and their perceptions in relation to the adoption of interoperable identity
management systems (IdMS) (Backhouse & Halperin, 2009). The notion
of citizen-centric e-government (Reddick, 2010) however draws attention
to this aspect of the emerging systems, an aspect that may vitally affect
whether or not such systems win public acceptance.
2 RESEARCHING THE PERCEPTIONS
OF CITIZENS TOWARDS EID
The study reported in this chapter addressed the gap in EU research on
eID perceptions (Lusoli & Miltgen, 2009; Seltsikas & O’Keefe, 2010). It
was designed to generate and analyse qualitative data so as to achieve a
deeper understanding of citizens’ perceptions on eID, and to reveal the rea-
soning underlying the prevailing views. The methodology adopted in this
study drew on grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) because it off
ffers
Identifying Online Citizens 109
a research method that seeks to develop accounts grounded in the data and
uses the analytical technique of open coding (Strauss & Corbin, 1990).
Data were collected using a web survey to explore the perspectives
of European citizens toward the new interoperable systems planned by
the European Union. A brief description was provided of the proposed
EU scheme and of the introduction of a Europe-wide eID card, which
would allow shared use for all governmental services across all Euro-
pean countries.
In order to generate qualitative data, the survey contained an open-ended
question inviting respondents to comment freely on any aspect of eIDs. This
method generated data in the form of free text. Although responses came
back from several EU countries, the national representation of the data
used in the present study was restricted to just two countries, Germany (N
= 360) and the United Kingdom (N = 377), a high response rate that lent
itself to rigorous content analysis.
Citizens were also asked to respond to demographic questions. The
results indicated that the survey respondents is dominated by a relatively
young population, with a mean of 34 years of age, a minimum age of 15
and maximum age of 77. In terms of gender, male respondents are heavily
over-represented in the survey (female 17 percent, male 83 percent). Finally,
on the question of political views, results indicated a mean of 4.53 on a 10
number scale with 1 indicating farthest left and 10 farthest right.
We recognize the limitation of web surveys as self-selected samples, but
interviews would not have provided the rich, diverse and anonymous responses
obtained through the web survey. We emphasise that our fi
findings do not seek
to represent the U.K. and German populations in a statistical sense. Instead,
the validity of qualitative research stems from the plausibility and the cogency
of the logical reasoning used in describing the results from the cases, and in
drawing conclusions from them (Agerfalk, 2004). This study lays claim to
analytical generalizability (Yin, 1984), in particular to the common type of
generalizing from data to descriptions (Lee & Baskerville, 2003).
We used content analysis where the data are read and categorized into
concepts that are suggested by the data themselves rather than imposed
from outside (Agar, 1980). Units for analysis defi
fine units of meaning
(Henri, 1992) whereby each response is partitioned into text segments
representing ideas in the text. This method of open coding relies on an
analytical technique of identifying possible categories, their properties
and dimensions (Kelle, 2007).
Systematic content analysis of the dataset revealed trust as a major issue: Governments cannot be trusted to
d
maintain identity information
on the citizen’s behalf.
The main problem is not the data that is stored on the ID-card, but
the lack of trust i
t n the authorities that handle the data.
110 Ruth Halperin and James Backhouse
The salience of similar statements and, as we shall show later on,
the logic of justification associated with them, led us to focus on trust-
related beliefs.
3 ANALYZING
TRUST-RELATED PERCEPTIONS
In this chapter we present the fi
findings that emerged from the analysis
focusing on trust-related perceptions. We illustrate them using the data
that created trust perception categories, and further consult the literature
to reconceptualise the data-driven categories, drawing from trust models
and trust taxonomies.
3.1 The Distinctive Themes: Competence and Integrity
I believe the authorities will attempt to be honest and secure but ulti-
mately will be unsuccessful in maintaining the confi
fidentiality of my
data. (United Kingdom)
This quote from a U.K. respondent is chosen to illustrate a fundamental
distinction arising from the analysis concerned with issues of trust and
public authorities. The focus on honesty in the fi
first part of the state-
ment implies an assessment of the integrity of government . The second part of the statement however addresses the ability of the government to
deliver a proper system, questioning its competence. These twin themes
of competence and integrity emerged from the analysis as distinctive
and independent categories. In the statement above, integrity of pub-
lic authorities is assessed positively while the judgment for competence
is negative.
In many cases, however, the responses refl
flected negative perceptions of
trust in both the competence and integrity of public authorities:
Governments cannot be trusted to maintain identity information on
the citizen’s behalf, and once such information is under the control of
governments, its abuse will necessarily follow—either by government
itself, or by criminals who infi
filtrate government systems. (Germany)
In this example the suggestion is that the abuse of personal data under
public custodianship is inevitable —“either by government itself, ” thus implying lack of integrity on the part of the government, “or by criminals
who infi
filtrate government systems” — suggesting the inability of the gov-
ernment to secure the data from criminal attack.
The distinction between competence and integrity was therefore apparent
in the grounded analysis process. We explore further these two themes.
Identifying Online Citizens 111
I am not against ID cards in principle, but have grave doubts about
the competence of those running the system. Human error is probably
a bigger risk than IT. (U.K.)
The theme of competence was raised repeatedly with statements address-
ing the ability of the U.K. state to secure and manage personal data. Neg-
ative judgments of the technical profi
ficiency of public authority was also
found in the German responses:
Theoretically the electronic identity card is a smasher; unfortunately pol-
iticians tend to be technically insuffi
fficient at implementation causing sig-
nifi
>
ficantly more harm than potential benefits to the citizens. (Germany)
It is implied that, given the sensitivity of the data, the lack of technical
competence required for operating an interoperable IdMS could lead to
harmful outcomes.
In the literature on trust relations, we discovered constructs similar to that
of competence in our grounded analysis. In their integrated model of organi-
zational trust, Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman (1995) propose the notion of
ability (i.e., the ability of the trustee to do what the truster needs). Renn sug-
gests that perceived competence is a component of institutional trust, defined
as the degree of technical expertise in meeting an institutional mandate
(Renn, 2008, p. 223). Clustering types of trusting beliefs, McKnight, Choud-
hury, and Kacmar (2002) identify in the literature a total of fi
fifteen constructs.
Among them are constructs related to competence, which include expertise,
dynamism, ability, capability and good judgment. Studying trust relationship
in the context of Business to Consumer (B2C) ecommerce, the McKnight et
al. model confi g
fi ures competence as an attribute of trustworthiness.
Trust is often studied in the arena of ecommerce (cf. Gefen, Benbasat,
& Pavlou, 2008; Sen, 2010), such as when a consumer is inclined to trust a
vendor not previously known to him— initial trust (
t McKnight et al., 2008).
By contrast, the public sector context represents a situation in which the
service provider, the government, is already known to its “clients,” the
citizens. Indeed, the familiarity of citizens with governmental authorities
found clear and frequent expression in our data:
We also already have all the evidence we need to know that massive
governmental IT projects are massive disasters, since every single one
in the past twenty years has been. (United Kingdom)
Evident in the data was the connection made to past experiences as a
way of justifying the perception of incompetence:
Unfortunately the authorities have shown in the past their incompe-
tence in realizing IT-projects. (Germany)
112 Ruth Halperin and James Backhouse
To summarize, our fi
findings point to negative perceptions regarding
the ability of government to operate a secure, interoperable IdMS. The
responses testify to the low level of trust in public authorities, and the
concern of citizens that governments will ultimately prove incompetent
and therefore “fail to deliver a working system.” A pattern was further
identified in the justifi
fication logic of the respondents, relying on past
experience: the perceived inability of the government to manage large-
scale IT projects rests on a reputation for failure.
Our analysis found judgments concerned with government ethics
ranging from moderate to extreme statements, such as viewing all pub-
lic authority as corrupt. The notion of integrity, as well as similar con-
cepts such as fairness, is found in research on trust-related perceptions
(cf. Renn, 2008). Going beyond general judgments of integrity how-
ever, further analysis revealed that the major issue of integrity revolved
around handling of personal data. More specifi
fically, a key concern
for the eID context was the potential for opportunistic behavior by pub-
lic institutions:
I don’t have the confi
fidence that authorities can resist the temptation
to use all available information to solve their acute problems e.g. “ter-
rorism” or crime. (Germany)
States cannot be trusted to restrict their use of citizenship data to what
they promised in different circumstances. (United Kingdom)
What emerge from the responses are scenarios often referred to as mission
creep, where information collected for one limited purpose is eventually
used for other purposes for which the data subjects have not approved.
Some responses drew attention to particular third parties gaining access
to identity information:
I am afraid that personal biometric data are combined with different
databases and will be used for other purposes than the one originally
determined. These “other” uses are for example—criminal prosecu-
tion, marketing, health insurance. (Germany)
Here, this respondent proposes a number of potential “other uses”
of personal data, including law enforcement — personal data shared
between diff
fferent public sector authorities, and marketing and insur-
ance — personal data is passed on from government to private sector
organisations.
Having once identifi
fied the centrality of the integrity issue, specifi call
fi
y
with regard to information passing to third party, we devised a coding
scheme to provide a more detailed picture of citizens’ perception in this
regard. The results of the analysis are summarised in Table 9.1.
Identifying Online Citizens 113
Table 9.1 Mission Creep Categories in Rank Order
Proportion of statements
Rank
Mission creep categories
referring to each category (%)
1
Criminal persecution
70
2
General
50
3
Commercial
20
Table 9.1 shows the percentage of statements made by respondents regarding general fear of mission creep as well as to specific kinds of mission
creep. The concern most frequently addressed was the use of personally
identifi
fiable information for criminal persecution purposes, for example:
if a technology is once introduced, it will one day be used for criminal
prosecution and the like by the authorities, even if that was excluded
at the time of introduction. (Germany).
Less frequently discussed but still important was the issue of sharing
personal information with commercial organizations: “I have a severe lack
of faith in the ability and willingness of the authorities to protect personal
data from being passed on to businesses” (United Kingdom). Whereas citi-
zens fear the possibility of ID data sharing between government and busi-
ness, they are less concerned about the potential abuse of their information
by the private sector than by the public sector: “The abuse done by cor-
porations is less problematic than the one by governments” (United King-
dom). Private sector motives may usually be seen simply in terms of profi
fit
maximization, whereas public sector agendas may be less clear.
An often-cited example was the transfer of EU citizens’ passenger data
to the U.S. government:
EU authorities, inter alia, with the transmission of fl igh
fl
t passenger
data to the US already shown clearly that data protection doesn’t play
an important role. Why should I now rely on the same institutions?
(United Kingdom)
4. BENEVOLENCE
It’s not about easy access for citizens to authorities. The reason for ID
syste
ms is to establish surveillance measures. And this is communi-
cated to me as an advantage for the citizen?? (Germany)
This statement encapsulates the third grounded theme that emerged and
questions the motives behind government eID initiatives. Comments such
114 Ruth
Halperin and James Backhouse
as electronic ID-cards are targeted specifi
fically to record and analyze
individuals and all their actions, or the recurring use of the metaphors
“1984” (mostly by British respondents) and “Glassy Citizens” (mostly by German respondents) were all taken to represent a negative perception
of intrusive governmental surveillance. Attempting to conceptualize this
emerging category within a trust relationship context, we explored the
congruence between this data-driven theme and the theoretical concept
of benevolence (Mayer et al., 1995). Benevolence refers to the expectation
of goodwill and benign intent from a trusted party (Yamagishi & Yam-
agishi, 1994). It is a construct found in a number of trust models, often
seen as a trustworthiness attribute, a trusting belief, or a type of trust
perception (McKnight et. al., 2002). The concept of benevolence is akin
to that of integrity in that both concepts refl
flect ethical traits, making
them appear less distinct and independent of each other (compared to the
trustworthiness attribute of competence). Mayer et al. (1995) have sug-
gested, however, that benevolence refers to trustee motives and is based
on altruism, whereas integrity refers to keeping commitments and not
telling lies, traits that may be manifested for pragmatic rather than altru-
istic reasons.
As before, respondents justify their beliefs by reference to the past:
Such systems/approaches have been implemented in Germany
between 1933 and 1945 with deadly outcome for some of the citizens.
(Germany)
ID systems are for Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia and other Police
States and Dictatorships. They are completely incompatible with a
free, democratic society. (United Kingdom)
Evident in these quotes is the strong historical reference to totalitarian
regimes. Respondents are suggesting that since governments have abused
data in the past they are capable of doing so in the future.
The fi
findings point to three discrete dimensions of trust beliefs about
public sector institutions responsible for IdMS: trust in the competence of
Public Sector Transformation Through E-Government Page 20