The Connected Discourses of the Buddha

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The Connected Discourses of the Buddha Page 120

by Bhikkhu Bodhi


  250 This is a fourfold classification of all objects. According to Spk, the seen (diṭṭha) is the visible-form base; the heard (suta), the sound base; the sensed (muta), the objects of smell, taste, and touch; and the cognized (viññāta), the other seven bases (i.e., the six internal sense bases and the mental-phenomena base). The words “attained, sought after, and ranged over by the mind” (pattaṃ pariyesitaṃ anuvicaritaṃ manasā) are just an elaboration of the fourth. In the following suttas of this vagga, this portion has been elided in the abridgement, but it should be understood in all.

  251 I read imesu chasu ṭhānesu, with Se and Ee, as against Be imesu ca ṭhānesu. Spk is silent, but it seems the six cases are the five aggregates and the tetrad of sense objects taken collectively as one. Cp. MN I 135,34-36, where the tetrad of sense objects actually replaces viññāṇa as a basis for wrong views (diṭṭhiṭṭhāna).

  252 As at 22:81; see n. 134.

  253 As at 22:81; see n. 135.

  254 This is the full nihilist doctrine (natthikavāda). At DN I 55,15-31, it is called annihilationism (ucchedavāda) and ascribed to Ajita Kesakambalī. For the commentarial explanation, see Bodhi, Discourse on the Fruits of Recluseship, pp. 77-83.

  255 The doctrine of the inefficacy of action (akiriyavāda), at DN I 52,22-53,2 ascribed to Pūraṇa Kassapa. See Fruits of Recluseship, pp. 69-70.

  256 The doctrine of noncausality (ahetukavāda) is ascribed to Makkhali Gosāla at DN I 53,25-33, but at 22:60 a portion of it is attributed to Pūraṇa Kassapa; see above n. 92. For the commentary, see Fruits of Recluseship, pp. 70-72. Strict determinism (niyativāda) is known to have been the main plank of Makkhali’s Ājīvika philosophy, discussed in detail by Basham, History and Doctrines of the Ājīvikas, pp. 224-39. The sentence in brackets is brought in from DN I 53,28-29, but is not in the SN text or in the version at MN I 516,33-517,3.

  257 The six classes (chaḷabhijātiyo)—the black, the blue, the red, the yellow, the white, and the ultimate white—represent stages along the Ājīvika road to perfection; see Fruits of Recluseship, pp. 73-75. At AN III 383,18-84,7 this scheme is ascribed to Pūraṇa Kassapa, which again shows the connection between the two systems (a point noted by Basham, pp. 23-24).

  258 At DN I 56,21-34 this doctrine of the seven bodies (sattakāyavāda ) is ascribed to Pakudha Kaccāyana.

  259 I have imported the sentence in brackets from the DN and MN versions of this view; it seems to have been lost in the SN transmission.

  260 In the DN version, this fantastic cosmology is connected to the doctrine of noncausality and subsumed under the teaching of Makkhali Gosāla, where the whole system is called the doctrine of purity by wandering on (saṃsārasuddhi ). At MN I 517,31-518,15 however, as here, the cosmology is attached to the doctrine of the seven bodies. This dual ascription suggests that the cosmological scheme may have been shared by both systems, and in fact the schools of Makkhali and Pakudha later coalesced to form the southern branch of the Ājīvika school. Basham discusses the different ascriptions at pp. 18-23, but treats the cosmology as an integral feature of Makkhali’s system at pp. 240-54.The passage contains a number of anomalous grammatical forms, such as nominatives both singular and plural terminating in -e, which are probably vestiges of ancient Māgadhī. Variant readings are common. I have generally translated the passage with the aid of Spk, but we must bear in mind that the commentaries are explaining the obscure terms at double remove: first, from the outside perspective of the Buddhist community (which may already have been acquainted with a distorted version of the doctrine), and then from the additional distance of the centuries that separated the commentators from the period when the views were current. Often the commentary is obviously engaging in conjecture, and sometimes is clearly wrong. For a translation of the full commentary, see Fruits of Recluseship, pp. 72-77, and for a critical assessment, see Basham’s discussion of the passage at pp. 240-54.

  261 Here I part with Spk, which glosses ājīvaka with ājīvavutti, “means of livelihood.”

  262 Bāle ca paṇḍite ca nibbeṭhiyamānā sukhadukkhaṃ paleti. Spk: Starting from a mountain top or a tree top, a ball of thread goes along unwinding for the length of the thread; then, when the thread is finished, it stops right there and goes no farther. Just so, fools and the wise flee from pleasure and pain, “unwinding” by way of time. They do not exceed the aforesaid time.The versions at DN I 54,20-21 and MN I 518,13-15 read: bāle ca paṇḍite ca sandhāvitvā saṃsaritvā dukkhass’ antaṃ karissanti; “the foolish and the wise, having roamed and wandered on, will make an end of suffering.” Note in both versions the nominative plurals terminating in -e.

  263 The next ten suttas are each devoted to one of the ten “undeclared points,” also dealt with from still different angles in SN 33 and SN 44.

  264 I translate the titles of the next three vaggas as in Be: Dutiyagamanavagga, Tatiyagamanavagga, Catutthagamanavagga . In Se, the third and fourth vaggas are similarly named, but the second is called Gamanavagga. Ee includes all the suttas after the first eighteen in a single chapter (Chapter II) subdivided into four sections called gamana. Ee applies the title Purimagamana to the first eighteen suttas of this chapter, and Dutiyagamana to the second eighteen; the third and fourth chapters are named as in the other eds., but without -vagga. In his introduction to this part (p. ix) Feer proposes to count the eighteen suttas of the Sotāpattivagga twice, and thus maintains that the whole saṃyutta consists of 114 suttas (18 + 18 + (3 x 26)). This, however, involves an unnecessary duplication (which Feer admits, to his puzzlement). It is thus best to follow the arrangement of this saṃyutta in Be and Se.

  265 This is said because the five aggregates are dukkha.

  266 The next eight views are varieties of eternalism with regard to the after-death condition of the self. They are also mentioned at DN I 31,6-15. For a translation of the commentary, see Bodhi, All-Embacing Net of Views, pp. 176-82.Spk: The view of a self consisting of form arises from taking the object alone [Spk-pṭ: the kasiṇa] as self; a formless self, from taking the jhāna as self; the syncretic view, from taking both object and jhāna as self; the double negation, from mere reasoning (takkamattena). The view of the self as exclusively happy arises in the meditator, the rationalist, and those who remember past births. The same for those who view the self as exclusively miserable, etc.

  267 This paragraph distinguishes the suttas of this “trip” (gamana) from those of the preceding trips. Similarly, the fourth trip is distinguished simply by the concluding argument.25. Okkantisaṃyutta

  268 The faith-follower (saddhānusārī) and the Dhamma-follower (dhammānusārī), described just below, are the two classes of disciples who are practising for realization of the fruit of stream-entry. The two are the lowest ranking members of a comprehensive sevenfold typology of noble disciples found, with formal definitions, at MN I 477-79. The seven types are also defined, somewhat differently, at Pp 14-15 (§§30-36) and at Vism 659-60 (Ppn 21:74-78). The faith-follower and the Dhamma-follower are also distinguished at 55:24 (V 377,8-24) and 55:25 (V 379,10-21), though the terms themselves are not used there. At 48:12-17 they come at the end of the more usual list of noble persons, in place of the one practising for the realization of the fruit of stream-entry, and here the faith-follower is placed below the Dhamma-follower for the reason that his faculties are weaker.Briefly, the faith-follower and the Dhamma-follower differ with regard to their dominant faculty: the former relies on faith as the vehicle of progress, the latter on wisdom. When they attain the fruit of stream-entry, the former becomes “one liberated by faith” (saddhāvimutta; see MN I 478,29-34), the latter “one attained by view” (diṭṭhippatta; see MN I 478,18-23).

  According to the Abhidhamma system, with its conception of the supramundane path as lasting for only a single mind-moment, both the faith-follower and the Dhamma-follower should be such for only the one mind-moment of the path. This interpretation, however, though advocated by the commentaries, is difficult to reconcile with the Nik
āyas. For an interesting discussion of the two models, see Gethin, The Buddhist Path to Awakening, pp. 129-33.

  Spk explains “the fixed course of rightness” (sammattaniyāma ) as the noble path (ariyamagga). On the clause, “he is incapable of passing away without having realized the fruit of stream-entry,” Spk says that once the path has arisen there can be no obstruction to the fruit. It quotes Pp 13 (§20): “Should this person be one practising for the realization of the fruit of stream-entry, and should it be the time when the aeon is to burn up, the aeon will not burn up until that person realizes the fruit of stream-entry.”

  269 On the Dhamma-follower, see n. 268. The commentaries do not clarify the syntax of the expression ime dhammā evaṃ paññāya mattaso nijjhānaṃ khamanti. Though nijjhānam is accusative, in English idiom it is more naturally rendered with an ablative sense.Spk: Mattaso nijjhānaṃ khamantī ti pamāṇato olokanaṃ khamanti; “Accepted after being pondered to a sufficient degree”: accepted in measure (through) examination. Spkpṭ: Olokanan ti saccābhisamayasaṅkhātaṃ dassanaṃ; khamanti sahanti, ñayantī ti attho; “Examination”: vision consisting in the breakthrough to the truths. “Accepted”: consented to, meaning “are known.”

  Spk-pṭ is trying to identify the Dhamma-follower’s “examination” or “pondering” of the teachings with the breakthrough to the truths achieved on the occasion of stream-entry, but the sutta itself distinguishes them, the former being merely preliminary to the latter.

  270 This statement makes it clear how the stream-enterer differs from those on the way to stream-entry. The faith-follower accepts the teachings on trust (with a limited degree of understanding), the Dhamma-follower through investigation; but the stream-enterer has known and seen the teachings directly. I read with Se: evaṃ jānāti evaṃ passati.

  271 Viññāṇadhātu is missing in Ee, but found in Be and Se.26. Uppādasaṃyutta

  272 This is a template, to be filled in with the same content as in the preceding chapter. 26:9 is almost identical with 14:36, but includes as well the space element and the consciousness element. 26:10 is fully identical with 22:30. See II, n. 253.27. Kilesasaṃyutta

  273 Cittass’ eso upakkileso. Spk: A corruption of what mind? The mind of the four planes. Admittedly, it is so for the mind of the three (mundane) planes, but how is it a corruption of the supramundane mind? By obstructing its arising. For it is a corruption because it does not allow that mind to arise.Although the title of the chapter has kilesa, which I render “defilement,” the body of the text uses upakkilesa, which I render “corruption.” MN I 36-37 enumerates sixteen “corruptions of mind,” while 46:33 applies this designation to the five hindrances.

  274 Spk: His mind inclines to renunciation (nekkhammaninnaṃ c’ assa cittaṃ hoti): The mind of serenity and insight inclines to the nine supramundane states. Those things to be realized by direct knowledge (abhiññā sacchikaraṇīyesu dhammesu): the things pertaining to the six direct knowledges. Spk does not gloss the verb khāyati, lit. “appears.”28. Sāriputtasaṃyutta

  275 As at 21:3. See I, n. 18.

  276 See II, n. 340.

  277 See I, n. 377.

  278 Her name means “Pure Face.” Spk explains that she approached the elder intending to mock him with her questions and to instigate a debate. Each question and reply has an implicit meaning, which is elicited just below.

  279 Disāmukha. Spk: Catasso disā olokento ti attho.

  280 Vatthuvijjā, the science of sites, included among the types of wrong livelihood for ascetics at DN I 9,7. Spk explains it as the means of determining whether a site will be suitable for agricultural cultivation, but Sv I 93,14-17 as the science of determining the virtues and faults of sites selected for homes and monasteries, etc., including the protective charms to be recited over them.

  281 Nakkhattavijjā. See DN I 10,10-31 for more detailed treatment.

  282 Dūteyya-pahiṇagamanānuyoga. See DN I 8,20-25. This is considered unfitting for a bhikkhu because it reduces his role to that of a messenger for others.

  283 Aṅgavijjā, mentioned also at DN I 9,7. Spk explains as the science of determining a person’s future from his or her bodily features. “Palmistry” is certainly too narrow, but there is no other simple English word that quite captures the sense.29. Nāgasaṃyutta

  284 On the nāgas and the beings featured in the next three saṃyuttas, see Introduction to Part III, pp. 850-51. The four modes of generation (yoni) are intended to comprise all sentient beings; see MN I 73,3-15. According to Spk, the Buddha spoke this sutta in order to rescue these bhikkhus from the nāga modes of generation (nāgayonīhi uddharaṇatthaṃ; or Se: ukkaṇṭhanatthaṃ, to make them fed up with the nāga modes of generation).

  285 Uposathaṃ upavasanti vossaṭṭhakāyā ca bhavanti. According to Buddhist folklore, the nāgas can undertake the precepts of virtue on the Uposatha days (see I, n. 513), and may even resolve to uphold the precepts at the cost of their lives. The classic illustration is the Campeyya Jātaka (No. 506), in which the Bodhisatta, reborn as a nāga-king, maintains the Uposatha precepts even when cruelly tormented by a snake-charmer.Spk-pṭ: “Relinquish their bodies”: as they are determined to maintain the precepts, they have given up their bodies with a mind of unconcern, thinking, “Let those who have need of my skin, blood, or bones take them all.”

  286 Spk glosses dvayakārino with duvidhakārino, and explains that they do both wholesome and unwholesome deeds.

  287 Each gift item is the subject of a separate sutta.30. Supaṇṇasaṃyutta

  288 Spk: Supaṇṇas of a given class are able to carry off only nāgas that are of an inferior or equal class but not their superiors.31. Gandhabbakāyasaṃyutta

  289 The gandhabbas are associated with fragrant substances, no doubt because the word is based on the stem gandha, meaning scent. Spk: Those dwelling in fragrant roots are born with the support of a tree whose roots are fragrant, but the entire tree is available to them as a dwelling place. The same for the other types.On the Vedic origins of the Buddhist conception of the gandhabbas, see Wijesekera, “Vedic Gandharva and Pāli Gandhabba,” in Buddhist and Vedic Studies, esp. pp. 191-93.

  290 Rebirth as a gandhabba is considered favourable and is thus the direct result of good conduct, unlike rebirth as a nāga or supaṇṇa, which is of mixed status and thus the result of ambivalent kamma.32. Valāhakasaṃyutta

  291 Spk: These are devas living in space who have arisen in the company of the devas called the cloud dwellers.

  292 The numbering of suttas in Ee has gone awry here, both in text and translation.

  293 I follow Se and Ee: Yaṃ nūna mayaṃ sakāya ratiyā rameyyāma. Be reads the verb as vaseyyāma. Spk explains that cool weather during the rainy season or winter is a natural coolness caused by the change of seasons, but when it becomes extremely cold during the cool season, or cold during the summer, that is caused by the power of these devas. Similar explanations are given for the other cases.33. Vacchagottasaṃyutta

  294 Vacchagotta appears as the inquirer in three suttas in MN, Nos. 71, 72, and 73. In the third he becomes a monk and attains arahantship. In SN he reappears in 44:7-11, again with questions about the undeclared points.

  295 This sutta, and those to follow, apply the framework of the Four Noble Truths to each of the five aggregates. Since not knowing the Four Noble Truths (dukkhe aññāṇaṃ, etc.) is ignorance (avijjā; see 12:2; II 4,11-14), these suttas collectively establish that ignorance (i.e., lack of knowledge) is the underlying cause of the ten speculative views. Spk says that this saṃyutta contains eleven suttas with a total of fifty-five explanations, but I have followed the printed editions, which count each explanation as a separate sutta.

  296 Spk explains each of the causes as a synonym of not knowing. The Pāli ablatives are: adassanā, anabhisamayā, ananubodhā , appaṭivedhā, asallakkhaṇā, anupalakkhaṇā, apaccupalakkhaṇā , asamapekkhaṇā, appaccupekkhaṇā, apaccakkhakammā.34. Jhānasaṃyutta

  297 Jhānasaṃy
utta is also the title of SN 53, which concerns the four jhānas as meditative attainments. Since the present saṃyutta focuses on the process of meditation rather than on the results, I have translated the title accordingly. The saṃyutta is constructed as a “wheel” (cakka) showing all the possible dyadic permutations of eleven skills related to meditation practice. Each pair is further considered by way of the four possibilities: possession of one but not the other, possession of neither, and possession of both. The last is always the best. Spk states that this entire Jhānasaṃyutta is discussed by way of mundane jhāna.Several of the skills are mentioned elsewhere: six at AN III 311,27-30; a partly overlapping six at AN III 427,25-428,4; and seven at AN IV 34,5-9. Between them these other sources cover all the skills dealt with here except “skill in the object” (ārammaṇakusala), which seems to be unique to this saṃyutta. The explanations at Mp III 354-55 correspond closely to those of Spk, but a few minor differences will be noted below.

 

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