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AUTHOR’ NOTE: Some of the ideas presented here are taken from Kaplowitz, S. A., & Fink, E. L. (1997). Message discrepancy and persuasion. In G. A. Barnett & F. J. Boster (Eds.), Progress in communication sciences (Vol. 13, pp. 75–106). Greenwich, CT: Ablex.
The authors acknowledge the work of our collaborators in the study of discrepancy models, and in particular Joseph Woelfel, Stan A. Kaplowitz, and Sungeun Chung. We thank Jeffrey C. Williams for description of discrepancy models from other sciences.
CHAPTER 7
Functional Attitude Theory
Christopher Carpenter, Franklin J. Boster, and Kyle R. Andrews
Oratory is the art of enchanting the soul, and therefore he who would be an orator has to learn the differences of human souls—they are so many and of such a nature, and from them come the differences between man and man.
Plato, “Phaedrus” (360 BCE/1993 CE, p. 84)
Plato proposed that a speaker who wishes to persuade others effectively must not assume that the same persuasive appeal works for everyone. He asserted that each person had a particular type of soul and that to change attitudes, persuasive efforts must be tailored to each. This concept of tailoring persuasive appeals to the needs of individual audience members finds modern expression in a group of persuasion theories identified as functional theories of attitudes.
In the 1950s, two groups of scholars developed attitude theories proposing that attitudes serve different functions (Katz, 1960; Smith, Bruner, & White, 1956). They posited that people develop attitudes in order to serve their goals, and that although any particular attitude might serve multiple functions, it would generally serve one more than the others. They theorized that although two people might have an attitude with the exact same valence, that attitude might serve very different functions for each person. For example, Varda might have a positive attitude toward BMWs because they are sturdily built vehicles that help her save money on car repairs, whereas Clover might have a positive attitude toward BMWs because he thinks they will help him impress women.
Smith et al. (1956) focused on trying to understand the relationships between attitudes and personality. Taking a clinical perspective, they conducted in-depth interviews to try to understand the personality of 10 men based on their attitudes toward the Soviet Union. From the interviews they then derived inductively their typology of attitude functions.
Working independently, and from the then-dominant perspectives in psychology (psychoanalysis and behaviorism), Katz (1960) and colleagues (Katz, Sarnoff, & McClintock, 1956; Sarnoff & Katz, 1954) derived attitude functions deductively. Katz’s goal was to define attitude functions as a means of increasing the effectiveness of persuasive appeals. He reasoned that if a persuasive appeal targeted the function that an attitude served for a particular person, then that persuasive appeal would be much more likely to change, shape, or reinforce the attitude in the direction that the speaker desired. For example, if a car salesperson, Craig, was trying to sell a new BMW to Varda, he would be more likely to make the sale if he emphasized the reliability of the car rather than how attractive people thought it was. On the other hand, if Clover was looking at cars, Craig would do well to point out how attractive the car was rather than bore him with statistics about gas mileage.
An implication of these positions is that understanding attitude functions allows influencing agents to tailor messages to audience members rather than merely target messages to an audience. Miller and Steinberg (1975) argued that communication varies along a dimension of the quantity of individuating information persons have and use about those with whom they are communicating. Rather than targeting cultural-level information about the audience (e.g., country of origin) or sociological level information (e.g., profession or SES), influencing agents who understand the function(s) that an attitude serves for a particular target can tailor their persuasive approach. Such an approach was conjectured to have a higher probability of success than alternative approaches.
After the first wave of functional research by Katz (1960) and Smith and colleagues (1956) to explicate functional attitude theories, these theories were “in a state of hibernation for some two decades” (Snyder & Debono, 1985, p. 597). Beginning in the 1980s, these theories underwent a revival and have subsequently inspired a great deal of empirical work on matching persuasive messages to functions in a second wave of functional attitude research. This chapter examines different approaches to using functional theories to understand persuasion by first examining the initial typology of functions constructed by Katz (1960) and Smith et al. (1956) in the first wave of functional attitude theory research. Then the contemporary approaches that attempt to determine attitude functions for the purposes of targeting persuasive messages that represent a second wave will be explored. Finally, a third wave of functional attitude research that conceives of the attitude functions as processes to be modeled in order to help determine which functions should be considered separate functions will be discussed before turning to suggestions for future research.
The Initial Set of Attitude Functions
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Despite the fact that the two groups of scholars worked independently, both Katz (1960) and Smith et al. (1956) derived similar lists of functions. They generally used different terms, but there was considerable conceptual overlap in their ideas. Most theorists identify five unique functions. In these formulations, the concept of an attitude function is that of a qualitative variable (i.e., attitude function) with each function being conceived as a value of that variable (e.g., ego-defensive, utilitarian, etc.) in much the same way as one would think of a qualitative variable such as religious preference having various different values (Judaism, Islam, Christianity, Hinduism, Buddhism, etc.). Although Katz and Smith et al. discussed the possibility of an attitude serving multiple functions, nevertheless, these values of the variable (functions) still are conceived as mutually exclusive. To extend the analogy with religious preference, an attitude that serves multiple functions for a person might be akin to someone who lists more than one religious preference. Such a person might be unusual; nevertheless, such a response is not impossible. The five functions are described next.
Utilitarian Attitudes
Attitudes that serve a utilitarian function (termed object appraisal by Smith et al., 1956) are formed and held in order to provide persons with an efficient way to distinguish objects that bring pleasure and objects that produce pain (Katz, 1960). Hence, utilitarian functions serve to help people maximize utility. These attitudes are rooted in a desire to satisfy personal needs and desires. For example, Varda’s attitude toward BMWs has a utilitarian function because she is focused on the practical aspects of the car, such as its reliability and the money she might save on repairs. If influencing agents wanted to tailor messages to an audience whose target attitude serves a utilitarian function, they would emphas
ize the ways in which that which is advocated improves the audience’s life. For example, politicians who emphasize the number of jobs they secure through defense contracts are targeting a utilitarian function.
Social-Adjustive
Although Katz discussed the application of social influences to a variety of functions, he did not include it as a separate function. On the other hand, Smith et al. (1956) described the social-adjustive function as a means of regulating relationships. Attitudes serving a social-adjustive function facilitate the ability to interact with desirable social group members or to impress attractive others. In the BMW example, Clover’s attitude toward BMWs serves a social adjustive function because he is concerned with whether or not his car will make him attractive to women. A politician who wanted to target an audience’s social-adjustive function might emphasize a descriptive norm that is both shared by the audience’s peer group and that supports her position on a pivotal issue.
Value-Expressive
Attitudes with a value-expressive function facilitate the expression of people’s abstract values (Katz, 1960). A value-expressive attitude facilitates a person’s ability to voice and remain consistent with their values. Unlike utilitarian attitudes, they do not provide direct, concrete rewards or punishments. And, unlike social-adjustive attitudes, a value-expressive attitude does not promote the needs of fitting in with a group or impression management. Value-expressive functions differ from utilitarian or social goals because one does not derive any benefit, construed narrowly, from having such attitudes, save a sense of satisfaction that one has been consistent with one’s principles. If a car salesperson wanted to sell a BMW to an environmentalist whose attitude(s) toward BMWs served a value-expressive function, the salesperson might focus on the BMW Corporation’s efforts to support green technology. Of course, in addition to knowing that an attitude serves a value-expressive function, one must also know which value is being served by the attitude in order to target a persuasive message (Maio & Olson, 2000). Even if an attitude toward BMWs serves a value-expressive function, mentioning the corporation’s efforts to use green technology might not be persuasive if the audience’s BMW attitude is anchored to values concerned with equality and fair labor practices rather than environmentalism.
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