by Keren Arbel
Given this basic definition, it can be suggested that ‘gladness based on renunciation’ is gladness that arises from knowing experience as it is (and not from pleasant experiences). I would suggest that this type of wholesome mental gladness is similar in nature to jhānic pīti. If we recall our discussion on pīti of the first two jhānas, the Buddha explains that it is like the fire that burns independent on fuel.17 That is, pīti of the first two jhānas arises due to clear seeing of reality and is not dependent on the obtainment of desired experiences or objects. This is similar to the way ‘somanassa based on renunciation’ is described: when one sees the true nature of sense experience, one experiences mental gladness that is not connected to specific pleasurable experiences and is not associated with any unwholesome states such as desire and clinging. Thus, both jhānic pīti and ‘somanassa based on renunciation’ describe a joyful wholesome mental state that originates from insight into the nature of experience.18 Interestingly, both jhānic pīti and ‘somanassa based on renunciation’ cease when one enters into the third jhāna. The reason seems to be that these two mental factors enliven the mind to such an extent that upekkhā cannot be fully obvious and strong. This again suggests that ‘somanassa based on renunciation’ might be another designation for jhānic pīti or perhaps very similar mental state.
According to the Saḷāyatanavibhanga Sutta, ‘discontent based on worldly life’ arises when one desires unobtainable delightful and gratifying sense experiences. In other words, this type of discontent arises when one desires what is unreliable, impermanent and subject to change.19 On the contrary, ‘discontent based on renunciation’ is discontent that arises from seeing with wisdom that sense experiences are impermanent, not worth holding on to. The sutta explains that when this insight arises, it arouses longing for ‘supreme liberations’ (anuttaresu vimokkhesu). This longing conditions the arising of ‘discontent based on renunciation’; it is discontent that arises due to clear seeing of the disadvantage of sense experiences and as it originates from wisdom, it is devoid of aversion.
The question relevant for our discussion is what kind of discontent is present in the attainment of the first jhāna and ceases in the attainment of the second jhāna? From reading the description of the jhānic process depicted in the Cūḷavedalla Sutta, it is evident that the type of discontent that arises when one attains the first jhāna is what the Saḷāyatanavibhanga Sutta calls ‘discontent based on renunciation’. This is clear from the almost verbatim depiction of jhānic domanassa from the Cūḷavedalla Sutta to the description of ‘domanassa based on renunciation’ from the Saḷāyatanavibhanga Sutta. In the Cūḷavedalla Sutta the wise nun Dhammdinnā explains to Visākha:
Here friend Visākha, separated from the desire for sensual pleasures, separated from [other] unwholesome states, a bhikkhu enters upon and abides in the first jhāna, which is joy and [bodily] pleasure born of viveka, accompanied by thought and reflection… Here a bhikkhu considers thus: ‘when shall I enter upon and abide in that base that the noble ones now enter upon and abide in’? In one who thus generates a longing for supreme liberations, discontent arises with that longing as condition. With that he abandons aversion, and the underlying tendency to aversion does not underlie that.20
It is obvious that both the Cūḷavedalla Sutta and the Saḷāyatanavibhanga Sutta describe the same type of discontent: (1) it is discontent that arises when one abandons the unwholesome; (2) it is conditioned by the arising of wholesome longing for liberation, longing that arises when one understands the unreliable nature of sense experience. The two accounts actually complement one another. The Saḷāyatanavibhanga Sutta points out clearly that this type of discontent or better put, sadness. Arises from seeing the nature of sense experiences,21 while the Cūḷavedalla Sutta connects the arising of this wholesome discontent or sadness with the attainment of the jhānas. The latter also associates this type of discontent with the abandonment of aversion. This is an interesting and important point, especially for understanding the liberative value of the jhānas. It points out that discontent that arises from ignorance (i.e., from holding on to impermanent delightful sense experiences) leads to the arising of aversion when these experiences fade away or cannot be obtained. Grieving about the passing away of desired experiences or from not obtaining what one desires arouses and perpetuates the arising of aversion. However, when one realizes with proper wisdom that everything is transient, suffering and subject to change, one arouses longing for liberation, longing that conditions the arising of wholesome discontent or sadness; this, in turn, conditions the abandonment of aversion (paṭigha) as a result of this insight.
What all this means is that jhānic discontent is beneficial for two reasons: first, it is discontent that motivates a person to carry on the effort to become liberated by acknowledging that true happiness cannot arise dependent on sense experience. Second and relatedly, this wholesome discontent aids in the abandonment of aversion since it originates from clear seeing of the unreliability of phenomena. When this type of discontent arises in the mind, obvious and latent aversion is not present.22 For our investigation it is of interest to note the following: according to the Cūḷavedalla Sutta, this type of discontent or sadness – discontent which the Saḷāyatanavibhanga Sutta calls ‘discontent based on renunciation’ – arises when one enters into the first jhāna and as the Aviparītaka Sūtra states, this type of discontent, ceases when one attains the second jhāna.23
III Upekkhā
We already established that somanassa and domanassa ‘based on renunciation’ can be seen as parallel designations for jhānic somanassa and domanassa, namely, wholesome gladness and discontent that arise from insight into the nature of sense experience. Following this, it is plausible to further argue that ‘upekkhā based on renunciation’ must be another title for jhānic upekkhā (and upekkhā-sambojjhaṅga). Yet, this identification might be problematic when we compare the analysis from the Saḷāyatanavibhanga Sutta with a description from the Potaliya Sutta.
But before setting about discussing this problem, let us first examine the analysis from the Saḷāyatanavibhanga Sutta, which further differentiates ‘upekkhā based on renunciation’ into two types: The first is ‘upekkhā that is diversified, based on diversity’ (upekkhā nānattā nānattasitā), and the second is ‘upekkhā that is unified, based on unity’ (upekkhā ekattā ekattasitā).24 According to the Saḷāyatanavibhanga Sutta, ‘upekkhā based on diversity’ is upekkhā regarding forms, sounds, odours, flavours and tangibles,25 while ‘upekkhā based on unity’ is upekkhā regarding the four arūpa samāpattis.26 This distinction is important since it seems to imply that while ‘upekkhā based on renunciation and unity’ concerns the four arūpa samāpattis, ‘upekkha based on renunciation and diversity’ is upekkhā that is present in the jhānas.
This identification between upekkha based on renunciation and diversity and upekkhā of the jhānas is not trivial; it touches upon the nature of the fourth jhāna and its liberative value. It raises the question of whether the fourth jhāna is onepointed meditative absorption, disconnected from sense experience and therefore not necessary for the attainment of awakening, or whether the fourth jhāna is a broad field of awareness, non-discursive but in direct contact with the changing phenomenal field.
From what has been described and analyzed until now about the nature of the jhānas, it follows that upekkha based on renunciation and diversity should be seen as a different designation for jhānic upekkhā. This means that upekkhā of the (third) and fourth jhāna is based on diversity of sense experience and not on onepointed absorption. What I am arguing again is that the fourth jhāna (and the other three jhānas as well) are not disconnected from sense experience. On the contrary, these attainments arise from seeing the nature of experience clearly (vipassanā).
Yet, the identification of upekkha based on renunciation and diversity with the upekkhā of the fourth jhāna encounters a problem when we read the Potaliya Sutta. Contrary to the Saḷāya
tanavibhanga Sutta, the Potaliya Sutta proclaims that upekkhā based on diversity is associated with ignorance regarding the nature of sensual pleasures. For the Potaliya Sutta, a noble disciple should develop ‘upekkhā that is unified’; this is because it is only then that clinging (upādānā) to material things of the world (loka-āmisa) utterly ceases without a remainder.27 In other words, for the Potaliya Sutta, any upekkhā that is based on diversity of sense experience cannot be considered wholesome.
The discrepancy between the two suttas did not escape the eyes of the commentator on the Potaliya Sutta. The commentary states that since the Potaliya Sutta claims that upekkhā based on diversity is connected to unwholesome states of mind, upekkhā of the fourth jhāna must be upekkhā based on unity (MA III.43). Note that this statement reflects the traditional view that the jhānas are wholesome states of mind but also trance-like attainments, absorptions that are disconnected from sense experience. For the commentator on the Potaliya Sutta, upekkhā that arises in the jhānas must be a wholesome mental factor, but it also must be based on unity of perception and not on the diversity of sense experience.
Having said that, the account from the Potaliya Sutta and the commentator’s solution are problematic for two reasons: first, it contradicts the clear statement in the Saḷāyatanavibhanga Sutta that upekkhā based on unity is upekkhā regarding the four arūpa samāpattis.28 Moreover, this statement in the Saḷāyatanavibhanga Sutta seems more valid and reasonable than suggesting that upekkhā of the jhānas is based on unity. Contrary to the jhānas, the four arūpa samāpattis are states which transcend form (rūpa). That is to say, they transcend diversity (nānatta) of sense contact; therefore, they are said to be based on unity of perception. The association of upekkhā based on unity with the attainment of the arūpa samāpattis is also reinforced by a description from the Mahānidāna Sutta of the DN, which delineates the ‘seven stations of consciousness’. For our discussion, the portrayal of the ‘station of consciousness’ that corresponds to the first arūpa samāpatti is particularly relevant. The Mahānidāna Sutta states that those beings who reach ‘space that is infinite’ are those
[W]ho pass beyond all perception of form, by the vanishing of the perception of resistence and by non-attention to the perception of diversity (nānattasaññānaṃ).29
It is clear from this description that ‘the non-attention to the perception of diversity’ (nānattasaññānaṃ amanasikārā), which characterizes the first arūpa samāpatti (and all the other arūpa samāpattis as well), means that these attainments are based on unity (ekattasitā) of perception. In all the formless attainments, one passes beyond all perception of form (sabbaso rūpasaññānaṃ samatikkamā) by the disappearance of sense stimuli.30 This, of course, supports the Saḷāyatanavibhanga Sutta statement that upekkhā based on unity (upekkhā ekattā ekattasitā) refers to the attainment of the arūpa samāpattis (the formless attainments).
Given that, I will argue that what the Potaliya Sutta calls ‘upekkha based on diversity’ actually parallels what the Saḷāyatanavibhanga Sutta designates as ‘upekkha based on worldly life’,31 which is also based on diversity of sense experience but is rooted in ignorance. Thus, it should be justified in arguing that the type of upekkhā that is present in the jhānas, while fully perfected in the fourth jhāna, is ‘upekkha based on diversity [of experience] and renunciation (i.e., on insight into the nature of experience)’.
At this point, I want to draw out the implications and meanings of what we have discussed until now with regard to the nature of upekkhā in the fourth jhāna. In light of the preceding discussion, we can deduce three things about the nature of jhānic upekkhā: the first is that it arises from insight into the nature of sense experience. The second is that it becomes fully fulfilled only when somanassa and domanassa based on renunciation fade away. And the third is that this type of upekkhā goes beyond the six sense objects.32 Before offering an interpretation for the latter, which seems to me important and in need of clarification, I wish to first look at the description from the Saḷāyatanavibhanga Sutta of how this type of upekkhā becomes fully grounded and fulfilled (contrary to its mere arising). This will further aid in understanding the nature of jhānic upekkhā and the meaning of it being perfected in the fourth and final jhāna.
The Saḷāyatanavibhanga Sutta delineates a clear process of how wholesome qualities arise in dependence on the abandonment of unwholesome factors. However, it also points out how certain wholesome qualities are fulfilled only when certain other wholesome qualities are abandoned (this is contrary to wholesome qualities that can accompany each other to perfection, like sati and upekkhā). This process of abandonment is demonstrated by a concise utterance in the Saḷāyatanavibhanga Sutta: ‘by depending on this, abandon that’ (tatridaṃ nissāya idaṃ pajahathāti).33 The sutta explains this utterance by stating that depending on ‘gladness based on renunciation’ one abandons and surmounts ‘gladness based on worldly life’.34 The same holds for discontent and equanimity based on worldly life: they are abandoned by the arising of discontent and equanimity based on renunciation. The significance of this description is that it points out that through the actual arising of wholesome states of mind, one can abandon unwholesome states. This line of reasoning is similar to my argument about the spiritual significance of the first jhāna: experiencing jhānic pīti and sukha is that which enables one to abandon the desire for sense gratification (kāma). In other words, for entering into the first jhāna one has to cultivate insight regarding the nature of sense pleasure; however, only the actual experience of a different kind of pleasure and joy – one that is not connected to unwholesome states – enables the mind to let go of ingrained mental tendency to desire pleasurable sense experiences.
In the same way, the process of abandoning unbeneficial gladness, discontent and equanimity is initiated by the development of insight into the nature of sense experience but ends when their wholesome counterparts fully arise. That is, the complete abandonment of unwholesome gladness, discontent and equanimity seems to be brought about by the full expression and manifestation of wholesome gladness, discontent and equanimity. When these wholesome qualities are fully realized and grounded in the mind, unwholesome states cannot find footing anymore.
Nevertheless, for certain wholesome qualities to be fulfilled, certain other wholesome states must be surmounted. The Saḷāyatanavibhanga Sutta observes that for wholesome gladness to be fully experienced, wholesome discontent must be surmounted. Furthermore, for wholesome upekkhā to be fully fulfilled and grounded, wholesome gladness must be surmounted. This is a gradual and dependent process:
By depending and relying on the six kinds of gladness based on renunciation, abandon and surmount the six kinds of discontent based on renunciation. It is thus they are abandoned; it is thus they are surmounted. By depending and relying on the six kinds of equanimity based on renunciation, abandon and surmount the six kinds of gladness based on renunciation. It is thus they are abandoned; it is thus they are surmounted.35
This prescription/description construes a certain aspect of the jhānic process. It elucidates the statement that one of the conditions for entering into the fourth jhāna (where upekkhā is fulfilled and perfected) is that somanassa and domanassa must fade away. In other words, for upekkhā to become purified (i.e., fully grounded) one must surmount and abandon wholesome discontent and gladness. This sutta also corroborates the description from the Aviparītaka Sūtra that points out that the cessation of jhānic domanassa and somanassa is a gradual and conditioned process where domanassa ceases before somanassa, and both cease before one can attain the last two jhānas (where upekkhā is now obvious and strong). Furthermore, I suggest that this account implies that wholesome upekkhā can be present in conjunction with jhānic domanassa and somanassa, but it cannot be said to be fully perfected until they fade away.
Now we can turn to the final aspect of ‘upekkhā based on renunciation and diversity’ (i.e., jhānic upekkhā) as upekkhā tha
t ‘goes beyond the six sense objects’.36 This is an intriguing statement. What does it mean that one goes beyond (ativattati) forms, sounds, odours, flavours, tangibles and mental phenomena (dhamma) while not being disconnected from them? How can we understand this statement so it will take us one step further in deciphering the phenomenology of the fourth jhāna and its significance for the attainment of liberation?
I will begin this investigation by looking at the way the Saḷāyatanavibhanga Sutta describes ‘upekkhā based on worldly life’. Understanding the difference between the two types of upekkhā – that which is based on worldly life and that which is based on renunciation – will illuminate the statement that ‘upekkhā based on diversity and renunciation’ is grounded upon the diversity of sense experience but at the same time goes beyond them.
The Saḷāyatanavibhanga Sutta explains that upekkhā based on worldly life arises in
[A] foolish infatuated ordinary person who has not conquered [his] limits (anodhijinassa) and the fruit [of action] (avipākajinassa) and who is blind to the disadvantage [of sense experience]. Such equanimity as this, does not go beyond (nātivattati) form’ etc.37