by Hamish Ross
I have just written a paragraph card to you at home, much quicker than this.
I told you that I’m in this convalescent hospital here two days, another twelve to go. It’s quite pleasant, with nothing to do, and good food and comfortable bed and the bathing very pleasant; you would like it well. I’m feeling quite fit now, although, with all the sweating I was doing, I must have lost quite a lot of weight; sometimes in the morning I could waken up to find myself right down to the mattress sopping wet.
I have left the Scottish Commando now: it wasn’t the same since our CO got written off. Nearly a year I was with it then; I liked it well enough but I think that commandos are finished in the Middle East.65
He then wrote about the Litani action and finished off this letter by saying, ‘The job is not bad, but I can’t stand the natives!’ In the shorter card letter to Douglas he added, ‘I’ve put my name down for another move to the East. I think I should get it.’66
Meanwhile, on the island of Cyprus, Keyes had a new troop structure drawn up for the Commando. He also called for operational reports of the Litani action to be written up. He himself wrote a detailed report of X Fighting Party’s actions; he ordered More to write a report of Z Fighting Party, and he asked for reports from McGonigal, who commanded No. 4 Troop, and from Fraser and Glennie, who respectively commanded B Section and A Section of No. 8 Troop. All of these were handwritten and signed. In addition, an unsigned, typed report of No. 10 Troop’s actions was provided; it was not written by Macpherson, who had been posted on detachment to the east of Cyprus to the province of Karpasso for a short time, and must have been prepared by the novice typist MacDonald.67 Keyes naturally had an oversight of all these reports, for he endorsed a statement made by Fraser in his report to the effect that he had been slightly wounded, suffered from concussion but had been able to carry on. Only two reports were dated: those of the commanders of the two fighting parties, X and Z; More’s report was dated 20 June and Keyes’ 21 June.68 All these reports of the Commando’s action were then held in readiness for Laycock’s imminent visit.
Two days later, on 23 June, Laycock flew to Cyprus. He inspected the Commando, congratulated it on its action and then discussed the reports with Keyes. At this point, however, Laycock saw that there was a problem: he would use these troop and fighting party reports as the basis for his own assessment of the operation and in recommending particular individuals for recognition; but there was virtually no evidence of the detailed actions of Y Fighting Party, commanded by Pedder. Most of Y Fighting Party’s officers had been killed and Bryan of No. 1 Troop, who had been severely wounded and captured, was still in captivity (Vichy Forces and the British had not yet signed an armistice in Syria). To be sure, there were two reports from No. 8 Troop, but the reality of the situation was that A Section of No. 8 Troop had early on in the action lost contact with its B Section and joined with Z Fighting Party; and B Section, under Fraser, after some initial contact and joint action with No. 7 Troop, operated independently for a while and then, for the remainder of the action, linked with a Section of No. 4 Troop from Z Fighting Party.
However, No. 7 Troop, commanded by Mayne, had been in Y Fighting Party, and Mayne’s leadership had been highly effective: he had taken his objectives and, in the course of the day, assembled the largest group of prisoners, held them throughout the action and succeeded in bringing them through enemy territory and across the river to the Australian lines. Indeed, from Laycock’s standpoint, Mayne had brilliantly exemplified some of the intended characteristics of the Commandos: independent action, speed, ingenuity and capacity for dispersion.69 But Mayne was no longer in Cyprus. And so Laycock on 23 June asked that a report of No. 7 Troop’s actions be compiled on the basis of interviews with the troop. Keyes delegated the adjutant, Capt More, to assemble and interview the members of No. 7 Troop who had been present at the operation, and to write a record of the troop’s actions. The structure that More adopted for the task – time followed by event – is the same as he used in his own report on Z Fighting Party, but this new report is much briefer and more focused.
Now, this is at odds with the claim made later by Elizabeth Keyes. Sister of Geoffrey, she published a book about her brother in 1956 (the year after Mayne’s death). She had access to these reports and made use of them for her narrative; but she did not quote from them at any length – with one exception. She wrote:
Mayne meanwhile pushed on towards the river, and according to his very bald account:
0700 Passed Lt Fraser’s section. Took twenty-five prisoners at French explosive store.
0730 Attack on strong mortar post covering river. There was also some form of observations post beside this. Another thirty prisoners taken.
0800 Pinned down by Bren-gun fire from Australians on other side of river. No notice taken of white flag.
0900 Had to retreat to obtain cover.
1000 Collected and concentrated all prisoners.
1100 Started to move east from explosive store.
1200 More prisoners, mostly mule drivers taken.
[1200 to 1700 not accounted for except by march.]
1700 Reached river after long detour.
1730 Again fired on by Australians, one OR killed.
1800 Reached small house beside river – spent the night there. French still sniping.
0430 Crossed pontoon bridge and marched down to Australian camp. Prisoners escorted to Tyre.
Signed Lt R.B. Mayne, RUR70
However, this claim is false: Mayne neither wrote this report nor signed it. The report of No. 7 Troop, written, signed and dated by More, is as follows.
Report on Action at the Litani river on 9 June 41 by Capt More RE as obtained from personnel in No. 7 Troop present at the action.
Preliminary
No. 7 Tp Under Lt R.B. Mayne was in ‘Y’ Fighting Party under Lt Col R.R.N. Pedder. Troop Strength (2 off. 43 ORS)
0422 No. 7 Troop landed successfully, under fire, one OR killed.
0515 Reached main road under fire from two heavy MGs on road. One OR killed. About forty French colonial troops surrendered.
0530 Advanced towards Qasmiye. No opposition but took several prisoners.
0630 Turned down towards river.
0700 Passed Lt Fraser’s section. Took twenty-five prisoners at French explosive stores.
0730 Attack on strong mortar and MG post, covering river. There was also some form of observations post beside this. Another thirty prisoners taken.
0800 Pinned down by Bren-gun fire from Australians on other side of river. No notice taken of white flag.
0900 Had to retreat to obtain cover.
1000 Collected and concentrated all prisoners.
1100 Started to move east from explosive store.
1200 More prisoners, mostly mule drivers taken.
1700 Reached river after long detour.
1730 Again fired on by Australians, one OR killed.
1800 Reached small house beside river – spent the night there. French still sniping.
10 June
0 30 [hour is smudged] Crossed pontoon bridge and marched down to Australian Camp. Prisoners escorted to Tyre.
(signed) G.R.H. More
Capt R.E.
Salamis Camp
23 June 4171
That Elizabeth Keyes was able fairly accurately to transcribe part of More’s report but ignore his introductory remarks – which show that it was written in the third person – as well as his signature, rank and date at the end of the report, instead misattributing the report and the signature to another officer of a different rank and regiment, is puzzling.
However, the expedient of More writing No. 7 Troop’s report – bearing the hallmarks of afterthought and haste, and carried out two days after Keyes had written his final report – appeared to be the best that could be done in the circumstances, and it satisfied Laycock’s purposes. But it shed little light on what happened to No. 1 Troop and to Pedder’s HQ. However, although the re
port of his former troop’s actions had been written without any contribution from him, Mayne was to be called upon to give information about the action in the future. So it is therefore necessary to jump forward briefly.
Not everyone in the War Office, it would appear, agreed that the Litani operation had been a great success. About six months after the operation, the War Office sent Combined Operations Headquarters in London some notes from MO 5 on Combined Operations in the Middle East, and among them was reference to the Litani river operation. Whatever the content and however it was couched, the information in those notes roused the indignation of the man to whose desk they were directed, Brigadier Charles Haydon. He responded robustly that the references to the Commando at the Litani river were unfair and misleading, and he sent his respondent a copy of Laycock’s appreciation of the action. Laycock’s precis was based on the limited information he had received on his visit to Cyprus,72 and it shed no light on the activities of the HQ party. So thought Brigadier H.W. Wynter of the Offices of the War Cabinet Historical Section who, three years later, had to draw up an account of the action. At this time Mayne was Lt Col 1 SAS and based in the UK. Brig Wynter wrote to him on 12 May 1944, reminding him that they had quite recently met at the Army and Navy Club before getting to the burden of his letter.
I am trying to write an account of the Litani river operation at which you were present. I understand you were with ‘Y’ Party and in command of 7 Troop. I should be very grateful if you could let me know:
1. How, when and where Col Pedder was killed.
2. Were Farmiloe and Coode with him or elsewhere, and do you know the circumstances in which they were killed?
3. What happened to No. 1 Troop (also in ‘Y’ Party) and who was in command of it?
The Naval Officer in charge of the ALCs says that you came under fire directly you landed. No. 7 Troop’s report confirms this, but No. 8 Troop’s report says that they were not fired at.
I am sorry to bother you with this but I must list what information I can.73
Wynter had read the troop reports and he knew that Mayne was not the author of No. 7 Troop’s report. From what he learned from Mayne, Wynter was able to describe the support Mayne’s Troop had received from Fraser’s B Section of No. 8 Troop, that he had sent a runner to find Pedder’s HQ, and the fact that the troop and its prisoners had crossed the pontoon bridge before dark on 9 June, not the following day74 (More had got that wrong when interviewing the troop). So three years after the Litani operation Mayne finally had the opportunity to comment on his Troop’s action.
But back in June 1941, Mayne’s departure from No. 11 Commando was but the start of what in August became an exodus to the LRDG, the fledgling L Detachment SAS, and other units. Throughout the month of July, the Commando continued with its garrison duty on Cyprus. But Laycock had spelled out to Keyes when he met him on 23 June that its disbandment was imminent.75 Morale plummeted. No less affected was Keyes himself. In a letter to his family, Keyes summed up No. 11 Commando’s plight as their passing into oblivion unless his father, Director of Combined Operations, could manage to take them back into the fold.76
When the details of recognition for the Litani action were later announced, Keyes, More and Bryan each received the MC, and Garland a Bar to his; Mayne received a Mention in Despatches.77
Pedder, one of the original officers chosen to raise a Commando, who had selected his men, trained and motivated them, who welded them into an efficient and effective unit and led it in the biggest Commando raid to be carried out in the Middle East, received no official recognition. But Pedder’s legacy was his impact on others: his understanding of the Commando role, his dedication to the task, his ability to motivate and his insistence on training – these qualities won lasting respect. And because the Commando was No. 11 (Scottish) Commando, a tradition was followed, and the regimental piper’s earlier composition was renamed Colonel Pedder.
Mayne was certainly among the beneficiaries. He was to put what he had absorbed to very good effect two years later when he commanded his own unit, which, for a period in Sicily and mainland Italy, operated in all but name as a Commando. And the French connection in Mayne’s military career reflected the complexities of that country’s experiences during the Second World War: it began with his firing on the flag of France and it ended with him receiving that country’s highest honour.
Of the 500 officers and men of No. 11 Commando who sailed from the Firth of Clyde on the night of 31 January 1941, over 100 died at the Litani river. On paper, No. 11 Commando would soon be disbanded, then reconstructed to carry out what was to be its last raid.
4
THE DESERT RAIDERS
But this is the struggle not to be avoided,
the sore extreme of human-kind,
and though I do not hate Rommel’s army
the brain’s eye is not squinting.
Sorley MacLean, ‘Going Westwards’
The birth of the Special Air Service, like many creation stories, over time became rich in myths. One of these concerned the circumstances in which Mayne joined the unit.
In reality, however, during July 1941, while David Stirling awaited approval to establish his new unit, Mayne was enjoying a fair portion of what a convalescing combat soldier would wish for: good food, a comfortable bed, some of his books, bathing in the Great Bitter Lake and being cared for by nubile young nurses.1 He began this pleasant regime on 13 July, when he left No. 19 General Hospital, and he had two weeks of it before returning to the ME Commando Base. His former unit, No. 11 Commando, was still in Cyprus, for it was not due to complete its tour of garrison duty until the following month. When it did, Layforce would finally disband. As early as 2 June, Mayne had applied for a transfer to the Far East, and in a letter to his father he felt fairly confident that his application would be successful. By mid-July he was still of the same mind when he told his brother Douglas, ‘I think I should get it.’2 What he could not tell them was that ‘it’ was a Military (Commando) Mission assigned to act as guerrilla-warfare instructors to the Chinese Nationalist Army of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.3
Japan had now been at full-scale war with China for some time; and as early as 1940, Churchill wrote to Commonwealth prime ministers and Britain’s commanders-in-chief overseas expressing the government’s estimate that Japan would soon join Germany in the conflict. He anticipated that they should organise paramilitary warfare, and to this end he would send them ‘well-equipped experts in this form of warfare’.4 Then, in November 1940, Chiang Kai-shek appealed to the USA and Britain for aid. After lengthy discussions with the Chinese, the British Commander-in-Chief Far East in April 1941 was given the task of recruiting men for a guerrilla operation; and he was promised a British contingent from Commandos in the Middle East, and an Australian contingent, for what was to become No. 204 Military Mission to China.5 They would be sent to the Bush Warfare School in Burma, where one of the instructors was Capt Mike Calvert (who would later become Brigadier of the SAS); and in July 1941 the Australian contingent was already on its way to Burma; when Layforce disbanded, the British contingent would follow. The complement that Laycock was looking for was about ten officers and 100 other ranks.6 No. 204 Military Mission was secret: it would be politically embarrassing if Japan got wind of it, for, of course, Britain and Japan were not yet at war. So it is understandable that Mayne was confident he would get the transfer: with his record in the Litani operation, he had to be a very credible volunteer; and the whole idea appealed to him. Unless some better offer turned up.
David Stirling, who was a lieutenant in No. 8 Commando, was among those who were disillusioned with the way Commandos had been used. But he was convinced that small groups of highly trained men would be effective in attacking enemy airfields and lines of communication that were particularly vulnerable in the desert. At the General Staff level, Auchinleck had replaced Wavell as Commander-in-Chief, Middle East Forces, but continued with Wavell’s policy decision to disband Layforc
e. So when No. 11 Commando returned to Egypt, the final dissolution of Layforce would take place. It was therefore an opportune time for Stirling both to put forward his ideas and to discuss them with Col Laycock, head of Layforce (and formerly Stirling’s CO of No. 8 Commando). Stirling got Laycock’s enthusiastic support.7 The two met in Cairo on the eve of Laycock’s departure by air to the UK, where he was to take part in discussions on the future of Special Service troops in the Middle East. Stirling wrote a brief letter to his mother which Laycock would post in the UK.
I am not sure what I shall do now but I am attempting and may succeed in establishing a permanent parachute unit. It would be on a small scale but would be more amusing than any other form of soldiering.
. . . I wish I had known earlier that Bob Laycock was leaving tomorrow. I have got to give him this letter tonight and it is very late . . .8
In their discussion Laycock and Stirling talked about personnel, for, if Stirling received authority to form a unit, its members would be drawn from Layforce.
Stirling wanted Jock Lewes from No. 8 Commando, who had already experimented with parachuting and whose ideas he valued. Names of other officers in Nos 7 and 8 Commando may have cropped up as well. But Laycock suggested that Mayne, formerly of No. 11 Commando – and of whom Stirling had no knowledge – would be a good choice. Now, by all accounts, Laycock was a shrewd individual. Stirling had no combat experience at this stage and he needed someone who had proven himself a highly competent troop commander in action – and Mayne was such a person. Laycock was the only senior officer in Egypt at the time who knew the details of the individual troop actions in the Litani operation, for he had used them as the basis of his recommendations for recognition.9 He learned that there had been antipathy between Mayne and Geoffrey Keyes, but he reasoned that Mayne would be a considerable asset in a unit whose leader had a more relaxed management style. Laycock’s recommendation was more than sufficient for Stirling; and neither of them regretted it. Indeed, in the years that followed, as we shall see, Laycock had a patron’s interest in Mayne. For example, two years later, when Mayne led his unit in an outstandingly successful raid, Laycock described him in a letter to a general as ‘Major Mayne DSO, ex 11 Cdo’.10