by Nigel West
Another BJ from General Osamu transmitted a further report to Tokyo, which he circulated to his colleagues in Lisbon, Madrid, Istanbul and Sofia, suggesting to the BJ analysts that it was considered important:
Whether landings in the Seine bay represent the chief point of the enemy’s plan or whether in addition to this the main offensive, which has been kept secret, is now being prepared is not yet clear. In view of the fact that these operations are being carried out by almost the whole strength of the American 1st Army (Normandy area) and the British 2nd Army (Seine Bay area) which belong to the 21st Army Group which is on the south west coast of Britain and by almost the whole strength of the Air Force and Navy, it is thought for the time being that this will be the only area included in their plans. But because one separate Army Group is stationed on the southeast coast of Britain it is expected that plans will be made for this to land in the Calais and Dunkirk areas.
On 19 June the Japanese ambassador gave an account of his interview at the Foreign Ministry with Ribbentrop’s deputy for propaganda, Dr Adolf von Steengracht:
According to investigations made by the Supreme Command on the basis of prisoners’ statements and captured documents there were in England, in addition to the Army Group under Montgomery, 23 divisions under the command of General Patton ready to carry out an invasion. This was another reason why the Germans (had refrained?) from pouring their armies into Normandy. Montgomery’s Army Group consisted of 36 divisions and it was thought that the original plan had been to occupy Cherbourg and Le Havre with about 17 of these divisions and then to advance south east down the Seine; meanwhile Patton’s Army Group would simultaneously have carried out landing operations between Dieppe and the country lying to the east of the port. The Germans still considered that there was a great likelihood of Patton’s Army Group landing between Dieppe and Boulogne and were prepared for this.
Again, Ops (B) was encouraged to see that the OKW remained convinced of the threat from Patton’s FUSAG, and noted that Oshima had been told that the information about FUSAG had come from PoWs, which could scarcely be true, and presumably had been a security measure to avoid revealing the true nature of the source. On 23 June another BJ, from the ambassador to his foreign minister, stated that, ‘The German High Command felt that their primary task was to meet the main body of the enemy which still had to be landed,’ thereby confirming that the OKW were still persuaded.
On 24 June Oshima set out his own analysis of the situation, which presumably was based on briefings, his own observations, and discussions with his embassy staff:
The Germans are in a position in which effectively to assume the offensive it is necessary for them to call upon large numbers of troops from the rear and other areas. Moreover, in England, Patton’s armies are waiting for a chance to land so that it is thought that it would be dangerous to put strong forces in Normandy … Although the German High Command are not able to discern clearly from the Anglo-American landing in Normandy the whole of their plan they can see roughly what they are aiming at and it is now felt that there is no fear, strategically, of a surprise attack from the British and the Americans while, anticipating that the Armies under Patton now standing by will naturally land somewhere in the north of France, the German army is awaiting them, and is concentrating on the transportation of general reserves from Germany to the west with the intention of launching a general offensive after making the best possible tactical dispositions. The important point, however, is when the enemy forces in England will land and whether: (1) they will attempt a landing relatively soon in connection with the operations in Normandy (it seems that the Germans consider this very likely) or (2) the enemy will land after it has got possession of Cherbourg and has landed (reserves?) and heavy equipment and has extended his bridgehead to include the high ground round Le Havre.
Three days later, on 27 June, Oshima relayed more information that he had been given earlier in the day by Dr Steengracht:
The morale and political consequence of the fall of Cherbourg would be more serious than the military and he himself though it was unfortunate … On the other side of the picture, however, Montgomery had already poured about 30 Divisions into Normandy. In the opinion of the German Supreme Command Patton’s Army remained concentrated east and south east of Southampton. More than 350 large and small vessels had been got ready, and landing operations would be attempted in the near future … The Germans, however, were determined to ambush these landing forces and smash them …
The BJs gave Ops (B) some understanding of what was happening in Berlin, but it would have to wait to make a comparison with one of Helmut Arntz’s documents, an FHW assessment for the period 13 to 25 June, dated 26 June:
C in C West makes the following appreciation of the situation as a whole:
The enemy still has not committed the American Army Group described in South-east England which is ready to jump off. It is stronger in force than Montgomery’s Group, its airborne troops will be reinforced with parts of battle-tried airborne and may also be stiffened with battle-tried units now appearing in Normandy. In connection with the intentions of gaining an operational base against Paris, the American Army Group could be used for landings staggered in time extending from points on both sides of the Somme to the Seine, with the mission of encircling and capturing the port of Le Havre; then together with the British Army Group launching a pincer movement against Paris on both sides of the Seine. Our forces behind the 15th Army are not sufficient, particularly for repelling the large-scale air landings that must be expected. Furthermore, the mobile units behind the 15th Army are not sufficient for a powerful counter offensive. High losses are to be expected on both sides. Without counting the defenders of Cherbourg, there were 47,070 casualties in Army Group between 6 and 25 June. Of these 897 were officers, among them 6 generals, 63 Commanders, 4 General Staff (officers). Further preparation of combat march [combat-ready] battalions appears to be warranted.
b. Mediterranean Coast Front
The threat to the French Mediterranean coast from the 12 to 14 divisions ready in North Africa has moved further into the foreground as a result of the unusually strong air attacks of 24 and 25 June against traffic installations and airports in Southern France. Army Group G believes in the possibility of an early enemy attack, in which connection the entry into the Mediterranean of aircraft carriers and auxiliary aircraft carriers from Gibraltar must be considered. The good showing of the French forces in Italy must be kept in mind in case of a landing on the French South Coast, particularly from the viewpoint of the psychological aspects.
Evidently the OKW retained its belief in FUSAG, and the pretence would continue until September when the charade was quietly dropped. When the Abwehr asked what had happened to the expected assault, the answer was that the Normandy offensive had been unexpectedly successful, making the further amphibious or airborne landings redundant. On 30 June General Osamu sent Tokyo a summary of the past ten days:
The British VII Corps Headquarters and the 52nd Infantry Division and the British II Corps Headquarters which were formerly stationed in Scotland have moved south from there. According to reliable intelligence the units which were on the south east coast and the units which were in the county of Kent are believed to have moved to the mouth of the Thames and to have been preparing for embarkation … Investigations of the formations which have landed in Northern France show that there was no error in previous estimates of the (disposition?) of troops in Britain. The American 28th, 79th and 80th Infantry Divisions and the American 5th Armoured Division have been identified in southern and south eastern England.
All this was in line with the Ops (B) narrative intended to keep the threat live, and continued on 3 July when FUSAG was referred to again by the ambassador in a BJ sent to Tokyo.
In Normandy the British armies were extending their bridgehead … The German armies did not intend for the present to drive the British and Americans out completely (they were not yet using the General Army Gro
up reserve in the area in question) and thinking that the group of armies under General Patton, waiting in the south of England, would very probably attempt a landing in the Le Havre area or in Brittany, were mainly concerned with making preparations to surprise them.
On 3 July, GARBO made his last contribution to FORTITUDE, with a short message from DORICK, who had seen the British 80th Infantry Division in Ipswich. Previously, this formation had been located in St Anne’s, Lancashire, and would later move to Kent.
On 6 July, a month after D-Day, Oshima had more to tell Tokyo, following a further confidential briefing from Dr Steengracht:
On the Normandy front the Anglo-American attacks aimed at a push south by American troops from the Cotentin Peninsula … There were some who thought that this opportunity should be seized to begin a general counterattack with part of the German forces but Marshal Kluge, who had recently become Commander-in-Chief in the west, [and] Vice-Marshal Rundstedt (Marshal Rommel is subordinate to him as before) prudently considered that his objective would be amply attained if he waited till the enemy attacked for the purpose of enlarging his bridgehead and that it was essential to make sure what the main enemy forces in England itself were up to. The result was that calmer thought had prevailed. The Germans, as before, anticipated that the enemy would next undertake landing operations in the area of the Straits.
Germany appears to think that the enemy will use Patton’s forces to attempt a second landing in the area of the Straits in the comparatively near future, and she evidently plans to liquidate the enemy in the Normandy area after liquidating this landing.
On 13 July Oshima sent another telegram to Tokyo, attributing the information directly to Dr Steengracht:
According to information in the possession of the Germans it appears that all the forces under Montgomery’s command had been landed in Normandy but up to the present not a single part of Patton’s forces seemed to have been landed and the German impression continues to be that Patton’s army would take part in the next landing operations in the sector extending from a point contiguous to the existing bridgehead up to the vicinity of Dieppe … Of the reserves held by Rommel a large part of the Tiger and Panzer forces were being kept back.
On 10 July, GARBO described the results of his research into the arrival of US troops in Liverpool:
I have obtained details about the American Army in the region of Liverpool. It is the Fourteenth Army. There is also in the West, another army, already reported, namely the Ninth American Army, Commander-in-Chief General Simpson; both under the command of FUSAG. No details about the Ninth. The Fourteenth Army, headquarters at Mobberley in Cheshire; composition XXXIII Corps and another, number unknown. I hear that it is due to move to the East of England in the near future. The XXXIII Corps at Marbury in Cheshire; composition 11th and 48th U.S. Divisions and an American armoured division. The 11th and 48th Divisions arrived during the month of June, well trained.
In reality, all these units were imaginary. However, General William Simpson was appointed to command the US Ninth Army in May 1944, but the rest of GARBO’s report was false, serving to establish the arrival of several entirely new American divisions.
It was at this point that the Allied deception planners encountered a significant and unforeseen problem when SHAEF revealed its intention to send the First Canadian Army and the US Third Army to Normandy. Hitherto, both formations had appeared in FUSAG’s order of battle, and it would not take the Germans long to realise that these units had been sent to the battle front, thus depleting FUSAG and undermining the threat of a ‘second wave’. When inevitably discovered, either through radio intercepts or a PoW interrogation, the Germans would be entitled to wonder if FUSAG had been committed to the western front and, if so, whether there was any realistic prospect of a further invasion. To plug the gap, Ops (B) arranged for FUSAG’s missing components to be replaced immediately by the recently raised US Ninth Army, which was not scheduled to be deployed to France until September. In addition, FUSAG received the entirely notional British Fourth Army, brought down from Scotland.
On 19 July BRUTUS mailed a lengthy report about his recent visit to FUSAG’s headquarters at Wentworth:
I learnt at Wentworth that FUSAG has undergone important changes owing to the necessity of sending immediate reinforcements to Normandy. So far as I know the Supreme Commander, namely Eisenhower, decided that it was necessary to send urgently a part of the forces under FUSAG, who would pass under the command of a new army group. These forces will be replaced in FUSAG by new units arriving from America and by British reserves. No exact details but I can confirm that FUSAG will include the Ninth American Army, the Fourteenth Army and the Fourth British Army. FUSAG, changes in command: I suppose that Eisenhower and Patton were not in agreement over the change in the Order of Battle because Patton has been replaced by General McNair as Commander-in-Chief of FUSAG. I have discussed, with my colonel, the latest changes which have caused a good deal of bother at our headquarters. He tells me that Montgomery demanded immediate reinforcements in Normandy in such a fashion that it was necessary to send units from FUSAG which were already in the South of England, notably the First Canadian Army and a large part of the Third American Army. The fresh units in FUSAG will take up the duties of the units which have been dispatched. The staff command of FUSAG remains unchanged, the Fourteenth American Army has already removed towards East Anglia to the area formerly occupied by the Third Army. The headquarters are at Little Waltham. The Fourth British Army is also in the South. My colonel considers that the fresh units in FUSAG will be ready to take the offensive towards the beginning of August.
Thus BRUTUS confirmed FUSAG’s continuing existence, provided news of replacements from the United States, and emphasised the threat of a further invasion in August. On the very same day, GARBO couriered a lengthy report to Lisbon, having closed down his transmitter on 12 July as a security precaution, allegedly prompted by his temporary detention when he had expressed too much interest in a V-1 bombsite. This had been the pretext for GARBO to go off the air for twelve days, following his arrest by an over-zealous policeman at a particularly crucial moment during the battle for Normandy. GARBO’s letter contained the latest news from his friend, the American sergeant:
A few days after the attack in Normandy had started General Montgomery found himself up against unexpected difficulties and asked for re-enforcements who were available to go into action immediately. The FUSAG troops being the only first line troops which were then available, he asked for certain of their formations even at the cost of delaying the plan to be undertaken by this Army Group. A few days later, General Eisenhower, in spite of the opposition of Patton, put at first the 83rd Division, and later, the Second Canadian Corps, under the orders of Montgomery. At the end of June, Montgomery was again dissatisfied, and found the situation in Normandy serious, and after having convinced Eisenhower of the necessity to strengthen the bridgehead still more, it was again decided to change the plan. This time Eisenhower promised Montgomery that if it became necessary he could make use of all the troops he required from FUSAG and that they could be incorporated with the U.S. Army already in the battle front in Normandy, in a newly formed Army Group. He made the conditions that part of the personnel of the Headquarters of FUSAG who had knowledge of the original plan should remain where they were in England so as to be able to control the operation when it was put into execution, and that in place of those who were transferred to France another staff officer would be brought from the USA direct. This new American Army Group hurriedly formed, will be known as the 12th U.S. Army Group. During this period of reorganization many staff officers anxiously started to manoeuvre for better jobs under one or other of the two Army Groups. This crisis was greatly aggravated by opposition from General Patton who is known among Americans to be a rough and brutal soldier. He opposed this plan, insisting that the troops trained for the second assault should remain under his command. This discussion was brought to an acid end by Eisenhow
er, after some insubordination by Patton. He was removed from his command of FUSAG and given instead the command of the 3rd U.S. Army, giving over the command of the 12th U.S. Army Group to General Bradley who is Eisenhower’s ‘yes man’ who at the same time has the experience of the battles he had led in France. The command of FUSAG was unfilled for a few days and was then given over to another of Eisenhower’s favourites, called McNair who has just recently arrived from America. This reorganization was completed last week. Meanwhile, the new FUSAG is being reorganized and is being formed with the 9th and 14th U.S. Armies which have arrived here during the last two months. (These are the units which he previously told me were arriving.) He told me that his uncle has been promoted and is now one of the chiefs of the 14th U.S. Army, and his Division, the 48th U.S. Division, was trained in assault before its arrival here and was recently incorporated in FUSAG. I asked him whether the new FUSAG was now weaker than the old. He said that it was not, as apart from these armies, the 4th British Army was also coming under it and would be coming down from Scotland as well as a large contingent of English divisions which will bring up the total of this army to a force in excess of thirty divisions.
Less than a month later, on 12 August GARBO reported on his latest meeting with CASTOR, his American sergeant who:
told me that in view of the possibility of the immediate collapse of the German Army, the Allied Chiefs of Staff want Eisenhower to maintain the closest contact with Montgomery at the present time. For this reason a section of Supreme Headquarters has been transferred to the Normandy front with the category of Advanced Headquarters for those two Army Groups, but the structure of Supreme Headquarters remains here. He said that it was merely a question of establishing closer liaison between the headquarters of Montgomery and Supreme Headquarters. Also learned the following from him: the Commander-in-Chief of the two Army Groups fighting in France is Montgomery.