Erik had 3,400 troops stationed in Livonia, but he did have 18,000 infantry and 4,500 cavalry available in Sweden and with these he led a counterattack, invading Halland laying siege to Halmstad in October. Overcoming supply and artillery transportation problems, he was able to breach the walls in November, but two attempts at storming the city were beaten back and Erik finally turned over command of the army to a French mercenary, Charles de Mornay.
Meanwhile, Frederick rushed a relief force to Halmstad that was intercepted by de Mornay. The Swedes met the advance guard of a small cavalry force and 2,000 arquebusiers at Mared. The Swedish horse was driven off, exposing the flanks of the infantry, resulting in a Swedish defeat. Had the Danish infantry been brought to bear, the defeat might have been a rout. Fortunately, the mercenary foot did not arrive for another day and de Mornay was able to slip away under cover of darkness, but he was forced to leave behind his guns.
Victorious twice, Frederick prepared two more campaigns. In Jämtland, Norway, he ordered a force be assembled and sent into Ångermanland to cut Sweden in two and open a backdoor to an invasion of Finland. This attack never got off the ground, but the risk was noted by Erik.
Frederick’s second campaign was in the south of Sweden. Here he sent his ablest general, Daniel Rantzau, through Skåne into Småland to capture the fortress and port of Kalmar, an attack that was supposed to have coincided with the advance against Älvsborg, but had been delayed by Erik’s move into Halland. In Småland, Rantzau got a taste of the border people’s defensive methods of delay, sabotage and ambush. Unable to reach Kalmar and with winter fast approaching, he withdrew to Skåne after pillaging the border area, spreading as much havoc as possible. It was only a prelude of things to come.
Now Frederick found himself with a large mercenary army he could not afford and that was not fighting. By spring he had reduced his mercenaries to two incomplete infantry regiments and seven companies of cavalry, less than 8,000 men.
While Frederick’s army was resting during the winter, Erik again took the offense sending Klas Horn into Bohuslän to besiege the castle at Bohus in the hopes of breaking through to the sea in February 1564. A second army under a French mercenary, Claude Collart, invaded Jämtland with 4,000 foot and horse, and 300 ski troops. Horn was unsuccessful and had to withdraw, but Collart broke through, capturing Jämtland and Härjedalen, then crossed the mountains taking Trondheim on the Norwegian coast. Erik would hold Jämtland and Häjedalem through the war, but in May a Danish rescue force of over 4,000 men landed at Trondheim and Collart was forced to surrender.
In 1565 the Swedish forces operating in Scania took most of Halland and captured the port of Varberg. It was put into service as the main western Swedish port, replacing Älvsborg. Records show the quantity of goods passing through this port surpassed normal traffic through Älvsborg. Frederick called upon Daniel Rantzau to recover the lost seaport. The Danish army lay siege to Varberg, but could not dislodge the Swedes. Erik countered by gathering all his remaining troops and moving in that direction. With winter coming on and the threat of a relief force intervening, Rantzau raised his siege of Varberg and set out for winter quarters in Skåne. His main objective achieved, Erik turned over command to Jakob Henriksson Hästeskog and departed with a 1,200 man escort.
Hästeskog pursued the Danish army, catching up with them near the small town of Axtorna. The ensuing fight would be the only major land battle of the Seven Year Northern War. Rantzau had 7,500 infantry, 1,600 cavalry and 21 guns, nearly all German mercenaries with a sprinkling of Scots. Hästeskog’s Swedish army consisted of 8,000 foot (peasant conscripts), 3,000 horse (Swedish rusttjänst and some German reiters), and 42 pieces of artillery.
On October 16, 1565, Rantzau took up defensive positions and waited for the Swedes to attack. Hästeskog hit the Danish army with light artillery then pushed forward with his first line of infantry. Rantzau counterattacked with cavalry, which silenced the Swedish guns, then turned on the infantry. Hästeskag ordered in his cavalry carrying a 2 to 1 advantage. Nevertheless, the Danish horse broke the Swedish cavalry charge and scattered the troopers.
The distraction of the Swedish cavalry attack did allow the infantry to press forward driving the Danish foot backward. However, once the Danish horse had destroyed the Swedish horse, they returned to the attack on the infantry. Bielke, the front line infantry commander, ordered his troops to fall back and retake the artillery, then join up with the rest of the infantry. But without cavalry support, the Swedish foot could not hold against the Danish foot and horse. They were soon in full retreat leaving their artillery behind. Again, the Swedish conscript infantry had aquitted itself well against the German professionals, but the poor showing of the Swedish cavalry had lost the day.
While the land war was grinding to a stalemate, it was the sea blockade that could bring Sweden to her knees quickly. Älvsborg had been taken in the first months of the war, cutting the country’s traditional opening to the west, though Varberg was proving a good substitute. Danish and Lübeck fleets now threw up a blockade cutting Sweden’s eastern ports off from the German and eastern Baltic ports. Without imported commodities, particularly salt, the population would soon face starvation. Fortunately, Gustav had foreseen such circumstances and stockpiled salt in the a isles of the Great Church in Stockholm, allowing the county to get by for the first two years of the war when the blockade was fairly effective.
During the summer of 1563 Denmark and Lübeck had put together great fleets by buying and converting large numbers of merchantmen into warships and manning them with German mercenary soldiers. These were added to the few built-for-war ships already in their navies. The coalition navy was commanded by Danish admiral Herluf Trolle, who introduced his own tactics whereby the fleet was divided into squadrons of three ships, one major vessel of 300 tons or more supported by two converted merchantmen. If attacking with the wind, the squadron would form a wedge with the major ship leading. If downwind and being attacked they formed a line with the major ship in the center.
A combined fleet sailed for Stockholm to enforce the blockade with 20 major Danish ships and 5 from Lübeck. On September 11 the coalition ships were joined by the Swedish fleet of some 12 major ships, but even the smaller Swedish vessels were warships and were better armed than the coalition’s merchantmen. Again the Danish-Lübeck ships attempted to close and board, but Erik’s ships were faster and able to hold them off while hitting them with cannon fire. Yet, the Swedes were not able to inflict a decisive blow and eventually withdrew into the Stockholm Archipelago. The coalition fleet was left to cruise the northern Baltic enforcing the blockade.
The next summer, 1564, the coalition fleet again appeared off the Swedish coast, this time with 16 Danish and 10 Lübeck major ships. On May 10 it was attacked by an increased Swedish fleet of 16 major warships. Again, even the smaller Swedish craft were warships while all but the largest allied vessels were converted merchantmen. Running with the wind, the Swedish fleet inflicted some damage the first day, but the second day the wind changed in favor of the coalition. One by one the Swedish ships withdrew leaving the giant flagship Mars (about 1,800 tons) to carry on alone. It sank one Lübeck ship and damaged several Danish vessels. Coalition gunfire finally smashed her rudder allowing the Danish-Lübeck ships to close and attack at close range. Eventually, the giant was set afire and destroyed.
Erik ordered the fleet back to sea that same summer to destroy the enemy fleet and this time they intercepted a Lübeck convoy of merchant ships, capturing the lot. This prize was brought to port where it was discovered a major portion of the cargo was salt, enough to supply Sweden for a year, a great triumph, but it still did nothing to raise the blockade.
Exasperated by his navy’s timidity and lack of confidence, Erik now put his general from the Estonian campaigns, Klas Kristersson Horn, in command of the fleet and sent them out once more. Again the two fleets collided, but under Horn the Swedes did not run. A series of battles were fought between Öland a
nd Gotland from August 11 to the 15, 1564. Again the coalition tried to close and board, but the Swedes outran and outmaneuvered them while firing their coppers. The effect, however, was slight. No decisive kills were made all though three Danish ships were captured in a night action. In the fall the Swedish fleet was able to put in at Kalmar, leaving the northern Baltic open to commerce. The coalition cruised the southern Baltic still able to interrupt trade with Germany, but had to leave the Swedish-Finland traffic unmolested.
By spring 1565 Erik had built his fleet to 25 major warships of 300 tons or more, a tremendous achievement due again to the treasury he inherited from his father. In early May he sent Commander Horn to duel with Admiral Trolle and the coalition navy once more. Horn sailed into the southern Baltic catching an enemy fleet of ten ships by surprise. Badly outgunned, the ships were burned by their crews or escaped to the German coast where the duke of Pomerania interned them for the duration of the war.
The coalition hastily pulled together a fleet of eleven Danish and ten Lübeck ships. Under Trolle, they met the Swedish fleet between Mecklenburg and the Danish islands on June 4. Again the Swedes held the coalition off with their shipboard artillery. One of the casualties of this battle was the Danish admiral Herluf Trolle.
The blockade was broken and the Swedes cruised the south Baltic, even stopping neutral merchant ships in the Sound and extracting a toll. The symbolism was clear; a new naval power now controlled the Baltic, if only for the time being. Sweden had served notice that from now on her sea power would have to be considered in Baltic naval calculations.
But the coalition wasn’t through yet. On July 7 a combined fleet of some 27 major warships met the Swedish fleet of about the same size off Börnholm Island. This time the Swedes allowed the coalition ships to close where their cannon were more effective. Horn lost three ships, but took the Danish flagship and sunk two others, one Danish and one Lübeck. Casualties were heavy on both sides, but it was the coalition fleet that retreated, leaving the Baltic to the Swedes. Again in the spring of 1566 Erik sent a still larger fleet with 30 major warships into the southern Baltic. It blocked the Sound and extracted tolls, even forcing some merchants to port in Sweden to sell their goods. Among these was a Dutch fleet of 52 merchantmen whose cargo was mainly salt. Coalition resources were nearly exhausted, but by midsummer they were able to scrape together something approaching the size of the Swedish fleet. The coalition had also acquired iron cannon from English foundries to replace the old stave and hoop breechloaders. The iron artillery was an improvement, but they did not cool as fast as the Swedish coppers and therefore could not be fired as fast. The two fleets met off Öland in an indecisive action of all cannon fire on both sides. Withdrawing, the coalition fleet made for Gotland where it ran into a fierce summer gale. Nine Danish and three Lübeck major ships were lost off Visby, losses that could not be made up. Nature had finished the job begun by the Swedes; the coalition navy had been irrevocably crippled. In 1567 the Swedish navy cruised the Baltic unchallenged.
By 1567 Erik had accomplished most of his objectives for the war. He had held onto nearly all his Swedish territory, even taking two Norwegian provinces and a good share of Danish Halland. His admiral Klas Kristersson Horn had broken the blockade and now controlled the Baltic. Successes in the war, however, were not enough to sustain his troubled reign.
Many of the land campaigns Erik had led in person, leaving government administration to his secretary, Jöran Persson. He was the first of what came to be known as the “rule of secretaries,” a long line of powerful administrators in the Swedish government.
Persson was the son of a parson of Sala, educated in jurisprudence at Wittenberg under Melanchthon, a schooling financed by Gustav Vasa under his plan to educate Swedes for his civil service. Upon his return in 1555, he entered government service rising to the position of secretary. After 1560 he attached himself to Erik, becoming his confidant and chief advisor. He was intelligent, efficient, capable, arrogant, ruthless and greedy for power. The aristocracy was jealous of his position. He had in effect replaced the Råd, the king’s council of noblemen. He was the government’s chief prosecutor among other things. It was Persson who managed the case against Johan in his trial before the Riksdag. He brought to trial those of the nobility whom Erik was suspicious of. One of the tools he used was the new High Court created by Erik when he first took office.
During Gustav’s reign the king was the court of last appeal. This required a great deal of the monarch’s time. The High Court was intended to take much of this burden from the crown. At first it was made up of 16 nobles and functioned as intended. But before long the nobles were replaced by commoners more easily manipulated and Persson became the crown prosecutor. Then it increasingly became a court of first instance, trying matters of treason, sedition and charges of negligence. As the Seven Years War dragged on, it became a kind of court-martial board hearing cases involving accusations of incompetence or lack of enterprise. Charges against the nobles’ failure to meet their rusttjänst obligations were brought before this court. Between 1562 and 1567, 300 death penalties were handed down by the court. Many of these were commuted to heavy fines and were pronounced only so the accused could be tortured to reveal co-conspirators—by law only a man condemned to death could be tortured. Persson used this means to collect information on political enemies, particularly the aristocracy, which came to fear and hate this high secretary and his high court.
By 1567 Erik’s marriage problems had become a state problem. He had had a series of mistresses and a band of illegitimate children, but no heir. He had made overtures to princesses in Poland, Saxony, Mecklenburg, England, Scotland and Hesse to no avail. At 34, his heir, or lack there of, was becoming a matter of state. For Erik it had become an obsession.
The strain of the war, paranoia toward just about everybody, especially the aristocracy, personal and national pressures to provide an heir, and his own mercurial personality were steadily crowding Erik to the edge of mental collapse. His frustrations and anxieties gradually began to center on one person. His astrological readings had told him he would lose his throne to a light-haired man. Erik interpreted this to mean Nils Sture, eldest son of Svante Sture. Of all the nobles, Erik feared the Sture family the most, a fear he now focused on Nils as his imagined nemesis.
In 1565 Nils was recalled from his position with the army in southern Sweden. He was given the special assignment to go to Halland and coerce the local peasants into doing the labor to strengthen the fortress port of Varberg. He apparently did not carry out his instructions very well for he was soon recalled and scolded for his derelictions. There the matter seemed to rest until June of 1566 when he was arrested and put on trial before the High Court with Persson prosecuting. He was found guilty and sentenced to submit to an act of degradation. He had to ride through the streets of Stockholm in a humiliating manner similar to the mock triumph inflicted on Peder Sunnanväder by Gustav Vasa. Erik figured this disgrace would remove Nils as a potential candidate for his replacement. What it did do was cement the distrust and hatred the aristocracy felt for their king, especially the Sture party, and it prompted a conspiratorial meeting.
In July 1566 there was a secret gathering of the magnates on an island of the Stockholm skerries. Included among those present were Nils Sture, Abraham Stenbock, Ivar Ivarsson Lillieörn, Hogenskild Blielke, Klas Fleming (from Finland), Sten Bauer and most interesting of all, Karl, the king’s youngest brother. It was here that fear and hatred turned to organized resistance.
Later that same year Erik once again sent Nils on a special mission. This time it was to secure the hand in marriage of Christina of Lorraine. Christina was the daughter of the former Danish king, Christian II, and therefore related to the Hapsburgs. She was now the duchess of Lorraine, having married and outlived the duke. She was also a schemer laying plans to reclaim the Danish throne. In truth Sweden was not part of her plans, at least not the first step and the mission had no chance of success. This fai
lure piled on top of other evidence of aristocratic conspiracies, including the revelation of the meeting on the island of the Stockholm skerries, drove Erik nearly to the breaking point. But the pressure was not about to abate.
Now his old problems with Russia resurfaced. Caught up in the Northern Seven Year War, Erik had considered it imperative to keep the tsar in at least a neutral position. In 1564 he had signed a treaty with the government of Novgorod acting for Ivan IV by which Russia agreed to recognize Sweden’s rights to Reval, Pernau, Karkus and Weissenstein, but had to accept Russian rights to all other territories of the old Livonian Order except Denmark’s under Duke Magnus. But as the First Northern War dragged on Ivan saw a chance to pick up a pawn he might use against his adversary in Poland. He demanded Erik hand over Johan’s wife, Sigismund’s sister, a former princess of Poland.
Erik’s back was truly against the wall. New negotiations were opened and a treaty written by which Katarina would be turned over to Ivan, Narva to be freely open to all merchants and Sweden would get Russia’s recognition of sovereignty over Estonia. In May Russian emissaries arrived in Stockholm demanding the treaty be signed and the Polish princess be given over to their care.
Under circumstances that would have been difficult for even a strong and stable personality to handle, Erik turned to his only trusted confidante. This was Karin Månsdotter, his latest mistress. She had been with him for two years. The daughter of a prison official and former barmaid at an inn, she was kind, good humored, good hearted and possessed a good deal of common sense. She was the only one who could deal with Erik’s fits of depression and he loved her deeply. He was tormented still more because he wanted to make Karin his wife.
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