34 Dhammānudhammapaṭipanno. Spk: Lokuttarassa nibbānadhammassa anudhammabhūtaṃ paṭipadaṃ paṭipanno; “one practising the way that is in accordance with the supramundane Nibbāna-dhamma.” Spk-pṭ glosses nibbānadhamma as “the noble path bringing Nibbāna,” and explains “(the way) that is in accordance with” it as meaning “(the way) whose nature is appropriate for the achievement of Nibbāna” (nibbānādhigamassa anucchavikasabhāvabhūtaṃ). This statement shows the sekha, the trainee. Cp. III, n. 51.
35 Diṭṭhadhammanibbānappatto. This statement shows the arahant, or asekha, who has completed the training.
36 Spk: Why does the Blessed One refuse three times? In order to inspire reverence; for if theorists are answered too quickly they do not show reverence, but they do so if they are refused two or three times. Then they wish to listen and develop faith. Also, the Master refused in order to create an opportunity for the ascetic’s faculty of knowledge to ripen.
37 Of the four alternatives, the first and second, as will be shown, are respectively implicit formulations of eternalism and annihilationism. The third is a syncretic solution, perhaps a form of partial-eternalism (ekaccasassatavāda; see DN I 17-21). The fourth is the doctrine of fortuitous origination (adhiccasamuppannavāda; see DN I 28-29).
38 Spk points out that the change of address, from the familiar bho Gotama to the respectful bhante bhagavā, indicates that he has acquired reverence for the Teacher.
39 Spk glosses ādito sato as ādimhi yeva, and explains it as meaning “(if) at the beginning (one thinks)....” It seems to me more likely that this phrase is part of the eternalist view itself and means “of one existing from the beginning,” i.e., of a being that has always existed. This interpretation can marshal support from the fact that the phrase is omitted just below in the corresponding restatement of the annihilationist view, which is otherwise constructed according to the same logic and thus, if Spk were correct, should include ādito sato. Spk says “it should be brought in,” but the fact that the text replaces it by another phrase is strong evidence that it does not belong there; see n. 40.Spk: If at the beginning (one thinks), “The one who acts is the same as the one who experiences (the result),” in such a case the belief (laddhi) afterwards follows, “Suffering is created by oneself.” And here, what is meant by suffering is the suffering of the round (vaṭṭadukkha). Asserting thus, from the beginning one declares eternalism, one grasps hold of eternalism. Why? Because that view of his amounts to this. Eternalism comes upon one who conceives the agent and the experiencer to be one and the same.
Spk-pṭ: Prior to the belief that suffering is created by oneself there are the distortions of perception and of mind (saññācittavipallāsā) in the notion, “The one who acts is the same as the one who experiences (the result),” and then a wrong adherence to these distortions develops, namely, the belief “Suffering is created by oneself” (a distortion of views, diṭṭhivipallāsa).
On the three levels of distortion with their four modes, see AN II 52.
40 In this passage the phrase ādito sato found in the preceding statement of eternalism is replaced by vedanābhitunnassa sato, which countermands Spk’s proposal that ādito sato should be brought in here. Spk interprets the sentence as stating that the annihilationist view is held by one who experiences the feeling associated with the view, but I understand the point to be that the view is held with reference to one “stricken by feeling,” perhaps by painful feeling.Spk: If at the beginning (one thinks), “The one who acts is one, the one who experiences (the result) is another,” in such a case afterwards there comes the belief, “Suffering is created by another,” held by one stricken by—that is, pierced by—the feeling associated with the annihilationist view that arises thus: “The agent is annihilated right here, and someone else (‘another’) experiences (the results) of his deeds.” Asserting thus, from the beginning one declares annihilationism, one grasps hold of annihilationism. Why? Because the view one holds amounts to this. Annihilationism comes upon him.
41 Spk: The Tathāgata teaches the Dhamma by the middle without veering to either of these extremes—eternalism and annihilationism—having abandoned them without reservation. He teaches while being established in the middle way. What is that Dhamma? By the formula of dependent origination, the effect is shown to occur through the cause and to cease with the cessation of the cause, but no agent or experiencer (kāraka, vedaka) is described.
42 The going forth (pabbajjā) is the initial ordination as a novice (sāmaṇera); the higher ordination (upasampadā) admits the novice to full membership in the Saṅgha as a bhikkhu.
43 For details on the ordination of a wanderer formerly belonging to another sect, see Vin I 69-71. Spk: The candidate is actually given the going forth and lives as a novice during the probationary period, after which the bhikkhus give him the higher ordination if they are satisfied with him. The Buddha, however, is entitled to waive the usual procedure when he recognizes that the candidate is sufficiently competent and need not be tested. In Kassapa’s case he had the going forth given to him; then, immediately after, Kassapa was brought back to him and he called an assembly of bhikkhus and administered the higher ordination.
44 See I, n. 376.
45 Spk: In this sutta pleasure and pain as feeling (vedanāsukhadukkha) are being discussed; it is also acceptable to say the subject is resultant pleasure and pain (vipākasukhadukkha).
46 Spk: If at the beginning (one thinks), “The feeling and the one who feels it are the same,” there then comes the belief, “Pleasure and pain are created by oneself.” For in this case feeling is created by feeling itself, and asserting thus one admits the existence of this feeling already in the past. One declares eternalism, grasps hold of eternalism.
47 Spk: If at the beginning (one thinks), “The feeling is one, the one who feels it is another,” there then comes the belief, “Pleasure and pain are created by another,” held by one stricken by the feeling associated with the annihilationist view that arises thus: “The feeling of the agent (kārakavedanā ) in the past has been annihilated, and someone else (‘another’) experiences (the result) of his deeds.” Asserting thus, one declares and grasps the annihilationist view that the agent is annihilated and rebirth is taken by someone else.
48 Spk: This body has thereby originated (evam ayaṃ kāyo samudāgato ): This body has been produced thus because he has been hindered by ignorance and fettered by craving. So there is this body: one’s own conscious body. And external name-and-form (bahiddhā ca nāmarūpaṃ): the conscious body of others externally. The meaning should be explained in terms of the five aggregates and six sense bases of oneself and others. This interpretation of bahiddhā nāmarūpa seems dubious. We may have here, rather, a rare example of the term nāmarūpa being employed to represent the entire field of experience available to consciousness, “external name” being the concepts used to designate the objects cognized. See the common expression imasmiṃ saviññāṇake kāye bahiddhā ca sabbanimittesu, “in regard to this conscious body and all external signs,” at 18:21, 22; 22:71, 72, etc., and explained below in n. 340. Spk interprets this dyad (etaṃ dvayaṃ) as the internal and external sense bases, which it calls “the great dyad” (mahādvaya). However, while the sense bases are usually shown to be the condition for contact (e.g., at 12:43, 44) and are also called a dyad (e.g., at 35:92, 93), it seems that here the text intends the term dyad to denote one’s own conscious body and “external name-and-form.” The six sense bases are introduced only in the next sentence, after contact has already been said to arise from a duality. At DN II 62,12-37 too the Buddha demonstrates that name-and-form can be a direct condition for contact without mention of the six sense bases.
49 Bhagavantaṃ yeva paṭibhātu etassa bhāsitassa. Lit. “Let the meaning of this statement occur to the Blessed One.” I translate this Pāli idiom freely in accordance with the sense. See I, n. 227.
50 In this brief sutta we find clearly adumbrated the later exegetical sche
me of “the four groups” (catusaṅkhepa) and “twenty modes” (vīsatākāra), explained at Paṭis I 51-52; Vism 579-81 (Ppn 17:288-98); and CMA 8:7. See Table 4, p. 519. The past causes are the ignorance and craving that brought both the fool and the wise man into the present existence; the present results—the conscious body, name-and-form, the six sense bases, contact, and feeling; the present causes—the ignorance and craving that the fool does not abandon; the future results—the birth, aging, and death to which the fool is subject in the next existence. This should also help establish the validity of the “three-life” interpretation of paṭicca-samuppāda and demonstrate that such an interpretation is not a commentarial innovation.
51 Ṭhitā va sā dhātu dhammaṭṭhitatā dhammaniyāmatā idappaccayatā . Spk: That element (sā dhātu), the intrinsic nature of the conditions (paccayasabhāva), still persists; never is it the case that birth is not a condition for aging-and-death. By the next two terms too he indicates just the condition. For the dependently arisen phenomena stand because of the condition (paccayena hi paccayuppannā dhammā tiṭṭhanti); therefore the condition itself is called the stableness of the Dhamma (dhammaṭṭhitatā). The condition fixes (or determines) the dependent phenomena (paccayo dhamme niyameti); thus it is called the fixed course of the Dhamma (dhammaniyāmatā). Specific conditionality (idappaccayatā) is the set of specific conditions for aging-and-death, etc.Spk-pṭ: Whether it is unpenetrated before and after the arising of Tathāgatas, or penetrated when they have arisen, that element still persists; it is not created by the Tathāgatas, but aging-and-death always occurs through birth as its condition. A Tathāgata simply discovers and proclaims this, but he does not invent it.
At AN I 286,8-24 exactly the same statement is made about the three characteristics: “All formations are impermanent /suffering” and “All phenomena are nonself.” The two expressions, dhammaṭṭhitatā dhammaniyāmatā, must thus have a meaning that is common to both dependent origination and the three characteristics, and it therefore seems unfitting to explain them here, as Spk does, in a way that is specifically tied to conditionality. Moreover, it is more likely that here dhamma means the principle or law-fulness that holds sway over phenomena, not the phenomena subject to that principle. See too below n. 105, n. 211.
52 Abhisambujjhati abhisameti. The former verb, which is reserved for the Buddha’s enlightenment, is transitive. I thus render it “awakens to (with the object),” though otherwise I generally translate words derived from the verb bujjhati as expressing the sense of “enlightenment.” Abhisameti is the verb corresponding to abhisamaya, on which see n. 13.
53 Se contains a footnote which explains that the statement below, “Thus, bhikkhus, the actuality in this ...” should be inserted at the end of each section on the conditioning relationships; and each following section should begin with the statement, “whether there is an arising of Tathāgatas....”
54 At 56:20, 27 the Four Noble Truths are said to be tatha, avitatha , anaññatha—the adjectives corresponding to the first three abstract nouns here. Spk gives a very specific interpretation (translated just below), though we might suspect the original sense was simply that the teaching of dependent origination is true, not false, and not other than real.Spk: Actuality (tathatā) is said to indicate the occurrence of each particular phenomenon when its assemblage of appropriate conditions is present. Inerrancy (avitathatā) means that once its conditions have reached completeness there is no nonoccurrence, even for a moment, of the phenomenon due to be produced from those conditions. Nototherwiseness (anaññathatā) means that there is no production of one phenomenon by another’s conditions. The phrase specific conditionality is used to refer to the (individual) conditions for aging-and-death, etc., or to the conditions taken as a group (paccayasamūhato).
55 Sammappaññāya. Spk: With path wisdom together with insight (savipassanāya maggapaññāya).
56 The sixteen cases of doubt are also mentioned at MN I 8,4-15. For a discussion of their abandonment, see Vism 599 (Ppn 19:5-6) and 603-5 (Ppn 19:21-27). Spk explains that the basic division expressed in the doubts—between existing and not existing in the past, etc.—reflects the antinomy of eternalism and annihilationism. The other doubts pertaining to past existence arise within an eternalist framework. Similar distinctions apply among the doubts pertaining to the future and the present.
57 The ten powers, which are powers of knowledge (ñāṇabala), are expounded at MN I 69-71, where they are called Tathāgata powers (tathāgatabala). The ten types of knowledge are also claimed by the Venerable Anuruddha at 52:15-24, but in part only, according to Spk. A detailed analysis is at Vibh 335-44. The four grounds of self-confidence (vesārajja) are explained at MN I 71-72. In brief, they are the confidence: (i) that no one can challenge his claim to be enlightened about all phenomena; (ii) that no one can challenge his claim to have eradicated all the taints; (iii) that no one can challenge him regarding the states he declares to be obstacles; and (iv) that no one can challenge his claim that his teaching leads the one who practises it to liberation from suffering.Spk glosses brahma as seṭṭha, uttama, “the best, the highest,” and explains the Brahma-wheel as the purified Wheel of the Dhamma (visuddhadhammacakka). This is twofold, the knowledge of penetration (paṭivedhañāṇa) and the knowledge of teaching (desanāñāṇa). The former originates from wisdom and brings the Buddha’s own attainment of the noble fruits; the latter originates from compassion and enables him to teach in such a way that his disciples attain the fruits. The knowledge of penetration is supramundane (lokuttara), the knowledge of teaching mundane (lokiya). Both are self-begotten types of knowledge belonging exclusively to the Buddhas, not held in common with others.
58 This stock meditation formula on the five aggregates is also found in SN at 12:23, 22:78, 89, 101. It occurs too in the two versions of the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta at DN II 301,29-302,13 and MN I 61,3-8. The origin (samudaya) and the passing away (atthaṅgama) of the aggregates are explained from the standpoint of diachronic conditionality at 22:5 and from the standpoint of synchronic conditionality at 22:56, 57. See too n. 123.
59 This is the abstract formula of dependent origination: imasmiṃ sati idaṃ hoti, imass’ uppādā idaṃ uppajjati; imasmiṃ asati idaṃ na hoti, imassa nirodhā idaṃ nirujjhati. Spk-pṭ explains that what is meant by existence in the first part of the formula is not actual presence as such but “the state of not having been brought to cessation by the path”; similarly, what is meant by nonexistence in the second part of the formula is not mere absence as such but “the state of having been brought to cessation by the path.” A long, complex explanation of the formula (abridged in Spk-pṭ) is found at Ud-a 38-42 (translated in Masefield, The Udāna Commentary, 1:66-72). See too n. 14 above. The use of the formula here, immediately following the statement on the aggregates, connects the origin and passing away of the five aggregates to dependent origination, indicating that the former should be understood in terms of the latter.
60 Chinnapilotika. Spk: Patchwork (pilotika) is an old cloth, cut up and torn, that has been sewn and stitched here and there. If one does not wear this, but is clothed in a sheet of uncut cloth, one is said to be “free of patchwork.” This Dhamma is similar, for in no way is it sewn up and stitched together by deceitful means, etc.This encomium of the Dhamma is also at MN I 141-42. At 16:11 (II 220,1 and 221,5 foll.) there occurs the expression paṭapilotikānaṃ saṅghāti, “an outer robe of patches.”
61 Spk calls this four-factored energy (caturaṅgasamannāgataṃ viriyaṃ); the four factors are to be understood by way of skin, sinews, bones, and flesh-and-blood. The vow recurs below at 21:3 (II 276,12-16) and is also at MN I 481,1-5. At Ja I 71,24-27 the Bodhisatta makes the same resolve when he takes his seat at the foot of the Bodhi Tree.
62 Spk glosses sadatthaṃ: sobhanaṃ vā atthaṃ sakaṃ vā atthaṃ, “beautiful good or own good.” The latter explanation is more likely. The common translation of the expression as “true good,” taking sad to represen
t sant, does not seem to have the support of the commentaries.
63 Spk: It is not by inferior faith, energy, mindfulness, concentration, and wisdom that the supreme—namely, arahantship—is to be attained. The supreme must be attained by supreme faith and so forth.
64 Spk explains maṇḍapeyya as a compound of maṇḍa in the sense of clear (pasanna) and peyya in the sense of what is to be drunk (pātabba). It seems that maṇḍa originally meant the best part of milk or butter, i.e., the cream, and like the English word came to signify the essence or finest part of anything. At 34:1, etc., we find sappimaṇḍa, “cream-of-ghee,” the finest of dairy products.Spk: There are three types of cream: (i) the cream of teachings (desanāmaṇḍa), i.e., the Four Noble Truths and the thirty-seven aids to enlightenment; (ii) the cream of recipients (paṭiggahamaṇḍa), i.e., disciples capable of understanding those teachings; and (iii) the cream of holy lives (brahmacariyamaṇḍa ), i.e., the Noble Eightfold Path. The words “while the Teacher is present” (satthā sammukhībhūto) show the reason: since the Teacher is present, having made an energetic effort, you should drink this cream.
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