By the terms of the treaty Estonia would be part of the Swedish realm and Poland would acquire Livonia. In Estonia, Swedish law and administration replaced the tyranny of the German lords. A peasantry, ground under the heel of the Livonian Knights and impoverished from years of pillaging by armies from four nations, found relief under their new masters.
An ignorant and downtrodden clergy was invigorated by a crown supported church ready to educate, reform and rebuild. Land grants were handed out to Swedish aristocrats and for the first time the nobility took an interest in this imperialism which could be of benefit to them.
Ingria and Kexholm were ceded back to Russia, but Sweden did get a new eastern Finnish border, farther east than the old one and extending to the Arctic Ocean. Russia, at last, recognized Swedish sovereignty from Malanger Fjord across the North Cape to Varanger Fjord.
Given his many disappointments in domestic affairs, Johan III’s foreign policy must be considered his one area of real success. He secured the north for Sweden and made the Gulf of Finland a Swedish waterway. He had seen his son placed on the Polish throne, though he gained neither pleasure nor political advantage from this. Now that son was in line to be king of Sweden as well. A united Sweden and Poland was to be feared by all the nations of the north.
10. Sigismund III and Wars in the North
King Johan III was dead. His body lay in state in the great courtyard of Stockholm Castle. The anti-liturgists, anti-imperialists and clergy must have pondered their future. They had just lost a king who had striven for reconciliation with Rome. Now they were about to inherit a monarch who was a devout Roman Catholic. Would Catholicism be reinstated in Sweden as Queen Mary had attempted in England? And there were political issues. Would the union of the Swedish and Polish crowns mean a strong, single front against Denmark, Russia and the Germans, or would Poland merely strip Sweden of her hard won eastern Baltic possessions and make her a province of the Commonwealth?
Even these questions were overshadowed by the immediate problem of the succession itself. Sigismund was still in Warsaw negotiating with the Sejm for permission to go to Sweden and claim his throne. The nobles wanted two things: assurance Sigismund would not simply take the Swedish crown and abdicate his Polish throne, and they wanted Estonia, particularly Narva, which Sigismund could now give them.
Meanwhile, in Sweden the old power struggle was receiving new vigor. It was still king versus Råd, versus duke, only Johan had been replaced by Sigismund. The antagonism flared quickly with Count Axel Leijonhufvud trying to gain a following in Västergötland by claiming Duke Karl was agitating for the overthrow of the monarchy. Karl sent a troop of his ducal cavalry to arrest the count, who fled across the border into Denmark. Next, the duke made overtures to members of the Råd for a reconciliation, particularly with Erik Sparre, the old constitutionalist. He argued cooperation was necessary to maintaining a viable government in the absence of the king. By January 8, 1593, these two factions were able to come to an agreement. Karl was recognized as “leading personage” of the realm and would carry on the government in partnership with the Råd. Besides the need to provide a government for the country, this cooperation was driven by their mutual interest in seeing Sweden not become a province of Poland ruled from Warsaw. Neither Karl nor the aristocracy had any intention of having Poland replace Denmark as their master or being absorbed and dominated by Poland as Lithuania had been.
Sigismund sent a letter notifying the Råd that it would be several months before he would be able to depart for Sweden. He signaled that he approved of their arrangement for an interim government until his arrival.
Though Sigismund does not seem to have understood it, two legs of the power structure had united leaving him alone as the third. Karl, in particular, was in a position of strength. He was the recognized leader of the county, temporarily at least, with a substantial power base. His duchy made him the richest man in the country and provided him with his own army and navy. Karl may have seen himself as the regent in the style of the Stures, the de facto ruler of Sweden for an absent king.
Had Sigismund moved quickly, he might have secured his Swedish throne with little problem; he was the legal heir and had the whole of Poland-Lithuania to back him up. But he tended to vacillate before taking decisive action. He was the most affable of the Vasas, even tempered, not given to rages or periods of depression. He was a gifted painter, a talent he would exercise to be by himself, which he often preferred. He would probably be seen as a good man by modern standards, not driven by overambition as was characteristic of the Vasa clan. In many ways he was the least like his royal family, an introvert without the gift of oratory or the common touch typical of his grandfather. Above all he was sincere in his religion. He would do his duty as best he could here on earth, but his real goal was to attain the kingdom of Heaven in the next life.
Though slow to excite, Sigismund was becoming more and more worried by his uncle’s position of power in Sweden. These suspicions were fed by Axel Leijonhufvud who moved on to Poland after his escape to Denmark. He reinforced Sigismund’s concerns with wild tales of Karl’s usurpation of monarchal rights. As evidence to substantiate his stories he could point to the church council being called in Sweden and the formation of the interim government without consulting the heir to the throne.
The struggle between Karl and Sigismund has often been glossed over as merely a confrontation based on religion. Religion was certainly a factor, but so was the Swedish fear of a Polish takeover. The real basis of the conflict, however, was the ambitions of the two Vasas, the foreign heir and the native prince. Still the Reformation and Counter-Reformation were powerful forces in Europe at this time. They could be used to whip up emotions and deliver allies. So it was probably for more than one reason that Karl and the Råd saw fit to call together an assembly to meet at Uppsala in March 1593. In attendance were over 300 clergy, a few representatives of the other Estates and nine members of the Råd giving it more authority than a simple church gathering. Karl did not sit in on the deliberations, but his shadow loomed large in the background. He kept close tabs on the proceedings and was even consulted by emissaries from the assembly on particularly important matters.
The object of the meeting was to settle differences within the church so that a united front would be presented against any attempt by Sigismund to reinstate Catholicism. How real was this threat? Swedes had only to look at the Huguenot Wars raging in France and the Dutch war for independence. The defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588 was still fresh in their minds. Even though Poland had guaranteed religious rights to the Protestants of that country, the fear of papal imposition in Sweden was real. To mitigate this fear, Sigismund had sent an open letter to his Swedish subjects in January 1593 guaranteeing his protection of the prevailing faith in the country.
In spite of Sigismund’s reassurances to the Swedes, the church in Rome had not given up on its wayward northern flock. Pope Clement VIII was elected in 1592 and saw an opportunity with a Catholic prince on the Swedish throne. He appointed Germanico Masapina nuncio to Poland and gave him the specific assignment to bring about the reconversion of Sweden. At Johan’s death he appointed a special council of six cardinals on Swedish affairs. The events in Rome were unknown to Sigismund’s subjects in Sweden. They were, nevertheless, fearful enough that the council moved effectively on several of the church’s most divisive matters: the liturgy controversy and the adoption of a confesio.
The liturgy question was dispensed with easily. The anti-liturgist wing of the church had grown rapidly during the last few years of Johan’s reign, becoming an overwhelming majority within the church. The liturgists lost out. Johan’s Red Book was denounced as heretical, giving it one last and final rejection. Exorcism was retained. Rituals and ceremonies were set as outlined in the Church Ordinance of 1571.
As to a confession of faith, the Augustana Invariata was adopted. The Swedish church had now come together with a unified base of beliefs: the Bible, the Church Ord
inance of 1571 and the Augustana Invariata. But the assembly went further. It voted to condemn all papists. It sent notice to the government it wanted the removal of all Catholic priests from the country and the suppression of the nunnery of Vadstena. What’s more, the assembly called for the persecution of anyone raising a voice against the church and the condemnation of heretics. This last was to include Calvinists and Zwinglians, a question that nearly split the meeting open. The issue became so divisive it was referred to Karl who, though personally opposed to its inclusion, sided with the majority in the interests of unity. A resolution was adopted by the end of March. It was eventually endorsed by 7 bishops and 1,556 clergy. Karl signed it along with 14 members of the Råd and 218 other nobles. The burgher masters and councils of 36 towns, the provinces, and the representatives of 197 counties also signed. The Uppsala Resolution was the declaration of Swedish Lutheranism.
The Protestant Church in Sweden had come a long way, from a fight to gain the right to practice its faith, to full acceptance. Now its beliefs were agreed upon and any dissention was to be stifled. Henceforth, opposing views would not be tolerated. Ecclesiastic Sweden had moved from intolerance to accommodation, back to intolerance.
In addition, the Uppsala Assembly declared Abraham Augermannus archbishop, authorized a recoinage and reopened the University of Uppsala, all intrusions on regal authority. An ad hoc provisional government was developing. Sigismund had to get to Sweden before all his power was usurped. He did have one powerful ally among his Swedish subjects and that was Klas Fleming, governor and military commander of Finland, lagman of Uppsala and member of the Råd.
At the end of the Second Northern War, Fleming had not disbanded his troops. Instead, he maintained them as a private army, forcing Finnish peasants to quarter them without compensation. This meant he was one of only three men in Sweden with a significant fighting force, the other two being Karl and Sigismund. He was also completely loyal to Sigismund.
The heir apparent could delay no longer. By August 1, 1593, Sigismund was in Danzig. In order to leave Poland he had to promise the Sejm that once crowned he would cede Estonia to Poland. While in Danzig, waiting for a fleet provided by Fleming to take him to Stockholm, Sigismund received an emissary from Clement VIII bearing 20,000 scudi and instructions not to grant Sweden any guarantee of religious freedom. But he had already done this in his letter in January. Still, the message was clear, the pope had high expectations for the new sovereign. And for insurance he had Malaspina in the royal entourage.
Finally, on September 30, Fleming’s fleet was able to transport Sigismund to Stockholm. At the capital he was confronted by Karl and the Råd demanding he accept the Uppsala Resolution and confirm Augermannus as archbishop or there would be no coronation.
Presented with this ultimatum, Sigismund stalled. He understood that the apparent united front was only superficial, that underneath there were deep divisions between Karl and the nobles. The council, led by Erik Sparre, the old constitutionalist, wanted to see the monarchy subject to the law and restrained from totalitarianism. Karl, on the other hand, was more interested in maintaining his ducal authority and gaining a position of dominance in the Swedish government. Sigismund’s efforts to drive a wedge between the two were impeded by the antics of his Jesuit confessors and Malaspina. Their belligerent attitude antagonized the Swedish clergy, who were quick to spread their distrust throughout the church and subsequently to the parishioners. In a short time the king was cast as a threat to Swedish Lutheranism by the clergy and seen as such by the peasants.
Sigismund tried to find a crack in the alliance facing him. He first appealed to the Råd, offering concessions particularly to the nobles condemned at Reval, but Erik Sparres was able to keep the aristocracy in line. He next turned to his uncle with hints of guarantees for his duchy and maybe rights of succession, only to be rebuffed. At last he tried the peasants, reissuing his letter of religious guarantees and sending spokesmen to the markets proclaiming his position. But the gentry and peasants were already convinced of this Polish-Catholic’s true intentions and would not listen. Sigismund was beaten. He might as well have been in a foreign land, quite alone and without allies except for Fleming, who was himself an outcast.
The Estates met on February 1, 1594, for the internment of Johan III’s body in the great cathedral of Uppsala. Even here the lines were drawn. Klas Fleming, though marshal and admiral, was not allowed to wear these badges of office. Malaspina was not even allowed to attend and Abraham Angermannus gave the funeral oration. It was a demonstration of Sigismund’s impotence.
Following the internment, the Riksdag met to consider the matter of the coronation. Sigismund fought for a compromise, but found no chink in the front facing him and finally had to concede on all counts as the peasants threatened to depart if matters were not quickly settled. On the morning of February 18, Angermannus was consecrated as the new archbishop and that afternoon he preached the sermon at the coronation of Sigismund I, king of Sweden.
The coronation oath was taken directly from the old Land Law and contained nothing extraordinary. However, prior to the ceremony, the new king was forced to sign an accession charter, something new in Swedish politics, but a document that would be required of all succeeding monarchs through Karl XI in 1672.
The charter set down the terms agreed to at the Uppsala Riksdag of 1594. As for religion, Sigismund promised to maintain the Lutheran faith in Sweden as defined by the Augustina Invariata and the Uppsala Resolution. Non-Lutherans could not be appointed to office or participate in the education system. Key government offices were reserved for members of the aristocracy. He promised to maintain good relations between Sweden and Poland. He would rule Sweden with the advice and consent of Duke Karl and the Råd, not make war without the consent of the Estates, nor raise taxes without consulting the taxed. In his absence Karl and the Råd would act in his behalf. Erik Sparres had gotten his constitutional monarchy. If Karl and the Råd could work together they could effectively rule Sweden. Sigismund was left constrained in Sweden as much as he was in Poland.
Though outmaneuvered and humiliated to this point, the new king wasn’t finished. First, he ordered in a Polish fleet to secure his retreat to Warsaw. It arrived in June with 1,500 soldiers on board. With some military backing, he was able to take the initiative. He appointed his own commanders of the great castles of Sweden and made them responsible directly to him. Next, he created the office of regional governor (ståthållare). Each would rule one or more provinces. Klas Fleming would be ståthållare of Finland. Östergötland and Västergötland would be ruled by Arvid and Erik Gustavsson Stenbock respectively. Both served notice they would not prevent the practice of Catholicism in their territories. Erik Brahe, an openly practicing Roman Catholic, was appointed ståthållare of Stockholm, Uppland and Norroland, in direct defiance of the charter Sigismund had been obliged to sign. Finally, just before sailing on August 4, he issued a writ forbidding Karl or the Råd from calling a Riksdag without his express permission. Thus, Sigismund countered the alliance arrayed against him and made certain the three way power struggle would continue.
With their monarch again absent, the Råd searched for a way to govern the country. They needed some method of managing the newly appointed ståthållare before they had time to test the extent of their power. They turned to Karl as the only individual with adequate clout, calling him to Stockholm for a meeting. By September 1594 they had come to an agreement. Karl was named “head of government.” Karl and the Råd signed mutual pledges of support. A letter was immediately sent to Sigismund explaining the actions taken and the need for a government to run the country. The king replied in a letter six months later refusing to sanction the elevation of Karl to any such office.
Checked once again by his nephew, the duke called for a meeting of all the Estates. The Råd complained, but finally consented. A Riksdag was called to assemble September 29, 1595. Karl drew up an agenda which was forwarded to Sigismund for comment. After
weeks of no reply from the absent monarch, the Estates met with the duke who pushed for recognition as head of government and the title of riksföreståndare with the right to appoint all officials in the country. The peasant estate backed Karl, but the nobility, headed by Erik Sparres, and the clergy under Archbishop Angermannus, held out for a more limited authority for Karl. In the end, the coalition won. Karl was given the title of riksföreståndare, but was to rule with not just the Råd’s advise, but its consent and according to the law of the land (Sparre’s constitutionalisms). Thus, the Resolution of Söderköping, October 22, 1594, seemed to legitimize Karl’s position as the de facto head of state within limits. Though disappointed in the final statement from the Estates meeting, it did have a clause that was to benefit him; it was that persons who did not subscribe to the resolution would be considered “lopped off”1 and if officeholders, could be removed, a direct threat to the ståthållares. Further, if such backsliders actively resisted the resolution, Karl had the authority to “resist and pursue”2 them.
The resolution was widely circulated. Meetings were held throughout the provinces explaining how and why Karl and the Råd were to rule in the king’s absence. Karl wasted no time. The lopping off process started with declaring Arvid Stenbock deprived of office. The nunnery at Vadstena was closed. On November 4 a letter from Sigismund arrived forbidding the holding of the Riksdag and if it had been held, its proceedings were to be considered illegal and all agreements null and void. The nobility and particularly the Råd were trapped. Their acts were insubordination at least if not outright treason. Their necks could very well be on the line.
Warrior Kings of Sweden Page 18