In The Paradox of Representation (1997), Lublin stated, “African American voters support the election of Black representatives not just to gain a new role model, but because they believe that Black representatives will work harder for real substantive gains for their community.”14 The real issue, according to Swain (1995), is that the increase of Black faces in political positions (descriptive representation ) may not necessarily correlate with increased tangible goods (substantive representation ) for African-Americans. She implies that symbolic representation, even though public officials may not advance those interests deemed important by their constituency, may be the result of wholehearted efforts to elect representatives who share demographic aspects of identity. It has long been known that representatives are self-interested, that they have a strong need to be reelected, and that much of their activity is unknown to most constituents and takes place behind closed doors of negotiation and compromise.15 The question is whether substantive representation alone is enough for the kind of changes that still need to be made with regard to racial equality, or whether descriptive representation is needed as well. Put succinctly, is it enough that a representative claims to believe in most things that constituents believe in and has a voting record to support it, even though the representative may be white? Can substantive symmetry be enough to ensure this representative will still espouse the same ideals behind closed doors as he or she does in public? Framing the question in racial terms, should African-Americans simply trust in either substantive or descriptive representation alone?
When examining the confirmation process of Thomas, there was great division within the African-American community about whether descriptive representation or substantive representation was most needed. The question for the public quickly became whether African-Americans could take the chance that another African-American would be nominated for such a high position in the future, rather than a question of the current nominee’s ideological stance. Swain highlights the weakness in this calculus by pointing to the various appointees who did not support the majority of issues supported within their racial/ethnic communities, Thomas being the exemplary case. The question, then, is how Black progressive politics are undermined when Black women use racial solidarity as their cue, rather than gender.
Similar issues also came to the forefront in the O. J. Simpson trial, which could be subtitled, “The Erasure of Marguerite.” Although most empirical studies reflect Black women’s disdain for interracial marriages between Black men and white women, most Black women supported O. J. Simpson , a man who left his Black wife for a younger Barbie-like white woman. Black women were able to forgive Simpson (particularly since he was accused of killing the white wife). The Simpson case bears certain similarities to the allegations against Thomas in that the issue to be resolved was not one of guilt or innocence, but rather an opportunity to “beat the legal system.” Most Black women refused to demonize Clarence Thomas or to censure him for his grossly inappropriate behavior. Instead, just as they did with Simpson , many Black women including, the esteemed writer Maya Angelou , chose to play it safe by effectively turning their heads and letting Thomas off the hook, considering it more important to take a Black hero where one could be found, however flawed he might be.
The important exception was Black female academics, many of who were brave enough to state publicly that they believed Hill. Their public outrage toward the all-white male judiciary had significant political implications, resulting in a record number of female candidates being elected to Congress in 1992. This election was popularly dubbed “the year of the woman,” and for Blacks the woman of the year was Carol Moseley Braun. In late 1991, before the Clarence Thomas confirmation hearings took place, Carol Moseley Braun decided to run for the US Senate. She would attempt to unseat the incumbent, Senator Alan Dixon , in the Illinois Democratic primary the following March. Wealthy Chicago lawyer Albert Hofeld also declared his intention to run for the Democratic nomination, turning the primary into a three-candidate race.
It is rare for an incumbent senator to be unseated in a primary election, and Dixon’s campaign benefited from many of the advantages of incumbency, including a long list of political contributors and the support of the Democratic Party establishment. Chicago Mayor Richard Daley , Senator Paul Simon, Representative Dan Rostenkowski, and other Illinois Democratic and labor leaders supported Dixon . Hofeld’s advantage—indeed, the only thing that made him a legitimate candidate—was his personal bank account. He spent $4.5 million of his own money campaigning, most of which paid for television commercials that were highly critical of Dixon . Though Moseley Braun had less money to spend than either of her opponents, she had a number of advantages in the race. First, Dixon’s decision to break ranks with most Senate Democrats by voting to confirm Clarence Thomas received a great deal of scrutiny, incensing women activists, who threw their support behind Moseley Braun . Hofeld’s commercials attacking Dixon also advantaged Moseley Braun . Not only did they diminish Dixon through allegations and Hofeld through his posture as a mudslinger, but also they boosted Moseley Braun’s stature as the candidate who refused to stoop to negative campaign tactics. Dixon had angered many union workers with his initial reluctance to back a bill that would have outlawed the permanent replacement of striking workers, and though he eventually decided to support the bill and labor leaders eventually lent him their official support, the backing Dixon received from labor voters was less than enthusiastic. Additionally, the country was in an economic recession in 1992 and the House of Representatives had just witnessed a banking scandal, both of which may have made voters less likely to vote for incumbents. Moseley Braun’s personality was also an asset. “I just wish we had a Republican with the charisma and dedication Carol has,” said one of Braun’s former opponents, state Representative Virginia Fiester Frederick , a Republican from Lake Forest. “…I’ve listened to women who are ecstatic over her win, and these are Republican women calling my office.”16
Moseley Braun’s status as a Black woman was also a factor, especially after the nation’s consciousness had been refocused on race and gender by the Clarence Thomas hearings. In campaign speeches, Moseley Braun frequently mentioned that the Senate should more accurately reflect the diversity of America’s population. She did not, however, appear to play the race or gender card overtly, considering diversity more broadly, as in the following quotes reported by journalist Robert Novak :Braun… insists that her decision to challenge Dixon was not based on his vote for Thomas, or Anita Hill’s allegations that Thomas had sexually harassed her. “The campaign started before our senator voted on the confirmation,” Braun said in an interview after her [primary] victory. “It wasn’t an issue in this campaign. What was an issue was that the Senate unlocked its doors… and it needed to more closely reflect our society. Democracy is supposed to mean the people govern. Our institutions have to reflect the people’s concerns, not just the narrow interest of millionaires talking to each other.”
Moseley Braun’s candidacy was clearly aided by the potential that she could make history by becoming the first African-American woman ever elected to the US Senate. However, this history-making potential was recognized by the media more frequently in the general election campaign than it was before the primary. Moseley Braun’s platform was liberal. She promised to be a voice in Washington for people who were underrepresented there. She advocated increasing taxes for the top one percent of wage earners. She also proposed to cut $100 billion in defense spending—twice as much as incumbent President George Bush proposed—and to use the freed-up money to repair roads and bridges, providing jobs.
The week before the primary, a Chicago Sun Times/Fox News Chicago poll showed Dixon with the support of 41% of Democrats who planned to vote, compared to 29% for Moseley Braun and 21% for Hofeld. A poll for Peoria television WEEK had Dixon at 37%, Hofeld at 35%, and Moseley Braun at 18% (Ritter). With three candidates in the race and turnout in primary elections notoriously hard to predict, the o
nly reasonable prediction worth making was that the race would be close.
The Democratic primary took place on March 18, and Moseley Braun unseated Dixon as the party’s nominee. Moseley Braun won half the vote in Chicago, handily outperforming Dixon’s 30%, and also won Cook County suburbs and the Chicago “collar counties.” Dixon won in less populated areas downstate, but those areas also gave significant support to Hofeld, taking away from Dixon votes he needed badly. The day after Moseley Braun’s primary victory, the national media honed in on the possibility that a Black woman could be elected to the Senate. Moseley Braun was thrust into the national spotlight, becoming a star overnight, and the potential that she would make history attracted support from across the country. “Ms. Braun was transformed from the little-known Cook County recorder of deeds – the county’s chief file-keeper – to a national celebrity who counts people like Gloria Steinem and Bill Clinton as her new best friends.”17 A week and a half after the primary, Moseley Braun flew to Washington, where she received pledges of support from the AFL-CIO and Jesse Jackson , and met with other potential backers. In fact, the entire Democratic Party seemed to throw its support behind Moseley Braun. As Freivogel observed,Don Foley, of the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee said Braun had been swamped with offers of assistance…. The [DSCC] has not yet said how much money it will give Braun, but Foley described the race as uniquely important. Foley said the party “had a special responsibility to her because of the historic nature of her race.” Moreover, Foley noted, the Democrats need to win Illinois to have a shot at winning the presidential race. 18
Moseley Braun had raised less money than her opponents in the primary, but she had been told that she would need to spend $5 million to $6 million to win the general election, so she set to work raising funds that would be necessary to defeat her opponent, Republican Richard Williamson . Unlike many of the campaigns that take place today, in which both major party candidates rush to the center and attempt to portray themselves as mainstream moderates, there were clear ideological differences between Moseley Braun and the conservative Williamson, a lawyer who had once been an advisor to President Ronald Reagan . Williamson, who was considered the underdog—the last Republican senator elected from Illinois was Charles H. Percy in 1978—had a two-pronged strategy to overcome Moseley Braun’s early lead in the polls: portray her as ultraliberal and criticize her as being unethical.
One tactic Republicans employed was to attempt to link Moseley Braun to US Representative Gus Savage (D-IL), an African-American known for holding controversial views regarding Israel and Jews. On September 23, Cook County GOP Chairman Manny Hoffman criticized Moseley Braun for having participated in a March 7 rally that Savage also attended. After Moseley Braun left the rally, Savage showed up and gave a speech in which he criticized American Jews supporting his opponent in the primary. Hoffman called on Moseley Braun to denounce Savage, and Williamson’s campaign attacked Moseley Braun with campaign ads criticizing her sponsorship of a 1979 legislative resolution that honored Savage as a “model of public service.”
Reports of scandals escalated. In late September, Chicago’s WMAQ-Channel 5 reported that Moseley Braun had dispersed $28,750 of her mother’s inheritance without first applying it to her public aid bills. Moseley Braun kept about $10,000 of the money without reporting it to state officials. In an October 2 opinion piece in the Chicago Sun-Times, Steve Neal was highly critical of Moseley Braun’s treatment of her mother’s inheritance and her ethics in general:In her 14-year public career, Braun has missed few opportunities for personal gain. She knows all the tricks of parlaying political influence into cash. As a legislator, she was also a $103,450 bond counsel for the city of Chicago, though she had no experience in the field. As recorder of deeds, Braun registered as a lobbyist with the local officials on behalf of her pal [state Rep. Alfred G.] Ronan. Braun collected a $30,000 lobbying contract to one of Shea’s partners, Billie Paige. Special interests get special consideration from Braun.
Moseley Braun’s alleged ethical violations were a point to which Williamson would return throughout the campaign, both in television ads and debates. In fact, in the second public debate of the campaign, which took place October 22, “Williamson, as in most of his campaign, tried to turn the one-hour forum into a discussion of Moseley Braun’s ethics and to portray her to the left of Bill Clinton.” The candidates also clashed on a number of policy issues. Particularly prominent was the question of how to deal with crime, the debate having occurred just days after a seven-year-old Chicago boy, Dantrell Davis , had been killed in a shooting that drew public attention to the issue of violence. Moseley Braun said that in order to keep the guns off the street, Congress should pass the Brady Bill, which would place new restrictions on the purchasing of guns. Moseley Braun also criticized Williamson for his links with the National Rifle Association . Williamson said Moseley Braun was soft on crime and criticized her opposition to the death penalty and her support for decriminalizing marijuana. Williamson also argued in favor of a voucher system that would give parents money to send their children to private school, noting that Moseley Braun’s son attended a private school. Moseley Braun criticized Williamson for bringing her son into the debate and stated her opposition to vouchers. Williamson responded that Moseley Braun’s proposal to spend more federal money on education was “a goofy liberal idea.”
As the election neared, the campaign became increasingly negative, with the candidates attacking each other on almost a daily basis. The day before the election, the candidates traded barbs that highlighted the themes of their campaigns. Williamson urged voters to elect “somebody they don’t have to be embarrassed by – someone who is honest.” Moseley Braun said, “We don’t need any more arrogant rich boys in the Senate, and that’s what this campaign is all about.” A week earlier, she had paid more than $15,000 to the Illinois Department of Public Aid to settle the question about her mother’s inheritance, but Williamson continued to hammer her on the issue, claiming she had broken the law. Illinois Governor Jim Edgar, a Republican supporting Williamson, said that though he thought “somebody broke the law” in regard to the inheritance situation, prosecution would be inappropriate because it was not the standard approach to such cases. Despite Williamson’s vigorous attacks, his exposure of Moseley Braun’s alleged ethical deficiencies never produced the surge in the polls he had hoped, and Moseley Braun won the November 3 election by a significant margin. “Despite miserably cold and damp weather over the state’s most populous areas, election officials were predicting a record turnout of at least 5.2 million of the state’s 6.6 million registered voters.” Exit polling indicated that Moseley Braun captured about half the white vote and “virtually every Black voter” in an election that The New York Times said had been “a race where symbolism was as important as strategy.”19
After her election, Moseley Braun toured the Southern part of Illinois to reassure voters that she wouldn’t forget about them in Washington. She said her priorities, intended to benefit the entire state, were to attract investment to Illinois, to create more job opportunities, to give law-enforcement authorities strong federal support, and “education, education, education.” Recognizing the symbolic value of her election, Moseley Braun said the best way she could live up to the expectations that others across the country might have of her was to be the best senator in Illinois history.
Moseley Braun was just one of the many women and racial minorities who won election to Congress in 1992, the “year of the woman,” although the vast majority of the membership continued to be white and male. Of 110 new members in the House of Representatives, 24 were women, 16 were Black, and eight were Hispanic, making the incoming Congress the most diverse in American history. The Senate also admitted four new women into its ranks, a small percentage considering that there were 33 Senate races in 1992, but a larger number than ever before. Moseley Braun headed to Washington planning to further the many causes she had advocated on the campaign trail, but she wa
s not able to leave behind the ethical questions that had plagued her campaign in Illinois. Even before she was sworn in as Illinois’ junior senator, the press honed in on a number of questions about the behavior of her campaign manager, Kgosie Matthews and a possible romantic relationship between the two, and on the way her campaign funds were spent. Questions about her ethics would continue to dog Moseley Braun throughout her six-year term.
Moseley Braun’s first few months in the Senate were “rocky,” according to an article that appeared April 5, 1993, in Crain’s Chicago Business. “The senator started in office with a series of political miscues, organizational delays, and ethical question marks; efforts… to erase her relatively high $543,871 campaign debt should indicate whether she is generating more support than dismay….” Because of the perceptions that Moseley Braun had had a difficult beginning in Washington, many Chicago area businesses were reluctant to contribute money to erase her debts, preferring a wait-and-see approach. However, Moseley Braun was receiving financial backing from Chicago’s futures exchanges, for which she had “gone to bat early and often with the Clinton administration over its proposed trading tax and other issues.” According to the article, some potential contributors were reluctant to help Moseley Braun pay off her debts because they sensed she had spent more money than she needed to defeat a lackluster opponent. They also questioned the $15,000 monthly salary she paid campaign manager Matthews during the race. Her relationship with Matthews continued to draw attention through the spring, with Moseley Braun disclosing in April that she and Matthews were engaged to be married in the summer. The wedding never took place, but the summer of 1993 was important for Moseley Braun nevertheless.
In July 1993, Moseley Braun took to the floor of the Senate, persuading her colleagues to vote against renewing a design patent held by the United Daughters of the Confederacy for a symbol that included the Confederate flag. Her speech, and the following vote, drew national press coverage and praise. A bill that would have renewed the Daughters of the Confederacy’s patent had failed to make it out of committee that spring, so on July 22, Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC) proposed amending a national service bill to include language that would renew the patent. Many senators were unaware what they were voting on, and Helms won a test vote for the amendment, 52 to 48. But then Moseley Braun took the floor and delivered a passionate speech denouncing the flag as a symbol of slavery and arguing that the Senate had no place renewing a patent that included it. “On this issue there can be no consensus,” she said. “It is an outrage. It is an insult. It is absolutely unacceptable to me and millions of Americans, Black or white, that we would put the imprimatur of the United States Senate on the symbol of this kind of idea.”20
Black Feminist Politics from Kennedy to Trump Page 8