Water had also become an issue. “It was hot. People were dehydrated and without water. I don’t believe there were any true heat casualties. We all had cramps, but there were more important things to think about at the time,” recalled another Delta operator who preferred to remain anonymous. A faucet was discovered near the eastern end of the crash site and several Rangers refilled their canteens, preferring to drink and take their chances with dysentery.
1820 HOURS: ASSAULT FORCE AMMO GETTING CRITICAL.
Ammunition was also a problem. The operators recovered Dan Busch’s M249 and delinked the ammunition to reload their CAR15 magazines, but many men were down to their last magazines (a pair of night-vision goggles had also been found in the downed aircraft and were given to a Ranger machine-gunner guarding the perimeter). At that point, if the Somalis had made a concerted and coordinated effort to overrun the crash site, there was a good chance that the Rangers would have run out of ammunition.
Mike Moser explained:
As the evening settled in, and it became apparent I would remain static in this CCP for the time being, I naturally began to run through a number of themes. The possibility of being overrun was certainly there. I realized that the force would have considerable difficulty walking out on our own given the number of non-ambulatory folks. I tried to put myself in the Somali position – it would have been a tremendous coup not just to defeat us but to completely annihilate [or] capture our force.
That was a very remote possibility, but if they had acted quickly – massing and coordinating early enough to make us extinguish all of our ammunition before any rescue force was capable of assisting – they may have succeeded. Anyway, I became a little concerned that they may send some very committed guys at us through the walls of the housing units rather than in the main alleys. I knew that they most likely had no explosives breaching capability, but an RPG or two might provide access. At any rate we had guys watching every doorway and window that led to us.
1836 HOURS: NUMEROUS RPG LAUNCHES IN VIC [VICINITY] N [NORTH] CRASH SITE; STILL HAVE ONE BODY TRAPPED IN ACFT [AIRCRAFT] – UNABLE TO GET DUE TO NUMEROUS SMALL-ARMS.
Tom DiTomasso was also low on ammunition and reliant upon the AH-6s to engage any large groupings of Somalis they spotted:
My Forward Observer was talking to the aerial fires assets which were the AH-6s at that time and continually calling fire missions to keep the Somali gunmen off of us. They just kept attacking – if they had better command and control, if they were better organized, they might have been able to overwhelm us at that point as we were running out of ammo. They just kept attacking in threes and fours and running at the building and climbing in through the windows. We were able to fight them in small groups. The Rangers would fight to the death for each other, and it showed. I owe my life to them forever.
There were several times during the battle that we should’ve been overrun – there were only seven of us there initially and then there was 15 from Chalk 2. If the enemy had mounted a very quick and large counterattack they could have overrun us very, very quickly. We may have been outnumbered, but the Rangers fought as a team, and were fighting for a bigger prize: each other and our fallen comrades in the aircraft.
1908 HOURS: SUPER 66 WILL DROP RESUPPLY ITEMS AT CRASH SITE #1; DZ [DROP ZONE] MARKED BY IR [INFRARED] STROBE; AH-6 SUPPORTING WITH GUNS. ASSUME FRIENDLIES AT THE STROBES. TAKING FIRES FROM 9 O’CLOCK; RESUPPLY SUCCESSFUL. AT LEAST 20 ENEMY WITH AKS IN VIC.
The shortage of ammunition and water led to a very courageous resupply mission conducted by Super 66 as DiTomasso recalled:
We’d already run out of water, we’d already run out of medical supplies. We’d almost run out of ammunition. General Garrison made the decision to send in the resupply bird, Super 66. After dark, they decide to load up the resupply bird with water, ammunition, and medical supplies and they fly it into the target area. A Little Bird used a laser pointer to show Chief Warrant Officer Stan Wood flying Super 66 which building to go to.
The MH-6s were told to “stay on the ground and stand by for a mission.” Their flight lead, Karl Maier, had volunteered for the resupply mission, figuring that the MH-6s would be more agile and face less of a risk than the lumbering Black Hawk, but was turned down and the mission went to Super 66. The other surviving Black Hawk, Super 65, also remained on standby in case another resupply or an emergency MEDEVAC was cleared in. “We stayed on the ground and we kept running all night long. We stayed running until about 7:30 in the morning,” confirmed Gerry Izzo.
Hooten still remembers the resupply. He recounted:
We ran dry until we had the Black Hawk come over and kick out a bundle. We were short on ammo and a lot of guys were out of water – that was a big issue. They [Super 66] were there for maybe 10 seconds and they were taking a lot of ground fire. RPGs are going everywhere but they were not very effective. They were shooting but they don’t have any night sights plus they weren’t very good with them during the day and they were even worse at night.
Mike Moser recalled the tremendous amount of fire directed at Super 66 and the supporting AH-6s as they attempted to suppress the enemy firing points:
I definitely heard that [resupply mission], [it] sounded like it was directly above us when she finally came in. We could hear brass [expended cartridges] raining down on our tin roof, mostly from gunship strafing runs as they prepped and delivered fire missions for our guys before and afterward. I was still monitoring our assault net and knew of the intent to risk the delivery. The aircraft’s approach and hover, to me anyway, seemed painfully slow as the enemy fire climaxed all around. I did at some point become concerned that she [Super 66] might come crashing down through the roof on top of us if she didn’t conclude her business soon.
Another operator commented that he couldn’t hear Super 66’s miniguns because of all the Somali fire being directed at the helicopter. The ammunition and bottles of water were packed in Mk19 ammunition boxes and dropped out the side of the aircraft by two members of Delta’s sniper troop who had volunteered for the mission – Alex S and Joe V. Both had survived the earlier gauntlet of the McKnight convoy, traveling in the five-ton with C-Team and the prisoners.
DiTomasso recounted:
As soon as he came into the area he started to take machine-gun fire. He came in and pushed out the supplies but he received so much fire that he started to lose hydraulics, but they managed to make it back to the airfield and crash landed it there. [Unfortunately] all the water shattered on the ground, a lot of the ammunition shattered when it hit the ground. We were picking up bullets out of the sand, bringing them back and loading them in our weapons. Our machine guns were overheating so we actually took our bayonets and punctured the oil can underneath a car that was parked in the garage of the building that we were defending and used that to lube up our machine guns, both the M60s and the SAWs.
2025 HOURS: ASLT [ASSAULT FORCE COMMANDER] ADVISES THAT “IF QRF DOES NOT GET THERE (NORTH CRASH) SOON, THERE WILL BE MORE KIAS FROM PREVIOUSLY RECEIVED WIA; GET THE ONE STAR [GENERAL] TO GET HIS PEOPLE MOVING!”
Tragically the resupply hadn’t included any blood which Delta medic Kurt S desperately needed, but it had provided bags of IV solution that Schmid immediately administered to the wounded Corporal Jamie Smith. Perino and other Rangers were taking turns at keeping pressure on Smith’s wound in an attempt to stem the bleeding. After refusing for many hours, as it might dangerously lower his respiration rate, Kurt S finally agreed to provide morphine which took the pain away for the young Ranger.
Super 65 pilot Gerry Izzo:
At one point in the battle, after the resupply, the senior Delta operator on the ground [Miller] called Colonel Harrell who was in the C2 bird and he said “We need an immediate MEDEVAC, I’ve got two guys who are going to die if I don’t get them out of here.” We got the aircraft ready, I figured I would land on the roof of the building, but this was the same building they had done the resupply mission to that had got shot to ribbons, so I�
��m thinking I’ve got about 30 seconds to get in there and get these guys and get out. I remember I took my pistol out and jacked a round into the chamber, I grabbed my M16 and I thought, “Well, at best I’m going to get shot down or I’m going to get killed.”
I’m thinking all of this and on the radio Colonel Harrell and Captain Miller are talking and Harrell said [to Miller] “Scottie, just hang on, I can’t send any more Black Hawks in, [and] I’m running out of helicopters. We’re going to get some tanks and armored vehicles and we’ll punch through to them with those.” I was frustrated but at the same time I was relieved.
Lieutenant Perino later wrote:
Smith was deteriorating; he was losing blood at an alarming rate. We were running critically short of IVs, and I realized that Corporal Smith would die if he was not evacuated immediately. I requested MEDEVAC on three separate occasions, but each time I was denied – enemy fire was just too great, and we had already lost three helicopters to enemy fire. All we could do was post security and wait. Despite all attempts to keep my soldier alive, Corporal Smith died at 2027 hours.1
Norm Hooten remembered the horror of that night: “You try to tell him ‘No, son, you’re not gonna die, you’re gonna live.’ And he died and that … that’s one of the things that … you know, keeps me up at night sometimes – that, that horrible lie that you tell someone trying to keep his spirits up.”2 “There were calls for a MEDEVAC that were refused by the command bird and the reason was because they felt they couldn’t get the bird in there safely, they would’ve lost the MEDEVAC bird and I agreed with them on that,” added Hooten sadly.
2027 HOURS: ASLT FORCE ADVISES 1 X CRITICAL WIA AT CRASH SITE #1 IS NOW KIA.
Delta Medic Bart B continued to treat the other wounded Rangers and operators at the second CCP with Captain Steele. He recalled:
The casualties I treated were all very cooperative. I was the primary care provider for some, and others came to “my courtyard CCP” already self/buddy treated. The ones who were seriously wounded and needed it were given morphine. They couldn’t walk or fight anyway. Others who were still able to fire their rifles were given injectable Toradol [an anti-inflammatory pain reliever] if needed. I explained to them all that we may very well be in for a long stay, and everyone needed to be able to fight and move without being “under the influence.” I never saw any excessive screaming or psych cases.3
When Captain Miller wanted Captain Steele to move his force to link up with Miller’s element to shrink the perimeter and make it easier to both defend and to allow the Little Birds a clearer “kill box,” Steele refused after initially agreeing to the request as relayed by Colonel Harrell. His senior NCO, Sergeant Watson, argued that with the number of wounded they had suffered, such a move was suicidal. Harrell apparently refused to directly order Steele to move, leaving the management of the ground force and all its elements to Miller.
Norm Hooten recalled:
We got a call from Captain Miller, who said “Come on over to my location. Move everybody up here and we’ll try to establish a proper perimeter around the aircraft.” So [B-Team leader] John B, [A-Team leader] Jon Hale and I are getting ready to move forward. We had our teams together and we had fragments of the Ranger blocking positions and Captain Steele was there as well.
We went to him and said, “How long until you can get moving? We’ve got to move up to put a perimeter around the aircraft. How long do you need before you’re ready to move?” He said “Five minutes.” So what happened was we went back after the five minutes and said, “Okay, are your guys ready to move?” and he [Steele] says, “I want to readdress this, I don’t think it’s a good idea,” and I said, “It doesn’t matter what you think, this is what’s happening. The Ground Force Commander has made the call and we are moving.” Still Steele resisted.
So [B-Team leader] John B and I are talking through a hole in the wall and he says, “What in hell is taking you guys so long?” and I said, “I’ve got an issue. I think I’ve got a personality conflict with Captain Steele. Why don’t you come over here and see if you can convince him to move?” So John B goes over to “Mr Personality” [Steele] and says, “Hey, what’s your problem?” and he goes, “I don’t think this is a good idea,” and John B took his headset off and goes, “Get on the radio to Scott Miller, the Ground Force Commander, and tell him you don’t think it’s a good idea.” Captain Steele wouldn’t take the headset.
With Steele refusing to move, Miller instead ordered John B, Hooten, and the three other Delta operators at Steele’s position to link up with him and his command element opposite the alleyway leading into the crash site. Hooten said:
We moved out and got lit up. The plan was to move up to Scottie Miller’s position. I was concerned that, along with the Somalis, every man in that assault force might light us up as well. I was making sure on the radio that [everyone knows] we have friendlies moving across the streets. We managed to get one house up and that put us directly on that corner where Earl [Fillmore] had been hit.
Hooten’s element then prepared to bound across to a house directly opposite to close the gap between them and the crash site perimeter. Hooten reported:
We were getting ready to cross the street into the corner house and we were going to light it up before we moved. We got all of our 203 gunners lined up to unload on the house and just before we did we saw a flash of a light. So we called over [the radio], “Are we sure that we have no friendlies in that house?” and everybody confirmed, “Nope, you have no friendlies in that house.” And just before we did we saw a light come on and it was [Ranger Sergeant] John Belman and that was our first link-up with anyone from the crash site.
Belman also remembered the moment vividly. The operators believed they had seen a tactical light affixed to Belman’s CAR15 when in fact it was a flashlight owned by a Somali civilian woman in the house which incredibly still had batteries. She had switched the light on at an opportune moment, likely saving Belman’s life. Hooten then “went over to link up with Scott Miller so I took my team over to Scott Miller’s location directly across the street from the house Belman had moved back to.”
An operator who requested anonymity said that the Somalis continued to probe their positions all night long, mainly in twos and threes but sometimes in larger groups: “The skinnies [Somalis] kept trying to sneak up on us but most were killed.” The operator believed that the AH-6s were instrumental in holding back the Somalis: “early on I thought this [being overrun] was a possibility, but after a prayer and the AH-6s all seemed well!”
The AH-6s flew all night. The five-man airfield services detachment “loaded more than one hundred rockets and fifty thousand rounds of minigun ammunition while pumping 12,500 gallons of fuel to ‘hot-fuel’ the helicopters.”4 Combat Controller Jeff Bray called in danger close Little Bird gunruns all night long. “Danger close” is the US military term signifying that friendly troops are dangerously close to the intended enemy target and pilots should take particular care to ensure against fratricide. Bray had placed infrared strobes around their location to mark the location of friendlies and guided the AH-6 pilots onto his targets using the AIM-1 infrared laser mounted on his GAU-5 carbine (the Air Force personnel carried a slightly different version of the CAR15 called the GAU-5).
Many of the Rangers and CSAR team remembered the expended brass from the miniguns of the AH-6s raining down on their heads as the Little Birds zipped by overhead. PJ Tim Wilkinson recalled with some understatement: “When Jeff was calling in danger close missions on the wall right next to us – that I’m almost leaning up against – and hot brass is raining down on my head, and the whomp of the rockets they are shooting is shaking the house, you have a sense that things are indeed grave.”5
AH-6 pilot Chief Warrant Officer Paul White recalled Bray talking him onto targets: “I will always remember the calm demeanor and professionalism [Bray] showed over the radio even as I heard bullets hitting very near his position each time he keyed his radio microphone.”
6 He was awarded the Silver Star for his efforts to defend the crash site.
His citation reads in part:
While serving with a US Army Ranger element trapped and surrounded inside a building in the city, Staff Sergeant Bray coordinated helicopter gunship fire on targets all around his position throughout the night. He developed tactics and techniques on the spot that allowed him to mark friendly forces’ locations so that helicopter gunships could destroy close enemy concentrations. By his gallantry and devotion to duty, Staff Sergeant Bray has reflected great credit upon himself and the United States Air Force.7
Gerry Izzo explained the process of calling in the air support: “The Little Birds [would] make several dry dummy runs to make sure the target the guys on the ground were talking about was the same target before they would fire. They were engaging targets with the miniguns within 10 meters of friendly troops and they were engaging targets with the rockets within 30 meters.” It was the first time in the combat history of the 160th that Little Birds “Winchestered” or ran out of ammunition before they ran out of fuel. Jeff Struecker recounted:
The tide of the battle changed when the Little Birds started firing rockets. We could tell the Somalis became defensive and they said, “Okay, now we are officially outgunned.” There had been a lot of concern about casualties to civilians. The flight lead for the Little Bird gunships said, “Give us credit for using the proper weapon at the proper time.” They used HE rockets, not the fletchette rockets.
First time I heard a rocket from one of our aircraft was 2 or 3 o’clock that morning and I thought “I thought we weren’t supposed to be using rockets”: then it dawned on me that we had now thrown the rules of engagement out the window and said, “We’re going to do whatever it takes to keep each other alive.”
At any one time there would be a pair of AH-6s refueling and rearming, whilst another pair were flying over the battlespace. At the Super 61 crash site, one AH-6 would be flying gun runs whilst its partner provided overwatch, keeping an eye out for Somali RPGs or heavy weapons that could threaten the Little Birds. As they ran low on fuel or ammunition, they would be replaced in a constant cycle as the others refueled and rearmed.
Day of the Rangers: The Battle of Mogadishu 25 Years On Page 24