by Kevin Wright
Detailed unit analysis required regular, repetitive target coverage so that changes could be quickly detected. It also demanded patience from the PIs, an eye for detail and the ability to detect changes.
An Area Print of the target would be produced. A single-occupancy target required the target’s external boundaries to be determined, followed by the identification of the functional areas such as accommodation, administrative, vehicle and equipment storage, logistics and training facilities. A letter or number denoted these areas.
Multi-occupancy targets presented their own set of problems in identifying and establishing individual unit areas. After defining the external boundaries the PIs had to find the areas housing individual units. Soviet paranoia was a great help in this. Unlike NATO, where personnel from individual units mixed freely both at work and at leisure, and passed through another unit’s area during their day-to-day duties, this concept was anathema to the Soviet mind set. In the Soviet Army personnel did not have free association either at work or at leisure. Although the units’ domestic areas were not fenced off, a strict policy of personnel segregation was applied with each Soviet and East German unit having its own individual cookhouse and club that were for their exclusive use. Enforcing this segregation was simple – erect fences. Unit equipment areas were fenced off to mark the boundary between one unit and its next door neighbour. Within unit areas there were sometimes internal fences to segregate sub-units or denote ‘sensitive areas’. Changes to fence lines indicated either an expansion of the occupying unit’s area or a change of occupant. By following the fences and observing the equipment seen in the fenced areas, the PIs could soon deduce who lived where. Another aid to defining individual unit areas was the sand table-like models created in the unit’s domestic accommodation area that showed unit personnel which part of the barracks housed their unit.
Within each unit’s area were vehicle and equipment storage sheds. Analysing the unit’s vehicle holdings and parking patterns helped to deduce the unit organisation. To do this each shed housing vehicles or equipment was individually numbered and the number of vehicle/equipment storage bays established. The convention for numbering bays was from left to right when facing the shed. So ‘Shed 3 v 40’ meant that it was shed number 3 in the area and it had forty storage bays. Bays came in several variations, such as double-depth, where two vehicles could be accommodated one behind another, and multiple-width bays that accommodated a number of vehicles abreast across the width. A record of sightings associated with a particular shed and bay was made on the Shed and Bay Card so that the parking patterns and vehicle associations could confirm the units or sub-unit occupying the shed. Any changes in parking patterns often indicated a unit reorganisation or a change of occupant.
The Table of Organisation and Equipment (TO & E) Card recorded overall equipment sightings in an area. These were compared against the unit’s published TO & E and any anomalies reported. TO & E Card information formed the basis of any further in-depth analyses.
Recording and analysing the turret and side numbers painted on armoured vehicles was a very useful aid that often gave the first indication of an organisational change. The system was designed and developed by two Intelligence Corps warrant officer PIs around 1970 as part of a study covering two Soviet divisions. Although BRIXMIS had been recording these numbers for some time, this was the first occasion that they were subjected to in-depth analysis. This resulted in the accurate determination of an individual vehicle’s unit, sub-unit and its position within that sub-unit. The study’s boundaries were widened to cover all units within the BCZ. The Allies’ light aircraft missions were the main source of turret and side numbers, although in the right circumstances they could sometimes be seen on Corridor photography. The turret number study had many successes, alerting the intelligence staffs to organisational changes before other sources confirmed them.
A Photo Coverage Card recorded all the photographic cover of an installation, regardless of whether it had been exploited. PIs reviewed this previous coverage to identify photography suitable for area prints illustrating reports.
Until the early 1980s sightings in all exploited areas were fully recorded. This involved the expenditure of considerable time and effort because recording was a manual process. The operations officer at that time changed the system to reporting by exception to improve output. This meant that a report was only raised if an equipment sighting did not conform to the published TO & E. Complete listings were periodically done to maintain database integrity and ensure that routine surveillance was not lost. This change sped up the reporting process and reduced the backlog of photography awaiting exploitation. The downside was that records were not as comprehensive as they had previously been, so there was a greater risk of something significant being missed. It also meant that if the target became the subject of detailed study, all the unreported photography of that target had to be reviewed.
Preparing material from the database for a detailed study was a laborious manual process that involved transcribing individual entries into chronological order so that the data was studied sequentially. One Warrant Officer PI remarked that: ‘this is a good way of dealing with a junior soldier who has got up my nose. A few days of transcription should get the message home that I may be cross with them’ – although cross was not the term used in the original remark.
Shed and Bay Card
Example of a Shed and Bay Card. This was used to record the associations of equipment with a particular storage shed and their parking patterns within bays, including turret/side numbers. (Document via Peter Jefferies)
TO & E Card
Example of a TO & E Card. This card recorded all equipment sited in a unit area so that they could be compared with the published Table of Organisation & Equipment. (Document via Peter Jefferies)
Turret Number Analysis
Example of Turret Number analysis. A change in a unit’s turret/side number system was often the first indicator of an organisational change. (Document via Peter Jefferies)
The study of the numbering sequence and the allocation of numbers to individual equipments allowed a picture of the unit’s organisation to be built up. In this case it shows that that 020 was the Battery Command Vehicle, 021 to 026 were self-propelled howitzers and 027 was the Battery Fire Direction Centre Vehicle. The appearance of a 1V series with number 029 may indicate a re-organisation or allocation of turret/side numbers. A wider study of the unit’s numbers revealed the following allocation within the regiment:
001-004
1st Battalion Headquarters 005-009 2nd Battalion Headquarters
010-019
1st Battery of 1st Battalion 040-049 1st Battery of 2nd Battalion
020-029
2nd Battery of 1st Battalion 050-059 2nd Battery of 2nd Battalion
030-039
3rd Battery of 1st Battalion 060-069 3rd Battery of 2nd Battalion
Photo Coverage Card
Location
Schönwalde
Installation
Flugplatz Kaserne 281
Mission
Date
Frames
Remarks
BRX 77/034
21 May 77
Film 123 Fr 01-36
77 CY 123
21 Apr 77
Pan 0100-0104
LARKSPUR 77-029
19 Apr 77
Film 155 Fr 001-036
MMFL 277
14 Apr 77
Film 007 Fr 005-036
RAFG 1234
15 May 77
F31 0025-0036
F32 0026-0035
F33 0025-0029
RAFG 1237
22 May 77
F31 0001 – 0012
F32 0002 – 0013
F33 0002 – 0011
77 CY 125
22 Apr 77
Pan 0010-0015
NAMA
77 CY 126
23 Apr 77
Obl 0056-0099
Example of
a Photo Coverage Card. This recorded all photographic coverage of an installation. (Document via Peter Jefferies)
Unlike their US counterparts who had been using IT since the early 1970s, the British PI units didn’t adopt IT until the early 1980s when Project Double Vision (DV) was commissioned. DV speeded up exploitation and reduced the amount of card-held data, such as Installation Coverage, TO & E and Shed and Bay records. Data could be sorted chronologically which meant that analysts could look at the developing situation without resorting to manual transcription. To ensure that spurious or inaccurate data did not enter the records and to keep the raw data as pure as possible, any data underwent a rigorous quality control process before being committed to the main database. DV was a 6 Int Coy and PID internal system with no external connections. Reports for external distribution were prepared and edited on DV but the final product was distributed in hard copy because DV was not capable of managing electronic distribution. Despite its limitations and obvious inadequacy today, it gave the British a leap in capability and efficient data handling at the time. A modern networked system would really have speeded up dissemination beyond the wildest dreams of those late twentieth-century PIs.
Conclusions
Throughout the Cold War, Corridor and BCZ flights provided regular surveillance of the Soviets’ area. There were frequent changes to the equipment and methods used to extract intelligence from operations’ photography. A major challenge was always the capability to effectively, process, organise and interpret the information provided from the vast quantities of photography.
Before the advent of reliable reconnaissance satellite imagery the Corridor and BCZ programmes were the only constant and regular surveillance available to the Allied intelligence community that could give them any indications of preparations for hostilities in this most forward area of deployed Soviet troops. To meet this requirement, simple listings of the equipment within an installation were usually sufficient. The downgrading of the I&W requirement in the mid 1960s significantly changed the way information was managed. It led to the development of more sophisticated analytical methodologies that were eventually adopted throughout the British PI community. These encompassed the use of other intelligence sources to provide a final product that was much more thoroughly analysed and assessed than previously. These changes were themselves the precursor to the twenty-first century’s multi-skill, all-source intelligence cells.
Technical intelligence was always a significant product throughout the Cold War because Germany was the theatre where new equipment was often seen first. Satellite imagery may have often given more warning of the impending introduction of new equipment and systems, but it was in Germany that the analysts could get ‘up close and personal’ to collect and analyse detailed close-up images.
Notes
1 Prior Preparation and Planning Prevents Poor Performance.
8
WAS IT WORTH ALL THE EFFORT AND WHAT DID IT ACHIEVE?
For forty-five years, the Allied Corridor and BCZ flights produced almost daily coverage of a substantial portion of GSFG, the NVA and the air, maritime and border forces stationed in the GDR at relatively low political and military risk. For the first fifteen years, before the arrival of viable reconnaissance satellites, they were the only regular photographic surveillance capability available to the Western intelligence community. Although the early reconnaissance satellites provided wider area coverage of target countries, they had two disadvantages: first, optical cameras cannot penetrate the cloud cover that abounds over Eastern Europe for much of the year; second, their orbits are predictable, which lets forces in the targeted areas take measures to hide activity and disguise any new equipment, whilst the satellite is in range. The Corridor and BCZ flights could fly beneath the cloud cover and their flight timing and routes were less predictable than satellite orbits, which made concealment measures more difficult.
Continuous Development of GSFG, NVA and Other GDR Forces
Throughout the Cold War, Soviet and East German ground and air forces went through unit and formation reorganisations that increased their size and capabilities. Alongside the reorganisations, extensive re-equipment programmes progressively advanced their technical capabilities too, from the relatively simple Second World War-era equipment to the much more sophisticated levels of the 1980s.
During this period, Corridor and BCZ flights captured on film major unit changes and reorganisations including:
• Identifying Divisional and Army-level Independent Tank Units. In the 1980s, the Army-level units were disbanded and their assets redistributed into Tank Divisions and Motor Rifle Divisions.
• Regimental artillery batteries that were increased to battalion strength.
• The introduction of an SS-23 Spider Brigade at front level.
• The establishment, in each of the five GSFG armies, of Air Assault Units equipped with BMD-1 armoured personnel carriers (APC), 2S9 air-portable self-propelled guns, Mi-17 HIP transport helicopters and Mi-24 HIND attack helicopters.
Individual re-equipment programmes are too numerous to mention but those involving ground forces included:
• Qualitative improvements to all types of armoured vehicle including main battle tanks (MBT), armoured personnel carriers (APC) and armoured infantry combat vehicles (AICV).
• The introduction of new towed and self-propelled artillery pieces at all unit and formation levels and the associated 1V series automated target acquisition and fire control systems.
• A new generation of multi-barrel rocket launcher (MBRL) systems at all levels which replaced the wartime simple rocket launchers.
• The introduction of SS-21 Scarab medium-range guided missile systems, replacing the unguided Free Rocket over Ground (FROG) systems in the Divisional FFR Battalion.
• The replacement of towed AAA systems by self-propelled radar-controlled anti-aircraft guns, combined AAA and SAM systems, and SAM systems including MANPADS.
• The introduction of sophisticated battlefield radar equipped reconnaissance vehicles and an ECM capability into Divisional Reconnaissance battalions.
• The PMP floating ribbon bridge, new ferries, amphibious load carriers, and tracked IPR river reconnaissance vehicle enhanced river-crossing unit capabilities at all levels.
• A complete review of the existing logistics train and its improvement through the introduction of modern, larger load-carrying capacity vehicles based on the URAL-377, URAL-4320, KrAZ-255, KrAZ-260 and KamAZ-5410 series chassis.
Air and air defence forces also went through a series of re-equipment and upgrade programmes, including:
• The transition from wartime piston-engined aircraft to jet aircraft, including fighters, tactical bombers and reconnaissance aircraft, which improved with each generation fielded.
• The development of helicopters from simple transports to attack, versatile troop and heavy lift machines in many variants, including command and control and ECM variants.
• Improving the defence of key points and airfields by introduction of semi-mobile SAM systems like the SA-2 Guideline, SA-3 Goa and SA-5 Gammon missiles. The first system deployed in the GDR was the SA-2 Guideline site at Glau in the late 1950s.
• The introduction of sophisticated, integrated command and control systems, combining all the elements into the one entity needed to control and co-ordinate aircraft and SAM system activities in a complex air picture.
The regularity of Corridor and BCZ flights meant that they were able to detect and monitor these organisational changes and re-equipment programmes as they took place. This made a significant contribution, together with other sources, to military capability assessments by in-theatre and national intelligence staffs. This information also contributed to the MoD Defence Industry Desk’s assessments of Warsaw Pact equipment production rates, by monitoring the speed and progress of its introduction into service.
Before the mid 1960s, when satellites opened up Soviet research and development establishmen
ts to surveillance, the Corridor and BCZ programmes were virtually the sole source of new equipment photography. Satellite surveillance reduced the importance of the Corridor and BCZ programmes’ contribution to the overall technical intelligence programme because it allowed technical assessments to be made before the new equipment appeared in the GDR. Despite this surveillance net stretching back to the heart of the Soviet Union, there was still some new equipment that slipped through the surveillance net and consequently the first sightings were in the GDR, captured by Corridor and BCZ flights.
Routine Reporting
Chapter 7 covered the production of the First Phase (RECCEXREP) and Second Phase (IPIR) reports that the British used to communicate the immediate results, detailed reporting and database population from their missions, whereas the Americans used their IPIR for immediate reporting and database population. The content of these reports formed the basis for subsequent analysis and report production. Both nations’ units also produced special reports to meet specific tasks or intelligence requirements.
Briefing Notes (BN)
BNs were a quick response, time sensitive – usually within twenty-four to forty-eight hours – to meet a specific task, or draw attention to a significant sighting or event. They consisted of a single page of written analysis supported by either a photographic print or transparency. The Scud battalion training deployment on the Letzlinger Heide training area (see image 46) and the deployed Divisional FFR battalion (see image 47) is typical of the activity that would have prompted a BN’s production.