The Connected Discourses of the Buddha

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The Connected Discourses of the Buddha Page 84

by Bhikkhu Bodhi


  155 Spk: It is held to (ajjhosita) by being swallowed up by craving; appropriated (mamāyita) by being appropriated by craving; and grasped (parāmaṭṭha) by being grasped through views. “This is mine” (etaṃ mama): the grip of craving (taṇhāgāha); by this the 108 thoughts of craving are included (see AN II 212,31-213,2). “This I am” (eso ’ham asmi): the grip of conceit (mānagāha); by this the nine kinds of conceit are included (see I, n. 37). “This is my self” (eso me attā): the grip of views (diṭṭhigāha); by this the sixty-two views are included (see DN I 12-38).

  156 Because this body ... is seen standing for a hundred years, or even longer. Spk: (Query:) Why does the Blessed One say this? Isn’t it true that the physical form present in the first period of life does not last through to the middle period, and the form present in the middle period does not last through to the last period?... Isn’t it true that formations break up right on the spot, stage by stage, section by section, just as sesamum seeds pop when thrown on a hot pan? (Reply:) This is true, but the body is said to endure for a long time in continuous sequence (paveṇivasena), just as a lamp is said to burn all night as a connected continuity (paveṇisambandhavasena) even though the flame ceases right where it burns without passing over to the next section of the wick.

  157 Spk: By day and by night (rattiyā ca divasassa ca): This is a genitive in the locative sense, i.e., during the night and during the day. Arises as one thing and ceases as another (aññadeva uppajjati, aññaṃ nirujjhati): The meaning is that (the mind) that arises and ceases during the day is other than (the mind) that arises and ceases during the night. The statement should not be taken to mean that one thing arises and something altogether different, which had not arisen, ceases. “Day and night” is said by way of continuity, taking a continuity of lesser duration than the previous one (i.e., the one stated for the body). But one citta is not able to endure for a whole day or a whole night. Even in the time of a fingersnap many hundred thousand of koṭis of cittas arise and cease (1 koṭi = 10 million). The simile of the monkey should be understood thus: The “grove of objects” is like the forest grove. The mind arising in the grove of objects is like the monkey wandering in the forest grove. The mind’s taking hold of an object is like the monkey grabbing hold of a branch. Just as the monkey, roaming through the forest, leaves behind one branch and grabs hold of another, so the mind, roaming through the grove of objects, arises sometimes grasping hold of a visible object, sometimes a sound, sometimes the past, sometimes the present or future, sometimes an internal object, sometimes an external object. When the monkey does not find a (new) branch it does not descend and sit on the ground, but sits holding to a single leafy branch. So too, when the mind is roaming through the grove of objects, it cannot be said that it arises without holding to an object; rather, it arises holding to an object of a single kind.It should be noted that neither the sutta nor the commentary interprets the monkey simile here as saying that the untrained mind is as restless as a monkey; the point, rather, is that the mind is always dependent on an object.

  158 Spk explains the order of this discourse thus: First, because these bhikkhus were excessively obsessed with form, the Buddha spoke as if it were improper to grasp form (because its growth and decline are seen) but not improper to grasp mind. Next (in the passage beginning, “It would be better to take as self the body”) he speaks as if it were proper to grasp the body but improper to grasp the mind (because of its incessant change). Now, in the present passage, he speaks with the aim of removing their obsession with both body and mind.

  159 I read with Se and Ee nānābhāvā vinikkhepā, as against Be nānākatavinibbhogā. The simile recurs at 36:10 (IV 215,22-25) and 48:39 (V 212,21-24); in both places Be has the same reading as Se and Ee here. Spk: The sense base is like the lower firestick, the object is like the upper firestick, contact is like the friction of the two, and feeling is like the heat element.

  160 A translation of the long commentary to this sutta is included in Nyanaponika, The Four Nutriments of Life. Spk explains that the Buddha spoke this discourse because the Bhikkhu Saṅgha was receiving abundant almsfood and other requisites, and the Buddha wanted to place before the bhikkhus “a mirror of the Dhamma for their self-control and restraint, so that, contemplating on it again and again, the bhikkhus of the future will make use of the four requisites only after due reflection.” The opening paragraph is identical with that of 12:11.

  161 Spk: Edible food should be considered as similar to son’s flesh by way of the ninefold repulsiveness: the repulsiveness of having to go out for it, of having to seek it, of eating it, of the bodily secretions, of the receptacle for the food (i.e., the stomach), of digestion and indigestion, of smearing, and of excretion. (For details see Vism 342-46; Ppn 11:5-26; there ten aspects are mentioned, the additional one being “fruit,” i.e., the repulsive parts of the body produced by food.) A bhikkhu should use his almsfood in the way the couple eat their son’s flesh: without greed and desire, without pickiness, without gorging themselves, without selfishness, without delusion about what they are eating, without longing to eat such food again, without hoarding, without pride, without disdain, and without quarreling.

  162 Spk: When the nutriment edible food is fully understood: It is fully understood by these three kinds of full understanding: (i) the full understanding of the known (ñātapariññā); (ii) the full understanding by scrutinization (tīraṇapariññā); and (iii) the full understanding as abandonment (pahānapariññā ). Therein, (i) a bhikkhu understands: “This nutriment edible food is ‘form with nutritive essence as the eighth’ (see n. 18) together with its base. This impinges on the tongue-sensitivity, which is dependent on the four great elements. Thus nutriment, tongue-sensitivity, and the four elements—these things are the form aggregate. The contact pentad (contact, feeling, perception, volition, consciousness) arisen in one who discerns this—these are the four mental aggregates. All these five aggregates are, in brief, name-and-form.” Next he searches out the conditions for these phenomena and sees dependent origination in direct and reverse order. By thus seeing name-and-form with its conditions as it actually is, the nutriment of edible food is fully understood by the full understanding of the known. (ii) Next he ascribes the three characteristics to that same name-and-form and explores it by way of the seven contemplations (of impermanence, suffering, nonself, revulsion, dispassion, cessation, and relinquishment—see Vism 607; Ppn 20:4). Thus it is fully understood by the full understanding by scrutinization. (iii) It is fully understood by the full understanding as abandonment when it is fully understood by the path of nonreturning, which cuts off desire and lust for that same name-and-form.Lust for the five cords of sensual pleasure is fully understood: It is fully understood by (i) the singlefold full understanding (ekapariññā), namely, that the craving for tastes arisen at the tongue door is the same craving that arises at all five sense doors; (ii) the comprehensive full understanding (sabbapariññā ), namely, that lust for all five cords of sensual pleasure arises even in regard to a single morsel of food placed in the bowl (for food stimulates desire in all five senses); (iii) the root full understanding (mūlapariññā), namely, that nutriment is the root for all five types of sensual lust, since sensual desire thrives when people are well fed.

  163 Spk: There is no fetter bound by which: This teaching is taken only as far as the path of nonreturning; but if one develops insight into the five aggregates by way of these same forms, etc., it is possible to explain it as far as arahantship.

  164 Spk: Just as a cow, seeing the danger of being eaten by the creatures living in the places she might be exposed to, would not wish to be honoured and venerated, or to be massaged, rubbed, given hot baths, etc., so a bhikkhu, seeing the danger of being eaten by the defilement-creatures rooted in the nutriment contact, becomes desireless towards contact in the three planes of existence.

  165 Spk explains the full understanding of contact in the same way as for edible food, except that contact is taken as the st
arting point for the discernment of the five aggregates. When contact is fully understood the three feelings are fully understood because they are rooted in contact and associated with it. The teaching by way of the nutriment contact is carried as far as arahantship.

  166 Spk: The charcoal pit represents the round of existence with its three planes; the man wanting to live, the foolish worldling attached to the round; the two strong men, wholesome and unwholesome kamma. When they grab the man by both arms and drag him towards the pit, this is like the worldling’s accumulation of kamma; for the accumulated kamma drags along a rebirth. The pain from falling into the charcoal pit is like the suffering of the round.

  167 Spk: The three kinds of craving are fully understood: The three kinds of craving are craving for sensual pleasures, craving for existence, and craving for extermination. They are fully understood because craving is the root of mental volition. Here too the teaching is carried as far as arahantship by way of mental volition.

  168 Spk: The king represents kamma; the criminal, the worldling; the three hundred spears, the rebirth-consciousness. The time the king gives his command is like the time the worldling is driven towards rebirth by King Kamma. The pain from being struck by the spears is like the resultant suffering in the course of existence once rebirth has taken place.

  169 Spk: Name-and-form is fully understood when consciousness is fully understood because it is rooted in consciousness and arises along with it. By way of consciousness too the teaching is carried as far as arahantship.

  170 Spk explains lust (rāga), delight (nandī), and craving (taṇhā) as synonyms for greed (lobha). Consciousness becomes established there and comes to growth (patiṭṭhitaṃ tattha viññāṇaṃ virūḷhaṃ): having impelled a kamma, it “becomes established and comes to growth” through its ability to drag along a rebirth. On the establishing of consciousness, see 12:38 and n. 112, and on the descent of name-and-form, 12:39 and n. 115.

  171 Spk: Wherever (yattha) is a locative referring to the round of existence with its three planes. Or else, in all instances, this locative is used with reference to the correlative term in the preceding phrase. [Spk-pṭ: This locative expression yattha ... tattha is used with reference to each preceding phrase, which is its sphere of application.]

  172 Atthi tattha saṅkhārānaṃ vuddhi. Spk: This is said with reference to the volitional formations that are the cause of a future round of existence for one abiding in the present round of results.The variation here on the usual sequence is very interesting. When “the growth of volitional formations” is placed between name-and-form and future existence, this implies that the expression corresponds to three critical terms of the standard formula—craving, clinging, and (kamma-)existence—with āyatiṃ punabbhavābhinibbatti signifying the process of entering the new existence.

  173 Spk: The painter represents kamma with its adjuncts [Spkpṭ: craving and ignorance, and time and destination, etc.]; the panel, wall, or canvas represents the round with its three realms. As the painter creates a figure on the panel, so kamma with its adjuncts creates a form in the realms of existence. As the figure created by an unskilled painter is ugly, deformed, and disagreeable, so the kamma performed with a mind dissociated from knowledge gives rise to an ugly, deformed, disagreeable figure. But as the figure created by a skilled painter is beautiful and well shaped, so the kamma performed with a mind associated with knowledge gives rise to a beautiful and comely figure.

  174 Spk: The kamma of the arahant is similar to the sunbeam. However, the sunbeam does exist, but because there is no place for it to settle it is said to be unestablished (appatiṭṭhitā). But the arahant’s kamma is said to be unestablished because it is nonexistent. Although he has a body, etc., no wholesome or unwholesome kamma is thereby created. His deeds are merely functional, not productive of results (kiriyamatte ṭhatvā avipākaṃ hoti). In this connection, see 12:25 and n. 81.It should be noted that Spk explains the statement that the arahant’s consciousness is unestablished to mean that his kamma is unestablished. This seems too free an interpretation. Nevertheless, I think it would be wrong to interpret the sutta as saying that after his parinibbāna the arahant’s consciousness persists in some mode that can only be described as unestablished. The present passage is clearly speaking of the arahant’s consciousness while he is alive. Its purport is not that an “unestablished consciousness” remains after the arahant’s parinibbāna, but that his consciousness, being devoid of lust, does not “become established in” the four nutriments in any way that might generate a future existence.

  175 Opening as at 12:10.

  176 Dependent origination is formulated in identical terms in the account of the Buddha Vipassī’s enlightenment at DN II 32,22-30. For the Buddha’s explanation of the mutual dependency of consciousness and name-and-form, see DN II 62,38-63,26. A translation of the detailed explanation at Sv II 501-3 with excerpts from Sv-pṭ can be found in Bodhi, The Great Discourse on Causation, pp. 84-89. See too below 12:67.Spk: When there is name-and-form, consciousness comes to be: Here it should be said, “When there are volitional formations, consciousness comes to be,” and “When there is ignorance, volitional formations come to be.” But neither is mentioned. Why not? Because ignorance and volitional formations belong to a third existence and this insight is not connected with them (avijjāsaṅkhārā hi tatiyo bhavo, tehi saddhiṃ ayaṃ vipassanā na ghaṭīyati). For the Great Man (the Bodhisatta) undertakes insight by way of the present five-constituent existence (pañcavokārabhava, i.e., existence where all five aggregates are present).

  (Query:) Isn’t it true that one cannot become enlightened as long as ignorance and volitional formations are unseen? (Reply:) True, one cannot. But these are seen by way of craving, clinging, and existence. If a man pursuing a lizard has seen it enter a pit, he would descend, dig up the place where it entered, catch it, and depart; he wouldn’t dig up some other place where the lizard can’t be found. Similarly, when the Great Man was sitting on the seat of enlightenment, he searched for the conditions beginning with aging-and-death. Having traced the conditions for the phenomena back to name-and-form, he searched for its condition too and saw it to be consciousness. Then, realizing “So much is the range of exploration by way of five-constituent existence,” he reversed his insight (vipassanaṃ paṭinivattesi). Beyond this there is still the pair, ignorance and volitional formations, which are like the unbroken region of the empty pit. But because they have been included by insight earlier (under craving, etc.?), they do not undergo exploration separately; hence he does not mention them.

  177 This consciousness turns back (paccudāvattati kho idaṃ viññāṇāṃ). Spk: What is the consciousness that turns back here? The rebirth-consciousness and the insight-consciousness. Rebirth-consciousness turns back from its condition, insight-consciousness from its object. Neither overcomes name-and-form, goes further than name-and-form.Spk-pṭ: From its condition: Rebirth-consciousness turns back from volitional formations—the special cause for consciousness—which has not been mentioned; it does not turn back from all conditions, as name-and-form is stated as the condition for consciousness. From its object: from ignorance and volitional formations as object, or from the past existence as object.

  It it possible the Bodhisatta had been seeking a self of the Upaniṣadic type, a self-subsistent subject consisting of pure consciousness that requires nothing but itself in order to exist. His discovery that consciousness is invariably dependent on name-and-form would have disclosed to him the futility of such a quest and thereby shown that even consciousness, the subtlest basis for the sense of self (see 12:61), is conditioned and thus marked by impermanence, suffering, and selflessness.

  178 Spk: To this extent one may be born (ettāvatā jāyetha vā), etc.: With consciousness as a condition for name-and-form, and with name-and-form as a condition for consciousness, to this extent one may be born and undergo rebirth. What is there beyond this that can be born or undergo rebirth? Isn’t it just this that is born a
nd undergoes rebirth?Spk-pṭ: To this extent: that is, by the occurrence of consciousness and name-and-form mutually supporting one another. One may be born and undergo rebirth: Though the expression “A being is born and undergoes rebirth” is used, there is nothing that serves as the referent of the designation “a being” apart from consciousness and name-and-form. Hence the commentator says, “What is there beyond this?” Just this (etadeva): namely, the pair consciousness and name-and-form.

  It might be noted that jāyetha, jīyetha, etc., are middle-voice optatives in the third person singular. At KS 2:73, C.Rh.D seems to have mistaken them for second person plural optatives in the active voice, while at LDB, pp. 211, 226, Walshe has used a roundabout rendering, presumably to avoid having to identify the forms. For a detailed discussion of the mutual conditionality of consciousness and name-and-form, see Bodhi, The Great Discourse on Causation, pp. 18-22.

 

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