces past Chencang. To help Liu Bang accomplish this maneuver, Han Xin built a cliffside plank road that diverted Xiang Yu's attention, allowing Liu Bang to reach his destination. See SJ, "Gao Zu benji."
3. Yangzhou was the official Han (and now Wei) provincial name for the Southland region.
4. Huan was the main city of Lujiang, a district which was the center of a long strip of Southland territory above the Yangzi. The northern part of Lujiang was in Wei hands.
5. Lu Xun was renowned for foiling Liu Bei's invasion of the Southland (chap. 84).
CHAPTER 97
1. The triumph at Hanshui refers to Zilong's rescue of Kongming. On the eve of the battle at Red Cliffs, Zilong picked up Kongming and ferried him out of the Southland. For the rescue of the Second Emperor (Ah Dou), see chapter 41.
2. This refers to the early years of Emperor Xian's reign; Liu Yao was made inspector of Yangzhou in a. d. 194. A few lines below, the translation follows the TS (p. 936), which reads Sun Ce, not Sun Quan.
3. Mao (introductory note): "The first petition was to guide Liu Shan, the second petition to answer critics.... The first petition concerned itself with domestic issues, the second with external affairs."
Many scholars doubt the authenticity of Kongming's second petition, in part because Zhao Zilong's death is dated in his SGZ biography to the following year. The document is preserved in the Han Jin chunqiu of Xi Zuochi, via Pei Songzhi's notes to the SGZ (p. 923). Neither the SGZ itself nor the Wen xuan includes it; Sima Guang, however, places it in the ZZTJ under the year a. d. 228. Ma Zhijie, "Hou chu shi biao de zuozhe wenti," attributes the piece to Zhuge Liang's nephew, Zhuge Ke; see Wen shi, no. 17 (1983): 264-69. Also see Zhuge Ke's biography in the SGZ, especially p. 1435.
The Cong and the Sou, mentioned a few lines below, are non-Han peoples who come from the Ba and Shu regions, respectively, of the Riverlands. The Black Qiang were named for the color of their clothing.
4. Dated in the TS to the eleventh month of Jian Xing 6 (between December 14, a. d. 228, and January 12, a. d. 229). Mao (introductory note): "Since the defeat at Jieting and the execution of Ma Su, voices in the Riverlands had been raised in favor of maintaining peace in the kingdom and opposing the war against Wei. Kongming, however, held that only by waging war against Wei could peace in the Riverlands be made secure."
5. Mao: "Sima Yi is a fine judge of men if this is the kind he recommends."
6. Mao: "Ma Su could not hold Jieting with thirty thousand; but Hao Zhao held Chencang with three thousand—because Jieting had no wall and Chencang did."
7. Mao: "Sima Yi took Jieting, but Kongming could not take Chencang. The reason lies in the difference between the defenders as well as the site." Chencang commands the middle section of the Wei River; farther west, Tianshui and then Nan'an command the river's western end.
8. Mao (introductory note): " Zhou Fang 'surrendered' to Wei, and Cao Xiu believed him. Jiang Wei 'surrendered' to Wei, and Cao Zhen believed him. The incidents are analogous, except that Zhou Fang 'surrendered' by letter and in person, Jiang Wei only by letter....
"Meng Da gave allegiance to Shu as a man of Shu, and Kongming believed him. Jiang Wei gave allegiance to Wei as a man of Wei, and Cao Zhen believed him. The incidents are analogous, except that Kongming judged rightly, Cao Zhen wrongly. Meng Da's surrender was genuine, but his plan failed; Jiang Wei's surrender was false, but his plan worked. In this respect the incidents are not analogous."
CHAPTER 98
1. It was not the third day of the cycle (bingyin), but the thirty-third (bingshen), according to the SGZ (p. 1134). Achilles Fang equates it to June 23, a. d. 229; see Ssu-ma Kuang [Sima Guang], The Chronicle of the Three Kingdoms, trans. and annot. Achilles Fang, Harvard-Yenching Institute Studies, no. 6 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952-65), 1: 291.
2. From "Imperial [huang, yellow] Might" to "Imperial Dragon."
3. Zhuge Ke, a nephew of Zhuge Liang, is often supposed to be the author of Kongming's "Second Petition on Taking the Field" (chap. 97) because it resembles Ke's polemic against Wei, the "Zheng Wei lun." See SGZ, p. 1134; see also chap. 97, n. 3. Zhuge Ke's anti-Wei militance and Sun Quan's anti-Wei leadership come through more sharply in the historical than in the fictional traditions.
4. Zhuge Ke alludes here to Zhang Zhao's long record of favoring accommodation with the north (note his conflict with Zhou Yu before the battle at Red Cliffs). The reference to Jiang Ziya, the military leader who guided the Zhou dynasty founder to power, emphasizes Zhang Zhao's timidity.
5. In the TS (p. 951), Sima Yi begins with these words: "Years before, Sun Quan defended Wu from below the Great River with help from no one. He was satisfied [to hold his region] and harbored no further ambition. After that, when Lu Xun took Jingzhou, Sun Quan said he had gone too far. Now, however, Sun Quan has declared himself emperor, but his people remain uneasy. He will not dare to risk military action."
6. Mao: "Not wanting the Emperor to reclaim the seal but wanting Cao Zhen instead to yield the seal on his own demonstrates Sima Yi's skill in handling Cao Zhen. Not waiting for the Emperor to confer the seal but saying instead, 'I'll go for it myself, ' demonstrates Sima Yi's contempt for the Emperor."
7. Mao (introductory note): "The descriptions of Kongming's seven captures and seven releases of Meng Huo form a sequence, and herein lies their genius. The descriptions of Kongming's six offensives from the Qishan hills are not connected however, and therein lies their genius. Between the first and second offensives comes Lu Xun's defeat of Wei.... Between the second and third, Sun Quan declares himself emperor.... We often find that the Zuo zhuan narratives concerning a particular kingdom branch out to include narratives of other kingdoms, thus providing richer detail. And Sima Qian's Shi ji often branches out to lateral events in a particular narrative, thus making its accounts fuller. Three Kingdoms holds it own with those great histories.
"Among [the rulers of] the three kingdoms, Sun Quan was the last to declare himself emperor. Why? Because circumstances barred it. Sun Quan did not declare himself emperor while Cao Cao still lived simply because Cao Cao would have used the authority of Emperor
Xian to attack him. When Cao Pi declared himself emperor, Sun Quan could have done so too, but with Shu attacking Wu, such a rash move would have added strength to the attackers and cut off aid from Wei. But once Shu befriended Wu, and Wei separated from Wu; once Shu felt pressure from Wei, and Wei suffered defeat by Shu, then Sun Quan seized the chance to become the Son of Heaven....
"Wu had acknowledged itself a vassal to Wei and received the Nine Dignities from Wei because Wu was seeking Wei's aid in attacking Shu. But once Sun Quan declared himself emperor, Wu and Wei could never cooperate again.... This meant the isolation of Wu as well as Wei. Thus, Kongming's plan to befriend Wu may be rightly regarded as a plan to devour Wu."
Sometime in July of a. d. 229, "the leader of the Southland and the representative of Han [i. e., Shu] formally divided the territory of Wei between them. The treaty assigned Yuzhou, Qingzhou, Xuzhou, and Youzhou to the south; and Yanzhou, Jizhou, Bingzhou, and Liangzhou to Han. The administrative district [i. e., the sizhou, the territory that contained the two capitals] was divided at Hangu Pass" (ZZTJ, p. 2254). The account of this agreement in the SGZ (p. 1134) is even fuller and depicts Sun Quan personally dividing the territory of Wei. A trace of this agreement between Wu and Shu remains in the TS (p. 949); no indication whatever remains in the Mao edition of this formal acceptance by Shu-Han of Wu's equal sovereignty. However, the primary southern source, the "Wuzhu zhuan" (Life of Sun Quan), contains the text of this "Han-Wu" covenant. (Clearly, the Riverlands—Shu—called itself Han. ) The covenant is based on a common moral denunciation of the third Wei emperor, Cao Rui, for stealing power in the manner of Cao Pi, and it concludes with a provision for mutual military assistance (SGZ, pp. 1134-35). The personal preeminence of Sun Quan, uncontested after Liu Bei's death, is expressed in these pages of the SGZ.
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