The Connected Discourses of the Buddha

by Bhikkhu Bodhi

  34 Spk: “Each of the deva-kings has a retinue of a hundred or a thousand koṭis of devas. Placing themselves in grand positions, they see the Tathāgata. How can powerless female devas like us get a chance to see him?” A koṭi = 10,000,000.

  35 Spk: What can be expressed (akkheyya) are the five aggregates, the objective sphere of linguistic reference (not the terms of expression themselves). Beings who perceive what can be expressed (akkheyyasaññino sattā): When ordinary beings perceive the five aggregates, their perceptions are affected by the ideas of permanence, pleasure, and self, elsewhere called “distortions” (vipallāsa, AN II 52,4-8). These distorted perceptions then provoke the defilements, on account of which beings become established in what can be expressed (akkheyyasmiṃ patiṭṭhitā). Beings “become established in” the five aggregates in eight ways: by way of lust, hatred, delusion, views, the underlying tendencies, conceit, doubt, and restlessness (see n. 2).It-a II 31-32, commenting on the same couplet at It 53, says that “beings who perceive what can be expressed” are those who perceive the five aggregates by way of a percept occurring in the mode of “I,” “mine,” “deva,” “human,” “woman,” or “man,” etc. That is, they perceive the five aggregates as a being or person, etc.

  Spk suggests that this verse is stated in order to show how sensual pleasures are “time-consuming.” [Spk-pṭ: Kāmā here denotes all phenomena of the three planes, called sensual pleasures because they are pleasurable (kamanīyā).] This suggestion seems confirmed by the last line: those who do not understand the five aggregates correctly “come under the yoke of Death”; they undergo repeated birth and death and hence remain caught in saṃsāra, the net of time.

  36 Spk: One “fully understands what can be expressed” by way of the three kinds of full understanding: (i) by full understanding of the known (ñātapariññā) one understands the five aggregates in terms of their individual characteristics, etc.; (ii) by full understanding by scrutinization (tīraṇapariññā) one scrutinizes them in forty-two modes as impermanent, suffering, etc.; (iii) by full understanding as abandonment (pahānapariññā) one abandons desire and lust for the aggregates by means of the supreme path. For a fuller discussion, see Vism 606-7 (Ppn 20:3-4) and Vism 611-13 (Ppn 20:18-19), based on Paṭis II 238-42, where, however, only forty modes are enumerated under (ii).The forty-two modes are at Vism 655,15-30 (Ppn 21:59), in connection with “discerning formations as void.”One does not conceive “one who expresses” (akkhātaraṃ na maññati). Spk: The arahant does not conceive the speaker as an individual (puggala); that is, he no longer takes the five aggregates to be “mine,” “I,” and “my self.”

  That does not exist for him (taṃ hi tassa na hotī ti): In this couplet I follow SS in omitting, as an interpolation, the words na tassa atthi, included in all the printed eds. The Skt version too, cited at Ybhūś 2:2 (Enomoto, CSCS, p. 23), does not include such a phrase, but reads: tad vai na vidyate tasya, vadeyur yena tam pare, “That does not exist for him by which others might speak of him.”

  Spk explains that there exist no grounds for speaking of the arahant as lustful, or as hating, or as deluded. It would be more fitting, perhaps, to see this second couplet as referring to the arahant after his parinibbāna, when by casting off the five aggregates (“what can be expressed”) he goes beyond the range of verbal expression (see Sn 1076). It should be noted that thematically these two verses closely correspond to the Mūlapariyāya Sutta (MN No. 1). Spk states that this verse discusses the “directly visible” ninefold supramundane Dhamma, i.e., the four paths, their fruits, and Nibbāna.

  37 The “three discriminations” (tayo vidhā) are the three modes of conceit: the conceit “I am better” (seyyo ’ham asmimāna), the conceit “I am equal” (sadiso ’ham asmimāna), and the conceit “I am worse” (hīno ’ham asmimāna). See 22:49 (III 48-49), 45:162, 46:41. At Vibh 389-90 it is shown that these three become ninefold in so far as each triad may be entertained by one who is truly better, truly equal, or truly worse. One “not shaken in the three discriminations” is the arahant, who alone has completely eradicated the fetter of conceit. Spk points out that the first couplet shows how sensual pleasures are time-consuming, while the second couplet discusses the supramundane Dhamma.

  38 The most common reading of this pāda is pahāsi saṅkhaṃ na vimānam ajjhagā, found in Be, Se, and Ee1 of v. 49, in Be and Ee1 of the parallel v. 105, and in the lemma in Spk (Be, Se) to v. 49. From his comments it is clear the commentator had a text with vimāna, which he explains as equivalent to vividhamāna: “He does not assume the threefold conceit with its nine divisions” (navabhedaṃ tividhamānaṃ na upagato). Spk’s alternative explanation, which takes vimānaṃ to be the mother’s womb, the destination of the rebirth process, seems too fanciful to be taken seriously. Vimānadassī occurs at Sn 887b in the sense of “contemptuous,” but this meaning of vimāna may be too narrow for the present context.The verse may have originally read na ca mānam and this reading may have already been corrupted before the age of the commentaries, c/v confusion being not uncommon in Sinhala-script texts. The corruption would then have been preserved and perpetuated by the commentators. Despite the dominance of na vimānam, the reading na ca mānam is found in v. 105 of Se, in the lemma to v. 49 in four Sinhala mss of Spk (referred to in the notes to Spk (Se)), and in Thai eds. of SN and Spk. The Skt counterpart (quoted at Ybhūś 2:4; Enomoto, CSCS, p. 23) has prahāya mānaṃ ca na saṅgam eti, which corresponds more closely to the alternative reading of the Pāli. The original finite verb may have been the rare reduplicative perfect ājā (as in SS) or āgā (as in Ee2 and Thai eds.). See von Hinüber, “On the Perfect in Pāli,” Selected Papers, pp. 174-76.

  Spk understands pahāsi saṅkhaṃ to mean that the arahant can no longer be described by such concepts as lustful, hating, or deluded, but the point is more likely to be that he has stopped forming papañcasaññāsaṅkhā, “ideas and notions arisen from mental proliferation” (see MN I 112,2-3). The Skt reading saṅgam may actually make better sense in this context. It seems that this phrase refers back to v. 47 and na vimānam ajjhagā back to v. 48. It is possible, too, that the lines describe the arahant after his parinibbāna, when he can no longer be reckoned by way of the five aggregates (see 44:1). Pādas cf seem to be describing the arahant after his parinibbāna, though elsewhere he is also said to be unfindable here and now (e.g., at 22:86; III 118,35-36).

  39 Spk explains the avoidance of evil in body, speech, and mind by way of the ten courses of wholesome kamma (see MN I 47,12-17, 287-288, etc.). The phrase having abandoned sense pleasures rejects the extreme of indulgence in sensual pleasures; one should not pursue a course that is painful and harmful rejects the extreme of self-mortification. Thus, Spk says, the verse points to the middle way that avoids the two extremes. The whole verse can also be construed positively in terms of the Noble Eightfold Path: doing no evil by body and speech implies right speech, right action, and right livelihood; “mindful” implies right effort, right mindfulness, and right concentration; “clearly comprehending” implies right view and right intention. Spk says that at the end of the Buddha’s discourse the devatā was established in the fruit of stream-entry and spoke this verse, “a great Dhamma teaching,” in order to show the eightfold path by which she had attained the fruit.

  40 In pāda b, I read ḍayhamāne va, with Ee1 and SS, as against ḍayhamāno va in Be, Se, and Ee2. With bhavarāga in pāda c, these verses also appear as Th 39-40 and 1162-63. In the present form the pair of verses sets a problem in interpretation, for kāmarāga, sensual lust, is abandoned by the third path, while sakkāyadiṭṭhi, identity view, is abandoned by the first path, so the devatā appears to be advocating a higher attainment than the Buddha. This problem does not arise in the Th version, since bhavarāga, lust for existence, is abandoned by the fourth path, that of arahantship. Spk gives an ingenious solution: The deva spoke his verse with reference to the abandoning of sensual lu
st by way of suppression only (vikkhambhanappahānam eva), i.e., temporarily through the attainment of jhāna, while the Buddha recommended the attainment of stream-entry, which eliminates identity view by way of eradication (samuccheda) so that not even the subtle underlying tendency (anusaya) remains, thus ensuring full liberation in a maximum of seven more lives.

  41 The verse poses a riddle which hinges on two connotations of phusati, “to touch”: (i) to acquire a particular kamma, here the grave kamma of wronging an innocent person; and (ii) to reap the result of that kamma when it comes to maturity.

  42 At Sn 662 this verse refers to Kokāliya’s calumny of Sāriputta and Moggallāna (see 6:10, which includes the story but not this verse). A different, and less credible, background story is told at Dhp-a III 31-33, commenting on Dhp 125; see BL 2:282-84. On the kammic result of harming innocents, see Dhp 137-40.

  43 This verse and the next form the opening theme of Vism and are commented on at Vism 1-4 (Ppn 1:1-8); the explanation is incorporated into Spk. VĀT suggests that the words antojaṭā bahijaṭā should be taken as bahubbīhi compounds in apposition to pajā (“having a tangle inside, having a tangle outside”), but I translate in accordance with Spk, which treats them as tappurisa.Spk: Tangle (jaṭā) is a term for the network of craving, in the sense that it “laces together,” for it arises repeatedly up and down among the sense objects such as forms. There is a tangle inside, a tangle outside, because craving arises with respect to one’s own possessions and those of others; with respect to one’s own body and the bodies of others; and with respect to the internal and external sense bases.

  44 The Buddha’s reply is a succinct statement of the threefold training, with samādhi referred to by the word citta. Spk says wisdom is mentioned three times in the verse: first as innate intelligence (“wise”); second, as insight-wisdom (vipassanā-paññā), the wisdom to be developed; and third, as “discretion,” the pragmatic wisdom that takes the lead in all tasks (sabbakiccaparināyikā parihāriyapaññā).Spk: “Just as a man standing on the ground and taking up a well-sharpened knife might disentangle a great tangleof bamboos, so this bhikkhu… standing on the ground of virtue and taking up, with the hand of practical intelligence exerted by the power of energy, the knife of insight-wisdom well sharpened on the stone of concentration, might disentangle, cut away, and demolish the entire tangle of craving that had overgrown his own mental continuum” (adapted from Ppn 1:7).

  45 While the previous verse shows the trainee (sekha), who is capable of disentangling the tangle, this verse shows the arahant, the one beyond training (asekha), who has finished disentangling the tangle.

  46 Spk says this verse is stated to show the opportunity (or region) for the disentangling of the tangle (jaṭāya vijaṭanokāsa ). Here name (nāma) represents the four mental aggregates. Spk treats impingement (paṭigha) as metrical shorthand for perception of impingement (paṭighasaññā). According to Spk-pṭ, in pāda c we should read a compressed dvanda compound, paṭigharūpasaññā (“perceptions of impingement and of form”), the first part of which has been truncated, split off, and nasalized to fit the metre. Impingement being the impact of the five sense objects on the five sense bases, “perceptionof impingement” (paṭighasaññā) is defined as the fivefold sense perception(seeVibh261,31-34and Vism 329,22-24; Ppn 10:16). Perception of form (rūpasaññā) has a wider range, comprising as well the perceptions of form visualized in the prising as well the perceptions of form visualized in the jhānas [Spk-pṭ: perception of the form of the earth-kasiṇa, etc.]. Spk explains that the former implies sense-sphere existence, the latter form-sphere existence, and the two jointly imply formless-sphere existence, thus completing the three realms of existence.

  It is here that this tangle is cut. Spk: The tangle is cut, in the sense that the round with its three planes is terminated; it is cut and ceases in dependence on Nibbāna.

  47 Readings of pāda b differ. I follow Se and Ee2, mano yatattam āgataṃ, as against Be na mano saṃyatattam āgataṃ.Spk: This deva held the view that one should rein in every state of mind; whether wholesome or not, whether mundane or supramundane, the mind should be reined in, not aroused. [Spk-pṭ: He believed that every state of mind brings suffering and that the unconscious state is better.] The Buddha spoke the rejoinder to show that a distinction should be made between the mind to be reined in and the mind to be developed. See 35:205 (IV 195,15-30), where the Buddha advises reining in the mind (tato cittaṃ nivāraye) from objects that arouse the defilements.

  48 Spk: This deva, who dwelt in a forest grove, heard the forest bhikkhus using such expressions as “I eat, I sit, my bowl, my robe,” etc. Thinking, “I had imagined these bhikkhus to be arahants, but can arahants speak in ways that imply belief in a self?” he approached the Buddha and posed his question.

  49 Vohāramattena so vohareyya. Spk: “Although arahants have abandoned talk that implies belief in a self, they do not violate conventional discourse by saying, ‘The aggregates eat, the aggregates sit, the aggregates’ bowl, the aggregates’ robe’; for no one would understand them.” See in this connection DN I 202,7-9: “Thus, Citta, there are these worldly expressions, worldly terms, worldly conventions, worldly concepts, which the Tathāgata uses without grasping them.”

  50 Spk: At this point the deva thought that while arahants may not speak thus because they hold a view (of self), they might do so because they still have conceit (i.e., asmimāna, the conceit “I am”). Hence he asked the second question, and the Buddha’s reply indicates arahants have abandoned the ninefold conceit (see n. 37).

  51 Spk resolves mānaganthassa in pāda b as māno ca ganthā assa, “for him conceit and knots,” in order to conform to the doctrinal tetrad of gantha, which does not include māna; see 45:174. It seems, however, that here mānaganthā should be understood in a looser sense, as mānassa ganthā. At It 4,16, in a sutta solely about māna, we find mānaganthā used as a bahubbīhi compound qualifying pajā (“a generationknotted by conceit”)and arahantsdescribed as mānaganthābhibhuno (“those who have overcome the knots of conceit”), which supports my rendering here. The readingsofpāda c vary: Be has maññataṃ ,Semaññana (which is the gloss in Spk (Be)), Ee1 yamataṃ, Ee2 ya mataṃ (= yam mataṃ?). Spk explains that he has transcended the threefold conceiving due to craving, views, and conceit.

  52 Spk: The question refers to the “streams” of saṃsāra, the answer to Nibbāna. Portions of the reply can be found at DN I 223,13-15 and Ud 9,4. On the stopping of the streams, see Sn 1034-37, and on the round not revolving see the expression vaṭṭaṃ … natthi paññāpanāya at 22:56-57 and 44:6 (IV 391,9).

  53 Ee2 precedes this verse with another (v. 70) found only in two Lanna mss from northern Thailand. As that verse is not included in any other edition or known ms of SN, and hardly relates to the subject matter of the dialogue between the Buddha and the devatā, it clearly does not belong here; thus I have not translated it. My decision is further supported by the absence of any gloss on the verse in Spk and Spk-pṭ, which indicates it was not found in the texts available to the commentators. At Ee2, p. xvii, the editor argues that this verse must be “restored” to provide a question put by the deity, but he assumes that the sutta originally read the first word of v. 72d as te which was then changed to ko or ke by the textual tradition in order to supply a question. But since ke as a question makes perfectly good sense, both syntactically and semantically, there is no reason to suppose the original reading was te and thus no need to interpolate a new verse to supply the question.

  54 Spk: “ong those who have become so avid (ussukkajātesu): Among those who are engaged in various tasks, avid to produce unarisen forms, etc., and to enjoy those that have arisen.” In pāda c of the second verse I read ke ’dha taṇhaṃ with Be and Se, as against gedhataṇhaṃ(“greed and craving”) in Ee1 & 2, and kodhataṇhaṃ(“anger and craving”) in SS. In pāda d, Ee2 reads te lokasmiṃas against ke lokasmiṃ in the other
eds.Ussuka (Skt utsuka) means anxiously desirous, zealous, or busily engaged in some pursuit. The corresponding noun is ussukka, which is sometimes found where the adjective would have been more appropriate. Ussuka is used in both a laudatory and reprobative sense. At 41:3 (IV 288,12 = 291,4, 302,7), it occurs in the commendatory sense, which I render “zealous.” See too MN I 324,27 and Vin I 49,19-50,8. The negative sense—of being greedy, ambitious, or “avid” (my preferred rendering)—is found here and at Dhp 199. The expression appossukka, lit. “having little zeal,” is used to describe one who refrains from busy activity. In SN we find this expression—which I generally render, loosely, “(living) at ease”—at 9:10 (I 202,22), 21:4 (II 277,12), 35:240 (IV 178,1, here “keeping still”), and 51:10 (V 262,18). The abstract noun appossukkatā, at 6:1 (I 137,1, 6), characterizes the Buddha’s original inclination, just after his enlightenment, towards a life of quietude rather than towards the “busy work” of preaching the Dhamma. See too below n. 366 and n. 551.