by G. A. Henty
Chapter 10: The Peiwar-Khotal.
At ten o'clock at night, on the 1st of December, the troopsdetailed for the attack mustered in the camp. The assembly tookplace without sound of bugle, and even the necessary words ofcommand were given in a low tone. Through the still night air theAfghans on the hills, little more than two miles away, would haveheard the stir. It was a very dark night, although the stars shoneclear.
"Where can we be going?" William Gale asked the soldier next tohim. "We are going right away from the pass, instead of towardsit."
"So we are!" the soldier replied. "I am blest if I know what we areup to, and it's so precious dark that I can scarcely see the filebefore me. I hope we ain't going to fight in the dark, anyhow. Whatwould be the good of being a marksman, when you cannot see the endof your own rifle, let alone the man you are firing at?"
"Oh! We can't be going to attack in the dark," Will said. "I expectwe have got a long march before us; and are going to work round,somehow, and take them in rear."
"Well, I hope whoever is acting as guide can see better in thedarkness than I can; else we are safe to lose our way, and may findourselves anywhere, in the morning.
"Confound it!" The exclamation was elicited by the speakerstumbling over a boulder, and nearly going on to his head.
"Silence in the ranks, there!" an officer said, close by.
Each regiment was followed by its ammunition mules, and hospitaldoolies--the latter being covered stretchers, or palkies, carriedby natives. Besides these were dandies--or chairs--slung uponmules. This greatly added to the difficulty of a night march for,even in the daytime, the presence of baggage animals in a column,upon a narrow road, greatly hinders the troops and, at night, thedelays occasioned by them are naturally very much greater.
For the first three and a half miles the column marched away fromthe enemy upon the Khotal, and the surprise of the soldiersincreased at every step they took. At the end of that time theyarrived at the village of Peiwar. Here they turned to the left and,after crossing several ravines, and stony water courses, arrived ona cultivated terrace; and kept along this till they reached a verystiff nullah, twenty feet deep.
The night was bitterly cold, the bank of the nullah was extremelyslippery, and the boulders in the water course below coated withice. The difficulty of getting the loaded animals across, in thedarkness, was therefore very great. The passage of the variouswater courses caused great delays; and it was difficult to keep thecolumn together, in the dark. At each passage, the rear wasimmensely delayed while the leading troops were passing; and theseagain had to be halted, while those behind them struggled over thedifficulties. The men suffered much from cold, as the pace was soslow that they could not warm themselves; and the mounted officersspecially suffered, in their hands and feet.
At midnight the ravine leading up to the Spingawi Pass was reached;but so dark was it that the 2nd Punjaubees, separated by a fewyards from the regiment in front of them, marched straight oninstead of turning up it; and the 22nd Pioneers, and the fourartillery guns carried on elephants--being behind them--naturallywent astray, also. Brigadier General Thelwall, who commanded thecolumn, was at the head of his brigade; and was, for some time,unaware of the absence of two of his regiments but, after haltingand finding that they did not come up, sent back a mounted officerwho, after a two-mile ride, came up with the missing troops, andguided them back to the point where they had left the route.
From the foot of the ravine to the top of the pass is six miles indistance and, dark as it was in the open, it was still more so inthe ravine, shadowed by the steep hills on either side. As theascent continued the road became worse; the boulders being larger,and the holes and dried-up pools deeper. The darkness, and theprevailing white color of the stones, prevented the difference oflevel being observed; and many of the men had heavy falls, as thesteep sides of these pools were often from two to four feet deep.
After marching for a mile and a half up the ravine, the report of arifle was heard in the ranks of the 29th Punjaubees--who wereleading the column--followed instantly by another discharge.Colonel Gordon--commanding the regiment--halted; and he and thegeneral tried, in vain, to discover who had fired. No one could, orwould, identify them; and this seemed clearly to prove that therifles had been fired as a signal to the enemy, for they had notbeen loaded before the column started. The Punjaubee regimentscontained many hill tribesmen--men closely connected, by ties ofblood and religion, with the enemy whom they were marching toattack.
A non-commissioned officer and several of the men, who were justabout the spot where the guns had been fired, were placed underarrest and sent back. It was afterwards found that two of theirrifles had been discharged; and the men who fired, and theirnon-commissioned officer were tried by court martial for treachery,and were hung. After these men had been sent back, the 5thGhoorkas, the company of Rangers, and two companies of the 72ndpassed the 23rd Punjaubees, and took their places at the head ofthe column. In the course of the march a good many other men of the23rd left the column, in the dark, and made their way back to camp.
It turned out, afterwards, that the Afghan sentries at the top ofthe pass heard the reports, and woke up the commander of the post;who, hearing no further cause of alarm, took no action in thematter. Had the traitors waited until the column was within a mileof the top of the pass, the Afghans would assuredly have taken thealarm but, firing at a distance of four and a half miles, theyfailed in the desired effect.
The advance was resumed, up the bed of the stream, for another mileand a half. About three in the morning the main water course wasquitted, the road now entering a ravine to the left; up which,three miles further on, was the summit of the pass. The columncontinued its weary way up the ravine, slowly stumbling along inthe dark.
One incident occurred, in this part of the road, showing thenecessity, in night marching, for the regiments to keep close toeach other. In one place a fir-covered island lay in the middle ofthe ravine, the torrent's bed lying on either side of it. When thetwo companies of the 72nd Highlanders--who had been following closeto that of the Rangers--came to the spot, they were surprised tofind that the troops in front had suddenly vanished. No explanationcould be given as to the cause of this disappearance, so thecompany were halted until the mystery was solved.
The leading regiment had taken the passage to the right of theisland, while the 72nd had gone to the left; the separation of theroads being unnoticed, in the dark. Had the roads diverged, insteadof reuniting, much inconvenience might have been caused by thedelay in collecting the separated portions of the force.
At last the foot of the Khotal was reached, where the track leftthe ravine and turned up the spur. The two guides--natives of thecountry, who had led the head of the column to this point--refusedto go any further and, as the column was now at the point where thefighting might begin, they were allowed to depart.
It was about six o'clock when the Ghoorkas began to climb the spur.The morning had broken; but it was still dark, and the path wasalmost invisible in the shadow of the trees. The Ghoorkas--theirrifles loaded now--made their way quietly up the hill. Presentlythe challenge of the sentry was heard, followed by two shots.
It was a relief to the men, after ten hours of weary stumblingalong in the cold and darkness, to know that they were, at length,face to face with their foe. Cold and fatigue were at onceforgotten and, with eyes strained through the darkness, and riflesready for use, every man pressed forward. Fifty yards up the hill,behind the sentry who had fired, was the first stockade of theenemy; formed by several large trees, which had been felled so asto completely block up the road, presenting an obstacle of abouteight feet high to the attacking force.
The Afghan pickets lining the stockade poured a volley into theGhoorkas who, led by Major Fitzhugh and Captain Cook, made a rushat the place. For a few minutes there was a fierce fight at thetrees but, as fresh assailants momentarily poured up, theobstruction was scaled; and the Afghans retired on a secondstockade, eighty yards back. He
re another stand was made but, thespur being a little wider, the Ghoorkas were able to work roundand, taking the defense in flank, soon drove the Afghans back.Beyond this point the ground was clear of trees; and the road ran,in short zigzags, up the steep hill to the breastwork which linedthe edge of the top zigzag. A mountain gun, at this point, sweptthe approach to the position; while the hill at its back was nowcovered with Afghans, who opened a heavy fire upon the troops as,in the dim morning light, they issued from the trees.
By the time that the Ghoorkas and the Rangers had cleared thesecond stockade, the wing of the 72nd Highlanders--ascending by theright flank--had made their way up to the front; and the whole nowadvanced together. As quickly as possible they pushed up the hill,under the heavy fire of the enemy. The latter fought well, and anumber of them were killed before retiring. At the defense erectedat the top of the zigzag, so obstinately did the Afghans in fronthold their ground that their comrades, behind, were enabled toremove their mountain gun.
To the right of the enemy's position was a knoll, and the 72nd atonce took possession of this; and two mountain guns were brought upto their assistance. The Afghans were seen, in great numbers, inthe broken ground ahead. The Ghoorkas and the little body ofRangers pushed on against them. Presently the enemy gathered, andmade a rush down upon them; and a desperate hand-to-hand fight tookplace, for a few minutes. The men were scattered among the trees,and each fought for himself.
William Gale had just reloaded his rifle when he saw CaptainHerbert--who commanded his company--fall to the ground, and threeAfghans spring forward to finish him. With a bound, Will reachedthe side of the officer. Two of the Afghans had already dischargedtheir pieces. The third leveled and fired. So close was he that theflash almost burnt the soldier's face, and he felt a sharp pain, asif a hot iron had passed across his cheek. In an instant, he shothis assailant dead; and then, with bayonet, stood at bay as theother two Afghans rushed upon him.
Illustration: Captain Herbert saved.
They had drawn their tulwars, and slashed fiercely at him; but hekept them off with his bayonet until a Ghoorka, running up, cutdown one of them with his kookerie--a heavy, sword-like knife whichthe Ghoorkas carry, and which they always employ in preference tothe bayonet, in fighting at close quarters. The remaining Afghan atonce took to flight. The 29th Punjaubees had now come into action;and the Afghans, disheartened at the loss of their position, fellback and withdrew into the woods which cover the plateau.
At half-past seven o'clock the whole force--except the elephantguns--had reached the plateau; and General Roberts was able toflash the news, of the successful capture of the enemy's firstposition, to Brigadier General Cobbe, who was in command of theforce which was to operate direct against the Peiwar-Khotal. A restwas given the troops after their long march and, at half-past nine,they again fell in for the attack upon the pine-covered slopes inthe direction of the Peiwar-Khotal. How strong were the enemy whomight be lurking there, they knew not. But it was certain that hewould fight obstinately and, in so dense a forest, much of theadvantage gained by drill and discipline is lost.
A change was made in the order of the advance. The troops who hadbefore led the advance, and had done the fighting, were now placedin the rear; and the 23rd Pioneers led the way, followed by the 2ndand 29th Punjaubees. The column crossed the plateau withoutopposition, and began the ascent towards the enemy's position inthe woods. Considerable caution was needed, as no one had anyknowledge of the country, and all were ignorant of the position andnumbers of the enemy; who might, for aught they knew, be massing ingreat numbers for an attack upon the front, or one of the flanks.
The line of skirmishers entered the pine wood near the rockyhillside, and a rolling fire of musketry soon told that they wereengaged, from end to end of the line. It was slow work; for fallentrees, rocks, and bushes everywhere hampered the advance. Still theskirmishing line--reinforced from behind--pushed forward steadilyand, presently, cleared the Afghans off the hillside.
When the troops reached the top, they found a valley in front ofthem and, from the woods on the opposite side, so heavy a musketryfire was kept up that it was evident the Afghans intended to make adesperate stand here. The valley--or rather ravine--was a narrowone: fifty yards wide, at its foot; and scarce three times as much,from brow to brow. The enemy--hidden among the trees--could not bemade out, except by their continual fire. They did not contentthemselves, however, with the mere defense of their side of thehill but, from time to time, large numbers charged down, and triedto force their way up that held by the British. Each time, however,when they attempted this, the Punjaubees drove them back withslaughter.
It was clear that the Afghans were in great numbers, for their lineextended for a mile and a half along the hillside. Major Andersonof the 23rd Pioneers, after repulsing one of these attacks, ledfour companies to the assault of the Afghan position, and drove theenemy back for some little distance; but Major Anderson fell, andthe party retired. Colonel Curry--who commanded the regiment--againled the men forward and, for a time, a hand-to-hand fight tookplace. For two hours the rifle contest continued, withoutcessation. The storm of bullets was tremendous, but no very greatexecution was done, on either side, both parties lying behind theshelter of trees.
So far, no advantage had been gained by the British; and GeneralRoberts felt that, with the force under his command, it would berash to attempt to carry so strong a position, held by a greatlysuperior force.
In the meantime, the attack upon the Peiwar-Khotal from the valleyhad commenced. Before daylight Brigadier General Cobbe, with the5th Punjaub Infantry and the 8th Regiment, left camp; his objectbeing to cooperate with the flank attack. The 8th Regiment moveddirectly towards the pass, while the 5th Punjaubees climbed one ofthe principal spurs between the Peiwar and Spingawi Khotals.
The ascent was extremely difficult, and it took the troops sixhours to reach the summit. During the last portion of the ascent,they came under the fire of the enemy. When near the summit, MajorMacqueen of the 5th Punjaubees saw, through an opening in the pinewood, the Afghan camp, with their baggage animals; which wereplaced, for shelter, in the glade behind the Peiwar-Khotal. Twomountain guns were at once brought up, and a fire opened upon theAfghan camp. In a few minutes the tents caught fire, the animalsstampeded in all directions; and the enemy in front, seized with apanic, began rapidly to retreat.
The Afghan troops facing General Roberts' column, when they foundtheir comrades on their right retreating, began to draw off, andthe fire sensibly diminished. The movement was accelerated by thefour elephant guns--which had, at length, come up--opening fireinto the pine-wood forest. As the fire slackened, a reconnaissanceof the hill was made by General Roberts and his staff; but theresult showed that the mountain was so covered with pines, andbrushwood, that it formed an almost impenetrable barrier to theadvance of troops--for the growth was so thick that it wasimpossible to say in which direction any movement should be made.The experience gained, in the last six hours of hard fighting, hadshown how difficult it was to keep command over troops scatteredalong a front of half a mile long, in the forest, where nothingcould be seen beyond a radius of a few yards.
The general, therefore, determined to desist from the attempt toforce his way direct to the top of the Peiwar-Khotal; and to marchto his left and so, by menacing the Afghan line of retreat, tohasten the movement towards the rear which had evidently begun. Themen were, therefore, brought back to the plateau to the east of theravine. Here they were halted for a time, and the contents of theirhaversacks furnished them with a meal.
At two o'clock they again drew up on the Spingawi plateau. The 2ndPunjaub Infantry being left on the hill, to oppose the Afghans,should they again advance in that direction; the rest of the columnentered the defile leading into the Hurriab valley, far in the rearof the Peiwar-Khotal. As soon as the enemy--who were still opposingthe 2nd Punjaub Infantry--saw the head of the column enter thedefile, they were seized with a panic lest their retreat should becut off; and began to retre
at with the greatest haste, as they hadto make their way across two mountain ridges, before they couldpass the spot towards which our troops were moving. The advance ofthe column, however, was necessarily slow; as the woods and sidevalleys had to be carefully examined, lest a flank attack should bemade upon them.
In two hours the head of the column emerged from the forest on tothe open slopes above the highest cultivated point in the Hurriabvalley. It was now four o'clock. The short December day was drawingto a close. No enemy were in sight, for their line of retreat washidden in the bed of the stream, a couple of miles further on; andno one knew where they were to be found. The troops were muchexhausted with the want of rest, and with their heavy work--forthey had now been marching, and fighting, for eighteen hours--andthey were glad to receive the order to bivouac; although they hadno tents, or food, and the cold--as might be expected on a winterday, at an elevation of over 9000 feet above the sea--began to bevery severe.
A number of the nearest trees were felled by the pioneers, and hugefires were soon alight. There was still some uneasiness, as no oneknew where the force under General Cobbe was, or whether the attackon the Peiwar-Khotal had been successful or not.
While the 5th Punjaub Infantry had been mounting the spur, halfwaybetween the Peiwar and the Spingawi Khotal, the 8th Regiment hadmoved directly upon the pass. The Afghans, who had expected anattack, had remained under arms until three in the morning when,hearing no sounds in our camp, they had been dismissed to rest.
Three guns of the Royal Artillery, and two of the Royal HorseArtillery took up their post 800 yards in front of our camp; wheretheir fire, at the crest of the pass, would assist the advance ofthe 8th. These, after two hours' march, found themselves at sevenin the morning on the last spur, which is separated from thePeiwar-Khotal by a deep ravine. When it became daylight, a fewminutes later, the enemy caught sight of our artillery in thevalley, and at once opened fire. Although they had six field piecesat the top of the hill, only three had been placed in position tocommand the valley and the ascent; and the mountain battery, whichhad arrived the afternoon before, was not brought to the front.
The three field pieces, and the mountain gun on the spur kept up acontinuous fire on our battery, of five guns. These were, however,almost beyond their range, and but little damage was done. On ourside, the fire was chiefly directed against the mountain gun, atthe end of the spur; and at any bodies of men who showedthemselves. The artillery duel went on for four hours and, in themeantime, the infantry were engaged sharply with the Afghans. Thesehad taken up their position in the woods, on the other side of theravine; and kept up a continuous fire upon the 8th. The distance,however, was too great for much execution on either side,especially as both parties were sheltered in the woods.
About ten o'clock the Afghans were seen gathering in strength, asif to come down across the road leading up to the Khotal, to attackthe 8th in the rear. A squadron of the 18th Bengal Cavalry chargedup the valley, and the enemy retired up the hill again and, seeingthat they could not cross the road, without the chance of being cutup by the cavalry, they did not try to repeat the experiment.
At eleven o'clock Brigadier General Cobbe was wounded in the leg,and Colonel Barry-Drew succeeded him in the command; receiving theorders which had been given to General Cobbe--that the Khotal wasnot to be attacked, till there was some evidence that the flankattack had shaken the enemy's defense, in front.
At twelve o'clock the guns, with the 2nd Punjaub Infantry, alarmedthe Afghans by their fire upon the camp and, although the Afghanguns in front kept up their fire, the musketry fire decreasedconsiderably. Seeing this, Colonel Drew ordered the artillery to bebrought up nearer. When--after advancing 300 yards--they came to aravine crossing the road, the Afghans--who had come down the hillto meet them--opened a heavy fire and, the road being narrow, onlythe leading gun could come into action. However, the two companiesof the 8th--which were acting as an escort to the guns--advanced inskirmishing order, and drove the Afghans up the hill.
The panic among the Afghans on the plateau having now spread to thetroops at the Khotal, their fire entirely ceased; and the 8thRegiment descended the defile, and began to climb the path to theKhotal. Not a hostile shot was fired and, at half-past two, theyreached the enemy's camp, which they found deserted.