Özbek’s ambition went beyond simply establishing himself on the throne. He also sought to ensure that, among all the branches descending from Möngke-Temür, only his own could produce candidates for the next generation of khan. Thus Özbek killed not only Tükel Buqa but also the descendants of Toqto’a’s younger brother. In doing so, Özbek eliminated all of the grandsons of Möngke-Temür with claim to the throne equal to his own. This was intended to guarantee that no one could emerge as a competitor to Özbek’s direct descendants.19
Özbek’s rise to power by means of murder and political purges was not unique, but that is precisely why it was momentous. That Özbek, like his predecessor Toqto’a, won the throne by killing his rival demonstrates that, at least within the Horde, the Mongol succession system was breaking down. Chinggis Khan had developed a political process that tolerated competition among potential successors, assuring that matters would be settled by negotiation and consensus rather than violence. But with each transfer of power among the Jochids, the process was strained further. Since the days of Batu and Orda, interregnum periods had shortened, a clear sign of the Jochids’ decreasing willingness to negotiate with one another. Long gone was the time when defeated candidates accepted the decision of the quriltai and publicly gave up their claim to the throne.
Of course, Özbek did not reach the throne by himself. The assistance of Qutluq-Temür was crucial, and Özbek repaid that assistance by granting Qutluq-Temür authority unprecedented for a qarachu, an elite not from the golden lineage—a decision with transformative implications for Jochid governance. From the time of Batu, the political regime of the Horde had relied on distinctions among the elites, intended to prevent families outside the golden lineage gaining too much power and to prevent the khan’s relatives from toppling him. To this end, both Jochids and Jochid in-laws had been kept out of the keshig. Over time, however, conflict and competition among the descendants of Batu changed this system of distinctions and the leadership positions that individuals could hold. The first major change was the creation of the beglerbeg position, which devolved a great deal of power to a single agent beneath the khan and above the keshig elders. The beglerbeg was the khan’s deputy, referred to in Arabic source as nā’ib al-qān. Nogay was the first to hold this position, meaning that a Jochid was allowed in the khan’s official ruling circle.20
Özbek went farther, installing Qutluq-Temür as beglerbeg. This was a drastic change because Qutluq-Temür was a güregen, an imperial husband; his chief wife, Turabak Khatun, was a wealthy Jochid princess. In addition, Qutluq-Temür was made governor of Khwarezm, another role previously unavailable to in-laws, who were prevented from governing hordes and administrative divisions of the ulus. Meanwhile Qutluq-Temür’s brother ‘Isa also entered the ruling group after marrying the khan’s daughter. ‘Isa’s own daughter became the khan’s fourth wife. ‘Isa used his kinship ties to strengthen his own position, becoming the second most powerful beg after Qutluq-Temür.21
Özbek’s ruling circle was unusual for other reasons, too. His in-laws were Muslims, adding a new dimension to the keshig and the beglerbeg position. And the criterion for their membership was not their honored place in Mongol society or their skill in military command but rather the political, financial, and military support they provided the khan. Özbek’s qarachu in-laws had backed his election and now they were ruling begs. Perhaps reflecting the historic rupture that Qutluq-Temür and ‘Isa represented, Özbek changed the name of his ruling cadre: they were no longer keshig elders but ulus begs. There were also eight of them, rather than the original four.
The Jochids immediately perceived the threat of the khan’s new way of governing: Özbek was subordinating his blood relatives to preferred appointees who traditionally were barred from the sorts of offices he bestowed on them. But there was nothing the Jochids could do. Qutluq-Temür had more to offer Özbek than they did—specifically, military support and the political allegiance of a powerful Muslim leader, whose partnership was vital to governing Muslim populations and maintaining stable relations with the Horde’s southern neighbors. Qutluq-Temür remained a central figure of the government until his death around 1335. For more than twenty years, he commanded in the lower Volga and in northern Khwarezm, while ‘Isa ruled Crimea and stood in for Qutluq-Temür as beglerbeg when necessary.22
Merging the ranks of the ulus begs—the former keshig—and the Jochid marriage partners was Özbek’s most significant innovation. The bond between Özbek’s and Qutluq-Temür’s families in time became generalized into a new framework of governance that transcended lineage. In this new system, the qarachu begs took over many former functions of the Jochids and other Mongols and helped the khan centralize power under a single, all-embracing administration.
All Hordes in One
One of the first acts of Özbek’s government was to appropriate and redistribute the Jochids’ assets and power. The khan divided the territories and peoples of his horde into a number of groups, each administered by one of his loyal qarachu begs rather than by a Jochid. The Jochids also no longer ruled sedentary subjects directly and did not collect taxes themselves. Instead, the khan’s deputies collected the taxes and deposited them in the treasury. The khan continued to distribute cash and gifts to the Jochid princes, but their authority had been highly constrained.23
The armed forces had always answered ultimately to the khan, and that did not change under the new system. What did change was the hierarchy beneath him. Now the Jochid princes no longer commanded the forces in their territories. Instead, the ulus begs did, helping to ensure that armed horsemen from all the Jochid territories would gather upon the khan’s call, for Özbek had eliminated the possibility that a resentful Jochid prince might act independently. Ibn Battuta reported that the ulus begs headed seventeen tümen commanders, each of them leading up to ten thousand warriors. Another source claims that Özbek was able to mobilize more than seven hundred thousand horsemen, a massive army that was invisible in times of peace but suddenly took shape when ordered.24
The shift toward qarachu authority was especially pronounced in the khan’s horde, where historically the Jochids had been even more dominant among the elites than in other hordes. But Özbek took more direct control of other hordes, too, including the Ordaid horde in the east. The left-hand wing lost considerable autonomy after 1321, when a new ruler, Irzan, took over. Irzan was the heir to powerful Ordaid predecessors, who had brought prosperity to their horde and even. In the case of Qonichi, an Ordaid had even become the de facto leader of the Horde. But while Irzan benefited from the wealth and capacity others had generated, he wanted more: he claimed the great cities of the lower Syr-Daria Valley, including Otrar. This was a clear encroachment on Chagatayid territory. Such ambitions were beyond even the considerable abilities of the Ordaids, which led Irzan to call on the help of Özbek. The khan provided his Ordaid relatives with military and political support in exchange for commitment to his policies and to himself. The political status quo ante between the Batuid and Ordaid hordes was thus restored, with the Ordaids the clear subordinate. At quriltais, Irzan followed Özbek’s lead, never raising his voice against the khan’s wishes. Indeed, the eastern horde was perhaps more dependent than ever, as the economies of the two hordes became more integrated and the Ordaids began to adopt Islam.25
The territory of Orda’s descendants had been expanding for decades, inching closer to and eventually encompassing Muslim-occupied lands. By the time Özbek and Qutluq-Temür were ascendant in the Horde, the Ordaids bordered Khwarezm in the west—Khwarezm with its Muslim beglerbeg, local Muslim administrators, and the Islamic splendor of its capital, Urgench. Rebuilt by the Jochids, the city was a hub of the fur trade and therefore the site of much interaction with the Ordaids. In Urgench the Ordaids encountered the mystical aura emanating from religious buildings, among them the mausoleum of the Sufi leader Najm al-Dīn al-Kubrā, whose teaching had influenced Berke Khan’s conversion. Both Qutluq-Temür and his chief wife had
their own religious and funerary buildings. Further Islamic influence came from Özbek himself. Influential officeholders of the central Horde were now mostly Muslims, as evidenced in their names, buildings, and burials. We do not know if officials converted en masse or whether the officials were recruited because they were Muslims. We do know, however, that under Özbek Islamic faith and practice became a necessity for those seeking a political career. Merged more tightly with the central horde, the Ordaids followed suit, and herders in the left-hand wing began to convert to Islam or, more precisely, to conflate Tengri and Allah.26
Two Mongol men studying the Quran, from an early fourteenth century edition of Rashīd al-Dīn, Jāmi‘ al-tawārīkh. Mongol hordes featured tent-mosques, tent-churches, Buddhist monasteries, and mobile Islamic schools. (bpk Bildagentur / Photo: Ellwardt / Art Resource, NY)
Irzan was said to be the first Ordaid leader to sponsor Islamic institutions. Under his rule madrasas, mosques, and Sufi lodges were built in the towns of the Syr-Daria Valley. Irzan was also said to be buried in Sighnaq, a site on the eastern bank of the Syr-Daria River that had previously been settled by urban and agrarian Muslim communities and that would become the center of the eastern horde. Together, the Ordaids and Batuids reinforced local Islamic establishments, promoting and securing connections between Muslim-dominated areas, including the Ordaid Syr-Daria region and regions directly controlled by the khan, such as the Bulgar towns on the Volga. Crucially, Özbek granted tarkhan status to Muslim elites across the Jochid realms. As the Muslim tarkhans used their financial protections to build and fund more schools—through which they taught, healed, and fed the poor—the Muslim community of the Horde grew in size, wealth, influence, and visibility. And as Islam secured a more important place within the Horde, the Muslim Özbek became that much more powerful. He was knitting himself more thoroughly into the lives of his diverse subjects. Many who previously saw themselves as dominated taxpayers became loyal followers of a ruler who was a kind of spiritual father.27
Almost concurrently, at the western end of the Jochid territories, the Danubian horde also came firmly under the control of the central horde. Under Nogay, the Danubian horde had enjoyed considerable independence, but Toqto’a and then Özbek saw to it that the west was brought to heel. Around 1300 Tsar Theodore Svetoslav of Bulgaria, following orders from Toqto’a, murdered Nogay’s eldest son and successor, Cheke. Cheke had been Theodore’s brother-in-law and ally, yet Theodore carried out his mission to eradicate what was left of Nogay’s rule. There were to be no followers, no legacies, no memories of Nogay—all had to be wiped out. Cheke was strangled and beheaded, to make clear that Nogay’s lineage had been cut off for good—the bones had been broken. Soon after, and again on the authority of the khan, Theodore conquered the “Black Tatars,” as the Slavs called the nomads of the Bujak steppe. The Black Tatars were a mix of Qipchaq and Mongol families and warriors who had followed Nogay; Theodore harshly repressed any resistance among them.28
Özbek’s Balkan policy continued Toqto’a’s. Both khans seemed to consider Bulgaria the westernmost part of the Horde—not an ally, but a territory. Indeed, Jochid armies attacked the Byzantines at least five times during Özbek’s rule, while the Bulgarians were never attacked—a clear sign that Jochid rule ended at the border between Bulgaria and Byzantium. Confirming this, Özbek authorized Theodore Svetoslav’s southward expansion, which came at the expense of the Byzantines. Theodore was also allowed to expand northward to the Dniester River, giving him power over the former lands of Nogay, which were Jochid regions. Specifically, the Bulgarian tsar was allowed to rule the areas of Dobruja and Bujak. Theodore and his successor George Terter banished from the Danubian horde the final remnants of Nogay’s heirs and followers.29
After George Terter died in 1323, Özbek established firm, personal control over the west. The new Bulgarian ruler, Tsar Michael Shishman, hoped to create a more ambitious Bulgarian dynasty, but he did not get the chance. Nogay’s legacy was no longer a threat, and Özbek had no further need for Bulgarian mediation. Instead Özbek supported the formation of a small principality known as the Romanian Land or Walachia. In exchange for Özbek’s protection the Romanian leader, Besarab, a former vassal of the Hungarian king, was to reinforce the Jochid frontier, especially against expansionist Hungary. The Romanians proved themselves in 1330, when they crushed the Hungarian army at the Battle of Posada. Walachia had once been the core of Nogay’s territory, and the wealth gained there through trade and economic development redounded to the Romanians who took over—a legacy that would help to drive Walachia’s growth and consolidation for generations to come.30
The role an empire assigns to its borderlands says a lot about its imperial dynamics. Some peripheries are largely forgotten, but the Jochid khan saw his borders as crucial. Walachia and Bulgaria were the Mongol gateways to Central Europe and, thanks to their empowerment by the Horde, key bulwarks against Hungarian and Byzantine expansion. Vassalage supported the interests of both sides—the khan and his subordinates. Until the death of Özbek in 1341, Catholic Romanians and Orthodox Bulgarians maintained the Horde’s border, and through them the khan’s name resonated with fear and respect deep into Western Europe. Meanwhile, the two statelets—Walachia and Bulgaria—developed into durable regimes of their own, ultimately outlasting their Mongol masters and going on to play key roles in Balkan politics throughout the next centuries.
The Rocky Rise of Moscow
The history of Mongol rule in the Russian principalities was largely one of hands-off relations—until Özbek. Özbek’s influence on Russian politics was profound, leading to world-historic change. In particular, his support of the princes of Moscow fueled the transformation of a backwater town into the enduring center of Russian power and reset the ruling lineage of the eastern Slavs.
When Özbek took the throne, the state of relations among the Russian princes was as it had been for decades. The principalities were small and fragmented. Each was led by a kniaz responsible for defending his domain and administrating and sustaining the local economy. Although scattered, the kniazia were unified under the power of the grand prince, who was the overarching leader of the Russians. This was true when the grand prince had his court at Kiev and when the court moved to Vladimir. The grand prince was selected according to the lestvitsa, a principle of succession whereby the eldest kniaz became grand prince, provided that his father or grandfather had also served in the role.
For the Jochids, the Russian system worked well. Each kniaz collected taxes from his territory and sent the receipts to the grand prince, who in turn distributed the entirety of the revenue to the Mongols. The Mongols preferred to oversee a centralized administration rather than handle directly a constellation of villages and cities led by rival princes. As for how that central administration functioned, the Mongols were happy to leave the grand prince in charge. They had enough experience in state building to know that hierarchy was essential to effective administration, and the grand prince was the traditional occupant of the top of the hierarchy. The grand prince needed to have two qualities: he needed to be loyal to the khan, and he needed to command the confidence of the Russian people; otherwise he would face difficulty collecting the Mongol taxes. To better assure the people’s confidence, the Mongols largely allowed the traditional succession process to hold sway. The title of grand prince technically was confirmed by the khan, but Mongol appointments were largely consistent with the lestvitsa. Tension between the old Russian pattern of succession and the Horde’s authority was therefore rare.31
Both sides—the Jochid and Russian elite—sought to uphold each other’s governing prerogatives because both benefited from their relationship. The kniazia sought the khan’s support because the khan’s trust and material backing were key to their power. And the khan courted the kniazia because the khan needed to determine who among the kniazia was a reliable ally. Over the years, mutual respect formed between the two sides, and they communicated well. Russian princes could
even marry Mongol princesses, a sign that the nomadic lords trusted their northern vassals. Unlike Byzantines and others who routinely used their daughters as diplomatic gifts and tokens of political allegiance, Mongols were reluctant to cut off their daughters from the steppe world, so the Jochids’ willingness to marry their daughters to non-nomads was a sign of their high esteem for the Russians. One of the few instances outside Russia proves the point: as I describe below, in 1320 Özbek married his niece to the Mamluk sultan, an unprecedented kinship relationship between Jochids and Mamluks.32
A balance formed as Russian and Mongol elites became mutually dependent. Russian elites kept their populations under control and funneled tax receipts to the Mongols. Russians also subordinated themselves. In hopes of winning Mongol favor, kniazia visited the khan’s horde as often and for as long as needed—at least six months and sometimes a year or two. Through these visits, a prince could enhance his stature, expand his network, and deepen his military strength. For their part, the khans never visited the kniazia; the khans did not go to their subjects except in cases of war. The khan’s movement always required a higher motivation. When the Russians came to him, the khan would, at least sometimes, resolve their conflicts. This further enhanced the khan’s prestige while helping to maintain stability among the Russians. In exchange for the Russians’ deference and material support, the khan offered protection: if the grand prince needed military help, the khan could not turn him down. The Jochids were the overlords, but they knew their duties.33
The Horde Page 25