Despite the tendency to equate persuasion with behavioral conversion, it seems useful to distinguish among three different behavioral outcomes commonly served by the persuasion process. Although some overlapping must be granted (the three outcomes are not always mutually exclusive), the utility of the distinction rests on the fact that the outcome sought sometimes affects the relative importance of variables contained in the persuasive equation as well as the probably ease or difficulty with which persuaders may hope to accomplish their goals.
Being Persuaded as a Response-Shaping Process
Frequently, individuals possess no clearly established pattern of responses to specific environmental stimuli. In such instances, persuasion takes the form of shaping and conditioning particular response patterns to these stimuli. Such persuasive undertakings are particularly relevant when dealing with persons who have limited prior learning histories or with situations where radically new and novel stimuli have been introduced into the environment.
Although it may be fallacious to assert that the mind of a small child is a tabula rasa, it is indisputable that children initially lack a response repertory for dealing with most social, political, economic, and ethical matters. Much of what is commonly referred to as socialization consists of persuading the child to respond consistently (shaping responses) to stimuli associated with these matters. Thus, at a relatively early age, the child can be observed responding as a “good” Catholic (Lutheran, Presbyterian, Unitarian-Universalist, atheist, etc.) should respond, expressing rudimentary opinions about political candidates or programs, and manifesting a relatively consistent code of conduct and ethics in dealing with others. In these instances, parents, teachers, ministers, peers, and others collectively shape and condition the responses the child performs.
It should be emphasized that all instances of response-shaping are not commonly thought of as instances of being persuaded. This distinction, while admittedly nebulous and slippery, implies that persuasion is a species of the genus commonly labeled learning. For instance, it would sound strange to speak of children “being persuaded.” It would sound strange to speak of children being persuaded to tie their shoes correctly; typically, we assert that they have learned to tie their shoes. On the other hand, should children refuse to attempt shoe-tieing behaviors, rebel against feeding themselves, and neglect to pick up clothing or toys, they are likely to be bombarded with messages by parents and teachers aimed at shaping these behaviors. If such messages produce the desired effect, the communicators are likely to claim they have persuaded the children to become more self-reliant or independent; if not, they will probably lament the failure of their persuasive mission and devise other strategies for coping with the problem. In short, the behaviors associated with “being persuaded” are usually directly linked with more abstract attitudes and values that are prized by society or some significant segment of it—or, as Doob (1947) phrased it, responses considered socially significant by the individual’s society.
As indicated earlier, response-shaping is not limited to small children. When the first nuclear device exploded over Hiroshima, Japan, in 1945, humanity witnessed the advent of a radically new energy source whose effects were so awesome they could scarcely be compared with anything preceding them. Before that August day, no one, save perhaps a few sophisticated physicists and technologists, had acquired patterns of responding to concepts such as nuclear warfare and nuclear power because these concepts were literally unheard of by most persons. That considerable response-shaping has occurred during the interim from 1945 to 1980 is attested to by the currently raging controversy regarding the wisdom of developing nuclear power sources; members of the Clamshell Alliance have been persuaded that the dangers of nuclear power far outweigh its potential benefits, while officials of the Nuclear Regulatory Agency have been convinced that the contributions of nuclear energy can be realized without serious attendant risks for humankind.
It must be granted, of course, that such instances of response-shaping are often confounded by elements of people’s prior learning histories. While citizens of 1945 had acquired no established patterns of responding to the concept of nuclear warfare, most of them had developed response repertories vis-à-vis the concept of warfare. For those who already viewed warfare as ethically and politically irresponsible, nuclear weapons were yet a further argument for the abolition of armed conflict, a powerful new persuasive weapon in their pacific arsenal. Conversely, those who sought to defend the continued utility of war as an instrument of national policy were forced to reevaluate their strategic doctrines; post-World War II Realpolitik, as embodied in the messages of spokespersons like Henry Kissinger, spawned doctrinal concepts such as limited war and strategic deterrence. (As an aside, these concepts have not seemed to carry the same persuasive force as earlier ones; people who were motivated to enthusiastic efforts by the battle cry for “unconditional surrender” in World War II grew quickly disenchanted with the “limited war/limited objectives” rhetoric of the Korean and Vietnam conflicts.)
In the case of the concept nuclear power, the confounding influences of prior learning, while more subtle, are nevertheless present. Arguing for greater concern with values than with attitudes in studying persuasion, Rokeach (1973) has contended that
a person has as many values as he has learned beliefs concerning desirable modes of conduct and end-states of existence, and as many attitudes as direct or indirect encounters he has had with specific objects and situations. It is thus estimated that values number in the dozens, whereas attitudes number in the thousands. (p. 18; see also Rokeach, 1968)
Applying Rokeach’s contention to this example, it follows that while individuals may have no established response patterns for the stimulus “nuclear power”—to use his terminology, they may have no present attitude about the issue—they are likely to have well-developed response repertories for terminal values (Rokeach, 1973) such as family security and a comfortable life. Inevitably, messages seeking to persuade these persons to adopt a particular response stance regarding nuclear power will be linked to these values. Thus, an anti-nuclear power spokesperson may assert, “The existence of nuclear power plants, such as Three Mile Island, poses a threat to the safety of your family,” while an advocate of increased development of nuclear power facilities may contend, “Only by expanded use of nuclear power can you hope to retain the many comforts and conveniences you now enjoy.” In both cases, success in shaping the responses of the intended persuadee hinges on the linkage of these responses to strongly held values; that is, the public will be persuaded to the extent it perceives that maintenance of an important value, or values, mandates adoption of a particular set of responses regarding the issue of nuclear power.
In spite of the limitations and complications just outlined, it remains useful to conceive of response-shaping and conditioning as one behavioral manifestation of “being persuaded.” Traditionally, the persuasion literature has characterized this process as “attitude formation,” reserving the term “attitude change” for attempts to replace one set of established behaviors with another. From a pragmatic vantage point, messages seeking to shape and condition responses may have a higher likelihood of success than do communications aiming to convert established behavioral patterns; in addition, the two goals may imply the use of differing persuasive strategies. Moreover, from a scientific perspective, the two outcomes may suggest different theoretical and empirical literatures; for example, learning theories thus far have been most frequently and profitably employed in the arena of response-shaping and conditioning. Thus, for persuasive practitioners and researchers alike, the distinction possesses potential utility.
Being Persuaded as a Response-Reinforcing Process
Rather than aiming at changes in attitudes and behaviors, much persuasive communication seeks to reinforce currently held convictions and to make them more resistant to change. Most Sunday sermons serve this function, as do keynote speeches at political conventions and presidential a
ddresses at meetings of scholarly societies. In such cases, emphasis is on making the persuadees more devout Methodists, more active Democrats, or more committed psychologists, not on converting them to Unitarianism, the Socialist Workers Party, or romance languages. (Miller & Burgoon, 1973, p. 5)
The position espoused in the preceding quotation is certainly not earth-shaking, even though the popular tendency to view persuasion as a tool for bringing about conversion may cause people to overlook, or shortchange, this important behavioral outcome. The response-reinforcing function underscores the fact that “being persuaded” is seldom, if ever, a one-message proposition; instead, people are constantly in the process of being persuaded. If an individual clings to an attitude (and the behaviors associated with it) more strongly after exposure to a communication, then persuasion has occurred as surely as if the individual had shifted from one set of responses to another. Moreover, those beliefs and behaviors most resistant to change are likely to be grounded in a long history of confirming messages along with other positive reinforcers. One current theory of attitude formation and change holds that the strength of people’s attitudes depends entirely on the number of incoming messages about the attitude issue they have processed (Saltiel & Woelfel, 1975).
There are strong grounds for believing that much persuasive communication in our society serves a response-reinforcing function. Although students of persuasion disagree about the extent to which the selective exposure principle (Festinger, 1957) dictates message choices (Freedman & Sears, 1965; Sears & Freedman, 1967), few, if any, would question people’s affinity for supportive information (McGuire, 1969). Such an affinity, in turn, suggests that under conditions of voluntary exposure, the majority of individuals’ persuasive transactions will involve messages that reinforce their existing response repertories. This possibility is further supported by early mass media research documenting the reinforcement function served by the media (e.g., Katz & Lazarsfeld, 1955).
If people do, in fact, relish hearing what they already believe, it may seem that the response-reinforcing function of persuasion is so simple as to require little concern. Distortion of information is not as likely to occur, and the initial credibility of the communicator should have less impact than in cases where persuasive intent centers on response-shaping or behavioral change—although even in the case of response reinforcement, the work of Osgood and his associates (Osgood, Suci, & Tannenbaum, 1957; Osgood & Tannenbaum, 1955) indicates that extremely low credibility may inhibit persuasive impact. Logical fallacies and evidential shortcomings are likely to be overlooked, while phenomena such as counterarguing (Brandt, 1976; Festinger & Maccoby, 1964; Osterhouse & Brock, 1970) will be largely absent. Unquestionably, message recipients are set to be persuaded; hence, would-be persuaders are assured of optimal conditions for plying their communicative wares.
Nevertheless, there are at least three good reasons for not losing sight of the response-reinforcing dimension of “being persuaded.” For the practicing communicator, this dimension underscores the importance of keeping old persuasive friends as well as making new ones. In the heat of a political campaign or a fund-raising drive, it may be tempting to center efforts on potential converts at the expense of ignoring those whose prevailing response tendencies already coincide with the intent of the political candidate or the fund-raiser. Such a mistake can easily yield low vote counts or depleted treasuries. Turning to the interpersonal sphere, close relationships may be damaged, or even terminated, because the parties take each other for granted—in the terminology employed here, fail to send persuasive messages aimed at reinforcing mutually held positive attitudes and mutually performed positive behaviors. In short, failure to recognize that being persuaded is an ongoing process requiring periodic message attention can harm one’s political aspirations, pocketbook, or romantic relationship.
The need for continued reinforcement of acquired responses also constitutes one possible explanation for the ephemerality of many persuasion research outcomes. The typical persuasion study involves a single message, presented to recipients under controlled laboratory conditions, with a measure of attitude or behavior change taken immediately afterward. On numerous occasions, researchers have observed immediate changes, only to discover that they have vanished when later follow-up measures were taken. Although a number of substantive and procedural reasons can be offered for the fleeting impact of the persuasive stimulus, one obvious explanation rests in the likelihood that the behaviors engendered by the message received no further reinforcement after the recipients departed from the research setting. Thus, the response-reinforcing dimension of being persuaded has implications for the way persuasion researchers design and interpret their studies.
Perhaps most important, however, is the fact that all response-reinforcing strategies and schedules are not destined to be equally effective. Research using cultural truisms (McGuire, 1964, 1969) has demonstrated the low resistance to change that results when behaviors and attitudes rest on a history of nearly 100% positive reinforcement; apparently, too much exclusively behavior-congruent information is not a good thing. Although studies such as those of McGuire and of Burgoon and his associates (Burgoon & Chase, 1973; Burgoon & King, 1974) have been characterized as dealing with the problem of inducing resistance to persuasion, the conceptualization that has been offered here views this label as a misnomer. Research dealing with the response-reinforcing function of persuasion is research on how to persuade, albeit in a different sense from what the popular use implies, a position that has also recently been espoused by other writers (Burgoon, Cohen, Miller, & Montgomery, 1978). Including response reinforcement as one of the three behavioral outcomes subsumed under the phrase “being persuaded” not only calls attention to the continued need for research concerning the workings of the reinforcing process but also results in a tidier conceptualization than has previously existed.
Being Persuaded as a Response-Changing Process
As has been repeatedly noted, “being persuaded” is most typically thought of as a response-changing process; smokers are persuaded to become nonsmokers, automobile drivers are persuaded to walk or use public transportation, Christians are persuaded to become Moslems, and so on. Popular use equates “being persuaded” with “being changed.” Moreover, definitions of persuasions found in most texts emphasize the notion of changing responses (Bettinghaus, 1973; Cronkhite, 1969), and even when other terms such as modify (Brembeck & Howell, 1952) and influence (Scheidel, 1967) are used, the lion’s share of the text is devoted to analysis of persuasion as a response-changing process.
This view of persuasion is, of course, consistent with the ideological tenets of democratic societies. Problems of social and political change are problems of persuasion; the public must be induced to change current attitudes and behaviors to comport with the realities of new situations. The current energy crisis provides a convenient illustration of the process at work. Eschewing more coercive steps such as rationing, those charged with managing America’s energy resources have bombarded the public with messages urging behavioral changes calculated to conserve these resources: dialing down thermostats, driving at slower speeds (a message buttressed by the coercive power of speeding laws), and voluntarily sharing rides—to mention but a few. Naturally, patience and faith in persuasion are not boundless; nevertheless, the democratic ethic strongly mandates that attempts to change behavior symbolically should precede more coercive remedies.
If one departs from the realm of public policy issues to conceive also of persuasion as a process involving modification of people’s relational behaviors, a step recently urged by this writer (Miller, 1978), the same change-centered orientation is readily apparent. For instance, the continuing popularity of Dale Carnegie-type courses rests primarily on the following claim: Our instruction will motivate you to change your manner of self-presentation (i.e., to alter established patterns of social behavior); this change, in turn, will cause others to change dramatically their patterns of res
ponding to you (i.e., others will be persuaded by your changed behavior to relate to you in different ways). Similarly, the popularity of Zimbardo’s (1977) shyness volume and the spate of books and courses that deal with assertiveness training attest to the pervasiveness of people’s attempts to alter their ongoing social behaviors and, concomitantly, to persuade others to respond differently to them. Although these processes are typically treated under rubrics such as interpersonal communication and interpersonal relations, the conceptualization outlined here argues that they should be counted as instances of the response-changing dimension of “being persuaded.”
The largely unchallenged hegemony of the response-changing conception of persuasion obviates the need for further discussion. Most prior research in persuasion deals with behavioral change; at best, it treats response-shaping and response reinforcement indirectly. What remains in order to complete this analysis of the phrase “being persuaded” is a brief consideration of the way persuasive effects have typically been characterized.
Although terms such as response and behavior have been employed herein to refer to the effects of persuasive communications, the concept of attitude has also been mentioned on several occasions. Its emergence is not surprising, for concern with attitude formation and change has consistently guided the efforts of persuasion researchers ever since Allport (1935) confidently proclaimed attitude to be the single most important concept in social psychology. Notwithstanding widespread faith in the utility of the attitude construct, certain of its conceptual aspects pose knotty problems for students of persuasion. If “being persuaded” is to be considered synonymous with “shaping, reinforcing, and changing attitudes,” these problems eventually must be resolved.
The SAGE Handbook of Persuasion Page 16