The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha
Page 148
1207 According to Buddhist legend, three of the divine messengers—the old man, the sick man, and the dead man—appeared to the Bodhisatta while he was living in the palace, destroying his enchantment with the worldly life and awakening in him a desire to seek the way to deliverance. See AN 3:38/i.145–46 for the psychological nucleus out of which the legend must have developed.
1208 The following description of hell, down to §16, is also found at MN 129.10–16.
SUTTA 131
1209 This discourse with a lengthy introduction and notes is available separately in a translation by Bhikkhu Ñā˚ananda under the title Ideal Solitude.
1210 In the first edition I followed Ñm in rendering bhaddekaratta as “one fortunate attachment.” At the suggestion of Ven. Thānissaro Bhikkhu, however, I have changed it to “a single excellent night,” which seems more likely to be correct. Ratta and ratti could be taken to represent respectively either Skt rātra and rātri (= night) or Skt rakta and rakti (= attachment). Ñm had taken the words in the latter sense, but the fact that neither MA nor Ṃ glosses ratta implies that “night” is intended; for if the word were used to mean attachment, an unwholesome state in typical Buddhist discourse, some commentarial clarification would surely have been offered. The Central Asian Skt version, the Skt title at the head of the Tibetan version, and the Tibetan translation itself all use bhadrakarātri . This confirms the identification of ratta with “night”; the change from -e- to -a- can be understood as an attempt to convert a difficult reading into a more familiar one. (I am indebted to Peter Skilling for this information.) The Chinese Madhyama Āgama has merely transliterated the title of the Skt version and thus offers no help.Apart from this series of suttas, the expression bhaddekaratta does not occcur elsewhere in the Pali Canon. MA merely says: “‘A single-excellent-nighter’ is one with a single night who is excellent because of possessing application to insight” (bhaddekarattassā ti vipassanāyogasamannāgatattā bhaddekassa ekarattassa). Ṃ simply gives word resolutions (ek̄ ratti ekaratto; bhaddo ekaratto etassā ti bhaddekarattaṁ) and says this refers to a person cultivating insight. As the verse emphasises the urgent need to conquer death by developing insight, the title probably describes a meditator who has had a single excellent night (and day) devoted to practising insight meditation “invincibly, unshakeably.” Ñm says in Ms: “It might be supposed that the expression ‘bhaddekaratta’ was a popular phrase taken over by the Buddha and given a special sense by him, as was not infrequently done, but there seems to be no reason to do so and there is no evidence for it in this case. It is more likely to be a term coined by the Buddha himself to describe a certain aspect of development.”
1211 More literally the first two lines would be translated: “Let not a person run back to the past or live in expectation of the future.” The meaning will be elucidated in the expository passage of the sutta.
1212 MA: He should contemplate each presently arisen state, just where it has arisen, by way of the seven contemplations of insight (insight into impermanence, suffering, non-self, disenchantment, dispassion, cessation, relinquishment).
1213 Asaṁhı̄raṁ asankuppaṁ. MA explains that this is said for the purpose of showing insight and counter-insight (see n.1143); for insight is “invincible, unshakeable” because it is not vanquished or shaken by lust and other defilements. Elsewhere the expression “the invincible, the unshakeable” is used as a description of Nibbāna (e.g., Sn v.1149) or of the liberated mind (e.g., Thag v.649), but here it seems to refer to a stage in the development of insight. The recurrence of the verb form saṁhı̄rati in §8 and §9 suggests that the intended meaning is contemplation of the present moment without being misled into the adoption of a view of self.
1214 The “Peaceful Sage” (santo muni) is the Buddha.
1215 MA: One “finds delight” by bringing to bear upon the past either craving or a view associated with craving. It should be noted that it is not the mere recollection of the past through memory that causes bondage, but the reliving of past experiences with thoughts of craving. In this respect the Buddha’s teaching differs significantly from that of Krishnamurti, who seems to regard memory itself as the villain behind the scene.
1216 The syntax of the Pali allows this sentence to be inter-preted in two ways, as stating either that one thinks, “I had such form in the past,” yet does not find delight in that thought; or that one does not find delight in the past by thinking such a thought. Horner, Ñā˚ananda (in Ideal Solitude), and Ñm (in Ms) construe the sentence in the former way; I had preserved Ñm’s rendering in the first edition. On reconsideration, I now believe that the second interpretation is more true to the intention of the text. This also ties in better with the stanzas themselves, which enjoin the disciple not to dwell in the past and the future but to contemplate “each presently arisen state” just as it presents itself.
1217 In the first edition, this sentence was rendered: “Thinking, ‘I may have such material form in the future,’ one finds delight in that.” In retrospect, it now seems to me more likely that the sentence expresses an exclamatory wish for the future.
1218 The verb here and in the next paragraph, saṁhı̄rati, refers back to the line in the verse, “invincibly, unshakeably.” MA glosses: “One is dragged along by craving and views because of the lack of insight.”
SUTTA 133
1219 Down to §12, as at MN 18.10–15.
1220 MA: In the two previous suttas and in the one to follow the Buddha set up the outline and analysis by way of the five aggregates, but here he set it up so that it could be analysed by way of the twelve sense bases. Understanding the Buddha’s intention, Ven. Mahā Kaccāna spoke as he did, and because of his skill in grasping the method even when it was not explicitly shown, the Buddha appointed him the foremost disciple in explaining in detail a teaching stated in brief.
SUTTA 134
1221 According to the commentary to Thag, Ven. Lomasakangiya had been a bhikkhu in the time of the Buddha Kassapa. After the Buddha Kassapa had taught the Bhaddekaratta Sutta, a certain bhikkhu spoke about it to Lomasakangiya. Unable to understand it, he exclaimed: “In the future, may I be able to teach you this sutta!” The other answered: “May I ask you about it!” In the present age Lomasakangiya was born into a Sakyan family at Kapilavatthu, while the other bhikkhu became the god Candana.
1222 MA explains that this occurred in the seventh year after the Buddha’s enlightenment, at the time when he spent the three months of the rainy season in the heaven of the Thirty-three teaching the Abhidhamma to the gods who had assembled from ten thousand world-systems.
SUTTA 135
1223 See MN 99. According to MA, his father, the brahmin Todeyya, was reborn as a dog in his own house because of his extreme stinginess. The Buddha identified him to Subha by getting the dog to dig up some hidden treasure Subha’s father had buried before his death. This inspired Subha’s confidence in the Buddha and moved him to approach and inquire about the workings of kamma.
1224 If the kamma of killing directly determines the mode of rebirth, it will produce rebirth in one of the states of deprivation. But if a wholesome kamma brings about a human rebirth—and rebirth as a human being is always the result of wholesome kamma—the kamma of killing will operate in a manner contrary to that of the rebirth-generative kamma by causing various adversities that may eventuate in a premature death. The same principle holds for the subsequent cases in which unwholesome kamma comes to maturity in a human existence: in each case the unwholesome kamma counteracts the wholesome kamma responsible for the human rebirth by engendering a specific type of misfortune corresponding to its own distinctive quality.
1225 In this case the wholesome kamma of abstaining from killing may be directly responsible for either the heavenly rebirth or the longevity in a human existence. The same principle applies in all the passages on the maturation of wholesome kamma.
SUTTA 136
1226 MA says that Potaliputta did not actually hear
this personally from the Buddha, but had heard a report that these statements were made by the Buddha. The former is a distorted version of the Buddha’s declaration at MN 56.4 that mental action is the most reprehensible of the three types of deeds for the performance of evil action. The latter derives from the Buddha’s discussion of the cessation of perception in the Poṭṭhapāda Sutta (DN 9). MA glosses the word “vain” by “fruitless.”
1227 This statement is made by the Buddha at SN 36:11/ iv.216, with reference to the suffering inherent in all formations by reason of their impermanence. Though the statement itself is true, Samiddhi seems to have misinterpreted it to mean that all feeling is felt as suffering, which is patently false.
1228 MA: This section is not the expounding of the Tathāgata’s knowledge of the great exposition of action, but the setting up of the outline for the purpose of presenting that exposition.
1229 MA: This too is not the expounding of the knowledge of the great exposition of action, but is still the setting up of the outline. The purpose here is to show what can be accepted and what should be rejected in the claims of the outside recluses and brahmins. Briefly put, the propositions that report their direct observations can be accepted, but the generalisations they derive from those observations must be rejected.
1230 Here begins the expounding of the knowledge of the great exposition of action.
1231 MA: The person who was seen with the divine eye killing living beings, etc., is reborn in hell because of another evil deed he had done earlier than the deed of killing, etc., or because of an evil deed he did afterwards, or because of a wrong view he accepted at the time of death. Although the Pali seems to be saying that he was necessarily reborn in hell on account of some action other than the one he was seen performing, this should not be understood as an apodictic pronouncement but only as a statement of possibility. That is, while it may be true that he was reborn in hell because of the evil action he was seen performing, it is also possible that he was reborn there because of some other evil action he did earlier or later or because of wrong view.
1232 This statement shows that even if his evil kamma does not generate the mode of rebirth, it will still mature for him in some other way either in this life, in the next life, or in some more distant future life.
1233 In this case the heavenly rebirth must be due to some action other than the one he was seen performing, since an evil action cannot produce a fortunate mode of rebirth.
1234 MA explains abhabba, incapable, as the unwholesome (akusala), called “incapable” because it is devoid of the capacity for growth; and bhabba, capable, as the wholesome, called “capable” because it has the capacity for growth. This explanation sounds suspect; bhabba (Skt bhavya) may simply mean “potent, capable of producing results,” without implying any particular moral valuation. MA gives two explanations of the tetrad. The first devolves on taking the suffix -ābhāsa to mean “outshine” or “overcome,” and thus the four terms exemplify the way a kamma of one quality can “outshine” another in generating its result. The second explanation, which seems more cogent, takes - ābhāsa to mean “appears,” which I follow in the translation. On this explanation, the first type is illustrated by the person who kills living beings and is reborn in hell: his action is incapable (of good result) because it is unwholesome, and it appears incapable because, since he is reborn in hell, it seems to be the cause for his rebirth there. The second is illustrated by the person who kills living beings and is reborn in heaven: his action is incapable (of good result) because it is unwholesome, yet it appears capable because he is reborn in heaven; thus to the outside recluses and brahmins it seems to be the cause for his rebirth in heaven. The remaining two terms should be understood along the same lines, with appropriate changes.
SUTTA 137
1235 MA: Mental exploration (manopavic̄ra) is applied thought and sustained thought. One explores (or examines, upavicarati) the object by the occurrence of sustained thought (vicāra), and applied thought is associated with the latter.
1236 MA: Having seen a form with eye-consciousness, one explores a form which, as an object, is a cause of joy (grief, equanimity).
1237 MA: These are positions (pada) for beings who are intent on the round of existence and for those intent on the cessation of the round.
1238 MA: “Based on the household life” means connected with the cords of sensual pleasure; “based on renunciation” means connected with insight.
1239 MA: This is the joy that arises when one has set up insight and is sitting watching the breakup of formations with a current of sharp and bright insight knowledge focused on formations.
1240 MA explains “the supreme liberations” and “that base” as arahantship. See MN 44.28.
1241 MA: This is the equanimity of unknowing that arises in one who has not conquered the limitations imposed by the defilements or the future results (of action). It “does not transcend the form” because it is stuck, fastened to the object like flies to a ball of sugar.
1242 MA: This is the equanimity associated with insight knowledge. It does not become lustful towards desirable objects that come into range of the senses, nor does it become angry because of undesirable objects.
1243 MA says that previously worldly equanimity was discussed, but here the contrast is between the equanimity in differentiated sense experience and the equanimity of the meditative attainments.
1244 MA paraphrases: “By the equanimity of the immaterial attainments, abandon the equanimity of the fine-material attainments; by insight into the immaterial sphere, abandon insight into the fine-material sphere.”
1245 MA says that non-identification (atammayatā—see n.1066) here refers to “insight leading to emergence,” i.e., the insight immediately preceding the arising of the supramundane path; for this effects the abandonment of the equanimity of the immaterial attainments and the equanimity of insight.
1246 Satipaṭṭhāna here obviously has a different meaning than usual, as the sequel will make clear. The “Noble One” is the Buddha.
1247 This is one of the nine epithets of the Buddha in the usual enumeration of the Buddha’s qualities.
1248 These “eight directions” are the eight liberations, on which see n.764.
SUTTA 138
1249 It is strange that the Buddha, having announced that he will teach a summary and an exposition, should recite only the summary and leave without giving the exposition. Although elsewhere the Buddha departs suddenly after making an enigmatic statement (e.g., in MN 18) , on those occasions he had not previously declared his intention to give an exposition. MA offers no explanation.
1250 MA: Consciousness is “distracted and scattered externally,” i.e., among external objects, when it occurs by way of attachment towards an external object.
1251 MṬ: The form itself is called the sign of form (rūpanimitta) in that it is the cause for the arising of defilements. One “follows after it” by way of lust.
1252 MA: The mind is “stuck internally” by way of attachment to an internal object. The text of the sutta itself makes the shift from viññāṇa in the Buddha’s summary to citta in Mahā Kaccāna’s exposition.
1253 All known editions of the Pali text of MN 138 read here anupādā paritassanā, literally “agitation due to non-clinging,” which obviously contradicts what the Buddha consistently teaches: that agitation arises from clinging, and ceases with the removal of clinging. However, this reading apparently predates the commentaries, for MA accepts anupādā as correct and offers the following explanation: “In what sense is there agitation due to non-clinging? Through the non-existence of anything to cling to. For if there existed any formation that were permanent, stable, a self, or the belonging of a self, it would be possible to cling to it. Then this agitation would be agitation due to clinging (something to cling to). But because there is no formation that can be clung to thus, then even though material form, etc., are clung to with the idea ‘material form is self,’ etc.
, they are not clung to (in the way they are conceived). Thus, what is here called ‘agitation due to non-clinging’ is in meaning agitation due to clinging by way of views.” Ñm had followed this reading, and on the basis of MA’s explanation, had rendered the phrase “anguish [agitation] due to not finding anything to cling to.” He did not discuss the problem in his notes.A sutta in the Saṁyutta Nikāya (SN 22:7/iii, 16) is virtually identical with this passage of MN 138, except that here it reads, as we should expect, upādā paritassanā, “agitation due to clinging.” From the Saṁyutta text we may safely infer that the Majjhima reading is an ancient error that should be discounted. My rendering here is based on the reading of SN 22:7. Horner too follows the latter text in MLS.
1254 MA explains the unusual phrase paritassanā dhammasamuppādā as “the agitation of craving and the arising of (other) unwholesome states.”
1255 The agitation thus results from the lack of any permanent essence in things that could provide a refuge from the suffering precipitated by their change and instability.