by Keren Arbel
For example, Schmithausen argues that even though the fourfold insight into the āsavas and the realization of the Four Truths are both probably old and were incorporated into the text at the time of composition,39 there are problems with this theory if ‘we try to understand it as referring to a psychologically plausible process’.40 According to Schmithausen, it is hardly conceivable that knowledge of the Four Truths would have a direct psychological effect in eradicating craving or the āsavas.41 Instead, he suggests that insight into the Four Truths was considered as having an effect on the destruction of craving, possibly because of influences from Vedic beliefs in the magical powers of truth and knowledge.42 In Schmithausen’s view, passages in which the Four Truths lead to liberating insight are not ‘the original account of enlightenment’.43
Bronkhorst offers an argument with the same line of thought. He argues that the description of liberation that depicts a realization of the Four Truths does not fit the description of the Four Truths with reference to the āsavas (the recognition of the āsavas, their origin, their cessation and the path leading to their cessation).44 This is because ‘the connection between their knowledge and the destruction of the intoxicants is not clear’.45 He further suggests that the Four Truths were added later in order to explain Buddhist liberating insight (paññā/prajñā) to other traditions. Bronkhorst points out that while other śramaṇas acknowledged liberation in life when one realizes the nature of the self (ātman), the Buddhists did not;46 therefore, the tradition inserted the Four Truths in place of the term paññā wherever possible in order to explain what is meant by liberating insight.47 Following Schmithausen’s line of reasoning, Bronkhorst has also argued that the destruction of the āsavas by paññā and the identification of paññā with the Four Truths cannot be reconciled;48 he maintains that the Four Truths are actually useful knowledge for the Buddhist aspirant at the beginning of the path before he becomes liberated.49 He suggests that paññā was not intended to refer to the Four Truths;50 he also suggests that insight in the early Buddhist texts was not described in any explicit form51 but was quite possibly ‘unspecified and un-specifiable kind of insight’.52 For Bronkhorst, paññā is insight into the attainment of the jhānas and its possibilities.53
Adding to both Bronkhorst and Schmithausen’s hypothesis, in her study on the Four Truths in the Nikāyas and the Theravāda sources, Carol Anderson suggests that
[T]he four noble truths were introduced into what became the canonical writing first in relation to attaining the jhānic states and to the eradication of the āsavā, and later in the context of the Buddha’s biographies, such as the Dhammacakkappavattana-sutta.54
These studies all argue convincingly, I believe, that the identification of liberating insight (paññā) with the Four Truths is problematic.55 It seems that the centrality of the Four Noble Truths in the Buddhist tradition and its identification with the content of mind at the moment of awakening was a later development;56 yet, by ‘later’, I do not mean necessarily after the Buddha’s death, but it might be so. As for why the Four Truths became synonymous with the content of mind at the moment of liberation and a sufficient knowledge for the attainment of nibbāna (meaning, one does not need to attain the jhānas at all), this might have been the outcome of two historical processes. First, as Bronkhorst has suggested, the Buddhist tradition has been influenced by mainstream meditation traditions in which liberation in life was always accompanied by an explicit ‘liberating insight’.57 Second, insight became specified as a specific content when Buddhist monasticisms became more scholastic and less meditative. This last argument is also raised by Alexander Wynne. Wynne argues that in the early period, before the first schism, there was a tendency towards intellectualism; this tendency led to theories such as the one in which the Four Noble Truths and the teaching of dependent origination are the content of liberating insight.58
Given the preceding, I think it is very plausible to argue that the Four Truths were added to various suttas after the description of the attainment of the four jhānas for various reasons. First, they were an attempt to explain what type of liberating insight (paññā) Buddhism advocates for delineating Buddhist philosophical identity. This might have been a way for certain elements in the monastic institution to respond to arguments against the efficacy of meditation alone for attaining liberation. Second, it might be the result of a gradual decline in the practice of meditation in Buddhist circles and the growth of intellectual tendencies. It seems plausible to postulate that the emphasis in the Theravāda tradition on theoretical learning led to the idea that knowledge of the Four Truths is liberating. Wisdom (paññā) was recognized as a certain discursive and conceptual knowledge rather than ‘yogic insight’ (a specific type of awareness, possibly the fourth-jhāna - awareness). This might have originated the idea that paññā-vimutti arahants ‘includes those who attain Arahantship either as a dry insight meditator (sukhavipassaka) or after emerging from one or another of the four jhānas’.59
In light of this, I wish to make the suggestion that for the Nikāyas paññā, in its deepest sense, relates to a different phenomenological category than a conceptual or discursive insight. In other words, the content of mind is irrelevant for the attainment of complete liberation; this is because what is truly significant is the mode of awareness, the mode of knowing.
VI Wisdom or insight in the Nikāyas
The previous discussion raises a few important questions: is there any cognitive content that can transform the mind? In other words, what kind of mental content can transform our misconception of reality and our superimposition of independent separateness onto the various aspects of our experience? How is it possible to transform ignorance-based cognitive and affective processes into a liberated mind, free from misconceptions, delusions, anxieties, fear, attachments, aversion, hatred and other states that cause disease and suffering? How can one deconstruct the sense of self without going beyond mental structures such as thinking and conceptualizing, which lie at the basis of this mental construction?
It is not possible to discuss these issues at length in the present study. However, I will tentatively argue that it is possible to grasp every type of cognitive content – even those that can be classed under the category of paññā in certain stages of the path (as for example the development of ‘right view’ (sammā-diṭṭhi) or the perception (saññā) of impermanence). That is, the content itself, which might be conducive at a certain point in the spiritual path as a catalyst for right action in body, speech and mind and to abandon the unwholesome, can also become the object of attachment. Therefore, what is actually liberating is not the content but the quality of awareness that perceives this content. That is, the content or object of mind has no particular significance for the cessation of dukkha. What is crucial is the quality of awareness, the mode of knowing any content or object.
This might be the reason why wisdom (paññā) and insight (vipassanā) are not usually specified in terms of a specific content. This might imply that what we call wisdom or insight in the Nikāyas’ spiritual path is the actual ripening and fulfilment of certain wholesome qualities in the mind, qualities that enable one to see experience clearly, free from distorted perception and self-centred mental fabrications. It would seem that when the mind is fully impregnated by fully matured sati and upekkhā, as occurs in the fourth jhāna, one actualizes wisdom as ‘wisdomawareness’; this is a specialized form of awareness in which ‘even though the object of awareness is something as ordinary as the sensation of breathing, the moment is profoundly transformative’.60
Interestingly, in the Abhidhamma system of thought, wisdom (paññā), as pointed out observantly by Andrew Olendzki, is impermanent and tenuous, arising from certain causes and conditions.61 What is more, we all tend to experience such momentary moments of (conditioned) wisdom (just like we experience moments of equanimity, mindfulness and happiness). Yet the arising of these qualities in an ordinary mind can be described as brief glimpses.62 These
brief glimpses of a different way to relate to experience cannot transform the habitual reactivity of mind, uproot the sense of an enduring self or eradicate ingrained tendencies and perceptions that maintain ignorance, namely, the sense of permanency, of an ‘I’, of an observer. In other words, we all experience moments of deep equanimity and lucid awareness free from emotional overlays, namely, moments of clarity and non-clinging (moments unconditioned by desire, aversion and delusion); nevertheless, these are usually short mind-moments that arise and pass away quickly. These moments are not steady enough to transform the mind. In this regard, Olendzki’s observation seems significant for understanding the phenomenology and liberative value of the fourth jhāna. He points out that
[I]f the wholesome attention can be sustained moment after moment, the entire stream of consciousness becomes purified of its naturally-arising toxins and wholesome dispositions are reinforced while their unwholesome counterparts atrophy.63
In the discussion of the nature of the fourth jhāna in the previous chapter, it is clear that the fourth-jhāna -mode-of-awareness expresses a mind that does not grasp at anything, while rejecting nothing. That is, in the fourth jhāna one is free from clinging or identifying with impermanent and empty phenomena.64 I have also argued that the power of the jhānas is found in their description as attainments in which one ‘enters into and abides in’ (upasampajja viharati). Abiding in such modes of awareness for a prolonged period of time explains, I believe, their efficacy: they are not momentary, but attainments through which one becomes deeply familiar and closely in touch with a different mode of knowing. In the fourth jhāna, one experiences, moment after moment, a lucid (sati) and non-reactive (upekkhā) awareness, not conditioned by desire, aversion and ignorance. Experiencing this specialized form of awareness means that one does not become entrenched in sense objects, in their attractiveness or unattractiveness. Instead, the mind sees phenomena as they are: changing and empty of inherent existence. The fourth jhāna should be recognized as the actualization of wisdom. Phenomenologically, in this attainment one abides in a mode of awareness that is free from the effort to have, to hold or reject.65 In this mode of being, desire, aversion and delusion have no footing; this is because one has grounded sati and upekkhā as an ‘awakening-jhāna-factor’. In the fourth jhāna one does not cling to anything in the world; there is no tending towards being or non-being.66 When
[O]ne does not think, and one does not plan, and one does not have an underlying tendencies [towards anything], no basis exist for the maintenance of consciousness… such is the cessation of this whole mass of suffering.67
What I am arguing is that by experiencing this mode of being, one actualizes and embodies wisdom (paññā) as a wise-awareness. Thus, I wish to suggest that for the Nikāyas, liberating insight (paññā) is not some ‘knowledge of’ or specific cognitive content; rather, it is a specific type of wholesome awareness that is radiant, lucid and non-reactive.
In the fourth jhāna one actualizes wisdom also in the sense of abandoning.68 After all, the purpose of paññā – in Buddhist theory of liberation – is abandoning what causes dukkha. A passage from MN seems to express this idea and its purifying power:
[I]f nothing is found there to delight in, welcome, and hold to, this is the end of the underlying tendency to lust, of the underlying tendency to aversion, of the underlying tendency to views, of the underlying tendency to doubt, of the underlying tendency to conceit, of the underlying tendency to desire for being, of the underlying tendency to ignorance; this is the end of resorting to rods and weapons, of quarrels, brawls, disputes, recrimination, malice, and false speech; here these evil unwholesome states cease without a remainder.69
To sum up, when one abides in the fourth jhāna for multiple mind-moments, wisdom (paññā), as a specific stance and attitude towards experience, becomes intimate and transformative and might finally purify the entire stream of consciousness of ‘its naturally-arising toxins’. It might finally break ignorance completely and awaken the mind.
Notes
1 SN V.5–6: Iminā kho etaṃ ānanda pariyāyena veditabbaṃ yathā imassetaṃ ariyassa aṭṭhaṅgikassa maggassa adhivacanaṃ brahmayānaṃ… yassa saddhā ca paññā ca – dhammā yuttā sadā dhuraṃ, hiri īsā mano yottaṃ – sati ārakkhasārathī. Ratho sīlaparikkhāro – jhānakkho cakkavīriyo, Upekhā dhurasamādhi – anicchā parivāraṇaṃ.
2 Gethin 2001, 344.
3 Gethin 2001, 345. Gethin also observes that the bojjhaṅga list focuses on bodhi as a kind of jhāna (Ibid., 181).
4 Gethin 2001, 345.
5 See, for example, SN V.151–2.
6 At this point I wish to mention AN II.45, which talks of different results that develop out of samādhi. I wish to claim that all four possible outcomes seem to me as actually describing, in different ways, the deepening of insight and the attainment of liberation. I would say that the first one (diṭṭhadhammasukhavihārāya) describes the emotive and physical aspects of the four jhānas. This is connected to the development of insight (e.g., SN III.168–9) and is a description of a pleasant abiding in which the Buddha dwells (e.g., MN I.23, III.153). The second one (ñāṇadassanapaṭilābhāya) usually refers to the moment one attains one of the four paths (including Arahantship). Although it is not clear what exactly is attained in this second option. However, it is clear that because the sutta is using the terms ñāṇa-dassana, it refers to some kind of insight into the nature of experience. This is because the purification of ñāṇa-dassana is the aim of the path (e.g., MN I.150). The third one (satisampajaññāya) seems to refer, at least, to the third jhāna -awareness in which upekkhā, sati and sampajāna are fully expressed and, therefore, are ennobling (AN III.279). It states that in this samādhi, one understands the impermanent nature of feeling, perception and thoughts. Clearly, this samādhi is part of insight practice. The fourth one (āsavānaṃ khayāya) clearly refers to complete liberation by understanding the nature of the five aggregates.
7 If by the practice of mindfulness, the practitioner re-educates the mind not to react instinctively out of greed, hatred and delusion, then the attainments of the jhānas take the practitioner to another level. The akusala states do not arise anymore; therefore, we can say that dukkha is absent (temporarily) (e.g., MN I 89–90).
8 E.g., MN I.181. See the full discussion of this path structure in chapter 2 on the first jhāna. See a similar view also in AN V.2–4.
9 For example, when the desire for sense pleasures or ill will is present in the mind (the first two hindrances), one can act in a way that can harm oneself and others.
10 DN III.130: cattāro’me cunda sukhallikānuyogā hīnā gammā pothujjanikā anariyā anatthasaṃhitā na nibbidāya na virāgāya na nirodhāya na upasamāya na abhiññāya na sambodhāya na nibbānāya saṃvattanti.
11 DN III.131.
12 Ibid.
13 DN III.131–2: cattāro’me cunda sukhallikānuyogā ekantanibbidāya virāgāya nirodhāya upasamāya abhiññāya sambodhāya nibbānāya saṃvattanti. Katame cattāro? Idha cunda bhikkhu vivicceva… catutthaṃ jhānaṃ upasampajja viharati. ayaṃ catuttho sukhallikānuyogo. The sutta further indicates that those who are given to these four forms of pleasure seeking can expect four benefits: the attainment of stream entry, oncereturnership, non-returnership and arahantship by the destruction of the different fetters (DN III.132).
14 See also AN I.53.
15 MN II.27–8: ime ca thapati, akusalasaṅkappā kuhiṃ aparisosā nirujjhanti: nirodhopi nesaṃ vutto. Idha thapati bhikkhū vivicceva kāmehī vivicca akusalehī dhammehī savitakkaṃ savicāraṃ vivekajaṃ pitisukhaṃ paṭhamaṃjhānaṃ upasampajja viharati. Etthete akusalasaṅkappā aparisesā nirujjhanti.
16 These are the intention of renunciation (nekkhamma-saṅkappo), the intention of non-ill will (abyāpāda-saṅkappo) and the intention of non-cruelty (avihiṃsā-saṅkappo). E.g., MN II.28.
17 MN II.28.
18 Note that the Buddha points out that the practice o
f the path is for the cessation of wholesome intentions; this means that this is not some ‘side effect’ but part of the practice. MN II.28: kathaṃ paṭipanno ca thapati, kusalānaṃ saṅkappānaṃ nirodhāya paṭipanno hoti.
19 MN II.27: ime ca thapati, kusalasīlā kuhiṃ aparisesā nirujjhanti: nirodhopi nesaṃ vutto, idha thapati, bhikkhu sīlavā hoti no ca sīlamayo.
20 Pagis 2008, 60.
21 In contrast to Pagis, I believe abstract thought has an important place in Buddhist contemplative path. E.g., SN V.418.
22 Pagis 2008, 59–60. Her study aims at illustrating that vipassanā meditation focuses on the pre-verbal and non-conceptual forms of self-awareness, ones that resist articulation, contexts or causation (Ibid.).
23 Pagis 2008, 60.
24 Daniel 1984, 239.
25 Pagis 2008, 60–1. Pagis cites from Peirce 1965, 302.
26 I have taken the term ‘post-conceptual’ from Janet Gyatso, who has referred to this type of experience in her article ‘Healing Burns with Fire: The Facilitation of Experience in Tibetan Buddhism’. In this article she has analyzed Tibetan treatment of meditative experiences. She has pointed out that although in many instances Tibetan commentators grant that ‘meditative experience is framed and interpreted through conceptual categories, we cannot deny that these same commentators will still maintain that the final fruit is, nonetheless, a direct realization of a primordial reality’. What is interesting is her clarification that Tibetan commentators would grant ‘various kinds of immediacy that are projected at the end of these paths represent what we might call a “post-conceptual” immediacy rather than a pre-conceptual one. This is an immediacy or naturalness that is won, like the acquisition of bodily skills, through a process of habituation. It is the fruit of a course of training’ (Gyatso 1999, 138–9).