Meanwhile the shogun obtained an imperial command to punish the rebellious domain and in late 1864 launched the first Chōshū expedition. Rather than extensive fighting, the overpowering show of force by the 150,000-man coalition sufficed to oust Chōshū’s discredited and isolated radical loyalists.The shogun replaced them with conservative bureaucrats and, after punishing senior Chōshū officials for encouraging the loyalists and enforcing other punitive measures, disbanded the military coalition in mid-January 1865.
After being driven from the capital, Chōshū’s younger reformers concluded that inferior weaponry, not the kiheitai concept, was to blame for Chōshū’s setback at Kyoto’s Forbidden Gate. They resisted the newly installed Chōshū authorities’ attempts to disband the kiheitai and denounced the domain’s moderate leaders for suppressing the radical cause and submitting to the bakufu’s humiliating demands. They also scorned warriors who insisted on fighting in traditional fashion and encouraged more mixed commoner-warrior volunteer units using modern western tactics and weaponry.
Loyalists marked time while Takasugi expanded the kiheitai peasant militias and rifle units and armed them with modern weapons purchased from British arms dealers in Shanghai by Satsuma agents and covertly delivered to Chōshū. Takasugi enforced draconian discipline, purging kiheitai ranks by executing dissidents and deserters. Ōmura Masujirō, another of Chōshū’s young, dynamic military reformers, trained kiheitai rifle units in modern western skirmisher tactics. A self-taught tactician, Ōmura used translations of Dutch military manuals to develop a tactical doctrine for the kiheitai to fight as guerrillas or franciers in support of regular forces.9 In early 1865 Takasugi’s kiheitai units raided the domain capital at Shimonoseki, throwing Chōshū into civil war.
The mixed warrior-and-commoner kiheitai units displayed great tactical skill in employing their new weaponry and soon became the armed vanguard of reform. By March 1865 Takasugi controlled Shimonoseki and had routed government troops sent to oust him. He then ousted Chōshū’s pro-shogunate conservatives, but by that time Takasugi was mortally ill with the consumption that eventually killed him in 1867. Because of his deteriorating physical condition, domain authorities appointed Ōmura to reorganize the army. Besides his military expertise, Ōmura was more pro-emperor than antiforeigner, which made him attractive to Chōshū’s new leaders, who were trying to present a more moderate face to court and bakufu.
Ōmura guided army reform, sold samurai armor and helmets to raise money to buy modern small arms, and trained kiheitai rifle units. Recruits were armed with new Minié rifles, and close-order bayonet drills replaced traditional swordsmanship. By mid-1865 Ōmura had assembled a 4,000-man infantry force, divided equally between warriors and commoners. Word of these military initiatives alarmed the bakufu enough that it ordered another military expedition against Chōshū. This time, however, domains were divided over the value of such a campaign and wary of the resurgent bakufu. Satsuma leaders, covertly assisting Chōshū’s rearmament, later concluded a secret military alliance with Chōshū. Satsuma also used its considerable influence to dilute support for another Chōshū expedition.10
Nevertheless, in June 1866 the bakufu’s weakened expeditionary army marched on Chōshū, intending to surround the domain and attack it along exterior lines. Unable to forge a strong military alliance because Satsuma refused to join the coalition, the expedition’s dilatory advance gave Ōmura time to prepare his defenses. Commanding units along Chōshū’s northern border, Ōmura employed flanking attacks or struck enemy forces from the rear—tactics he termed “rabbit hunting,” designed to drive defenders from their warrens. Relying on such highly mobile infantry tactics, kiheitai units offset their inferior numbers and lack of artillery.
A bakufu war diary described the encounter of a government column with two ranks of kiheitai riflemen who fired at them from across a stream at ranges of 400 and 500 yards. The galling fire forced the densely packed bakufu formation to disperse and sacrifice tactical control or suffer heavy losses, either way losing operational integrity. Later that day concealed skirmishers sniped at the column from village rooftops, tree lines, or undergrowth, rarely firing more than a single round before fleeing, but still disrupting an entire column’s march.11 A combination of modern small arms and guerrilla tactics checked the bakufu’s advance as the kiheitai ambushed, outflanked, and encircled the shogun’s half-hearted allies, who fought in the traditional massed formations and relied on muskets, spears, and swords. By October Ōmura had gone over to the offensive and scattered the shogun’s demoralized forces.
Meanwhile, on the southern front Takasugi and his chief lieutenant,Yamagata Aritomo, led kiheitai units across the Shimonoseki Strait. Kiheitai raiding parties launched amphibious attacks against bakufu-held ports, burning docks and supplies. Small, nimble gunboats and launches harassed the shogunate’s larger warships, which had difficulty maneuvering in the restricted waters and soon were forced to abandon the strait. Without Satsuma’s military support, the bakufu had to throw badly armed and poorly motivated warriors from several minor fiefs into the fighting but refused to reinforce or resupply them. Troop morale cracked, and the dispirited shogunate army fled to Nagasaki.12 Takasugi’s innovative guerrilla-style ground and naval tactics had eliminated the threat on Chōshū’s southern flank and given the radicals control of the Shimonoseki Strait.
The heaviest fighting against the main shogun armies raged back and forth along Chōshū’s northern border, where kiheitai units held the mountainous high ground and ambushed the bakufu armies marching through passes or heavily forested areas. Peasants armed with bamboo spears or long-bladed hoes harried the shogun’s troops. One bakufu commander was astonished at the sight of local women and children armed with bamboo spears harassing his withdrawing units. By September the bakufu deputy commander concluded that the inability to feed or pay his troops, coupled with their obsolete weaponry and the determination of the commoner and peasant units, made success impossible.13 The shogun’s death later that month provided the face-saving justification to end the foundering expedition.
Ōmura’s kiheitai performance confirmed for up-and-coming Chōshū captains like Kido Kōin and Yamagata Aritomo that commoners could indeed make good soldiers. The kiheitai units were less effective, however, against domains like Aizu that were trained in western tactics and used artillery.14 That experience convinced Ōmura that rifles and bayonets could not overcome well-defended breastworks; he immersed himself in studying the latest artillery tactics.
During the final campaign, Takasugi suffered a tubercular relapse. Although Yamagata had served as his chief lieutenant and displayed organizational talent, shortly before Takasugi’s death in April 1867 he named Ōmura his successor. Ōmura was less politically minded and ideological than Yamagata, and his technical and tactical experience better qualified him to lead the new Chōshū army.15 As for the bakufu, it tried to rebound from defeat with foreign assistance to reorganize its army. In January 1867 French military advisers had organized two modern infantry battalions and two batteries of artillery. With the shogunate and its enemies rearming and reorganizing, a military showdown was inevitable.
The Boshin Civil War
Emperor Kōmei’s death in early 1867 and succession by his 14-year-old son Mutsuhito (who would become the Meiji Emperor) provided Satsuma and Chōshū the opportunity to legitimize their rebellion against the shogunate. That November the new shogun agreed to resign, hand over administrative power to the throne, and withdraw government troops from Kyoto to Osaka. Loyalist troops, including large contingents from Chōshū and Satsuma, quickly replaced them in Kyoto. The newcomers soon staged a military review. As the new emperor, shielded behind bamboo blinds in his royal box, looked on, 170 drummers paraded through the capital’s streets, leading uniformed Satsuma units that performed successive demonstrations of British-style drills and tactical maneuvers.16 The imperial presence conferred legitimacy on the new army, and the public display of pomp and military
muscle was a thinly veiled warning to the bakufu that loyalist forces would fight.
Abetted by court radicals, leaders from Satsuma and Chōshū next obtained a rescript (memorial) from the boy emperor authorizing them to overthrow the shogun. Armed with the imperial writ, on January 3, 1868, Chōshū and Satsuma forces seized the imperial palace in Kyoto, proclaimed an imperial restoration, and ordered the shogun to surrender all his power and lands. Unwilling to accept such humiliating terms, the shogun quickly dispatched troops from Osaka to crush the rebel stronghold. Thus on the morning of January 27, about 5,000 loyalist troops, mainly from Chōshū but stiffened by Satsuma and Tosa allies, were blocking three times that many bakufu warriors gathered at Fushimi, a small commercial port and administrative center just south of Kyoto.17
Satsuma forces commanded by Saigō Takamori, a charismatic loyalist and a key domain leader, barricaded the two main roads leading from Fushimi to Kyoto. The advance echelon of a lengthy column of bakufu troops strung out along the Toba highway arrived at the roadblocks and demanded entry to Kyoto. Refused, they withdrew, but in late afternoon again demanded passage. The Satsuma clansmen answered with a volley of artillery fire, and the bakufu warriors, armed with spears and swords, rushed the well-defended barricades. Deadly artillery fire and infantry skirmisher tactics inflicted heavy losses on the massed attackers. Lacking centralized command and control, the shogun’s forces fought individual skirmishes, not a coordinated battle, and eventually retreated.18
The cacophony of musket and cannon carried eastward to nearby Fushimi where warriors from Chōshū, Satsuma, and Tosa were blocking the shogun’s columns. When pro-Tokugawa supporters from Aizu tried to force their way along the Fushimi highway, loyalist artillery and rifle fire halted the Aizu spearmen’s attack and drove them back to Fushimi. Reinforced by bakufu supporters, the Aizu warriors fought pitched battles with loyalists in Fushimi’s broad streets and narrow alleyways. Both sides torched homes and buildings to drive enemies into the streets. Cannon fire and explosions also destroyed homes and warehouses and set the large shogunate administrative complex ablaze. The fighting subsided as the Tokugawa forces withdrew after midnight under a sky reddened by flames.19
Meanwhile along the Toba highway, the retreating bakufu forces improvised a hasty defense. Fighting from behind barricades made from sake barrels, straw tatami mats, and wooden doors, they fought the pursing Satsuma troops to a standstill, inflicting heavy casualties of the attackers. The turnabout elevated bakufu morale, and commanders expected to rout the Satsuma army the next morning. Saigō and other key officers realized that their cause hung in the balance and prepared to spirit the young emperor to the safety of a mountain redoubt in case the loyalists were defeated. As long as the young ruler remained in their hands they could legitimately conduct a war against the government forces. Possession of the emperor, real or symbolic, was essential for the new army, which was determined to avoid the impression that the fighting was merely a personal quarrel pitting Satsuma and Chōshū against the bakufu.20
At dawn on January 28, loyalists ambushed a Tokugawa column trying to force its way up the Toba road. Formations of bakufu spearmen collided with one another while attempting to maneuver from march to tactical formations along the narrow dirt track, horses bolted at the sounds of cannon and gunfire, and a steady fusillade from skirmishers hidden in the undergrowth made the loyalists seem to be everywhere. Several bakufu commanders fell to well-aimed Minié balls, and the disorganized column fell back. They quickly regrouped, however, and charged the heavily outnumbered Satsuma defenders.
At that critical point, 21-year-old Prince Ninnaji (Yoshiaki) appeared at the head of a column of reinforcements sent from an imperial general headquarters located on Kyoto’s southern fringes. Unfurling the imperial brocade banner and carrying a sword that the emperor had presented to him as commander in chief, Ninnaji personified the unity of the court and the new army. Loyalist morale soared at the sight of the imperial banner that signified their cause transcended domain interests and enjoyed the emperor’s support.21 They repulsed the assault and then pursued the retreating bakufu forces, harassing their flanks with artillery and rifle fire.
Little fighting had occurred near Fushimi because the greatly outnumbered Satsuma forces were reluctant to provoke a major battle and contented themselves by burning part of the town, leaving a holding force to pin down the pro-shogun units, and maneuvering to reinforce Toba. The shogunate had expected to outflank the loyalists near Fushimi and attack them from the rear. But the shogunate commander had fled two days before, and without overall leadership, piecemeal attacks soon collapsed and the dispirited government troops withdrew.
Throughout the fighting the separated bakufu columns had no single commander. Troops along the Toba highway fought one battle while those along a nearby parallel road fought a separate one. Each domain fought according to its idiosyncratic tactics without coordination between the two forces or with the rear guard. The shogun’s army squandered its numerical superiority, left troops massed along narrow highways instead of sending them to outflank the smaller loyalist units, and frittered away warriors in a series of uncoordinated attacks that left them increasingly isolated and susceptible to ambushes. Thoroughly defeated, the bakufu leaders agreed to surrender Osaka castle, but during the transfer of control a fire of mysterious origin exploded the ammunition magazine and destroyed the castle.
The four days of fighting claimed about 300 Satsuma or Chōshū warriors and more than double that number of bakufu troops. A Satsuma shock troop unit led by Kirino Toshiaki habitually spearheaded loyalist assaults and lost twenty-eight of its forty men. During the course of the war, Satsuma and Chōshū would suffer just over 25 percent of all government army casualties.22
The relatively few casualties obscured the disproportionate importance of the clashes. A loyalist defeat in the opening battle would have discredited the imperial cause and diminished the emperor’s role in modern Japan’s history. A military stalemate with a reinvigorated bakufu would have delayed Japan’s political unification, leaving the country more vulnerable to foreign intervention. Instead the loyalist army had defeated the shogun’s forces and done so in the name of the emperor, forging an enduring bond between throne and Japan’s first modern army.
2
Civil War and the New Army
The Toba-Fushimi fighting marked the opening battle of the Boshin (dragon) Civil War, named after the Chinese zodiacal cyclic character that designated the year 1868. The new army fought under makeshift arrangements with unclear channels of command and control and no reliable recruiting base. Samurai and kiheitai units paradoxically were fighting in the name of the throne, but they did not belong to the throne. To correct this anomaly and defend the court, which was in open rebellion against the shogunate, in early March 1868 the newly proclaimed imperial government created various administrative offices, including a military branch. The next month it organized an imperial bodyguard, about 400 or 500 warriors, composed of Satsuma and Chōshū units augmented by veterans of the Toba-Fushimi battles, yeomen, and masterless warriors from various domains, who reported directly to the court. The imperial court next notified domains to restrict the size of their local armies and contribute to the expenses of a national officers’ training school in Kyoto.1
Within a few months, however, authorities disbanded the ineffective military branch and the imperial bodyguard, which lacked modern equipment and weapons. To replace them, in April authorities established the military affairs directorate, composed of two bureaus: one for the army, one for the navy. The directorate drafted an army organization act based on manpower contributions from each domain proportional to its respective annual rice production.2 This conscript army (chōheigun) integrated samurai and commoners from the various domains into its ranks.
As the Boshin Civil War continued, the newly formed military affairs directorate had expected to raise troops from the wealthier domains. In June 1868 it fixed the organization
of the army by making each fief responsible, at least in theory, for sending to Kyoto ten men per each 10,000 koku of rice the domain produced.3 The policy put the government in competition with the domains to recruit troops, a contradiction not remedied until April 1869 when it banned domains from enlisting soldiers. The quota system to recruit government troops, however, never worked as intended, and the authorities abolished it the following year.
Meanwhile, in mid-March 1868 Prince Arisugawa took command of the Eastern Expeditionary Force as loyalist columns pushed along three main highways toward the shogun’s capital at Edo (present-day Tokyo). Skirmishes involving a few hundred warriors on either side brushed aside bakufu resistance, and the columns swiftly converged on the capital. The advancing army continually proclaimed its close bond with the imperial court, first to legitimize its cause; second, to brand enemies of the government as enemies of the court and therefore traitors; and third, to gain popular support.4
For food, supplies, horses, and weapons, the government army established a series of logistics relay stations along the three major thoroughfares. These small depots stocked material supplied by local pro-government domains or confiscated from bakufu agencies, senior retainers of the old regime, and anyone opposing the government. The army routinely impressed local villagers as porters or teamsters to move supplies between the depots and the frontline units. Japan’s largest merchant families also contributed money and supplies to the new army. The Mitsui branch directors in Edo, for example, donated more than 25,000 ryō (US$25,000) as insurance to protect their storehouses from pro-bakufu arsonists and probably government troops as well.5
Japan's Imperial Army Page 2