by Tim Clayton
On the other hand, Ney’s aide Pierre Heymès admitted that Ney wanted to occupy the abandoned part of the plateau with cavalry, although he denied that Ney intended to commit more than a brigade, serving to test the resolve of the infantry on the plateau and the strength of the remaining allied cavalry. General Delort, commander of the 14th Division, gave yet another version, recounting that when he saw a brigade of his cuirassiers moving forward without his orders and attempted to call them back, Ney rode over in person, bristling with impatience, to tell Delort that he had instructed the brigade to advance. Delort wanted orders from Count Milhaud, his immediate superior, but in the course of an animated discussion, Ney’s demand escalated and finally, in the name of the Emperor, he required both of Milhaud’s divisions to charge.
Flahaut claimed, however, that it was Napoleon who caused the escalation in the scope of the mounted assault from Ney’s brigade to two divisions. Bonaparte may have thought Ney had thrown in cavalry too early, before the artillery had completed its job, as he later claimed, and it was typical of the Emperor to blame Ney in advance for a risky attack that might well fail, but he knew that he was running out of time. He was gambling that his massed cavalry might achieve a sudden and decisive breakthrough. If this didn’t succeed, the cavalry would at least force the enemy into square, making them better targets for the artillery. It may be that Napoleon’s light-hearted encouragement of his cautious generals that morning contained the essence of his real design: he would pound them with his numerous artillery; he would charge with his cavalry to force Wellington to reveal his hand; then he would hit them with his Old Guard.
So, without explaining the danger from the Prussians to the east, or the urgent reason for such an attack, he called on Flahaut, his most loyal and intelligent aide, to send in all the cavalry:
I was close to the Emperor on a knoll, where he remained for the greater part of the day, and when he saw Ney beginning the movement by sending a corps of cavalry across the ravine, he exclaimed, ‘There is Ney hazarding the battle which was almost won’ (these words also are fixed in my memory), ‘but he must be supported now, for that is our only chance.’ Turning then to me, he bade me order all the cavalry I could find to assist the troops which Ney had thrown at the enemy across the ravine.2
Huge cavalry charges against unbroken infantry had succeeded gloriously in the past: at the bloody battle of Eylau, eight years earlier, such a charge had turned the tide of adversity.3 Napoleon knew that his previous cavalry attack had punched a hole in Wellington’s centre, destroying two infantry battalions; he knew that the capacity of the enemy’s cavalry to counter-attack was very much reduced, and he may well have hoped that another imposing attack by armoured cavalry on a larger scale would finish the job. Moreover, he had to do something dramatic to obtain a quick result: his hand had been forced by the emergency on the right flank caused by Blücher’s decision to show himself.
With the assault on La Haye Sainte still in progress, therefore, Milhaud’s cuirassiers – of whom a good 2500 or more remained – followed by 1500 or more lancers and chasseurs of the Guard, now formed up for an attack aimed at Alten’s division in the centre of Wellington’s line between Hougoumont and La Haye Sainte. There was only room to pack a few hundred of them in line at once into the thousand yards between the two farms, so they formed in columns. The time was around 4 p.m. – 4.15 at the latest.
The leader of the cuirassiers, Jean-Baptiste Milhaud, had proved himself an extremely gifted commander over long years in the army. Now forty-eight years old, had been a political hothead in his youth, at the cutting edge of the Jacobin party. He had taken part in the storming of the Bastille, was a regicide, having voted for the execution of Louis XIV without consulting his electorate, and had been a Representative of the People. He was just the sort of figurehead Napoleon needed: if revolutionary fervour was to inspire his troops to superhuman feats, Milhaud was a leader they could believe in.
To make the attack the regiments had to cross the Brussels high road, having started to the east of it (a manoeuvre that makes any suggestion that the charge was spontaneous somewhat implausible), and they went forward in columns of squadrons rather than in a simple continuous line. The wheeling advance led to a charge with the right wing to the fore, so that the first squadrons to make contact were on the right of the French line and they swept across the plateau from east to west, avoiding the deep cutting of the lane, close to the chaussée. ‘This was effected in beautiful order and the formation and advance of that magnificent and highly disciplined cavalry had, as a spectacle, a very grand effect,’ recalled James Shaw. To the enemy the sight, accompanied by the noise of so many horses, was awe-inspiring: ‘You perceived at a distance what appeared to be an overwhelming, long moving line, which, ever advancing, glittered like a stormy wave of the sea when it catches the sunlight. On came the moving host until they got near enough, whilst the very earth seemed to vibrate beneath their thundering tramp.’4
The first battalion to be attacked was the 5th of the German Legion, who were taken by surprise when the cavalry emerged from the smoke before they could complete their square. Lieutenant Edmund Wheatley was ‘busy in keeping the men firm in their ranks, closing up the vacuities as the balls swept off the men’ when ‘a regiment of Cuirassiers darted like a thunderbolt among us’, and the lieutenant-colonel admitted that ‘although the enemy Cuirassiers received the fire of the 5th and of the Grubenhagen Battalion, they managed to break into the square.’ Wheatley ‘made for the Colors to defend them’, and Christian von Ompteda, colonel of the battalion, rushed over to help close the ranks. They were saved by a squadron of cavalry who charged and drove off the cuirassiers, while Ompteda and his officers ‘succeeded with infinite difficulty in rallying the men again’. Disaster had only just been averted: Wheatley ‘parried with great good fortune a back stroke from a horseman as he flew by me and Captain Sander had a deep slice from the same fellow on the head the instant after’.5
Some seven hundred cuirassiers attacked the square formed by the Bremen and Verden battalions, but they mistimed their charge through what may have been ploughed land and came to a premature halt, horses blowing, seventy or eighty paces away from their target. As the cuirassiers wheeled away to their left the Hanoverians fired at them; the captain remembered the French leader lying flat on his horse to avoid the shooting and getting away unscathed.6
From behind this Hanoverian square, Belgian carabiniers launched a counter-charge. They were supposed to attack the French flanks but, over-eager, went straight in and suffered at the hands of the more experienced armoured horsemen. Two more squadrons of carabiniers followed up in support, but a mass of more skilful French Guard chasseurs then charged them in the flank and, as the leader of the cuirassiers recalled, ‘the Dutch brigade that he sent against us was broken: its debris fled in terror.’ Two squadrons of Arentsschildt’s 3rd German Hussars charged and drove off the cavalry pursuing the Belgians, but as they galloped off the fleeing horses spooked and almost carried away the horses of the remaining squadrons of hussars.7
As soon as the routed Belgians had passed, Lord Uxbridge ordered the remaining two squadrons of hussars to charge two squadrons of advancing cuirassiers. Old Colonel Arentsschildt led his hussars through the line of armoured horsemen but they then found themselves facing an even larger number of French lancers and chasseurs, who so enveloped their flanks that few escaped. After these two charges this large and experienced regiment, which had been holding the centre ground almost single-handed, was reduced to about 120 men.8
Just to the right, at the sight of the French cuirassiers coming over the crest and taking possession of the guns of Lloyd’s battery that were lined up on the ridge, the two columns of General Sir Colin Halkett’s British brigade had also rapidly formed square. The 73rd Highlanders and 30th Cambridgeshires reserved their fire until the cuirassiers were close and then made them veer away with a determined volley. Luckily, the cuirassiers did not at first charge th
e 1st Nassau, whose commander – judging them incapable of forming square – left his very inexperienced men in column. The Nassauers were inspired and emboldened by the skilled and disciplined way in which the British square ‘fired its first volley when the riders were at a distance of 60 to 80 paces’ and scattered the attacking French. Fortunately, smoke prevented them from seeing the next square along, which did not fare so well. Sergeant Tom Morris of the 73rd watched the neighbouring square of the 69th and 33rd broken, to be saved from destruction only by the intervention of the Household Cavalry. An officer of the French cuirassiers fired his pistol at Halkett, hitting his neck and causing severe pain but no lasting damage.9
Lord Uxbridge now sent his aide Major William Thornhill to order the Horse Guards to charge. Samuel Ferrior, commander of the 1st Life Guards, was shot dead at the outset, but the Guards drove off the cuirassiers pursuing the British infantry and checked their supports after a severe and bloody conflict in which Major Packe of the Horse Guards was killed while leading a squadron, run through by the officer leading a French squadron. Thornhill, said to be the strongest man in the British army and afterwards credited with having ‘slain more men at Waterloo than any other single individual’, accepted Sir Robert Hill’s courteous invitation to join the charge, but was stunned in the fall when his horse was shot. Hill afterwards told Thornhill how amused he had been at the ‘uncommon ugly face’ Thornhill had made at a cuirassier who was fighting him.10
A reserve squadron of French cuirassiers then hit the 1st Nassau column and the Bremen and Verden square simultaneously, but both units withstood the charge. The survival of the combined square of the 73rd and 30th and that of the 5th German Legion was crucial, as these were the last two experienced units holding up the centre. Lieutenant Wheatley of the 5th had ‘fired a slain soldier’s musket until my shoulder was nearly jellied and my mouth was begrimed with gunpowder to such a degree that I champed the gritty composition unknowingly’. The 5th was charged again and again, with cuirassiers reforming out of sight and leaving an officer on the ridge to direct their charges. Ompteda urged his men to take down the officer, but nobody could hit him until a rifleman from the first battalion, lying within the square with a broken leg, volunteered to be carried into a sniping position and brought him down with his first shot.11
A few hundred yards further west an officer of the 2nd Line of the Legion, in the second line, half a mile behind the first, was watching what was happening ahead:
we observed the Regiments of the first Line form Squares to repel Cavalry – this movement was scarcely executed when the French Cavalry made a dashing charge. they were received with a severe and galling Fire, that did much execution. they did not however retire immediately, but finding they could make no impression on the 52nd which received their charge they galloped down the Line of Squares, perhaps in the idea of finding some Corps in Confusion. but they were at every point repulsed with the greatest Steadiness. they finally came in Confusion and our Cavalry observing the opportunity cut in amongst them and completed the Havock previously made by the Infantry. those that escaped were immediately supported by numerous Forces, and our Cavalry were obliged to retire in their turn.
Some French squadrons now engaged with one of their objectives, the allied artillery on the ridge, which had been left exposed some distance in front of the infantry as they took shelter from the French artillery bombardment. The same officer observed:
At this charge the French had passed within our Artillery and many of the Men were cut down at the Guns, others escaped by creeping under and the moment the French had repassed, jumped up and fired with the greatest coolness and gallantry. It was also at this charge the Duke of Wellington and his Staff were exposed to considerable hazard of being taken Prisoners. He had been riding on the summit of the Hill (where some Batteries of Artillery were placed) the whole Morning. the best Spot where a general view could be had of the Battle. but certainly the most dangerous Post in the Field – The French Cavalry came on so rapid that the Duke had scarcely time to get within the protection of the Squares. His personal danger, great exertions, and Gallantry were conspicuous to the whole Army throughout the Day.12
When the cavalry swept round behind the left flank of the guns above and to the east of Hougoumont, for the most part the gunners limbered up and rode away. Some were saving guns that were already damaged. Some, who had fought at Quatre Bras and had been unable to obtain more ammunition, or whose ammunition had blown up, needed in any case to get more. However, Wellington was furious:
The French cavalry charged, and were formed on the same ground with our artillery, in general within a few yards of our guns. We could not expect the artillery men to remain at their guns in such a case. But I had a right to expect that the officers and men of the artillery would do as I did, and as all the staff did, that is to take shelter in the Squares of the infantry till the French cavalry should be driven off the ground, either by our cavalry or infantry. But they did no such thing; they ran off the field entirely, taking with them limbers, ammunition, and everything; and when in a few minutes we had driven off the French cavalry, and could have made use of our artillery, we had no artillerymen to fire them; and, in point of fact, I should have had NO artillery during the whole of the latter part of the action, if I had not kept a reserve in the commencement.13
Accounts by artillerymen tend to confirm Wellington’s allegation, though with many extenuating excuses. They had taken serious damage from the French artillery and some were genuinely short of ammunition after caissons blew up. They were also an alarmingly long distance in front of the squares, although each time the guns recoiled they moved further down the reverse slope and in the heavy soil the gunners couldn’t drag their guns back up: ‘their best exertions were unable to move the guns again to the crest without horses; to employ horses was to ensure the loss of the animals.’14 Moreover, with the guns on the downslope, firing up the hill, the French were sheltered from their fire behind the ridge. Cleeves claimed to have pulled his guns back to a position between the squares until he ran out of ammunition, but other evidence indicates that only two of them were repositioned there, possibly the only two still capable of firing. There was not much left of Lloyd’s battery. Kühlmann and Sandham pulled out, as did Sinclair, Ramsay and Bull.15
The sight of the artillery haring backwards certainly animated the French. Piré’s lancers had a good view from their high ground; just as the British 15th Hussars were trying to work out how best to cross the valley to attack them, ‘the lancers began cheering, and on looking towards the position we had quitted, the cause of cheering was discovered to be an impetuous attack by the French cavalry upon our infantry and guns, the limbers of which were going rapidly towards the Nivelles road.’16
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Lobau and the Prussians
Eastern flank, 4.30–5.30 p.m.
While the cavalry charged, 7000 fresh infantry commanded by George Mouton, comte de Lobau, were advancing to deliver the knockout blow east of La Haye Sainte. The ninth child of a baker from Lorraine, Mouton had volunteered to fight for the Revolution in 1792 and was elected captain later in the year. His bravery in Italy attracted the attention of Bonaparte, who made him an aide-de-camp from 1805. Tall and robust with black hair and grey eyes, he was frank and direct, a great organiser. He distinguished himself in 1809, winning his title and causing the Emperor to remark, ‘Mon mouton est un lion’. At Napoleon’s invitation, he married one of Josephine’s ladies and it proved an enduring love match. In 1813 he briefly commanded I Corps, and in 1815 he was again appointed an aide and then put in charge of VI Corps. He was one of Napoleon’s most faithful and dependable servants.
Aiming to drive home the French advantage in the area d’Erlon had attacked earlier, Lobau’s columns had just reached the crest of the ravine that separated the two armies when his chief of staff, who had gone on ahead to reconnoitre, came back wounded and announced that there was a line of enemy skirmishers on their right flan
k. Alarmed, Lobau, his aide Janin and General Jacquinot rode over to investigate. There they were, sure enough, and after a while the generals perceived two columns that they estimated at roughly 10,000 men emerge from the trees. Lobau thought it reckless to launch an attack while a force of enemy infantry of equal size to his own was in a position to attack his flank and rear. After an exchange of messages with the Emperor, he redeployed his forces to face the new threat.1
At half past four the Prussians had left the cover of the Bois de Paris with slightly more troops than Lobau’s staff had guessed: 12,000 infantry, 3000 cavalry and 64 guns. Finding themselves under fire from the small detachment of French infantry posted at the edge of the woods by Colonel Marbot, sharpshooters from the fusilier battalion of the 15th Regiment fired the first Prussian shots of the day. Marbot’s men retreated rapidly, covered by a detachment of cavalry.2 Riding ahead of the Prussian infantry, Silesian Hussars and lancers pushed back the main French skirmish line, while Johann von Hiller’s 16th Brigade set off towards Plancenoit with two fusilier battalions under Major von Keller detached to guard the left flank, covered by Falkenhausen’s Silesian cavalry.3
In front of the Prussians an open and relatively level plateau about half a mile wide stretched almost all the way to Napoleon’s tactical headquarters at Rossomme farm, although the ground was more hilly and broken over the last stretch between the village of Plancenoit and Rossomme itself. To their right was the lightly wooded and marshy valley of the Ohain stream with straggling buildings leading to the hamlet of Smohain; to the south of Smohain, the chateau of Fichermont overlooked the valley with woods to the south of it. To their left was the wooded valley of the Lasne stream with the Bois du Ranson and another wood at the edge of the higher ground north of the valley. Both streams were running unusually high, with their valleys flooded or boggy.