by G. A. Henty
Chapter 12: The Advance Up The Khyber.
Nothing has yet been said of the doings of the other columns: thatunder General Browne advancing, by the Khyber Pass, uponJellalabad; that under General Stewart, by the Bolan Pass, uponCandahar.
General Browne's force had been gathered at the frontier line, atthe mouth of the pass, awaiting the reply of the Ameer to theBritish ultimatum. None having been received, up to the night ofthe 20th of November, the advance took place in the morning; at thesame hour at which General Roberts advanced from Thull in theKhurum valley.
The principal defense of the Khyber Pass was the fort Ali-Musjid.This fort stands on a most commanding position, on a rock juttingout from the hillside far into the valley, which its gunscommanded. It was flanked by batteries erected on the hillsides,and was a most formidable position to capture. It was situatedabout six miles up the valley.
The force under General Browne was divided into four brigades. Thefirst--under General Macpherson--consisted of the 4th battalion ofthe Rifle Brigade, the 20th Bengal Infantry, the 4th Ghoorkas, anda mountain battery. These were ordered to take a mountain roadand--led by a native guide--to make a long circuit, and so to comedown into the pass at a village lying a mile or two beyondAli-Musjid.
The second brigade--under Colonel Tytler--consisting of the 1stbattalion of the 17th Foot, the infantry of the Guides, the 1stSikhs, and a mountain battery, were also to take to the hills and,working along on their crests, to come down upon the batterieswhich the Afghans had erected on the hillside opposite toAli-Musjid.
The third brigade, consisting of the 81st Regiment, the 14th Sikhs,and the 24th Native Infantry; and the fourth brigade, composed ofthe 51st Regiment, 6th Native Infantry, and the 45th Sikhs, were toadvance straight up the valley. With them was a mountain battery, abattery of Horse Artillery, one of Royal Artillery, and a batteryof 40-pounders, drawn by elephants.
These brigades marched forward until they reached some risingground in the valley, whence they could see Ali-Musjid, at adistance of a mile and a half, in front of them. The enemy at onceopened fire. The gunners in the fort had been practising for someweeks, and had got the range with great accuracy; and their shotand shell fell thick along the slope. The column was thereforemarched back behind its crest, and there halted; and the men wereallowed to fall out and eat their dinners, as it was desired thatthe flanking columns of Macpherson and Tytler--which had very muchfurther to go--should reach the positions assigned to them beforethe attack began.
The artillery, however, took up their position on the crest, andopened fire on the fort. The effect of the light guns was butslight, but the 40-pounders produced considerable effect on theface of the fort.
After a halt for some time, the troops were ordered to advance. The45th Sikhs were first thrown out upon the hillside and, workingtheir way along on the right of the valley, opened a heavy musketryfire against the Afghans in the batteries there. Presently the 51stand 6th Native Infantry joined them; while the 81st, the 24th, and14th Sikhs worked along on the left.
The scene was one of the most picturesque ever witnessed inwarfare. From the fortress, standing on the perpendicular rock inthe center of the valley, the flashes of the great guns came fastand steadily; while the edges of the rock, and fort, were fringedwith tiny puffs of musketry. From the rising ground in the valley,the smoke of the British guns rose up in the still air as, steadilyand fast, they replied to the fire of the fort. Both sides of thesteep hill slopes were lined with British infantry--the quick flashof the rifles spurting out from every rock and bush; whilecontinuous lines of light smoke rose from the Afghan entrenchmentswhich faced them.
Gradually the British skirmishers advanced, until they were closeto the Afghan entrenchments on the hillsides abreast of the fort.So far, there was no sign that Macpherson's brigade had reached thepost assigned to it, high up on the hill; or that Tytler had workedround to the village in the enemy's rear. Some attacks which weremade upon the Afghans were repulsed, with loss. Major Birch andLieutenant Fitzgerald were killed, and Captain Maclean wounded; andbetween thirty and forty of the rank and file were killed, orwounded. As the fort and its defenses could not have been carriedby direct attack, without immense loss of life; it was determinedto cease operations until morning, in order to give the flankingcolumns time to reach the positions assigned to them. A wing of aregiment, from each brigade, was ordered to remain on the hillsidefacing the Afghan entrenchments. The rest of the troops fell back ashort distance, and lay down as they were, for the night.
In the meantime, the brigades of Macpherson and Tytler hadencountered enormous difficulties on the line of march. The roadsthey had taken were mere tracks, and there were many places whereit was almost impossible to get the mountain guns along. Fromdaybreak until late at night the troops labored, unceasingly. Theyknew, by the dull roar echoed and re-echoed among the mountains,that their comrades below were engaged; and the thought that afailure might ensue, owing to their absence from the contest,nerved them to continued exertions.
Late at night, however, Macpherson with his brigade arrived on thetop of the hill facing Ali-Musjid; and Tytler, with his column,came down into the Khyber valley in rear of the fort. But, thoughunopposed, their march had not been unnoticed and, late in theevening, the news reached the Afghans that the British weremarching down into the valley behind them. A wild panic instantlyseized them. Clothes, ammunition, guns, everything that couldimpede their flight were thrown away; and the garrison ofAli-Musjid, and the Afghans in the hillside entrenchments fled, aherd of frightened fugitives, up the valley. Hasty as was theirretreat, they were not in time. Tytler, with his column, debouchedinto the valley before they had passed the spot where the mountainpath descended into it; and large numbers were taken prisoners.
As at the Peiwar-Khotal, the Afghans proved themselves capable ofdefending a strong position, valiantly; but were converted into amob of panic-stricken fugitives, by their line of retreat beingthreatened. A European army, under like circumstances, would havefallen back in good order. Their force was amply sufficient to haveswept aside the little column which barred their retreat, and theywould have occupied a fresh position farther to the rear, andrenewed the conflict. Not so the Afghans. The capture of Ali-Musjidbrought with it the entire demoralization of the Afghan army which,a few hours before, had been fully confident in its power torepulse any attack which might be made upon it.
The British continued their advance, passed through the KhyberPass, and entered the broad valley near whose head stands the townof Jellalabad. Beyond a few shots, fired at them by tribesmen highup on the mountain side, they experienced no opposition, whateverand, a week after the fight in the Khyber, entered Jellalabad andencamped around it.
Further than this it was not intended to go, for the present.Winter was now close at hand. Between Jellalabad and Cabul were aseries of most difficult passes. An army advancing up them wouldhave immense difficulty to encounter, and might find itself cut offfrom India by the snows. In the Jellalabad valley the weather ismild, large stores of provisions were obtainable, and here it wasdetermined to remain, through the winter; and to recommence thecampaign, in the spring, with the advantage of the Khyber Pass--oneof the keys of Afghanistan--being in our hands.
But a day or two after reaching Jellalabad--having defeated anddispersed one of the two Afghan armies--the news arrived of thecapture of the Peiwar-Khotal--the second key of Afghanistan--andthe utter rout of the army defending it. Thus, in little more thana week after the commencement of the campaign Sheer-Ali, the Ameer,saw the entire overthrow of the army which he had, for so manyyears, been occupied in organizing and training. The positionswhich he had deemed impregnable had both been taken, after a singleday's fighting; and his capital lay virtually at the mercy of hisconquerors. In one short week, his hopes and plans had beenscattered to the winds.
Sheer-Ali was not wholly to be blamed. He had for many yearsreceived an annual present of money and arms, from the Britishgovernment; but upon the other han
d, he saw Russia marching withgiant steps towards his northern frontier and, contrasting theenergy and enterprise of the great northern power, with theinactivity which he may have supposed to prevail among the men whogoverned England, he became more and more anxious; and asked theEnglish definitely to state whether he could rely upon them forassistance, should he be attacked by the Russians.
He received a reply from the Duke of Argyle--the British ministerfor India--of a doubtful nature, couched in terms which seem tohave aroused his resentment. From this moment, there can be nodoubt that the Ameer's course was decided upon. He was between thehammer and the anvil and, as he could obtain no guarantee ofassistance from England, he determined to throw himself into thearms of Russia.
Letters were exchanged between him and General Kaufmann--theRussian viceroy in Turkestan--and the latter gave him the warmestpromises of support, if he would ally himself with Russia. Althoughhe had, for years, declined to accept a British resident at Cabul,or to allow Englishmen to enter the country; he now, believing inthe power and willingness of Russia to help, received the visit ofa Russian general and staff, at Cabul.
Unfortunately for the Ameer, the government of England had nowchanged hands; and the ministry at once sent to Sheer-Ali, todemand that he should receive a British resident. It was late inthe year, and the Ameer--acting, no doubt, on the advice of hisRussian friends--sought to gain time by evasive answers. TheBritish government--who saw through the ruse--ordered the envoy toadvance, with a strong escort. This obliged the Ameer to come to afinal decision; and the die was cast by the escort being stopped,by force, on its arrival at Ali-Musjid.
There is no doubt that the Ameer, and his friends, calculated thatit was already too late in the season for the English to gather asufficient force, on the frontier, to force the passes held by theAfghan army before the snows. The promptness of action of theEnglish government, the valor of their troops, and the unusuallylate setting in of the winter combined to overthrow the Ameer'splans. Had the campaign been delayed till the spring, there can belittle doubt that the British, in their advance, would have foundthemselves opposed--if not by a Russian army--at least by an armyled and officered by Russians, with Russian engineers andartillerymen. The promptness of their advance, and the capture ofthe passes and the dispersion of the Afghan armies, within a weekof the opening of the campaign, altogether altered this position.
Sheer-Ali found himself a king without an army. The plains of Cabulwere thronged with the panic-stricken fugitives from the Khyber andPeiwar; and Sheer-Ali started at night from his capital with hisRussian friends, and made for the north; sending letter afterletter ahead of him to General Kaufmann, imploring the promised aidof Russia. The rapid course of events, however, had entirelydisconcerted the Russian plans.
In the spring, a Russian army might have advanced and cooperatedwith that of the Ameer; but the winter had set in, the distance wasimmense, and the Russians unprepared for instant action. Theappeals of the unfortunate prince were responded to with vaguegeneralities. He was no longer a powerful ally, but a brokeninstrument and, heartbroken with disappointment and failure, theunfortunate Sheer-Ali was seized by fever and died, in an obscurevillage, almost alone and wholly uncared for.
His son Yakoob Khan--who had, in his youth, proved himself a braveand able soldier; but who, having incurred his father'sdispleasure, had been for years confined as a prisoner atHerat--was now liberated, and took his place as his father'ssuccessor. He saw at once that, with a broken and disorganizedarmy, he could not hope to resist the advance of the three Britisharmies which, coming from Jellalabad, from the heights of theShatur-Gardan, and from Candahar, would simultaneously advance uponhis capital, as soon as the snows melted. He therefore openednegotiations and, early in May, himself descended from Cabul andhad an interview with General Browne, at Gundamuk; when thepreliminaries of peace were arranged, and signed.
The terms insisted upon by the British were not onerous. Yakoob wasrecognized as the Ameer of Afghanistan, the annual subsidy paid tohis father was to be continued. The Khyber Pass and the Khurumvalley, as far as the Peiwar-Khotal, were to remain in the hands ofthe British; and a British minister was to be stationed at Cabul.When peace had been signed, the greater portion of the British armyretired to India; and the Khurum column, leaving two or threeregiments in that valley, also fell back.
While the first and second divisions had been gaining victories inthe Khyber and Khurum valleys, the column under General Stewart hadmet with difficulties of another kind. Between the Indus, and thefoot of the range of mountains through which the Bolan Pass leadsto the lofty plateau land above, a great waste of sand stretches.In the wet season, this tract of country is overflowed by theIndus. In the dry season it is a parched and bare desert, with itswells few and far apart. There were great difficulties met with incrossing this inhospitable plain, and the losses among the baggageanimals were great; but the labors up to this point were asnothing, to those which had to be undergone on the way up the BolanPass.
This pass--whose ascent occupies three days--is in fact the merebed of a stream, covered deeply with boulders and stones of allsizes, in which the baggage and artillery horses sank fetlock deep.The difficulties encountered were enormous, and vast numbers ofcamels, horses, and bullocks died by the way. Even with a doublecomplement of horses, it was almost impossible to drag the guns upthe deep, shingly pass; and great delays were experienced, beforethe force intended for operations against Candahar were assembled,at Quettah. So far, the advance had taken place through Britishterritory, as Quettah has long been occupied by us.
When the advance began, it was rapid. No opposition was experiencedby the way, until the column arrived within a few hours' march ofCandahar; and then the enemy's attack was feeble, and easilyrepulsed. On the 9th of January, General Stewart entered the city.
Candahar, though not the capital, is the chief town of Afghanistan.It stands in a slightly undulating plain; and was, at one time, acity of great importance and wealth. Its position is the mostimportant in Afghanistan. It bars the road to an enemy advancingfrom the north, through Herat; and threatens the flank and rear ofone advancing against India, through Cabul. The country around isextremely fertile and, were irrigation properly used, and a railwayconstructed to India, Candahar and the surrounding country wouldagain become one of the gardens of the world.
The authorities of the city made their submission, as the columnapproached it, and the army settled down to quiet occupation;broken only by isolated attacks, upon individual soldiers, byfanatical Ghazis. When peace was concluded, one of the conditionsdistinctly insisted upon by the British general, and agreed to bythe Ameer, was that Candahar should remain in our possession. Thealleged advantage thus gained, and the territory thus acquired,were afterwards abandoned by the British government succeeding thatwhich had so vigorously carried out the war.
The occupation of Candahar by the British had been insisted on, atfirst, on the ground that, if Russia should make an advance againstIndia, the British nation would have ample cause to rue the cessionof Candahar; for it was declared that with this city stronglyfortified, and surrounded by outlying works, 10,000 British troopsthere could arrest the progress of an invading army, however large,until England had had full time to put forth all her strength, andto assemble an army amply sufficient to secure the safety of themost valuable of our possessions--the empire of India.
It was said that, whatever allies Russia might have prepared forherself, by intrigues among the princes of India, these would notthink of moving, so long as they knew that the fortress of Candaharremained as a British bulwark against an invading force. It wasrepresented that, so long as this place held out, England would beable to devote her whole force towards repelling the foreigninvader--instead of being obliged, simultaneously, to oppose himand to put down a formidable rising in India, itself.
It was, however, not the universal opinion that the best policy ofEngland was to occupy this territory by an armed force; andsubsequent events, with th
e change of government in England, led toa different determination.