In concert with ELM predictions, there is also evidence that voters who are high in elaboration likelihood are more likely to systematically process political information than those on the low end of the elaboration likelihood continuum. Voters high in political sophistication based their post 9/11 evaluations of former President George W. Bush on their defense policy preferences. Their less politically sophisticated counterparts seemed less motivated or able to base evaluations of Bush on policy predispositions. They increased positive evaluations of Bush, but not apparently because of systematic consideration of policy issues. Instead, they experienced a “rally around the flag” effect, transferring enhanced patriotic feelings to presidential evaluations (Ladd, 2007).
It would seem as if low-involved, low-ability voters are easily swayed by simple—sometimes misleading—persuasive appeals, displaying the type of susceptibility to persuasion that worries democratic theorists. Research would seem to offer some support for Churchill’s quip that “the best argument against democracy is a five-minute conversation with the average voter.” Yet this overstates matters. Voters who are low in elaboration likelihood lack the motivation to attend to political messages, and one cannot be influenced by a message to which one has not been exposed (presumed influence notwithstanding). Theoretically, these voters are more susceptible to McGuire’s (1968) yielding than reception mediator—more likely to yield to a persuasive message than to carefully attend to it. Political awareness intersects with elaboration likelihood to determine persuasion effects. Complicating matters, factors such as the intensity of political information and deviance of messages from the status quo also intervene, moderating the impact of elaboration likelihood and awareness on attitude change (Zaller, 1992).
Do political media then manipulate low elaboration voters? The answer is complicated. Under some conditions, low-involved, low-ability voters suspend beliefs, allowing themselves to be taken in by misleading information. Under other conditions, they consciously opt to rely on heuristics, such as political party or a judgment that if negatively valued lobbyists support a proposal, it should be opposed for this reason (Kinder, 1998). It is difficult to determine when judgments represent irrational voting and when they constitute a rational decision-making strategy. Suffice it to say that sometimes low-involved voters get taken for a ride, suckered in by their reliance on unctuous political cues.
On the other end of the continuum, it appears as if highly involved, high-ability voters adopt a more rational approach, taking into account policy predispositions or systematically processing persuasive messages. For example, in 2008, Independent voters whose conservative views on social issues would ordinarily propel them to a Republican candidate took a serious look at Obama. John Butler, owner of a floral shop near Youngstown, Ohio, typified these voters. Living in a region of the country hit hard by the economic downturn, Butler said he had no choice but to lay off 25 of his 26 employees and cancel his health insurance policy. “I looked at my situation and realized I couldn’t afford to vote for McCain. I was as shocked as anyone,” he said (Belkin, 2008, p. A5). A similar dynamic operated in 2010, this time to the detriment of the Democrats. Significant numbers of Independent voters, concerned about the economy and reasoning that the party in power was responsible for job losses, voted Republican in the midterm elections (Calmes & Thee-Brenan, 2010).
Yet high-involved, high-ability voters also tend to have strong preexisting attitudes, which can render them susceptible to emotional appeals (Brader, 2006). These attitudes can be based on sophisticated ideological schema or they may be well-learned prejudices, which can overcome the pull of material self-interest. Sears and his colleagues have consistently found that symbolically evoked predispositions, such as party identification, anti-communist attitudes, and racial prejudice, powerfully influence electoral behavior (Sears, 1993). This leads to what ELM theorists felicitously call “biased processing.” Complementing classic studies of confirmatory biases (Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979), political psychologists report that individuals routinely engage in biased searches of electoral information, increasing their support for prior preferences even after exposure to contradictory information (Redlawsk, 2002). Biased processing is more likely when individuals harbor strong political attitudes.
Yet in contemporary politics, where the electorate is divided between “red states” and “blue states,” selectivity is frequently the order of the day. Displaying what psychologists call “de facto selectivity,” voters are more likely to communicate with those who share their political predispositions than those with who disagree (Mutz, 2006). We live in political worlds that kindly reinforce what we know to be true. What is more, selective exposure can produce more polarized political attitudes (Stroud, 2010). Conservative Republicans who tune into more conservative media programs hold more polarized attitudes than other Republican conservatives. Liberal Democrats who are exposed to more liberal media outlets hold more polarized attitudes, compared to other liberal Democrats (Stroud, 2010). Yet although partisans do seek out opinion-reinforcing information, they do not necessarily avoid sources that provide politically dissonant information (Garrett, 2009). And Independent voters, who may be looking for signs of nonpartisanship in political candidates, can be open to persuasive messages containing persuasive arguments and cues.
Thus, the persuasive effects of political communications are best conceptualized as interactive, involving “a set of joint contingencies among message, receiver, and source factors” (Iyengar, 2004, p. 252). Source credibility, message, and channel factors discussed previously rarely exert main effects in the contemporary political world, but, instead, intersect with receiver characteristics such as those identified by persuasion theories, like the ELM and social judgment perspectives. Such intersections can be politically consequential, as when individuals tune into a politically congruent blog and become more convinced of the moral superiority of their political position. Glenn Beck and Sarah Palin appeal to scores of conservative Americans, offering nostrums that resonate with individuals who feel adrift in a system that they feel is dominated by hostile forces (Leibovich, 2010). Although political consultants may not express this in social scientific terms, they seem to be exquisitely aware of these contingencies. Republicans have mobilized evangelical Christians, relying on strong goodness of fit between their pro-life messages and voters’ attitudes. Democrats have activated Latino and African American voters, employing credible same-race communicators. Strategists have sought to access symbolic affect in voters, hoping they will translate attitudes into voting behavior.
Conclusions
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Viewed a half-century later, Klapper’s work serves as a time-honored bookend for the field of political persuasion. His conclusions captured a kernel of truth in his own era, which presaged the emergence of television news and exploitation of media technologies for political campaigning. As he suggested, mass media do operate within “a nexus of mediating factors” (p. 8). They can create attitudes when people lack opinions—or possess nonattitudes (Converse, 1970). Media can also form attitudes via processes of political socialization (McLeod & Shah, 2009). Yet although Klapper appreciated the nuanced complexity of political persuasion, he operated from a rather vapid conceptual orientation. The multitude of theoretical perspectives and research findings that have emerged over the past half century have enriched our understanding of political persuasion effects. And, as has been frequently observed, Klapper’s pessimistic account of media effects understated the power of contemporary political communication. Reinforcement effects can be politically consequential, when they pull behavior in line with attitudes, enticing voters (evangelical Christians in 2004 and droves of African Americans in 2008) to cast votes in favor of ideologically congruent candidates. Attitude-strengthening influences may matter a great deal in presidential primaries, which attract the politically motivated, whose attitudes are primed for reinforcement effects. Campaign messages that exert a large effect on a small number
of voters may be of considerable importance in close presidential elections like 1976 and 2000, as well as in a host of local races, where targeted campaign ads can propel more financially well-heeled candidates to victory. Outside the election season, agenda-setting, priming, and framing effects can influence the vicissitudes of public opinion on topics ranging from the Iraq War to the public option in health care.
When involvement is moderate and attitudes are not strong, voters will weigh political arguments, their processing a function of the political environment in which they reside. Yet in America, the political milieu is frequently fractious, contested, and freighted with rhetorical flourish. Given that the environment is intensely partisan, voters themselves have strong symbolic predispositions, and many vote against rather than for a candidate, it may be more useful to approach the persuasion quandary in terms of how candidates overcome voters’ resistance to persuasion rather than how they push them toward message acceptance (Knowles & Linn, 2004). Politicians do this in a variety of ways, such as by reframing a message to minimize resistance, confronting resistance by offering politically palatable slogans, or disrupting resistance through distraction. They also strive to define the terrain of the election. “Campaigns,” Kinder (2003) observes, “are not so much debates over a common set of issues as they are struggles to define what the election is about” (p. 365). Once candidates have successfully framed a campaign as revolving around a particular issue—change in 2008, Democrats’ responsibility for the economic downturn in 2010—they have set the persuasive stage for subsequent messages. Candidates then craft specific messages that meld source, message, and channel factors with situationally appropriate receiver characteristics (partisanship, prejudices, fears, and anxieties).
In a political world that is “out of sight” and “out of mind” (Lippmann, 1922) but that is experienced in deeply symbolic ways, the most enduring campaign appeals are frequently those rich in symbolic meanings. “The cognitive match between symbolic meaning and predisposition” is an important factor determining when symbolic meaning influences political predispositions (Sears, 1993, p. 131). And once again the focus is on meaning. Whether we call it framing, cue-activating, or political transportation, the conclusion that emerges repeatedly is that persuaders win elections by controlling the symbolic meaning of the issue du jour.
Normative Conundrums
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A discussion of political persuasion would not be complete without discussing normative issues that lie at the heart of so many questions about communication effects. Of the many value-laced questions that are discussed, the ones that strike at the core of democratic engagement involve campaign negativity. Do campaigns polarize voters, exacerbating partisan sentiments? Do uncivil candidate attacks inhibit citizen involvement? Do campaigns close rather than open political minds?
Many scholars take a dim view of contemporary campaigns. They argue that the proliferation of extreme political voices on cable television and the Internet exacerbate partisanship, strengthening polarized attitudes (Sunstein, 2001). Selective exposure magnifies this tendency. What’s more, as Bennett and Iyengar (2008) observe:
But while as recently as 25 years ago, these partisans would have been hard pressed to find overtly partisan sources of information, today the task is relatively simple. In the case of Republicans, all they need to do is tune in to Fox News or the O’Reilly Factor. The new, more diversified information environment makes it not only more feasible for consumers to seek out news they might find agreeable but also provides a strong economic incentive for news organizations to cater to their viewers’ political preferences. (p. 720)
Enhanced tendencies toward selective exposure also reduce the odds that partisans will encounter information that challenges their political viewpoints. Tuned into websites that can communicate false information, they lack the opportunity, as Mill (1859/1956) famously stated, to gain “the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth produced by its collision with error.” Thus, passionate liberals, tuned into websites that claimed Republican Vice President candidate Sarah Palin had faked her pregnancy may have subscribed to this notion for a time. Staunch conservatives may have chosen not to attend to information that countered the viral falsehood that Obama was a Muslim.
What’s more, in an effort to rouse partisan animus, campaigns deploy negative ads and uncivil attacks. American politics is a combat sport characterized by spectacularly nasty attacks on candidates for public office. Negative ads reinforce partisan attitudes and demobilize voters (Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1995). Uncivil political discussion can decrease tolerance for an opposing political view (Mutz & Reeves, 2005). Convinced that this is the way to win elections, candidates deliberately raise divisive wedge issues to influence persuadable voters (Hillygus & Shields, 2008). In a series of intriguing studies, Simon (2002) compared the electoral success of partisan campaigns, in which the candidate focused on his or her most effective political themes with those that sought to create dialogue, such as by discussing issues on which the opponent’s stand approximated that of the median voter or through inoculation, which mentioned, but counterargued, a potential political liability. Campaigns that focused on dialogue cost a candidate an average of 21 percentage points, or approximately one fifth of the voting public. Simon argues that, whatever the merits for the political system, it is rational for a candidate to deemphasize thoughtful dialogue in favor of a more narrow partisan approach.
Ruminating on problems such as these, Miller (2005) lamented, in an article aptly entitled “Is persuasion dead?” that “marshalling a case to persuade those who start from a different position is a lost art. Hearing what’s right in the other side’s argument seems a superfluous thing that can only cause trouble, like an appendix. Politicos huddle with like-minded souls in opinion cocoons that seem impervious to facts.”
In contrast, optimists put forth an alternative viewpoint. One set of counterarguments is empirically based: The public is less psychologically selective and polarized than critics suggest. Research finds that selective avoidance is not the norm. People do not shy away from politically incongruent information (Garrett, 2009; Holbert, Garrett, & Gleason, 2010). Most Americans commonly encounter political disagreements (Huckfeldt et al., 2004). In recent years, Americans have become more similar to one another in their social attitudes, not more different (Fiorina & Levendusky, 2006). Even the argument that negative advertisements adversely influence election outcomes has been questioned. After reviewing 111 studies, Lau, Sigelman, and Rovner (2007) reported that there is no significant evidence that negative campaigning propels attacking candidates to victory. Negative campaigns do reduce political efficacy and trust in government, but do not depress voter turnout.
Others have pointed out that negative ads have more issue content than positive spots (Geer, 2006). They also turn the normative argument around, contending that both negative messages and partisan attitudes can have salutary effects. Negative ads engage the thought processes of voters in a way that blander positive spots cannot (Brader, 2006). Uncivil negative messages can exert positive effects on political interest (Brooks & Geer, 2007), while intense campaigns promote open-minded thinking (Kam, 2006). Partisanship, which feeds off strident negative messages, can be good for the political system. Partisans, not the politically ambivalent, partake in political causes (Mutz, 2006). They knock on doors in election campaigns, organize new political parties (for example, the Green Party and Tea Party), and run for political office.
It is a controversial debate. Political persuasion is fraught with complexities and conundrums. Interpersonal discussions about politics contain internal contradictions. Dialogue with politically divergent others can increase tolerance, but produce ambivalence that inhibits participation in politics (Mutz, 2006). Lobbying can advance the needs of the little guy, but more often than not elevates the interests of economic elites (Hacker & Pierson, 2010). Political communication can be good for some types of democratic outcomes and b
ad for others. There are tensions and contradictions in the practice of political persuasion, all the more so in advanced media democracies such as the United States.
Unresolved Issues and Future Research
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In the first book chapter on political persuasion that appeared in a communication handbook, Sears and Whitney (1973) focused on such persuasion concepts as communicator credibility, selective exposure, perceptual biases, and partisan attitudes. Plus la change, plus la meme chose. Yet their chapter differs from a contemporary account in two ways. First, Sears and Whitney argued that Americans exhibited a positivity bias, a predisposition to favorably evaluate politicians. Quite the opposite tendency exists today. Second, reflecting the knowledge base circa 1973, their chapter did not discuss communication concepts (e.g., framing), explicate theoretical linkages between cognitive processes and media effects, or document the many complex influences political media exert on attitudes. The field has come a long way in the past four decades.
Even so, there remain unanswered questions, the resolution of which can advance political communication scholarship. In the remainder of the chapter, I propose a variety of directions, guided by the venerable source-message-channel-receiver rubric.
Source Approaches
Research on verbal dimensions of credibility would be usefully complemented by studies of nonverbal, visual features, exemplified by the three categories of expressive displays of political leaders: anger/threat, fear/evasion, and happiness/reassurance (e.g., Sullivan & Masters, 1988; see also Grabe & Bucy, 2009). An interdisciplinary program of research (Lanzetta et al., 1985) has documented the facial characteristics associated with each of these categories of political emotions (e.g., open eyelids for anger, lowered, furrowed eyebrows for fear, and raised eyebrows for happiness). At the same time, these studies have shown that expressive displays can influence political attitudes. Conspicuously absent has been research, directed by persuasion theories, that examines their impact on political communicator credibility, as well as the ways these expressive displays influence affective information processing (Dillard & Peck, 2000; Neuman, Marcus, Crigler, & MacKuen, 2007), particularly as it occurs in different electoral contexts and diverse cultures, characterized as they are by different rules of emotional engagement.
The SAGE Handbook of Persuasion Page 54