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CHAPTER 21
Persuading in the Small Group Context
Kyle R. Andrews, Franklin J. Boster, and Christopher J. Carpenter
In 1935, Muzafer Sherif brought subjects into a dark room with a p
inpoint of light shining on the wall. The task of the subjects was to estimate the distance that pinpoint of light was moving. The light was actually stationary, but because of the autokinetic effect, it appears otherwise to the human eye. Making judgments alone, subjects’ distance estimates varied substantially. Sherif then had the same subjects make distance estimates in groups. Across a series of trials the variance in the judgments decreased until the group members converged on a value approximating closely the mean of the initial individual group member estimates. This resulting estimate was proffered by the subjects even when they were asked to make estimates privately on subsequent trials, indicating that the group influence that occurred was not merely an external acquiescence to the group, but rather involved private acceptance as well.
In another study of perceptual acuity, Solomon Asch (1951, 1955) had subjects report which of three lines matched a fourth reference line. The answer was obvious—so obvious that virtually none of the subjects (< 1%) provided the wrong answer when making the decision alone. Because of the environment in which they made their decision, however, subjects were not nearly as accurate when responding in a group context. Of the group members participating in the experiment, only one was an actual subject. The remainder were confederates trained to give a uniform, incorrect answer, all delivered save one prior to the subject’s turn. In this situation Asch found that subjects gave the wrong answer 36.8% of the time. Post-experimental interviews indicated that although some of the subjects thought they could have been wrong in their judgments, the majority knew they were correct, but instead conformed with their fellow group members.
These two studies are often cited as early experimental demonstrations of two types of influence: influence that results in public conformity and private acceptance (Sherif), and influence that results in public conformity but not private acceptance (Asch). Subsequently, theorists have offered a variety of alternative terms for these two concepts, such as Festinger’s (1953) public conformity with private acceptance versus public conformity without private acceptance, Deutsch and Gerard’s (1955) informational influence versus normative influence, and Kelman’s (1961) internalization versus compliance. Pertinent to this chapter, this conceptual distinction facilitates defining persuasion by identifying it with public conformity with private acceptance, and serves to distinguish it from other forms of social influence. Consistent with Bettinghaus (1981), a persuasion attempt will be construed as any effort to alter, reinforce, or shape the attitude of another via verbal or nonverbal communication. If the communication attempt is successful and private acceptance results, then persuasion will be said to have occurred. This chapter focuses solely on persuasion that occurs in the group context, to the exclusion of other forms on influence that are known to occur in groups.
The term “group” is harder to define. In the main, scholars agree that three or more individuals are necessary to term the collective a group, with some disagreement on whether dyadic interactions should be considered group interactions. Groups must meet requirements in addition to a lower limit of members, however. Shaw (1981) suggests that groups are collections of people who are interdependent, interact often, have a collective identity, share common goals, have organizational structure, and in some way(s) satisfy the needs of fellow group members. If “groupness” is viewed as a quantitative, not qualitative, distinction, then a collection of people that fulfill these criteria to a greater extent can be considered more of a group than other collections of people.
Complexities in the Study of Group Persuasion
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Although valuable, distinctions such as persuasion versus compliance present an overly simple view of group influence. One reason is that there are empirical relationships between these constructs. So, for example, in cognitive dissonance and self-perception experiments, scholars have demonstrated that obtaining compliance can lead to attitude change (see Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959; and Bem, 1965, for seminal examples). A second reason is that in natural settings in which it is clear that social influence has occurred (e.g., Jonestown) it is difficult, perhaps impossible, to parse the forms that influence takes. And, even if this task could be managed, it would be yet more challenging to quantify the amount of influence due to each of the parsed sources of influence.
Nevertheless, in certain domains considerable strides in delineating the process by which groups can persuade each other have been made. The remainder of this chapter focuses on three of these areas: the ways in which group members persuade each other, the ways in which group members are persuaded by nongroup members, and the ways in which nongroup members are persuaded by group members.
Persuasion Within Groups
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The Choice Shift
A choice shift occurs when a group’s post-discussion decision is more extreme than the mean of the group members’ pre-discussion decisions. Initially, evidence of group decisions that were more risky than the pre-discussion average was uncovered (Stoner, 1961), and thus the phenomena was termed originally the risky shift. Evidence of a cautious shift soon emerged, however, resulting in the more generic phrase, group polarization, and later the choice shift.
In a typical choice shift experiment, subjects read choice dilemmas (CD), scenarios in which they must choose between two alternative courses of action. One of these alternatives, Option A is said to result in a relatively modest return, but with a high probability of occurring. The other alternative, Option B, is said to have the potential to result in a very high return, but with a low probability of occurring. Subjects are then presented with a range of probabilities that Option B would succeed, and their task is to rate the probability of Option B succeeding necessary for them to choose instead of Option A. One example used by Wallach, Kogan, and Bem (1962) is that of a college student who has to choose between going to medical school and becoming a doctor (an option that has a high probability of success for this student), or attempting to become a concert pianist (the preferred profession, but one at which the student is said to be less likely to succeed). The response items provided to the subject offer a range of probabilities that the college student will succeed as a concert pianist (10% chance of success, 20% chance of success, etc.), and the subjects must decide the lowest probability of success they would be able to tolerate for them to recommend that the college student attempt to become a concert pianist. After making these decisions individually, subjects then discuss the scenario in groups, and come to a collective decision. It is these group decisions that are typically more extreme (either more cautious or more risky) than the mean of the individual group members’ prediscussion position.
A number of theories have been proposed to explain this effect, and to use Deutsch and Gerard’s (1955) distinction, they can generally be categorized into theories based in normative influence and theories based in informational influence. Social comparison theory (SCT) is the dominant normative explanation (see Laughlin & Early, 1982). In a clear summary of SCT, Pruitt (1971) argues that mere exposure to the views of other group members is both necessary and sufficient to obtain the choice shift. He asserts that group members are motivated to equal or exceed their fellow group members of certain valued dimensions, such as risk or caution. Moreover, although they may be incorrect, prior to discussion, group members believe that they do so. Subsequent exposure to the opinions of others serves to indicate to many group members that they were incorrect. These group members then adjust their opinions accordingly so that they equal or exceed the group norm that they underestimated (see also Boster & Hale, 1989, p. 534).
Recently, alternative normative explanations have been proposed. According to the self-categorization explanation, group members naturally contrast their in-group to out-groups, especially when group salience is high. When this contrast process occurs, in-group members shift their opinions in such a way as to make their group more differentiated from an out-group, thus resulting in a more polarized group decision (Abrams, Wetherell, Cochrane, Hog
g, & Turner, 1990, but see Krizan & Baron, 2007). Complementary findings have emerged from research on group polarization in the computer-mediated context. A number of studies (Lee, 2007; Sia, Tan, & Wei, 2002; Spears, Lea, & Lee, 1990) have found that when group members are deindividuated via the process of computer-mediated communication, group identity increases and group polarization is enhanced. Lee (2008) found evidence that individuated groups were more adept at distinguishing strong versus weak arguments than deindividuated groups, and were also more likely to make decisions based on message content. Deindividuated groups, on the other hand, processed less systematically, and incorporated normative considerations in making judgments.
A second more recent normative explanation is Henningsen & Henningsen’s (2004) moderation-elasticity theory. Building on the work of Cialdini and colleagues (Cialdini, Levy, Herman, & Evenbeck, 1973; Cialdini, Levy, Herman, Kozlowski, & Petty, 1976; Cialdini & Petty, 1981), the moderation-elasticity explanation proposes that group members choose more moderate positions before an anticipated interaction because they do not know the positions of others, and moderate positions present the possibility for more social rewards than extreme positions. Once the position of group members is known, the hedging benefits of a moderate position disappear, and it behooves the group member to move in the direction of the group position (either as a result of normative or informational pressures), resulting in the choice shift.
More relevant to this chapter are the explanations of group polarization rooted in informational influence. The foremost informational influence explanation is persuasive arguments theory (PAT). PAT postulates that a pool of arguments favoring both risky and cautious alternatives exists. For CD items that produce a risky shift, the pool of risky arguments exceeds in both number and persuasiveness the pool of cautious arguments, the reverse being the case for CD items that produce a cautious shift. The complete pool of arguments is unknown to each group member, and the set of known arguments varies from group member to group member. Discussion results in sharing arguments so that each group member is exposed to novel arguments. Because of the skewed distribution of arguments in the argument pool, discussion results in each group member learning of more reasons and more extreme reasons to embrace the risky (cautious) alternative. Consequently, group members change their opinions and embrace more extreme positions.
The SAGE Handbook of Persuasion Page 72