Warrior Kings of Sweden

Home > Other > Warrior Kings of Sweden > Page 37
Warrior Kings of Sweden Page 37

by Gary Dean Peterson


  Chancellor Oxenstierna wanted to hold a hard line with the Poles and Wladyslav wanted war. But the Swedish Regency, backed by the Råd, was intimidated by the Commonwealth buildup and with one war in Germany already was willing to deal. In exchange for the Peace Treaty of Stuhmsdorf, signed in September 1635, the Swedes returned the Royal Prussian territories to the Commonwealth, losing the associated tolls and levies. This was the treaty that Oxenstierna had complained about so bitterly, a treaty negotiated while he was in Germany.

  The Sejm was quite satisfied with victories against three of its enemies, and the last without firing a shot. The Commonwealth Council contrived to curb any further outbreaks of Wladyslav’s warlike tendencies. Left unchecked, the young Vasa was ready to enter the German wars emulating, he hoped, his cousin Gustav Adolf’s successes and at least gobble up Silesia. He also had ambitions in recovering his Swedish throne from a child monarch and a woman at that. The child queen turned out to be a lot tougher and smarter than anyone expected and the Sejm saw to it Wladyslav would get no army to further his military ambitions. The Commonwealth settled into ten years of relative tranquility.

  Wladyslav’s reign became one of peace and prosperity for the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, but it was to end in violence, plunging his country into a devastating time of war for which it was not prepared. The catastrophe began in the Ukraine, but would spread to all parts of the country as Commonwealth enemies took advantage of the country’s weakness. In the Ukraine all social factions were tired of Poland’s tyrannical rule by Roman Catholic, Polish speaking authorities over the Orthodox population. Especially bitter were the Cossacks whose freely elected hetman chiefs had been replaced by Commonwealth komissars.

  In early May 1648 these Cossacks with their Tartar allies attacked a small Polish army at Zhovti Vody in the Ukraine. It took two weeks, but finally the entrenched Polish force was crushed by a coalition led by Zaporozhian hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky. Ten days later the main Polish army in the Ukraine, some 5,000 regular soldiers and twice that number in auxiliaries, was defeated by a Cossack-Tartar force at Korsun. Jarema Wi¢niowiecki escaped with 2,500 troops and left a path of destruction as he retreated out of the Ukraine. With the tangible presence of Commonwealth authority removed, the country erupted in a Cossack and peasant rebellion.

  During this crisis Poland-Lithuania also found itself leaderless. Wladyslav died May 20, 1648. The Sejm hurriedly raised an army and appointed three inexperienced commanders: Mikolaj Ostroro΄g, Dominik Zaslawski and nineteen-year-old Aleksander Koniecpolski. With 30,000 men they marched into the Ukraine and were routed at Pyliavtsi on September 23.

  Khmelnytsky reached the walls of Lwów two weeks later, carrying the war into Poland proper. Behind the city, manned by only a skeleton garrison, lay all of Poland exposed. Khmelnytsky, however, did not follow up his advantage. In exchange for a ransom, he retreated back into the Ukraine to see what the Commonwealth election would bring.

  The November vote placed John Casimir, brother of Wladyslav, on the throne. The new king assembled an army and in 1651 defeated Ukrainian forces at Berestechko. A year later, however, the Polish field hetman Marcin Kalinawski led the main Polish army into Moldavia to punish the rebels. At Batoh he was caught in an ambushed and cut to pieces by Khmelnytsky.

  The new Russian tsar, Alexis Romanov, son of Michael, who had gained the throne in 1645, watched the Commonwealth’s plight with interest. He had been reorganizing and modernizing the Russian army. He established arms factories to produce matchlocks, flintlocks, carbines and artillery. He purchased more weapons from the Dutch, Swedes and other western countries, and he recruited unemployed mercenaries left over from the Thirty Years’ War as officers, troops, and instructors.

  In January 1654 Alexis’s agents signed a treaty with Khmelnytsky to cooperate in a war against the Commonwealth. Again Russia’s first objective was the recovery of Smoleüsk, but this time the advance would be more methodical and broad based to prevent a repeat of the encirclement that Shein had suffered. This time the heavy guns were started early so as to be on station with the army. The main army of 41,000 commanded by Ia Cherkasskii struck out directly for Smoleüsk. On the left flank were 15,000 men who were to capture Roslavl, M¢cislaw and Borisov. The right flank was protected by V.B. Sheremetev with another 15,000 men advancing along the Düna through Polock and Witebsk. A 7,000 man detachment was sent south to prevent any interference from the Tartars and Khmelnytsky sent 20,000 Ukrainians into Lithuania per his agreement with the tsar. Alexis himself left Moscow in May as commander of his own regiment. A new Russian military machine was on the move to take back territories lost during the Time of Troubles.

  The Commonwealth had little hope of stopping the Muscovite invasion. The Calvinist Lithuanian field hetman Janusz Radziwill had less than 10,000 troops with which to defend his country. On August 12 he successfully attacked Cherkasskii at Shkolv. But twelve days later he suffered a devastating defeat at Shepelevishe after which he retreated to Minsk. The only major field army left in Poland was sent into the Ukraine to try to quell the uprising there. Smoleüsk, with only a 3,500 man garrison, was left to defend itself.

  Shein’s old earthworks were still serviceable and the Russians moved in for the duration. The small city garrison fought tenaciously, but was overwhelmed and surrendered on October 3. Alexis had recovered not only Smoleüsk, but also the upper Düna, and upper Dnieper.

  Karl X watched the shifting circumstances of Sweden’s two old enemies for threats and opportunities while building a largely mercenary army with his country’s approval. The expense of the professional soldiers could not be born for long on home soil, but where to attack? Russia was now a serious threat with her aggression on the Livonian border, but Poland’s impotence provided the best opportunity. In the spring of 1655 Karl and Alexis launched simultaneous campaigns against John Casimir.

  Most of the Commonwealth army was in the Ukraine under Polish hetmans Stanislaw Potocki and Stanislaw Lanckoroüski, some 23,000 men. They were pinned down by Khmelnytsky supported by a Russian army of 12,000 under F.V. Buturlin. Alexis began a westward move from Smoleüsk with an army similar to the one of the previous year advancing in three divisions, the strategy that had worked so well in 1654. The two Lithuanian field hetmans Radzwill and Wincenty Gosiewski, bitter political rivals now forced to cooperate, did their best to slow the Russian advance with only 11,000 men, but were pushed steadily backward. By August 8 Vilna was taken and Alexis entered the city in triumph.

  Karl, meanwhile, was attacking the Commonwealth on the Baltic side. His main objective was the recovery of Royal Prussia. Instead of landing forces in Prussia directly, he planned two campaigns; one was to hold off a Russian advance in Livonia before turning south into Poland. The other was to take Polish Royal Prussia from Swedish Pomerania. On July 12 Magnus de la Gardie seized Dünaburg up the Düna from Riga on the Swedish-Livonian frontier to block the Muscovite advance from that direction. From the west Arvid Wittenberg crossed Brandenburg with 13,650 men and 72 guns, entering Polish territory on July 21. Karl followed with additional troops. Wittenberg’s opposition was an army of 14,000 conscripts hurriedly assembled. Disorganized and demoralized, this force was not up to any kind of meaningful resistance. At Uj¢cie on July 25 the districts of Poznán and Kalisz surrendered, accepting Swedish protection and swearing fealty to Karl as their sovereign. The Swedish king with 12,700 troops caught up with Wittenberg on August 24 and the heart of Poland was open to him.

  For the Calvinist Lithuanian hetman Janusz Radziwill, the Swedish entry into Poland opened up some possibilities. Frustrated and humiliated at the beating he was taking from the Russians, due mainly to a lack of support from either the Sejm or Casimir, he turned to the Swedes. Radziwill believed Poland was ready to sacrifice Lithuania to save itself from the Russian invasion. On August 17 he signed the Treaty of Kiejdany which accepted Swedish protection for Lithuania. On October 20 he attempted to split the Commonwealth Union by signing a second
treaty recognizing Karl as grand duke of Lithuania. Lithuania would be aligned with Sweden, not Poland.

  Poland was in a panic. John Casimir tried to rally the country. With Khmelnytsky closing on Lwów, he left Warsaw and moved west to stop the Swedes, but was forced back by Karl’s advance units. He retreated to Krakow.

  Karl took Warsaw on September 8, 1655. He then turned south to intercept the Commonwealth’s king. Karl reached Krakow and invested the ancient Polish capital. Attempts to relieve the siege by Lanckoroüski and Koniecpolski were beaten back and the city surrendered on October 19. John Casimir escaped to Silesia where he lived in exile. In the meantime, de la Gardie had conquered Kurland and crossed the Niemen, advancing on Poland from the northeast.

  Overwhelmed, Polish forces capitulated. Koniecpolski, Lanckoroüski and Potocki surrendered with over 15,000 troops in October. The Russians and Cossacks had taken Smoleüsk, some of Lithuania, the Ukraine and Lublin, but the Swedes had grabbed most of the prize. Karl held Warsaw and Krakow and de la Gardie was moving on East Prussia. The total occupation of Poland was almost complete. Only Lwów and Danzig at opposite ends of the country held out.

  Much of Poland had been quick to enlist in the Swedish cause, but they were about to discover that military occupation came at a price. Karl had an army of foreign mercenaries to feed and pay, not to mention the Polish regulars who now joined him hoping to get back pay. Karl tried to control the looting, giving strict orders against any abuse of the population and even executing a few offenders. He levied requirements on the Polish cities of Krakow (300,000 zloties) and Warsaw (240,000 zloties) and instituted a system of taxation to pay his troops. He might have succeeded had he not succumbed to the temptation of persecuting the Catholic Church. To the king of the country viewed as the champion of Protestantism, the wealth of the Roman church in Poland was too much to resist.

  Karl ordered the churches of Krakow to turn over 300,000 zloties to his treasury. He was informed such a staggering sum was just not available. Karl responded by authorizing the churches be stripped until the sum was raised. Once the genie is out of the bottle.... The looting began in Krakow, but quickly spread to churches, monasteries and Jesuit colleges all over the Commonwealth, then to non-ecclesiastic facilities, and finally to farms and homes. Resentment and discontent began to build among people of all social classes, but particularly among the clergy.

  With most of Poland-Lithuania occupied, Karl moved north to take the real prize, the Prussian ports and trade cities. He left garrisons in southern Poland, Wittenberg with 3,000 men at Krakow and 2,000 Polish regulars of questionable loyalty at other locations. Karl invaded Royal Prussia where he faced 3,600 cavalry and 600 infantry, raised by the Prussian estates, 3,500 noble levy and mercenaries paid by the cities. Danzig was invested and a Swedish fleet moved in to blockade the seaside. With the occupation of Krakow, Warsaw and Thorn, Karl controlled the Vistula and could cut off commerce from the interior to the Baltic Sea.

  The Swedish king invaded East Prussia and forced Frederick William of Brandenburg as duke of Prussia and a Polish vassal to recant his loyalty to the Polish throne and pledge fealty to Karl. Karl X had accomplished what even Gustav Adolf had not, the conquest of not just Polish Prussia, but East Prussia and nearly all of Poland. Though conditions were quite different, still it was an astounding feat that alarmed the states of Europe. Control of the Baltic was one thing, but a large Swedish land empire in Central Europe would upset power calculations all over the continent.

  In early 1656 the Swedish position in Poland was similar to that of Sweden in the Thirty Years’ War. The Swedes could win the battles and, with their allies, control all the major cities in the country—in this case only Danzig and Lwów held out. But, as in Germany, they could not deliver the knock-out punch. Karl’s position was not secure with Swedish garrisons spread out all across the country. The large cities and strong forts were relatively safe, but the small towns and unfortified cities were vulnerable. In some cases Swedish garrisons would patrol the countryside and villages during the day, but would have to withdraw into a local castle at night.

  The Commonwealth’s king, John Casimir, was in exile and seemed in danger of losing his crown to the Swedish king instead of the other way around. Yet the tide had already begun to turn. Discontent with the occupation seethed across the country and by the fall of 1655 small bands of mixed noble and peasant partisans began operating throughout the Commonwealth. In Lithuania Radziwill’s attempt to unite the country with Sweden failed to gain traction with either the peasants or the nobility. Most of the Polish army opposed the move and formed a confederation at Wierzbolów to continue the struggle against the invaders.

  In October 1655 a band of partisans attacked a small Swedish garrison at Ko¢cian, killing Karl’s brother-in-law Frederick of Hesse. Word of the incident spread rapidly, encouraging the rising resistance movement. In the uplands of Malopolska a peasant group captured Nowy SRcz. The monastery of Jasna Góra in Czdstochowa was successfully defended against a poorly organized Swedish siege.

  John Casimir, recognizing the shift in momentum, issued a manifesto in November 1655 calling on all Poles to rise up and drive the invaders from Polish soil. By January 1656 he was back in Poland signing the Confederation of Tyszowce along with Potocki and Lanckoroüski who brought with them much of the old regular Polish army. By February 1656, even Lubomirski, Casimir’s old opponent, and Stefan Czarniecki had joined the confederation. In April Casimir arrived in the still unconquered city of Lwów and there dedicated the Commonwealth to the Virgin Mary, who was proclaimed queen of Poland. This would be a holy war to drive the heretics out. He appealed to the peasants of the country promising to improve their plight after the foreigners were expelled. Quickly, Commonwealth forces strengthened to nearly 30,000 men led by Czarniecki and Lubomirski.

  Without completing his conquest of Prussia, Karl was forced to turn south to meet this new resistance gathering in the heart of Poland. His army of 11,000 cavalry met Czarniecki at GolRb where he defeated the small Polish force of 2,400. Karl moved on to Lwów, but here he found a massive, thoroughly modern fortress. Even with the 3,000 infantry and a number of guns that had caught up with him, he didn’t have a large enough force to storm the works or lay siege. In fact it was now the Swedes who were outnumbered. With the king’s army down to less than 10,000 men, he left Lwów retreating north. Sapieha with a Lithuanian army of horse was coming toward him on the east bank of the San. Czarniecki with a reinforced army was moving in from the south. Karl was trapped between the Vistula and San facing potential annihilation.

  Margrave Frederick of Baden left Warsaw with a force of 4,500 cavalry and dragoons to rescue the king. He met Czarniecki and Lubomirski at Warka on April 7 where the rescue force was butchered, but the diversion gave Karl the opportunity to bolt. He abandoned his guns and baggage, and drove through Sapieha’s Lithuanians to make good his escape to Warsaw.

  Karl was now in danger of losing everything in Poland. He needed allies who could supply troops. On June 25, 1656, he signed a military alliance with Frederick William of Brandenburg at Marienburg. In return for hereditary sovereignty over Wielkopolska he would assist Sweden with troops. Reaffirmed was his position as a Swedish vassal as far as Ducal East Prussia was concerned. German Brandenburg, though, would remain his independent electorate.

  In July John Casimir arrived outside Warsaw with an army of some 40,000 men, Polish regulars, Tartars and noble levy. The ratio of cavalry to infantry was about ten to one. He crossed the Vistula to the east bank and began a march north along the river to attack the Swedish camp on that side of the river. Czarniecki with 2,000 horse stayed on the left bank to block any flanking move by the Swedish-Brandenburg forces.

  Before Casimir could attack, Karl took the initiative. His army, now reinforced with Brandenburg troops, still numbered only 18,000. Like the Polish army, Karl’s troops were mostly cavalry, 13,000 horse and 5,000 foot. In spite of his numerical inferiority, Karl drove head
on into the Polish works adjoining the river on July 28, 1656. The Polish infantry, well dug in, held the allies off in a daylong battle.

  On the second day of the battle Karl ventured a daring and risky maneuver. He pulled his infantry and guns out of the line. Using his cavalry to screen the action, he moved them around the Polish right flank and wheeled them into position creating a new front ninety degrees to the old one. Cavalry and guns were brought into line on either wing forming a complete battle line before Casimir could adjust his forces.

  The Poles launched Polubiüski’s Hussar heavy cavalry at the right and left flanks of the Swedish-Brandenburg formation which was held by allied cavalry. The Hussars smashed into the allied lines held mostly by the Uppland and Småland horse regiments. Polubiüski’s 800 Hussars performed admirably, breaking through the first two ranks, but were halted at the third. The Swedish cavalry bent, but did not break and in the end drove the pride of the Polish army back into their own lines. Once again the Swedes demonstrated they had learned their lessons from the Polish cavalry and a little more of the memory of the disaster at Kircholm was erased.

  John Casimir gave up Warsaw for the second time and his prospects seemed dim. But the international climate was changing rapidly. First, Frederick William withdrew his 8,500 troops from Karl’s army as soon as he had taken over Wielkopolska from the Swedish garrison as agreed. A combined Dutch and Danish fleet of over 40 ships anchored off Danzig in July. They broke the blockade and were able to deliver 1,300 troops to reinforce the city’s defenses. Alex declared war on Sweden in May, and Russia and Poland signed a treaty in November.

 

‹ Prev