There is little doubt that adolescents appear to overestimate their peers’ involvement in substance misuse (Wolfson, 2000). The Campaign may have fallen prey to this problem, but research has demonstrated massive normative misperception, even with illicit inhalants, which received little attention in the Campaign. For example, Crano, Gilbert, Alvaro, and Siegel (2008a) found that less than 5% of their sixth-grade respondents reported ever having used inhalants, but estimated nearly 40% of their friends had done so. A slightly higher proportion (< 10%) of the study’s seventh-grade respondents reported lifetime inhalant misuse, but estimated that more than 50% of their friends had used these substances to get high. This apparent normative misperception may have been motivated, as users estimated significantly higher “friends’ usage” rates than nonusers. It is reasonable to assume that users’ friends indeed might have been more likely to use inhalants than nonusers’ friends, but the extent of the discrepancy strains credulity.
Blanton’s deviance regulation model (DRM) provides the clearest empirically supported method of taking advantage of normative misperceptions in prevention (Blanton & Burkley, 2008; Blanton & Christie, 2003; Blanton, Stuart, & VandenEijnden, 2001). The DRM assumes that people develop images of prototypical persons as a result of the behaviors in which they engage. The image formed of a person described as a marathon runner, for example, is different from that of a chess whiz, or a regular marijuana user. Theoretically, if we engage in behaviors similar to those of the prototype (chess whiz, etc.), others will associate us with the prototype. People attempt to maintain a positive identity by acting in accord with, or contrary to, these implicit positive or negative images.
Because actions that deviate from the norm are viewed as particularly informative, the DRM suggests that people will deviate from (antisocial) norms if by doing so they stand out and are associated with positive prototypes; however, they will avoid deviating from (prosocial) norms if by doing so they become associated with negative images (persons or positions). The model suggests that messages should be framed on the basis of each group’s (or, better, each individual’s) perception of the normative nature of substance misuse or abstinence. For example, if an undesirable behavior (e.g., marijuana use) is viewed as normative by the individual (“Everyone does it”), the model suggests communications will be most effective if they adopt a positive persuasive frame that promotes the desirable attributes and behaviors of those who deviate from the norm (“Teens who refuse to use marijuana are acting responsibly, maturely …”). However, if usage is viewed as nonnormative, then a negative frame is indicated (“Marijuana is rarely used in this school. Why be an outsider?”) This frame emphasizes the negative consequences of deviating from the norm. Blanton and colleagues’ research suggests the utility of the DRM, and hopefully will be widely adopted in the future.
What Is to Be Done?
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The picture of antidrug mass media campaigns that has been drawn to this point is not particularly appealing, but it does supply direction for future campaign developers. In general, most prior campaigns did not live up to their potential. To change this longstanding state of affairs requires a reconsideration of approach. Repeating the same procedures and expecting different results would seem to fit Einstein’s definition of insanity. Taking advantage of all that went before in mass media and drug prevention requires reconsideration of strategies and tactics, starting with reflection on the fundamental functions persuasive messages are meant to serve. Almost by definition, poorly constructed messages will not persuade. In some circumstances, such communications, as has been shown, have produced results opposite to those intended. But how are persuasive messages created? To answer this question requires a return to theories and research in which the fundamental form of the persuasive communication was deliberated. We choose to focus on the work of Carl Hovland and his Yale Communication and Attitude Change Program, which he founded at the end of World War II, and whose impact is felt even today in communication and social psychology (McGuire, 1996). While we do not subscribe to all features of Hovland’s model of the nature of the persuasive communication, especially its almost singular commitment to a strong behaviorist orientation, the fundamental conception of the factors that must be included in a communication, if it is to persuade, strike us as persuasive (McGuire, 2003). These message features are honored more in the breech than in today’s practice, but as has been suggested, common practice does not have much to show for the past 50 years’ efforts in mass-mediated drug prevention. If a lack of clear focus on the construction of persuasive communications is at least in part responsible for past failures, then it makes sense to consider the factors that make a message persuasive.
Hovland insisted that a message must fulfill three functions if it to succeed in persuading. It must raise a question in the mind of the receiver about the validity of an established belief; it must provide an answer to that question at odds with the belief (after all, we are considering persuasion, a change of belief, not reinforcement of held-beliefs); and it must provide some compensation or reinforcement for accepting the proffered alternative (vs. continued resistance and maintenance of the original belief).
Following Hovland’s lead (see especially Hovland, 1954; Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 1953; Hovland, Lumsdaine, & Sheffield, 1949; Sherif & Hovland, 1961), these three components must be included in any and every message that is intended to persuade. They do not exhaust the list of desired features in a communication; rather, they are the minimum necessary requirements of a persuasive message. The focus is directed to persuasion, or attitude change, not attitude formation, for which recent research on evaluative conditioning seems more ideally suited. In persuasion, the receiver holds a position more or less strongly, which is more or less contrary to that advocated in the communication. In attitude formation, the critical belief, if it exists, is ill-formed and not strongly held.
Assuming attention to the message, a big assumption whose consideration is beyond the scope of this chapter (see Crano, 2012; Johnson & Eagly, 1990; McGuire, 2000), the first requirement that the message raise a question in the target’s mind regarding the validity of his or her belief flows naturally from this assumption. Without raising a question, there is little conflict, and subsequently little force for change. If the message fails to raise a question, the persuasion process never begins. This first requirement does not imply that the questioning produces change—it is merely the first step in the process. The message need not raise the question subtly, but it must do so credibly and unmistakably. Not many would judge the Truth anti-smoking campaign as subtle, but there is reasonable evidence that it is effective (Farrelly, Davis, Haviland, Messeri, & Healton, 2005).
The second requirement of the persuasive communication, that it answers the question it has raised, also flows naturally from the notion that the persuasion process is directive. It is not sufficient merely to stimulate a question. It is necessary that receivers accept the recommended answer. Without providing the answer, the communication is unlikely to achieve much in mass communication contexts. The answer to the question raised in the initial phase of the persuasive message process must be difficult to resist if it is to prevail (that is, if the attitude is to be changed). This requirement, too, is premised on Hovland’s view of persuasion dynamics, which maintains that the influence target will raise counterarguments in response to communications that call beliefs into question. The intensity of counterargumentation is theorized to be dependent in part on the centrality or personal relevance of the attitude under persuasive attack. If the attitude is not attached to a highly vested outcome, resistance may be minimal; with highly relevant attitude objects, however, strong resistance can be expected (Crano, 1997; Lehman & Crano, 2002; Visser, Bizer, & Krosnick, 2006).
For this reason, the communication should convey information that is difficult to contradict or falsify, be based on objective facts and observations rather than subjective beliefs, and take advantage of source and cont
ext features that may enhance message impact (Crano, 2012). The goal of the message developer is to anticipate the counterarguments likely to be raised and to build in rebuttals to these arguments in the persuasive message. With attitude outcomes that are involving or vested, messages are more likely to persuade if they are based on valid information, and facts rather than opinions (Gorenflo & Crano, 1989). Their internalization involves acquisition and acceptance of new knowledge, a necessary feature if there is to be consistency between attitudes and actions (Wood, Rhodes, & Biek, 1995). In contexts involving outcomes of low vested interest or weakly held attitudes, the effects of ads that do not share these features may not be differentiable from those that do. However, when poorly designed communications meet well-established attitudes, the attitudes usually prevail.
The call for careful consideration of arguments in developing antidrug campaigns may seem obvious, but common practice appears to belie this perception. In fact, easily rebutted messages seem a relatively consistent feature of many mass mediated antidrug campaigns, if we base our definition on the Hovland’s requirements. This is not to say that much of the available antidrug media content is not intense or extreme; but it is important to distinguish persuasive messages from extreme ones. Extreme messages, exemplified by those used in the classic Reefer Madness and the ongoing Montana Meth campaigns, for example, satisfy few, if any, of Hovland’s requirements, and as such have been shown to be easily resisted (Anderson, 2010; Erceg-Hurn, 2008). Their very extremity gives rise to rejection by audience members who either have used the illicit substance (or who know those who did) and did not suffer the many and varied slings and arrows promised in the message. Given the earlier discussion of iatrogenesis, it is reasonable to suggest that campaigns using extreme, easily rejected messages such as those that characterized these efforts probably did more harm than good.
Unsuccessful mass mediated drug prevention campaigns can fail in many ways, which are not exhausted by failure to adhere to the first two of Hovland’s criteria for a successful persuasive messaging. The final prerequisite of Hovland’s model requires that reinforcement be attached to the counterattitudinal position advocated in the persuasive message. This reinforcement need not be palpable; symbolic rewards are more commonly employed, and probably work as well as more tangible ones. The requirement is important because it forces the persuader to consider possible reasons why a target would forego an established belief and adopt the recommended alternative.
It also leads to a deeper understanding of the kinds of appeals that are most likely to supply the sought-for effects, and those that will prove considerably less likely to deliver. Symbolic reinforcements can come in many guises, and have been studied for many years, although they are not always discussed in behaviorist terms. For example, consider the relatively well-established finding that source credibility can play an important role in boosting the persuasive power of a communication (Crano & Prislin, 2006; Tormala, Briñol, & Petty, 2006). There are many explanations for this regularity, but one of the most persuasive suggests that aligning oneself with an expert or credible or attractive communication source is desirable, or reinforcing. Accepting a well-crafted, data-based message attributed to a recognized and respected information source is reinforcing for those seeking to be right, a motivation commonly recognized as widespread (Festinger, 1954). The specific form of the reinforcement may vary among contexts and persons, but the general rule is clear, and its utility has been demonstrated repeatedly over the years.
Does One Size Fit All?
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Research on the DRM indicates that the same norm-based message is not likely to be maximally effective with respondents who hold widely different normative perceptions of use, the validity of those perceptions notwithstanding. Fitting the appropriate normative appeal to the audience’s normative beliefs has important persuasive implications. We can expand Blanton’s insight into a more general consideration of fitting the message to targets’ features. For example, it seems self-evident that a persuasive drug prevention message delivered to resolutely abstinent nonusers should be different from one designed to persuade long-term substance abusers to quit. Historically, most antidrug mass media campaigns have adopted a universalist (or nontargeted) orientation, in which messages are developed for, and aimed at, the population at large. A limiting factor of this approach is that it is based on the improbable assumption that the same persuasive strategy can be used effectively to change attitudes and behaviors of a diverse group, from different backgrounds, with different perspectives, different norms, and different drug-relevant experiences.
Abundant evidence suggests this assumption is unfounded.1 For example, Fishbein and colleagues (2002) showed that message receivers’ drug use status strongly affected their susceptibility to persuasive appeals; however, they argued that merely distinguishing users from nonusers was unduly insensitive. In addition to the typical user/nonuser distinction, they demonstrated the utility of separating abstinent “intenders” from resolute nonusers to distinguish those adamantly opposed to drug use from those who, although nonusers, might be receptive to use in the future. A similar differentiation is seen in Crano and colleagues’ (2008b) distinction between youth they operationally defined as either resolute or vulnerable nonusers (see also Siegel, Alvaro, & Burgoon, 2003). This research showed that both groups of adolescents, neither of whom had ever used marijuana, differed appreciably in terms of future usage as a function of the intensity of their rejection: Marijuana “never users” who would not rule out future initiation (vulnerable nonusers) were significantly more likely to begin usage (37%) the next year than resolute nonusers who definitely abjured use (10%), and this discrepancy in lifetime use grew over time. In the fourth year of a nationally representative panel study, about one quarter of the nonusers defined as “resolute” in the first year had used marijuana, compared with nearly two-thirds of those nonusers considered at risk (vulnerable nonusers) at the first year’s measurement.
Consistent with these results was a study of adolescents’ reactions to different instantiations of anti-inhalant persuasive messages, which showed significant differences in message response among youth who were current users, vulnerable nonusers, or resolute nonusers (Crano et al., 2007). Users resisted communications that emphasized inhalants’ physical harms, whereas vulnerable nonusers were more likely to reject threats to social standing. Users and vulnerable nonusers responded differently when messages were targeted indirectly (i.e., the messages were addressed to parents rather than participants themselves); this variable did not differentially influence resolute nonusers. Vulnerable nonusers were receptive to peer sources, whereas users preferred adult sources. Resolute nonusers were not differentially attuned to peer or adult message sources: the messages were equally effective for this group. These differences suggest that usage status plays a significant role in determining targets’ susceptibility to persuasive antidrug messages. Further examining the three-part distinction between users, vulnerable nonusers, and resolute nonusers in preventing illicit substance misuse may hold considerable promise for future campaigns. Traditional mass mediated communication campaigns, however, seem uniquely unprepared to target messages on the basis of receiver features, much less tailor messages to targets. With the advent of new technologies, social networking, and the like, fitting message to receiver may not be farfetched, but for the moment, let us stick with the standard mass mediated approaches.
Some Applications of the Messaging Model
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The insights derivable from an application of the general messaging model apply to more than the selection of variables to be used in a message-based persuasion campaign. Hovland’s orientation alerts researchers to fundamental obstacles to be overcome. It does not specify the variables that must be used in the persuasion task, but rather the functions they must fulfill if the attempt is to succeed. In this sense, the model is a general framework that informs the construction of messages. It is concei
vable that there are additional benefits to be gained in an adopting this general framework for persuasive communication. Disseminating a host of well-received messages could be expected to enhance the effect of every new addition to the persuasive message repertoire of a campaign.
This build-up could be explained in a number of ways—framing, stimulus generalization (Hovland’s choice), openness, positive expectations regarding the utility of antidrug messages, and so on, but whatever the chosen mechanism, the point remains that the effect would grow the effectiveness of a campaign. With each addition to the message mix, an accretion of positive effects could be expected. An open mindset fostered by a positive attitude toward the prior messages that constituted the campaign would enhance the likelihood of success of any subsequent message associated with the campaign. Arguably, positive effects found in frequency of exposure research may succeed for this reason, but the effect would be the result of a campaign that has successfully cultivated a positive response (or openness) to its earlier offerings.
The SAGE Handbook of Persuasion Page 61