The first attacks made by 16 Brigade on Indaw had failed, partially due to the poor state of the Chindit troops, partially to a piece of bad luck. Columns of 111 Brigade, passing nearby but not knowing where 16 Brigade was, or what it was doing, had tried to confuse the Japs by telling local informers that they were heading for Indaw, to attack it from the north. They were doing no such thing, but when Fergusson and 16 Brigade did indeed attack from the north, there were the Japs, fully informed.
A month later, another attack was more successful. On 27 April 16 Brigade, back at Indaw and reinforced with elements of 14 Brigade, achieved one objective, to take the airfield. There was disappointment even in that triumph, when it was found that the supposed all-weather strip was just another piece of grass, useless in the monsoon. In any case, Wingate’s idea of a garrison at Indaw had long been dropped by Slim, and Lentaigne had already decided to bring 16 Brigade out. It looked bad to Chindit believers. Just over a month since his death, it seemed that all Wingate’s crusading work had been thrown aside.
Admittedly, Fergusson and his men desperately needed rest, but they had won through in the end. Now the prize they had marched, fought and died for, was being abandoned as if nobody had wanted it in the first place.
With the additional wisdom generated by hindsight and a safe distance, it was easy for analysts such as the chief MO, Colonel Officer, to come to judgements. The withdrawal of 16 Brigade was the first act in the dismantling of the Chindits and it was seen as representative of everything that was wrong with the very idea.
Colonel Officer:
‘Statistically considered, Special Force met a more dangerous enemy in disease than in the Japanese Army. Clinically analysed, it was more severely injured by malaria and dysentery than by bullets and grenades. Tactically appraised, its battle worthiness was determined by its medical discipline more than by its courage.
‘During the first 45 days of the campaign, little evidence appeared that health factors would affect combat manoeuvres. Then the plight of the 16th Brigade offered an ominous but little heeded warning. The major cause of its inability to capture Indaw probably was its exhaustion after the long and difficult march from India. But the inconsequence of its subsequent actions and its wholesale evacuation back to India were due to rapidly rising rates of disease and disability.
‘The loss of the 16th Brigade apparently produced some regrets but no surprise or change in plans for Special Force. It had always been assumed that long range penetration groups would be used up.’
The ominous warning was the medical one which would apply to all the Chindits. Apart from the fights at Indaw, 16 Brigade had not had a major battle. There had been no big losses in the field. They had not been anywhere they might have been infected by scrub typhus, a dreadful disease transmitted by mites called chiggers, similar in biology to our own harvest mites. They live in heavy, wet scrubland where a marching or camping soldier could easily pick up the larval stage of the insect, which would feed on his skin causing a rash and itching to start with. There was no vaccine. Antibiotics were not yet available. As full blown typhus developed, the soldier was incapacitated at the least, and would very likely die if not evacuated to hospital.
Other units, including the Black Watch columns, would encounter this entirely unlooked for health hazard. Apart from not experiencing scrub typhus, 16 Brigade had not had to live through the monsoon like the others would, when living conditions that were already bad became nigh intolerable. Even so, the incidences of malaria and dysentery were so high that they alone, regardless of wounds and other illness, were enough to justify evacuation of the entire brigade.
Malaria and dysentery, as all staff officers knew, were controllable, if not preventable, by medical measures enforced through military discipline. ‘Therefore,’ said Colonel Officer, ‘it might have been asked whether its (16 Brigade’s) high sick rates could be sufficiently explained by exhaustion. This factor, it might have been thought, would lower the resistance of the brigade to all kinds of diseases.’
The implication was that the Black Watch commanding officer, Brigadier Fergusson, had allowed discipline to get slack. Let us remember the earlier words of David Rose:
‘My friend Bernard Fergusson had been on the first Chindit operation and he told me what to expect. The most important thing of all was to prevent disease, particularly malaria. Fever and marching cannot go together. We had a pill to take every day, and any man who didn’t take it was in effect condemning himself.’
Perhaps a different implication might have been made, had the Colonel Officer been on the march from Ledo rather than studying statistics at a desk. A Chindit might have said that weeks and weeks in the jungle, behind the lines of the most ruthless enemy, living on inadequate rations and pushing the human frame beyond the limits it was designed to take, might result in an entirely different kind of exhaustion from the one the good doctor knew about.
Morale was a serious problem and not only because of the poor diet, the inconsistent air-dropped supplies, the invisible and deadly Japanese, the heat, the dysentery and the malaria. There was also an increasing sense of it not being worthwhile. Every soldier knew it when he marched this way for days, then that way, then another way, and somehow ended up where he started. What were they doing?
Colonel Green, like his colleague David Rose, knew that discipline, including self-discipline, was the key to survival in these horrendous conditions, and one aspect of that was Green’s insistence that all Black Watch soldiers would shave. Other Chindit regiments encouraged beard growing but the Jocks, Cameronians and Black Watch, were not permitted.
Fred Patterson: ‘We were called the ghost force. No beards.’
Bill Lark: ‘We were not allowed to grow beards like some of the other regiments, because our colonel wouldn’t have it. “You’re not coming out looking like those English lads (of the 1943 expedition),” he said, “wizened old men with beards. No, no, it’s bad for morale.” Everybody had to be as smart as possible. We all ended up looking like wizened old men, of course, but we were clean shaven wizened old men.
‘I shaved with a cut-throat razor because that was what my father used. All the other boys, apart from two that I knew, had Gillettes’ safety razors, and of course kept the blades. The way to put an edge on them was to strop them inside your mug, running them round the enamel mug side, or a glass jar if you were in camp. I always had my proper leather strop and I ended up shaving some of the others, who took their lives in their hands because I wasn’t entirely practised at shaving anybody but myself.’
By the beginning of May, 16 Brigade was out and Aberdeen stronghold was closed down. Broadway and White City would soon follow. The Cameronians had been given orders to move north towards a defended Dakota airstrip on the Mesa River, there to draw breath for a few days, take stock, evacuate their sick and prepare for their next operation – the long march to Blackpool.
Black Watch War Diary: ‘April 28, both Cols crossed Mesa river. April 29, two Cols marching together. April 30, crossed the Banmauk-Indaw road and the Mesa chaung, SD at night (early am May 1). A container with unopened parachute hit and killed a Royal Engineer attached to 73 Col. 73 Col moved on to bivvy south of the village of Alegyun.’
This ‘friendly bomb’ accident was not unique. Several men were killed this way. Some supply drops, called free drops, came without parachutes, and the standard ones often had ’chutes that didn’t work. The men knew all about this and sheltered under trees or any cover they could find, while the pilots above them tried to place their life-sustaining supplies exactly on the point given.
War Diary: ‘May 1, light plane landed in unprepared paddy. Day spent distributing rations. A certain number of jungle hammocks were dropped. These were of American type with mosquito net and waterproof roof. Initially they were only issued to senior officers and to the sick. They were a great novelty.
‘May 2, 73 Col marched north east to Brigade RV at Paungpila. 73 Col now have travelled approx 1
50 miles since leaving Aberdeen, 42 Col slightly less.’
On 30 April there had been a conference between Vinegar Joe Stilwell, General Slim and General Lentaigne. Developing the strategy outlined earlier, which devoted the Chindits to support Stilwell, the details were set forth.
The strongholds were to be abandoned. All Chindit columns were to move north as fast as possible, to become part of Stilwell’s assault on northern Burma. Mogaung was the target, and 111 Brigade was to begin by establishing a mighty block on the railway south of that town. When 77 and 14 Brigades reached the block, they would provide whatever additional resources 111 Brigade might need by then, and get ready to take Mogaung. The 3rd West African Brigade was to be deployed according to the requirements of the moment.
All of these brigades were roughly a quarter down on their starting strength, but no account seemed to be taken of that fact. Every confidence was expressed. With the possible exception of 77 Brigade, which had been in the longest, the Chindits were to operate for Stilwell through the monsoon summer.
Fred Patterson: ‘By now we were tired, having been on the move for weeks. Air supply was becoming more difficult and five days’ rations had to last ten days. The Brigadier (actually Lt. Colonel Masters; they didn’t make him up) was pushed to move us to a very vulnerable position on a hill, which fulfilled requirements in that it overlooked the railway and the main road and had plentiful water.’
The vulnerable position became known as Blackpool.
Black Watch War Diary: ‘May 3, new orders received. Btln to cross the Mawlu paddy and operate in the Napin area and to stop further Jap reinforcements from the south and SE reaching the forces investing the Henu block near White City held by 77 Brigade. The Btln was also to cover the impending evacuation of this block.’
The Japanese had been laying siege to White City for weeks, but every attack had been repulsed in some furious fighting. Now, to the amazement of the Japs and the puzzlement of the defenders, it was to be given up.
War Diary: ‘16.00 hours, a fighting group composed from both columns marched down, travelling as lightly as possible. Blankets and groundsheets were left with the combined rear elements under the command of Major Watson-Gandy. After a comfortable march in the cool of the evening on a path leading due north, both Cols halted for the night at 19.15.’
Jim McNeilly: ‘Our job was to keep the Japs from getting to the front at White City, but we were not to engage them, just get information. There was no action, just patrols. We came across them, but we didn’t attack. At the end of one day, we were on one side of a river and they were moving on the other side. We didn’t fire a shot. They probably knew we were there and didn’t fire a shot either. We were stalking them and they were stalking us. If we went off-track, the last platoon booby-trapped it. Grenades with trip wires.’
War Diary: ‘May 4, a march for a mile up the chaung helped to hide our tracks. A mule convoy of 17 mules under the command of Lt Noble returned to the old area to collect the various articles of small kit left behind by the battle group. Continuing the march north, contact was made with a patrol from White City. Progress was now very difficult as a trail had to be cut, up and down the ridges (of the Kachin Hills), in very hot weather. Information was received that a Jap patrol was occupying the village of Napin.’
A Burrif recce group investigated Napin and found no Japs because a West African column had cleared it two days before and was in possession. The villagers of Napin preferred Chindit occupation to Japanese and helped with a supply drop.
War Diary: ‘May 5, strong ambush party of three patrols under command of Major Fanshawe* with one 3 inch mortar in support moved off to the track which the enemy was believed to be using at night. 15.20 – a force of seven enemy planes flew low over the harbour on their way to strafe and bomb White City.’ (*John Fanshawe was an officer of the Argylls who had volunteered for Chindit duty.)
Bill Lark: ‘To the ambush we took three mules, two with radios and mine with the hand grenades. I had the hand grenades then because Thrushie Joe, which was Menzies’ mule, couldn’t take them as he was sick. Grenades are very dangerous in the jungle. You throw one and it’s liable to hit the branch of a tree and come back.’
The route took them across a plain of elephant grass, following the locals’ animal tracks, and over the railway. The fighting men carried only their weapons and ammunition, grenades, water and rations. It took some hours longer than planned.
Bill Lark: ‘We got there and were put in our places, about twenty yards behind the ambush line, and we thought it’s going to be another of those useless exercises when we should be asleep. We’ll be up here all night and nothing’ll happen. It was eleven o’clock, bright moonlight, and we were all lined up along one side of the road.’
Normal practice would have been to mine the other side, to cause mayhem among Japanese fleeing from the ambush, but there hadn’t been time.
Jim McNeilly: ‘There were two platoons who laid the ambush, and our platoon was one of them. Our sergeant was Sgt Blair. I think it was Sgt Ballantyne on the other platoon. Some of our boys had been in Tobruk and Crete, but the rest had never seen any action like this. So we had to cool them down, tell them to keep quiet and let the Japs through us into the trap. We didn’t know exactly what we were going to, how many Japs. We were just told a fair amount of Japs. And up they came, up the brae and, would you believe it, an officer on a great white horse, and all these men behind, slugging along with their heads down.’
Bill Lark: ‘When they were well in, the signal was to be firing the last Bren gun, but when they fired it, it went “plop”, and again “plop”, so they changed the gas port, and “plop”, so they shouted “bang” or something, and all hell let loose.’
Jim McNeilly: ‘Someone took out the officer, I think it was Geordie Ballantyne, and then it went mad, just mad. The Japs were screaming, their mules were screaming – theirs had voices, ours didn’t – they were braying and kicking. What a noise, rifles, and Brens on spray.’
Bill Lark: ‘The officer was shot off his horse by Private McLuskie. The horse went galloping up the road, then everything happened. When we opened up, what a racket. They all seemed to have high-pitched voices, and they were screaming and shouting. We always used to say, the answer to noise is silence. We never made any noise. In the jungle they used to call, “Come on Tommy, where are you, Tommy?” We were firing down the ranks and lots of them fell. In the dark, when you’re fired on, you have no idea what it might turn out to be and so you run, and they did, skedaddled away from the road. I was standing by my mule, Sten gun at the ready, when I heard men crashing through the trees. It was dark. I was going to fire, but it was our lads on the move. Then it happened again. Talk about nervous wreck.’
Jim McNeilly: ‘There was no fear of them attacking us. If they had we’d have been finished. They’d have over-run us. The story was there were over a thousand. And then it was over and we withdrew. Each and every man looked after each other, so we withdrew and got all together again. And the commanders decided to do another one the next day.’
Bill Lark: ‘Next morning there were dead Japs lying on the road and they’d all had their right hand cut off to send back to the relatives to cremate. We lost three dead and a dozen wounded, including a Dundee lad, Boozy Broon, who we made a bamboo stretcher for. He was in a very bad way and died later.’
This was Corporal Murdoch Brown, age 33. His body was moved after the war from the battlefield cemetery at Sahmaw to lie at Taukkyan War Cemetery.
Bill Lark: ‘Our burial party brought back bags of rice and bits of dried fish that we said was shark’s fin but I don’t suppose it was, and we threw it away anyway. And bags of iced gems, those little round biscuits with an icing star on, hard icing, except the biscuits were like dog biscuits and the icing stars had all come off and were mixed up in the bag, so we threw away the dog biscuits and ate the icing. So that was their rations, the Japs, rice, dried fish and dog biscuits. It’s a hard life be
ing a soldier in the jungle. We were grateful for the rice. It made a great change from K rations.’
Here is another American report on Japanese army rations, which confirms Bill Lark’s view of them:
‘Contrary to the belief of some persons, the Japanese soldier does not live entirely on rice. To him, rice is a staple food, just as bread is to us; and, if he had only rice for his meal, he would be as displeased as we would be with only bread to eat. However, rice does constitute well over 50 per cent of the Japanese soldier’s diet.
‘Both polished and unpolished rice have been captured from the enemy. Polished rice is more common, probably because it can be preserved longer than unpolished rice. To increase the palatability of rice, the Japanese usually season it with a soy-bean sauce (shoyu) or miso paste, which is made of fermented soy beans and which is more commonly used for preparing soup.
‘U.S. rations weigh more and have a higher calorific value than the Japanese.
‘Although the Japanese have standard rations, they supplement these whenever possible with various foods obtained locally – even when standard rations are easily available. Two types of specially packed field rations, “A” and “B”, have been noted frequently. The “A” ration normally consists of 30.7 ounces of rice, 5.3 ounces of meat or fish, and a small amount of seasoning and flavoring. The “B” ration normally consists of 24.4 ounces of hard biscuits in three paper bags (enough for three meals), 2.1 ounces of meat or fish, and a small amount of seasoning (salt and sugar).
‘Emergency air-crew rations found recently in a wrecked Japanese plane (New Guinea) included 20 ounces of unpolished rice and the following other items: puffed wheat, biscuits, a dried fish, two small bottles of concentrated wine (35 per cent alcohol), some candy wrapped in colored cellophane, large salt tablets, and a portable water-purifying set. These items were divided among five transparent, water-proof bags.
Jocks in the Jungle Page 13