Major General Garrison was right. A Somali militia commander later stated:
We knew that immediately after their arrival because we were in all the places where they would have arrived, say in the port, airport, the American compound, some people of us were always there, and the minute they arrived we knew that they were there. And after a very short [time] their own radios announced the arrival of these Special Forces.5
Their target was doing everything in his power to avoid detection including “moving every two hours, changing his means of travel, wearing disguises, sleeping at a different location each night.”6 He had also stopped appearing at the regular SNA rallies as these were obvious targets for the Task Force.
The Rangers had also started patrolling within the immediate vicinity to increase the security envelope around the hangar. “We did 42 total missions while we were there, mostly dismounted patrols … the first night we were there my whole platoon went out and did a dismounted patrol through Mogadishu. We had [enemy] contact that very first night,” explained Lieutenant DiTomasso. Ranger Staff Sergeant Matt Eversmann remembered these early patrols: “We conducted foot patrols out into the city at night. As I understood it the idea was [as a] presence patrol, go out and let the bad guys know that we’re here and by the same token let the good people of Mogadishu know that the good guys were there.” These patrols met with much heated resistance once the practice became known to the Pentagon.
General Downing commented:
General Garrison wanted to get out and do active patrolling and do more for force protection. The JCS [Joint Chiefs of Staff] found out and went ballistic. They said that we were not there to do that, do not send out patrols. That is the mission of UNOSOM and the QRF. General Montgomery would say they had the situation in hand – the Egyptians had the force protection mission for the airfield … The Joint Staff was concerned that the Task Force would get away from its mission. Garrison wanted the Rangers to conduct ambushes and to patrol adjacent to the airfield. Hoar and I talked about it. This provoked a firestorm – it was not a minor issue. It was not a negotiable issue. Powell was concerned about mission creep. People were very emotional during this time.7
The Task Force were also concerned about operational security (OPSEC). OPSEC is a vitally important consideration for any special operations unit. Special operations forces are trained to operate covertly and maintain the vital strategic and tactical element of surprise. Disguising or concealing the true nature of a deployment is a typical measure to maintain this operational security requirement. In Task Force Ranger’s case their efforts were compromised early by the release of the name of the task force in the international press, even before the deploying elements touched down in Somalia.
Naming the task force after its largest component unit was in hindsight a questionable decision. This has led to similar task forces operating during the Global War on Terror to adopt far less evocative and far more confusing numerical identifiers that conceal their true role and purpose. Task Force Ranger also tried their level best to conceal the presence of the Delta element within their ranks, again with little apparent success.
Incredibly media outlets affiliated with the Knight-Ridder news service were soon publicly reporting that Task Force Ranger included “about two dozen of the Army’s top-secret Delta Force commandos.”8 The fact that this information was sourced to “Pentagon officials” is equally troubling: at best it may have been a crude attempt at a psychological warfare operation to instil fear in their quarry; at worst it was an incredibly dangerous breach of operational security.
One anonymous source quoted by the newspapers even declared: “We’re not going to come right out and say we’re trying to nab him but if the opportunity presents itself, having Delta there gives us a better chance.”9 In late September, however, the same news service was reporting efforts to dampen such aggressive notions, adding that the US administration were now attempting to politically isolate Aideed. They even quoted Marine Lieutenant General Robert Johnston, former commander of US forces in Somalia: “If you end up fighting him, you play to his strong suit.”10
The members of Task Force Ranger recognized the on-the-ground effect of this press speculation. The Executive Officer of the Ranger’s Bravo Company, Captain Lee Rysewyk, commented:
The press had a major impact on the outcome of TF Ranger’s mission. Before the force even deployed, the news of the day described how the US was sending 400 elite Rangers to Somalia to hunt for fugitive warlord Aideed. CNN waited on the airfield tarmac for the Rangers. This only telegraphed our mission to Aideed and set TF Ranger up for failure by sending Aideed into deep reclusion. It was no wonder that intelligence reports rarely pinpointed Aideed.11
As noted, there were two main plans to capture Aideed. Ranger Lieutenant James “Jim” Lechner, the Fire Support Officer attached to Captain Steele’s command element and responsible for managing air support from the AH-6 Little Birds, described the “Building Assault” template in detail and is worth quoting at length, particularly as he spells out the exact package later employed on October 3:
The assault element was made up of special operations personnel and would be inserted directly on top of the target’s location. Once on the ground the assault element would have the responsibility for the capture and security of targeted personnel referred to as Precious Cargo (PC). The assault element would conduct the actual entry and clearing of buildings or vehicles where the PCs were located.12
Two to four AH-6Js, the armed attack helicopter variant of the Little Bird, would arrive just before the MH-6s that would deliver the assaulters to scout the target location, looking for potential threats including RPGs [anti-tank grenade launcher] or anti-aircraft guns. Although unarmored, the AH-6s, known colloquially as “Guns,” were heavily armed with six-barrel 7.62mm miniguns and unguided 2.75-inch rocket pods.
Lechner’s explanation continues:
Assisting the assault element in this mission was the security element. It was made up of two reduced strength Ranger platoons, broken down into four separate elements or “chalks,” which would surround the target, landing by fast rope, and form a perimeter of blocking positions (BPs). The mission of the Rangers was primarily to prevent any outside interference with the assault element and secondarily to seal off the target area so no one could escape.13
The term “chalk” dated back to Operation Overlord and the D-Day invasion of France during World War II. Airborne troops were assigned to a specific aircraft that had its identification number noted in chalk on the side of the plane or glider. The paratroopers were then divided into groups based on this chalk number. The Rangers continued the use of the term in Somalia to easily identify who was assigned to which helicopter. Whilst the chalks fast-roped in, the Ranger Ground Reaction Force or GRF would drive toward the target. As Lechner further explains:
Bravo Company would also provide the vehicular ground force made up of a platoon-sized element of … HMMWVs, armed with .50-caliber machine guns, and Mark 19 automatic grenade launchers. Immediately, upon the launch of the assault force, the vehicles would race from the airport to the target location and would reinforce the perimeter. Once our intelligence provided us a target, the recon birds would be used to pinpoint the target’s location and lead the airborne assault force to the landing zone (LZ). This was critical as the LZ was generally right on top of target among buildings or vehicles in the streets.
The lift birds carried the assault force to the target, then inserted them, generally by fast rope. After the insertion, the majority of the lift birds would fly a safe distance away and take up an orbit to wait for the call to extract the assault force. Some of the helicopters would remain over the target and support the assault force on the ground. The helicopters consisted of two birds carrying snipers who would provide precise fires to interdict Somalis approaching the perimeter. The snipers would be assisted in this by the doorgunners of these helicopters.
In addition to the sniper birds, f
our helicopter gunships would provide heavier firepower if needed. A Command and Control bird and one other lift bird carrying a Search and Rescue (SAR) team would also remain overhead. The SAR team was made up of medics and rescue personnel and was a contingency in case of a downed helicopter.14
The “Vehicular Convoy Intercept” template was primarily a Delta-led option. Once a targeted individual was identified moving in a vehicle convoy, the Task Force would launch with either MH-6 Little Birds or Black Hawks carrying Delta snipers in the lead, supported by a pair of armed AH-6 attack helicopters should close air support prove necessary. The snipers would engage the vehicle from the air using M249 squad automatic weapons (SAWs) or their sniper rifles, aiming for the engine block to immobilize the vehicle. If this did not stop the vehicle, the driver would subsequently be engaged.
Operators would then land and capture the targeted individual. Typically, the Ranger chalks would stand by in Black Hawks overhead to act as a cut-off force or to reinforce the operators should the target escape into a building. Both mission templates could be modified as needed, often on the fly. For instance, in some circumstances the assault force would be extracted by helicopter from roofs or from the street outside a target location. At other times, a Ranger vehicle convoy would drive into the target area to extract the operators.
In all scenarios, a number of helicopter-borne elements were ever present. High above was the C2 or Command and Control Black Hawk, callsign Super 63, piloted by Chief Warrant Officer Class 4 Stu Kaufman and Chief Warrant Officer Class 3 Mark Bergamo. This carried the Air Mission Commander, Colonel Tom Matthews, and the Ground Mission Commander, Colonel Gary Harrell. Super 63 was also equipped to carry out emergency MEDEVACs in extremis, although finding a large enough landing zone in the urban sprawl of Mogadishu would prove challenging.
Along with the C2 Black Hawk, another MH-60L carried Task Force Ranger’s insurance policy, the Combat-Search-And-Rescue or CSAR team. “We had seven Rangers, five Delta, two Pararescue and one CCT [Combat Controller] and we had an abundance of rank – we had two Delta Sergeant Majors and a Delta Captain,” explained Ranger Sergeant John Belman, assigned to the CSAR element’s security team. “It was a very senior team. I wasn’t in my usual team leader or squad leader role on that team.”
Amongst the five Delta operators on the CSAR element was Captain Bill C, who would later command C-Squadron during the Iraq invasion, C-Squadron Sergeant Major Tommy C, Sergeant Major Rick W from the sniper troop (also known as 3 Troop), Sergeant First Class Bob M, a highly trained special forces medic, and the C-Squadron EOD (Explosives Ordnance Disposal) technician, Luke V. The EOD technician was a mainstay in all Delta squadrons, available to make safe bombs or IEDs located during the course of raids or to destroy targets with explosives. One of Luke V’s chief roles on the CSAR team was to plant demolition charges on a downed helicopter to deny it to the enemy. Belman added:
Captain Bill C was in command, the senior person on the team. In the CSAR unit we all worked very well together even though effectively you had three different units reporting to three different chains of command. One of the Delta Sergeant Majors would have taken over if Bill C went down. Medically it was the PJs [Pararescueman Jumper] and Bob M in the lead – I’d had EMT training and everyone had had some form of [first aid] training. That was one of the lessons learned coming out of Somalia – to have more of that.
Three Air Force Special Tactics personnel were assigned to the CSAR team. Amongst them was the hugely experienced Air Force Master Sergeant Scott Fales. Fales had passed selection to become a Pararescueman Jumper or PJ back in 1980 and had participated in Operation Just Cause in Panama, jumping in to the airfield at Torios-Tacuman to position infrared strobes for the main air-landing force. A decade after qualifying as a PJ, Fales was selected into the 24th Special Tactics Squadron that supported JSOC operations. His first deployment was Operation Desert Storm where he was involved in the extraction of compromised Special Forces teams caught far behind enemy lines.15
The second PJ on the team was also a Panama veteran, Technical Sergeant Timothy Wilkinson, as was their CCT, Technical Sergeant Pat Rogers. All three airmen would be key to the events at the first crash site on October 3. The PJs carried a full suite of trauma kits to provide emergency first aid and were specially trained to rescue trapped aircrew.
In fact, Task Force Ranger included almost a dozen members of Air Force Special Tactics with CCTs spread amongst all elements, including Technical Sergeant Dan Schilling who accompanied Ranger battalion commander Colonel Danny McKnight on the GRF. Combat Controller Staff Sergeant Ray Benjamin would be stationed with the Task Force command element in the C2 aircraft.
Staff Sergeant Jeff Bray was assigned to the Delta assault force and would ride in with the operators. Bray replaced Master Sergeant Dave Schnoor who would only serve on the first three Task Force Ranger missions as he had to return to the United States on emergency compassionate leave. The role of these CCTs was to manage air support requests from the teams they were embedded with and to deconflict the airspace over the target to minimize the risk of collisions or friendly fire – it was a daunting task with up to 16 aircraft overhead at any one time. Each CCT carried a number of radios allowing them to communicate directly with the Little Bird and Black Hawk pilots or the C2 helicopter.
As previously noted, the Ground Force Commander as well as the Assault Force Commander was Delta Captain Austin “Scottie” Miller. The Ranger chalks were commanded by Captain Mike Steele. Colonel Danny McKnight led the Ranger ground reaction force convoy. The command relationship on the ground may not have been crystal clear to Steele and it led to command difficulties on the eventual October 3 mission.
Norm Hooten explained:
Scott Miller was the Ground Force Commander. It was clear as day to everyone that the Delta Force Assault Force Commander was the Ground Force Commander. That’s the way it had been on every single mission. There was no change to the command structure. I’m not sure if Captain Steele would say different but if he does, he’s wrong. Scott Miller up until a few days before had been the Operations Officer. Bennett S had been the Ground Force Commander and Bennett S’s father got sick and Bennett went home so Scott was put in charge temporarily until Bennett got back.
Whilst the close confines of their living arrangements naturally led to the occasional disagreement, all three units maintained a generally close relationship. The pilots of the 160th SOAR and the Delta operators had long experience working with each other and had an especially tight bond. Many of the Rangers were very young and by their own admission inexperienced in combat. Many were also understandably hesitant about their first real-world mission, although they tried to cover this with Ranger bravado. The young Rangers naturally looked up to the older Delta operators who exuded an irreverent air to army norms. Delta strongly encouraged individual initiative and rank was largely shunned with deference only to those with the most experience.
This did not sit well with the Ranger company commander. Steele, by all accounts a very dyed-in-the-wool army traditionalist, saw this as a negative and did his utmost to keep the two units apart, fearful of the influence of the operators. He also put a stop to some of the positive cross-pollination between the two units. Operators conducted classes in advanced CQB shooting and room clearance for the Rangers that would have no doubt helped them during the events of October 3, but Steele tried to stop the training sessions. Some Rangers snuck out after dark to attend secret training sessions with the Delta operators to avoid Steele’s wrath.
The Ranger captain was by all accounts a divisive individual. Most members of Delta and the 160th SOAR who had contact with Steele typically described him in almost uniformly negative terms. Some questioned his handling of the case of a 7th Special Forces Group soldier attached to the Ranger battalion as a Direct Support Special Operations Medic. He publicly argued with Steele over the tactical sense of briefing his Rangers after they had left the relative safety of the base as o
pposed to prior to the mission. As a result he was blacklisted by Steele and sent back to the United States the next day.
The individual concerned, then-Staff Sergeant Stan Goff, has his own colourful story. He was in fact a former Delta operator who had been kicked out of the unit in 1986 for alleged sexual improprieties. Whilst deployed to El Salvador, he was alleged to have had improper relations with a woman in the residence of the US Ambassador. He transferred to the 7th Special Forces Group after the incident. Despite leaving Delta under a dark cloud, Goff was a very experienced operator, and medic, who had conducted operations with Delta in Central America. Some viewed Steele’s treatment of Goff as yet another example of Steele’s poor command decisions.
Delta Staff Sergeant Mike Moser remarked: “As a general rule, I tried to avoid mixing with the Ranger folks as much as possible since I realized we were a major disruption [or] distraction to their internal chain of command.” This seems to have been true for most of his fellow operators. The Rangers saw Delta wearing whatever they wanted, carrying whatever modified weapons and equipment they felt were best suited for a specific task and exhibiting a general lack of adherence to regimented army doctrine, the polar opposite of their company commander. Some of this attitude undoubtedly began to rub off on the more impressionable Rangers.
Hooten added:
When you’re dealing with operators, you’re dealing with a pretty irreverent bunch of guys. I think he saw that as some sort of disrespect. His tactics didn’t work with 30-year-old men who’d been around a while. We couldn’t give a damn about Captain Steele as he was not involved in our life.
He had a lot of young Rangers looking up to the Delta operators and he thought, “Hey, these guys are usurping my authority,” I guess, and he felt like he was losing control of his guys. He’d come over and say [to his Rangers], “Get back to your own section, don’t talk to those guys,” or they’d want to come train with us and he wouldn’t want them to train with us. I think he was a little bit intimidated to be honest with you.
Day of the Rangers: The Battle of Mogadishu 25 Years On Page 5