by Leo Barron
34 “Catholic soldiers spread the word that a mass would be celebrated at 7 o’clock…. It was as though one was dying, or being born, in travail” (MacKenzie, 1968, 204).
35 “Instead, as Christmas Eve neared… when daylight began to fade on the battlefield” (MacKenzie, 1968, 202–03).
36 “At commencement of the offensive, on the 16th of December… I then returned to my Command Post” (Heintz, 1984, 64).
Chapter Seven
1 D. N. Moran, 2011.
2 “24 December… 1925—Unidentified aircraft over Bastogne. 1945—Enemy aircraft bombing Bastogne” (S2 Section, 327th Glider Infantry Regiment, 1944, 8).
3 “At 1955 approx 4-6 German planes believed to be Ju-88’s bombed Bastogne and vicinity of CP… the planes were out of range and did not fire” (Cox, 1944, 3).
4 S. Marshall, 1946, 250.
5 “Suddenly, three petrifying explosions… Colonel Renfro strode away, followed by the other” (MacKenzie, 1968, 205–08); August Chiwy, an African nurse from the Belgian Congo, also regarded as a heroine for her work with the wounded, survived the bombing (King, 2011).
6 “At 8:30 p.m. Christmas Eve… It is on these grounds that I recommend the highest award possible to one, who though not a member of the armed forces of the United States, was of invaluable assistance to us” (Prior, 2007); (King, 2011).
7 “On Christmas Eve they started…. So we moved up right behind his CP, a place called” (Harper, Bastogne Speech, 1975). To this day, if you visit the Bastogne cemetery, you can still see many of the tombstones and vaults cracked or displaced from the bombing.
8 “That night I didn’t get any sleep at all. I was banged and bounced around in my bed by them Luftwaffe bombs” (A. D’Angelo, Phone Interview with Anthony D’Angelo, 2009).
9 “Sometime after that I fell asleep…. that fires could be seen from outside our hayloft” (Black, The Last First Sergeant, 1998, 242).
10 “I would carry arms and legs from the hospital and put them in a pile. We would burn them later. It was Godawful” (Breder, 2009).
11 “I could watch the bombing of Bastogne… when they dove over Bastogne from the reflection of the flares” (Middough, 1990).
12 “Christmas Eve was not special… but I don’t remember that as our goal/target [objective]” (Lindemann, Second Interview with Ludwig Lindemann, 2010): “Christmas Eve we were in a large tank dugout westerly of Bastogne…. I don’t think it registered to us that it was Christmas” (Lindemann, Questionnaire to Ludwig Lindemann, 2010).
13 “Enemy: Bastogne has been encircled completely for days; enemy supplies munitions and food by air continuously… Achieved objectives are to be indicated through firing of white flares and by telephone or radio to Regtl CP” (Schriefer, 1944); See also German tactics and TO v Es in Handbook on German Military Forces, 1945 (War Department, 1945, Figure 51, Chapter 2); See Order of Battle for the XXXXVII Panzer Corps for the inclusion of Hetzers in 26th VGD (Staff, 1944).
14 “At the command post of the 26th VGD I received from the division commander the written order for the attack against Bastogne… The German troops did not know this, but later they noticed” (Maucke, Report Over the 15th Panzer-Grenadier-Division during the Ardennes Offensive from 16 December 1944 to 2 February 1945: MS P-032c, 1949).
15 Maucke’s assault force, or kampfgruppe, was equipped with an armory of the Third Reich’s weaponry, even if some of it was slightly out-of-date. His Panzergrenadiers were mainly equipped with obsolete Mauser Kar 98k bolt-action rifles. Here and there, several NCOs carried Schmeisser MP 40 9mm submachine guns or the semiautomatic Gewehr 43, also known as the “German Garand.” Many may have also carried the latest and most effective personal weapon, the Sturmgewehr 44, the first true assault rifle, firing a full magazine of thirty short-caliber 7.92mm bullets. For machine gun support, each squad of grenadiers (nine to eleven men) had an MG 42 or medium machine gun team, consisting of a gunner and spotter/ammo carrier. Many of the Germans carried the stick grenade, or Model 24 Stielhandgranate, commonly known as the “potato masher” grenade among the GIs. For camouflage, most of the soldiers had on reversible parkas and snowsuits of white. Helmets had been painted white, or white cloth covers had been attached to blend in with the snow. To strike terror in the hearts of the Americans, Maucke had specifically made sure that several squads fielded flamethrowers. The unusual devices, similar to the American version used mostly in the Pacific theater, consisted of a tank strapped to the back of the operator, carrying petrol and an oily gel similar to napalm. Another tank was filled with hydrogen as a propellant. When the operator squeezed a lever on the “gun” portion, a rubber tube attached to the tank squirted a hose of flaming liquid that could shoot some fifty or more feet. There was also a one-shot, smaller version of this device called the Einstossflammenwerfer 46, which could be carried under the arm. Although terrifying, the flamethrowers were not popular among the grenadiers. Often, these devices were more dangerous to the operator than to the enemy. A few of Maucke’s soldiers carried the antitank Panzerfaust or Panzerschreck, bazookalike weapons that propelled a cone-shaped explosive charge to penetrate enemy armor plating. Of Hauptmann Schmidt’s eleven tanks, the majority were the standard Panzerkampfwagen IV Ausf H, an aging but reliable medium tank used since 1941. Known to Americans as the Mark (Mk) IV, this veteran tank (although underarmored and undergunned compared to newer German tanks, such as the Mark V Panther and monstrous King Tigers and Jagdtigers), was still a force to be reckoned with when compared to the American M4 Sherman and M18 Hellcat. The Mk IV had long been regarded as the workhorse tank of the Wehrmacht and, in its most updated version, had supplied most of the tank companies during Wacht am Rhein. The crews were not happy about one recent change to the vehicle. Earlier that year, someone in the division that oversaw armament production decided to add extra gas tanks to extend the tank’s range. To accommodate this change, the small motor that powered the turret was removed. Now the crew had to turn a hand crank every time to rotate the turret. The maximum speed to turn the gun 180 degrees was now about five minutes—a fatal slowness in battle. There were at least three Sturmgeschütz III Ausf G assault guns attached to Dyroff’s battalion. The StuG (“Stoog”), for short, was an ungainly, bargain-basement armored vehicle that was really not supposed to serve as a tank. As a self-propelled (SP) or “assault” gun, the StuG had the same 75mm weapon as the Panzer Mk IV, yet the gun was mounted low and almost immobilized in the hull, simply pointing straight forward. The StuG III lacked a traversing turret like the Mk IV. It could really fire in only one direction—forward. This was actually a cost-effective idea—by skipping the production of a complicated rotating turret more StuGs could be manufactured in German factories compared to turreted tanks, and, at 82,500 reichsmarks, a StuG was also cheaper than a Mk IV, which cost more than double that amount to build. This may have seemed a strange concept, but originally the assault gun idea had been a great success during the early part of the war. In the open plains of Russia, the vehicle was considered simply a tracked artillery piece that could keep pace with the infantry. StuGs were originally crewed and managed by the Wehrmacht’s artillery corps. Later in the war, as with the 115th Panzer, the vehicles were used simply as tanks, or tank destroyers to supplement the lack of Jagdpanthers, Jagdpanzer IVs, Panzer IVs, and Panther V medium tanks at the battalion level. With a low silhouette, the StuG III was hard to see and hard to hit. Although providing less cover without a turret, with their flat backs they were easier for soldiers to ride on. Some even came with handrails welded on for just this purpose. The 75mm KwK 40 L/48 anti-tank gun shared by both the Mk IV and StuG III was indeed an awesome weapon. With a muzzle velocity of 2,800 feet per second, the weapon was easily comparable to the more famous (infamous to the Allies) German 88mm. Especially on the mobile Mk IV, the 75mm, firing a APCBC (armor-piercing capped ballistic cap) round could cut through the armor on any American tank of the time. As described in an U.S. Army intelligence bulletin of the time, the Germa
n 75mm was capable of “defeating, in European fighting conditions [that is, up to 1,500 yards], armor 100 millimeters thick and greater thicknesses at shorter ranges”—information that was certainly not comforting to American tankers. Maucke’s 33rd Panzerjäger (tank destroyer) Battalion seems to have been equipped with a motley collection of about twenty older tank destroyers of the Marder II, III, and Hetzer types. Several of the versatile StuG IIIs may have even rounded out the unit.
16 “At 2000 hours, in accordance with the card… Despite a bitter defense, the enemy was obviously surprised” (Maucke, Report Over the 15th Panzer-Grenadier-Division during the Ardennes Offensive from 16 December 1944 to 2 February 1945: MS P-032c, 1949); “Distribution of orders… The II Battalion shall be in reserve” (Operations Section, 1944).
17 “After 2100 hours on 24 December… The promised support had not been given any credence from the very start. Towards midnight of 24/25 December, several German planes appeared over Bastogne and dropped some bombs…” (H. Kokott, Ardennes Offensive—Battle of Bastogne, MS #B-040, 1950, 125–27).
18 “In Contact… 77th VG Regt 78th VG Regt 39th VG Regt 901 PG Regt 902 PG Regt 2 PG Regt 2 SS PG Regt, ‘Der Fuhrer’… 123 casualties were in the aid station at the time of the bombing and 23 are still missing” (P. A. Danahy, G-2 Periodic Reports No. 6 from: 240007 to 242400, December 1944).
19 For the intelligence overlay, see Anlage 2. “At 0000 hours, orders were distributed for the attack against Bastogne…. The commander was temporarily assigned as a stop measure, which explains why the battalion was not committed to the difficult task in the front lines” (Maucke, Report Over the 15th Panzer-Grenadier-Division during the Ardennes Offensive from 16 December 1944 to 2 February 1945: MS P-032c, 1949); “1830 Hours Distribution of orders to the commanders and chiefs of the regimental units… each of the 2 battalions shall receive two forward observers. The II Battalion shall be in reserve” (Operations Section, 1944); “Franz Adam Dyroff wurde am 06. Mai 1916 in Langstadt bei Dieburg geboren… Franz Adam Dyroff verstarb am 24. März 1998 und wurde auf dem Friedhof Darmstadt-Eberstadt beigesetzt” (The Knight’s Cross, Deutsche Wehrmacht and Waffen SS, 2007).
20 “The night in the basement of the Pensionnat des Soeurs de Notre-Dame… but also all the other passages where the hundreds of refugees were crowded” (Heintz, 1984, 65); “0300 25 Dec. Enemy planes are now bombing our entire Regimental area” (S2 Section, 502nd Parachute Infantry Regiment, 1944, 8).
Chapter Eight
1 Stryker, 1898, 70–71; D. N. Moran, Colonel Johann Gottleib Rall: Guilty of Tactical Negligence or Guiltless Circumstances, 2008.
2 Stryker, 1898, 70–71; D. N. Moran, Colonel Johann Gottleib Rall: Guilty of Tactical Negligence or Guiltless Circumstances, 2008.
3 “The unsheltered bystander [MacKenzie], too, had heard the first note of Death’s Christmas Hymn… they expanded and rose as upright as they might until the next” (MacKenzie, 1968, 212–13).
4 “In the deep foxhole beside the main gates at the western side of the Division headquarters compound… ‘We had better wake the Old Man,’ the Chief of Staff said to the early morning crew with him in the operations room. General McAuliffe accordingly was called” (MacKenzie, 1968, 211–16, 218).
5 “0300 25 Dec. Enemy planes are now bombing our entire Regimental area” (S2 Section, 502nd Parachute Infantry Regiment, 1944, 8); “At 0300 hours attack of Regimental strength was launched…. Casualties were light” (Danahy, 1944); “At 0300 hours on the 25 December 1944 ‘A’ Company’s position… hand to hand street fighting ensued” (Chappuis, 1944, 4).
6 “25 Dec 44 Shelling has been going on for three minutes on our positions. All communication destroyed with Able 1, 3, and 3” (A Co Headquarters Section, 502nd Parachute Infantry, 1945).
7 “On December 25th, Christmas morning, shelling started about 0300… but that was something we had to keep doing out of necessity” (Koskimaki, 2008, 284).
8 “…an all-out barrage, artillery, cannon, mortar and other firepower… and all connections from the front to the back and around our strongpoints” (Astor, 1994, 329–30).
9 “Well, about 2:30 in the morning there was this intense artillery barrage…. We knew something was up” (Fowler, Interview with Corporal Willis Fowler, 2009); “A little after 2 a.m. on the 25th… the Germans had broke and we scurried to our holes” (Goldmann, 1945).
10 “Mr. Hodge was born 12 Feb 1925. He was a member A/502 PIR, 101st ABN DIV. Born in Jefferson City, Missouri… That was his last big battle” (Hodge Jr., 2008); “The C.P. of the 2nd Platoon Co ‘A’ on December 24, 1944 was stationed in a farmhouse… as one of the men in the outpost had been severely wounded in the back by shrapnel” (Wise, 1948). Airborne platoons typically had two platoon leaders, since attrition was so high. One was designated the assistant platoon leader. In this case, Wise was the assistant.
11 “One Christmas Eve the Regt had midnight Mass in the 10th Century chapel of Rolle… that his men were locked in a hand-to-hand and house-to-house fight with them” (Cassidy, 1945, 7).
12 Another possibility is the explosive charges froze that night due to the frigid temperatures and damp weather.
13 “During the night, the Bastogne area was bombed… were rushed into position to back up the machine guns, but never had to fire as the enemy withdrew into the woods and ceased fire on 2nd Battalion’s positions” (Phillips, 1948, 20–21); “That very night, on the opposite side of our lines, the enemy activity had increased… in grotesque forms the death froze into eternity” (Peniche, 2009); “‘I thought mostly about home in the Yucatan in southern Mexico where we never had snow,’ he recorded in his journal… you have to be a patriot… you cannot shrink” (Meyer, 2008, 18).
14 This is alluded to by Asay and others in Koskimaki, but I have no direct accounts or figures.
15 “25 Dec 44… 0319 Enemy attacked between Able 1 and 3. Street fighting throughout the site. Able 2 CP set on fire. Large enemy forces behind lines, TD committed” (A Co Headquarters Section, 502nd Parachute Infantry, 1945).
16 “The CP of the 2nd Platoon with 1Lt. John Harrison (I was assistant platoon leader) on December 24, 1944 was situated in a farmhouse on the outskirts of Champs… while we fired at the Jerries attacking the 1st Platoon CP trying to distract the enemy” (Wise, 1948).
17 “I see German soldiers starting over the ridge to our front…. We always thought could get attacked, so it seemed like the smart thing to do” (Fowler, Interview with Corporal Willis Fowler, 2009); “Well, my assistant gunner, Bill Emerson, he wasn’t shooting when I came out of the potato shed…. He hadn’t been firing the machine gun; I knew I had to get that gun into action. I think he just kind of froze up a bit” (Fowler, 2nd Interview with Corporal Willis Fowler, 2010).
18 There are several stories from Bastogne veterans of machinery from pistols to tanks freezing up in the cold. In a purely nonscientific experiment, I once placed an M1 Garand, a M1A1 Thompson submachine gun, and an M1 carbine in the woods overnight during a frigid Colorado winter night. Taking temperature readings each hour, I recorded temperatures from thirteen degrees at seven p.m. to minus five degrees at about four a.m. The bolts and actions on all three weapons worked fine, even with frost buildup. It is my belief that the freezing and thawing (melted ice in the action), along with grime, grease, and gun oil, were the real culprits. Most of these weapons were designed to work in freezing temperatures as long as they were routinely stripped of oil and grease and kept dry and clean, which would have been near impossible for the soldiers in their foxholes that December (Author Don Cygan).
19 “The squad on the right side of the road wasn’t so lucky… which substantiated our beliefs” (Goldmann, 1945).
20 “The Germans hit us Christmas Eve. Fought an all-nite action at Champs. Squad on right overrun. Spent the nit directing fire and throwing hand grenades on the right to keep the Germans off our flank” (Asay, Individual Action Report for Bastogne, 1990); For list of MIAs, see A Company logs for that d
ay (A Co Headquarters Section, 502nd Parachute Infantry, 1945).
21 “I should have gotten back to our line…. That was the beginning of the worst four months of my life” (Koskimaki, 2008, 286).
22 “Company ‘A’ had the responsibility of protecting the Champs area… although they didn’t know if we were still around or who it was that might be on the right” (Koskimaki, 2008, 285–86).
23 “Arriving from across the fields, the first Germans reached the road which crossed the village, and infiltrated between the houses and Raviola and Ries… still had the courage to demand a cigarette” (Heintz, 1984, 72–73); “Witness Statements…Victor Raviola, Albert Clement, Achille Denis, Madeleine Seleck, Angèle Clement-Gouvienne, Rosine Paul-Denis… another was put in over the staircase” (Cercle d’Histoire de Bastogne, 1994, Chapter 14).
24 “At 0330 Cassidy called Swanson again…. And while they were talking the line went out” (Cassidy, 1945, 7); “At 0330, Colonel Cassidy called Captain Swanson (Company A) asking him about the situation at Champs…. Colonel Cassidy tried the radio but failed to make contact with Captain Swanson” (Phillips, 1948, 21).
25 “Prior to Company ‘A’ moving to Champs there had been another road block along the road south of Champs and due west of Rolle… if it pushed on into town and the Germans came around it” (Cassidy, 1945, 7–8); “The Regimental Commander, Lieutenant Colonel Steve A. Chappuis, was awakened…. This sector was thinly held by the 3rd Battalion [1/401st] 327th Glider Regiment” (Phillips, 1948, 21–23).
26 “Chappuis called First Bn by radio and told them to get ready to move… . then get forward into Champs and help Swanson” (Cassidy, 1945, 7); “During the early morning hours of the 25th, the regimental command wanted to know if we could use additional help. I informed them that even though there was lots of action going on in Champs, I did not feel as though any more troops should be sent in because of the darkness” (Koskimaki, 2008, 289); “Lt. Colonel Hanlon was ordered by the Regimental Commander… Companies ‘B’ and ‘C’ were halted along the road from Hemroulle to Champs” (Chappuis, 1944, 4).