by Keren Arbel
To offer a theory regarding these questions, let me begin by restating briefly the arguments concerning the disadvantages and limits of discursive thinking that were made in the previous chapter. These arguments are the basis and foundation for understanding the liberative value of the second jhāna. They also assist in interpreting the terms samādhi and ekodibhāvaṃ in the context of the jhānas.
I Introduction
In the previous chapter, I suggested that, ultimately, discursive thinking has serious limitations from a Buddhist perspective. Discursive thinking is a mental process that interprets experience based upon previous proclivities, misconceptions, desires and will. According to early Buddhist epistemology, the process of thinking can be said to be ‘on top’ of the process of perceiving and naming (saññā) that which we experience3 (although perception itself can be distorted).4 I have pointed out that although discursive thinking is useful in the preliminary stages of developing insight, it also has serious disadvantages according to the Nikāyas. Even when thinking is wholesome, it has a relative value in the context of Buddhist liberation theory.5 I have argued that thinking is a manifestation of the sense of self; it is that which sustains, at least, the grossest sense of ‘me’ and ‘I’. In other words, the notions ‘I am’, ‘this is mine’ and ‘this is myself’ are certain types of thoughts – thoughts with which we mistakenly identify and from which we interact with the world in a misconceived manner.6 According to Buddhist psychology, this mistaken identification is that which causes suffering.7 Therefore, I have suggested that experiencing the cessation of thinking when transitioning from the first jhāna to the second, lends insight into the origin and nature of the misconceived sense of self and the emptiness of thoughts. The cessation of the thinking process – accompanied by the observation of this cessation – is an important realization for loosening attachment and clinging to subjective experience and to a ‘thinker’. I suggested that after one has seen the advantages, disadvantages and limits of the thinking process, by seeing directly its origination and cessation,8 thinking will no longer have the same delusive power.
II The transition from the first jhāna to the second
From the perspective of the Nikāyas’ meditation theory, the progression from the first jhāna to the second jhāna allows the practitioner to further establish mindfulness and develop insight into the true nature of experience. I propose viewing the transition from one jhāna to the next as a manifestation of insight into the nature of mind. I would argue that the fading away of thoughts and reflections is the actualization of loosening attachment to them; this is achieved by not following the trajectory of thoughts. Thoughts are sustained by a continual identification with their content. Once one sees thoughts as they are – that is, penetrates their impermanent nature and lack of inherent existence, thereby seeing directly that they are not ‘me’, ‘mine’ or ‘myself’ (AN II.45) – thoughts are abandoned. In other words, only when one does not goad thoughts through identification, and does not nourish the thinking mind to sustain a sense of existence (bhava) and worthiness, can thoughts be naturally stilled. When they are stilled in this way (contrary to their stilling by vigorous one-pointed concentration), their cessation has a liberative value.9 This is implied in the description of the second jhāna from the Dantabhūmi Sutta. Also, a beautiful verse from the Udāna emphasizes this process; when one does not follow out thoughts, thoughts cease:
Trivial thoughts, subtle thoughts,
when followed, they stir up the mind.
Not understanding these thoughts,
one runs here and there,
the mind out of control.
But understanding thoughts,
one who is ardent, mindful,
restrains them.
When, followed, they stir up the mind,
one who is awakened
abandons them without a trace.10
The second jhāna is also essential for properly establishing mindfulness. As pointed out by Rupert Gethin, the texts distinguish between the initial stages of the establishing of mindfulness, which are preparatory in nature, and the proper establishing of mindfulness. He has observed that
[i]n order to practice the satipaṭṭhānas the bhikkhu requires concentration; in order to acquire concentration he practices the satipaṭṭhānas. Stated without paradox, this means that the texts distinguish between the initial stages of the establishing of mindfulness, which are preparatory in nature, and the establishing of mindfulness proper.11
Observation of the four satipaṭṭhānas can and should be practiced in various stages of the path. It should be practiced from the outset, when the mind has not yet abandoned the hindrances or developed fully the seven factors of awakening. This level of observation is preparatory in nature, but it also that which allows the practitioner to develop discernment (viveka);12 this quality aids the process of purifying the mind from the various unwholesome states, thereby slanting into the attainment of the first jhāna. 13 In the previous chapter, I showed that abiding in the first jhāna enables one to observe the four satipaṭṭhānas without being hindered by mental proliferation and unwholesome states. Nevertheless, the Buddha clearly states that observing the four satipaṭṭhānas in the first jhāna is still preliminary. Mindfulness is established and fulfilled properly only when one enters and abides in the second jhāna (and presumably when one abides in the third and fourth jhānas). This kind of observation is depicted clearly in the Dantabhūmi Sutta:
[C]ome bhikkhu, abide observing the body as the body but do not think thoughts connected with the body; abide observing feelings as feelings but do not think thoughts connected with feelings; abide observing mind as mind but do not think thoughts connected with the mind; abide observing dhammas as dhammas but do not think thoughts connected with dhammas. With the stilling of thoughts and reflections he enters upon and abides in the second jhāna. 14
This passage explains the initial difference between observing the four satipaṭṭhānas when one abides in the first jhāna and the observing the four satipaṭṭhānas while one abides in the second jhāna. It also elucidates how the transition between the two occurs: when the practitioner does not react or cling to experience by thinking and commenting about it, thoughts fade away, and one enters naturally into the second jhāna.
Whereas the Theravāda tradition explains the entrance into each jhāna as a process of concentrating on the paṭibhāga nimitta (‘counterpart sign’),15 this sutta connects the attainment of the jhānas with perfecting the practice of observing experience (what is traditionally called vipassanā meditation). It is interesting to note that the account from the Dantabhūmi Sutta also indicates clearly that one does not emerge from each of the jhānas for the sake of contemplating the jhāna factors; rather, one actually observes phenomena while in the jhānas. 16
Thus, it is plausible to argue that the second jhāna, along with the following two, are the optimal states for seeing experience clearly. They are the actualization of developing insight (vipassanā) and wisdom (paññā). In the first jhāna, the practitioner observes phenomena without being hindered by the nīvaraṇas (or any other unwholesome states that obstruct wisdom);17 in the second jhāna, the practitioner observes phenomena without being hindered by conceptual thinking, mental interpretation and intentionality. As observed before, thinking might be beneficial in certain stages of the path, but it also filters our perception of reality by interpreting what is being experienced according to conditioned tendencies, views and memories. In just the same way, while intention can be wholesome and directed to wholesome action, it also implies that there is a preference towards something; this is a movement of becoming (bhava). In the first jhāna, this intentionality is wholesome, that is, one’s intentions are directed to the correct path to awakening. However, the second jhāna is where kusala saṅkappa (wholesome intentions) cease without a remainder (aparisesā nirujjhanti).18 Importantly, according to Buddhist philosophy, wholesome intentions create kamma19 and yi
eld the fruit of upadhi (the substrate for existence and dukkha), just as unwholesome intentions do.20 This seems to be the reason why wholesome intentions must cease for attaining liberation. A mind with no intention, an unmovable mind, resembles the mind of a liberated person21 – one who does not create kamma. I would also suggest that the cessation of intention, accomplished while one is abiding in the three higher jhānas, de-conditions the tendencies to prefer, to like and to dislike.
To sum up this point, the Dantabhūmi Sutta delineates the way one transitions and progresses from the first jhāna to the next and correlates this transition with the development of insight and the establishing and grounding of mindfulness (sati).
III Samādhi and vipassanā
The fading away of vitakka and vicāra seems to be the proximate cause for entering into the second jhāna. The cessation of discursive thinking is also the condition for the arising of three mental qualities that were not present in the mind prior to entering into the second jhāna. These are samādhi, ajjhattaṃ sampasādanaṃ (‘inner stillness’) and cetaso ekodibhāvaṃ (‘unification of mind’). These three factors are obviously related and indicate a certain quality of mind that cannot manifest when discursive thinking (not perception) is still active. From this supposition, two interesting questions arise: do samādhi and ekodibhāvaṃ designate a one-pointed concentration, that is, a one-pointed absorption in which the mind is disconnected from sense experience? Or perhaps these terms indicate a spacious and open mind, a quality of mind that allows one to perceive experience without being obscured by likes and dislikes, interpretation, aversion and wanting?
The assumption that samādhi designates a one-pointed concentration of mind is founded upon the common dichotomy, which I would argue is misconceived, between samatha meditation and vipassanā meditation. According to this dichotomy, samatha meditation is described as means for attaining samādhi through one-pointed concentration, and vipassanā meditation is described as means for attaining insight by observing the changing phenomenal field.
Here, I would merely like to emphasize again that the concept of ‘access concentration’ (upacāra samādhi) and the correlation of the jhānas with ‘absorption concentration’ (appaṇā samādhi) are both products of the commentarial tradition. In the Nikāyas, there is no mention whatsoever of this classification of two types of samādhi together with the view that the jhānas are not necessary for liberation (since upacāra samādhi is enough for insight practice and for the attainment of liberation). Furthermore, Buddhaghosa’s classification and systematization of the path into sīla, samādhi and paññā led to the view that the development of samādhi is not the outcome of insight (although it might be a basis for insight practice) or the manifestation of insight. Those who embrace Buddhaghosa’s structure of the Buddhist path fully22 will also ascertain that one can achieve samādhi (i.e., attain the jhānas) by concentrating on various synthetic objects of meditation; such objects do not reveal anything about the nature of experience. Thus, the common interpretation of samādhi is that it is a mental quality which has nothing to do with the development of insight into the true nature of phenomena,23 although it can be used, if wished, as a basis for insight practice.24
This sort of interpretation of samādhi (and the jhānas) seems to derive from two preconceptions. The first assumption is the notion that genuine Buddhist practice is a conceptual reflection upon basic categories of Buddhist doctrine.25 The second assumption is the view that vipassanā mediation, as Buddhist practice par excellence, does not lead to the ‘cessation of normal intellectual operations’26 since this is not the aim of Buddhist meditation. We can see that these assumptions are interconnected and place great emphasis on the power and significance of discursive thinking for attaining the Buddhist summum bonum. Therefore, for one who holds the preceding views about the nature of Buddhist practice and goal, the first jhāna is still in accordance with this notion, while the second, third and fourth jhānas are at odds with it.
Contrary to the aforementioned assumptions, we have seen in our analysis that according to the Nikāyas the attainment of the first two jhānas enables mindfulness (sati) to be further developed and established. I have also postulated, based on textual analysis, that the jhānas themselves exemplify the optimal state for observing phenomena clearly and directly. Moreover, although the practice of vipassanā27 as the practice of observing the four satipaṭṭhānas does partially employ concepts and propositions of Buddhist doctrine in its preliminary stages, it is quite problematic to assert that the practice of observing these four categories of experience always involves conceptual thinking.
We are left, then, with the need to offer an alternative interpretation of the term samādhi, as it appears in relation to the jhānas and the earlier argument. Rethinking and re-interpreting the meaning of such an important term might assist in understanding the correlation between path elements, which can appear irreconcilable when one holds the preceding conceptions about the Buddhist path. For this study, two applications of the term samādhi are relevant. The first refers specifically to a quality of mind that arises when vitakka and vicāra fade away, specifically when one enters into the second jhāna. The second is sammā-samādhi, which is one of the factors of the Eightfold Path. I would suggest that the former signifies the development of the samādhi bojjhaṅga (‘awakening factor’) and the initial development of sammā-samādhi; in contrast, sammā-samādhi refers to the situation where one attains the fourth and final jhāna and fulfils the seven factors of awakening as ‘awakening factors’ (bojjhaṅgas). In other words, the concept of sammā-samādhi contains within it the previous development of the samādhi bojjhaṅga together with the purification (parisuddhi) and fulfilment of the other awakening factors, most importantly, sati and upekkhā.
Although sammā-samādhi refers to the attainment of the four jhānas as a whole, I have decided to discuss it in this chapter, since this chapter is dedicated to the concept of samādhi in the jhāna attainments. Here, I have two primary objectives. First, I show that the presence of samādhi (and ekodibhāvaṃ) in the second jhāna is the actualization of insight. I contend that these two qualities express the ability of the mind to know experience directly. Second, I will argue that sammā-samādhi symbolizes the fulfilment of the Eightfold Path and the ability to perceive the nature of phenomena, meaning that no phenomena is viewed or grasped at, as ‘me’ or ‘mine’.
I want to preface this discussion by highlighting two interesting observations made by Stuart Sarbacker and Anne Klein; these observations will be echoed in my analysis and interpretation of the next three jhānas. Sarbacker has observed that the mind, according to both Buddhist and Hindu texts, can be knowing and discriminative despite being non-discursive.28 Following his observation, I hope to show that in the Nikāyas, both the quality of samādhi, which manifests in the second jhāna, and the concept of sammā-samādhi denote this type of non-discursive awareness. This is contrary to the common interpretation of samādhi as onepointed concentration that has nothing to do with insight. Second, I believe that Klein’s observation that there are ‘degrees’ of conditioning is pertinent to our discussion and very sensitive and insightful with regard to the process of Buddhist meditation. Klein suggests that the grey area between the conditioned and the unconditioned is mental quiescence which is ‘an ameliorating connection between these two oppositionally framed categories’.29 I would suggest that the jhānas, as sammā-samādhi, 30 function as such a connection. Samādhi describes a quality of mind that although conditioned, aids the process of de-conditioning, thereby allowing the mind to perceive phenomena without being tinged by tendencies, preferences and ‘self-view’. This will demonstrate further that the dichotomy between samatha (as the jhānas) and vipassanā (as the four satipaṭṭhānas) has no firm basis in close textual analysis; all the more so, the view that the jhānas are a separate meditation technique, not required for attaining liberation, is unfounded. Hopefully, this will offer insight into the
vision of liberation and the potentiality of mind according to the Pāli Nikāyas.
IV Samādhi, ekodibhāvaṃ, sati and paññā
In the Nikāyas, the compound sammā-samādhi refers specifically to the attainment of the four jhānas as a whole:
And what, friend, is right samādhi? Here, separated from the desire for sensual pleasures, separated from [other] unwholesome states, a bhikkhu enters upon and abides in the first jhāna, which is [mental] joy and [bodily] pleasure born of viveka, accompanied by thought and reflection. With the stilling of thought and reflection, a bhikkhu enters upon and abides in the second jhāna, which is [mental] joy and [bodily] pleasure born of samādhi, inner stillness and unification of mind, without thought and reflection. With the fading away of [mental] joy, a bhikkhu abides in equanimity, mindful and fully aware. [Still] experiencing pleasure with the body, he enters upon and abides in the third jhāna, on account of which noble ones announce: ‘abiding in pleasure, one is equanimous and mindful’. With the abandoning of pleasure and pain, and with the previous disappearance of joy and grief, a bhikkhu enters upon and abides in the fourth jhāna, which is neitherpainful-nor-pleasurable, and has purity of mindfulness and equanimity. This is called right samādhi. 31
The Mahācattārīsaka Sutta clarifies that sammā-samādhi is a quality achieved by the support and development of the other seven factors of the Eightfold Path:
Bhikkhus I shall teach you noble right samādhi with its support and requisites… What bhikkhus is noble right samādhi with its support and requisites, that is, right view, right intention, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right effort, and right mindfulness? Unification of mind equipped with these seven factors is called noble right samādhi with its support and requisites.32