Though accurate up to 300 yards, the rifles were slow to reload and were not designed to hold bayonets, which meant that riflemen were vulnerable to swift attacks by light infantry or dragoons. Washington's instructions to Morgan included a desperate remedy for this deficiency: “I have sent for Spears, which I expect shortly to receive and deliver to you, as a defence against Horse; till you are furnished with these, take care not to be caught in such a Situation as to give them any advantage over you.” To add a further element of surprise, Washington suggested an extraordinary tactic: “It occurs to me that if you were to dress a Company or two of true Woods Men in the right Indian Style and let them make the Attack accompanied with screaming and yelling as the Indians do, it would have very good consequences especially if as little as possible was said, or known of the matter beforehand.”103
Concerning the use of rifles among regular troops, Anthony Wayne wrote to Richard Peters, chairman of the Pennsylvania Board of War, with a request for “two hundred Stand of Arms, i.e., Muskets & Bayonets, to be exchanged for an Equal number of Rifles—which his Excellency wishes to lay Entirely aside except those in the Hands of a Corps of that Marks men under Col. Morgan who were lately Draughted & are to be Armed with Spears in place of Bayonets—without which a Rifle would not be formidable.”104 Wayne, commanding a brigade of Pennsylvania regiments that included many frontiersmen armed with rifles, had little use for the weapons or frontier dress. He firmly believed that smartly uniformed and properly trained infantry armed with muskets and bayonets were a much more formidable opponent than scruffy, undisciplined frontiersmen with their slow-loading rifles and drab, shabby, homespun clothing. “Experience has taught us that they are not fit for the field,” he told the Pennsylvania Board of War about the rifles. “I am Confident…that you will use every means in your power to expedite the Arming & Clothing of our People as Soldiers.”105
The following day, June 14, the action was confined to skirmishing near Hillsborough on the Millstone River. Almost unbelievably, the Royal Army had halted and established camp. “Their conduct was perplexing,” Gen. Henry Knox, chief of the Continental Artillery, commented incredulously. “It was unaccountable that people who the day before gave out in very gasconading terms that they would be in Philadelphia in six days should stop short when they had gone only nine miles.” The purpose of the maneuver gradually became clear: “In the course of a day or two [we] discovered that they…had come out with an intention of drawing us into the plain.”106
In the British Army, Maj. Charles Stuart of the 43rd Regiment was also astonished but not surprised by Howe's strange maneuver. To him, it seemed consistent with the inept pattern of command. The twenty-four-year-old son of the influential and much-hated Tory minister John Stuart Lord Bute, the major had been sent to Rhode Island several months earlier to command a grenadier battalion, only to have Howe recall his unit to New York without him. Humiliated by this public demotion, which he believed was done out of spite for political reasons, Stuart exchanged several sharp letters with Howe and asked permission to go to England, which was refused. The major returned to New York in the spring with no command and accompanied the army from New Brunswick as an observer.
Now, as the campaign was opening, Stuart told his father, “The report circulated by those in power is that it was thought necessary to march to Hilsborough to offer Washington battle.” He, too, was dumbfounded, believing that “the idea of offering these people battle is ridiculous; they have too much caution to risk everything on one action, or rather too much sense to engage an army double their numbers, superior in discipline, and who never make a show of fighting but upon the most advantageous ground. If we wish to conquer them we must attack him.”107
News of Howe's advance to the Millstone River arrived in Philadelphia late on the fourteenth. “Yesterday We had an Alarm, and news that the Enemy were on their March, towards Philadelphia in two Divisions,” John Adams told Abigail. “We feel pretty bold, here,” he reassured her and quipped, “If they get Philadelphia, they will hang a Mill stone about their necks.”108
As Howe's army set up camp in new territory, an old problem resurfaced. “Great symptoms of a disposition to plunder being perceived in the Troops,” Grey's aide, Captain André, wrote on June 15. “The Commander-in-chief sent a message to General De Heister desiring him to warn the Hessians not to persist in such outrages, as they would be most severely punished.” André also mentioned that “most of the Brigades received the same injunctions from the Officers commanding them.”109
Some skirmishing involving the Jägers took place, but not much else. The following day, copious amounts of dirt flew as the British began to build entrenchments. Howe's chief engineer, Capt. John Montrésor, directed the construction of three sizable redoubts, or earthen forts—not the sort of activity conducive to a swift-moving campaign. Once again, criticism of Howe's lethargic leadership began to mount. “Many blame General Howe for not having followed Washington immediately,” von Münchhausen wrote. Defending his commander, he emphasized, “Nobody in the world could be more careful than he is. This is absolutely necessary in this cursed hilly country.”
The opening maneuvers of the campaign, June 13–18, 1777. The Crown Forces left New Brunswick on June 13 and marched ten miles west to Middlebush. There they build three redoubts, shown here on André's map, and skirmished with Washington's light troops. After five days of skirmishing and plundering, they returned to New Brunswick.
The rebels were firmly ensconced in the Watchung Mountains. “Washington is a devil of a fellow, he is back again, right in his old position, in the high fortified hills,” the Hessian aide remarked. “By retreating he supposedly intended to lure us into the hills and beat us there.”110 Von Münchhausen was correct. “When the Enemy first advanced, General Sullivan Retreated over [the] Delaware, in order to Draw the Enemy on towards Princetown, and then we would have fallen in their Rear,” Colonel Chambers of the 1st Pennsylvania explained, “but they thought it not Safe to Leave so formidable an Enemy in their Rear, Least they should find Difficulty in case of a Retreat.” The Pennsylvanian added, “It seems to me they see his Scheme, and Will not Go that Way, for if they do their Ruin, to all appearances, is inevitable.”111
“Hints from head-quarters, that his Excellency, ever attentive to the sparing of his Gallant Troops, could not bear the idea of risking two or three thousand brave men to be sacrificed by ‘base scum, and dunghill villains,’” a New York Loyalist complained with bitter sarcasm. Frustrated, he scribbled to a friend in England, “Rebellion, which a twelvemonth ago was really a contemptible Pigmy, is now in appearance become a Giant.”112
The mood of the people of New Jersey turned vengeful as plundering once more erupted unchecked. Volunteer militia appeared by the hundreds, eager for a chance to shoot British redcoats and Hessian “brass caps.” “Nothing could exceed the spirit shown on this occasion by the much injured people of the Jerseys,” Gen. Henry Knox wrote, cheering the turnout. “Not an atom of the lethargic spirit that possessed them last winter—all fire, all revenge.”113 Joseph Clark of New Jersey, the adjutant of Stephen's Division, commented in his diary that the British seemed headed for Philadelphia. “This rouz'd the militia of all the neighbouring Counties, & they turn'd out with such a Spirit as will do them honour to the latest ages. Never did the Jersies appear more universally unanimous to oppose the enemy,” he noted with enthusiasm. “They turn'd out young & old great & small, Rich & poor Scarcely a man that cou'd cary a musket was left at home…. [The enemy] could scarcely stir from their camp but they were cut off.”114
In the same vein, “The Jersey Militia have turned out, with great Spirit,” John Adams proudly informed Abigail. “Magistrates and Subjects, Clergy and Laity, have all marched, like so many Yankees.”115
Lt. Col. Persifor Frazer of the 5th Pennsylvania Regiment, part of Wayne's 1st Pennsylvania Brigade, watched the maneuvers from the camp at Mount Pleasant. “The intent of their movement was to procu
re forage and in case we should move to attack,” he explained to his wife, Polly, “that they might take possession of the Ground we occupy, which is naturally very strong; a river on each wing of their army, and a large deep swamp in their Front; so that an attempt to attack them would be very imprudent.” Frazer went on to say that “a number of Rifle Men and two or three regts. were Sent off and kept them employ'd Saturday and Sunday. The enemy fired a vast deal, and all the Execution they did was to kill One Man and wound another. We have taken several Prisoners, a great Number of deserters have come Over to Us lately.” He reassured Polly, “In a very short time you may expect to hear of a General attack; as We shall be greatly reinforced.”
“The General has the entire confidence of the army,” Percy Frazer declared, “and if God will but smile upon us every thing within human foresight appears encouraging.” Believing that this would be a decisive encounter, he was proud to say, “Our regiment with several others of our State have the Post of Honor in the Front at the Gap of the Hills; the remainder of the army are encamp'd behind us. I am clearly of Opinion a very Short time will decide the Controversy…. One grand exertion will certainly put a finishing stroke to the dispute, and then peace and Happiness will ensue if We have Virtue enough to accept the desirable guests.”116
By June 18, day five of the Campaign, Howe's force had moved less than ten miles, skirmished, encamped, foraged, plundered, built three redoubts, plundered, skirmished, plundered some more, and was no closer to Philadelphia. “We are under no more Apprehensions here than if the British Army was in the Crimea,” John Adams wrote from the city that day. Regarding Washington's leadership, he wryly commented, “Our Fabius will be slow, but sure.”117
Also from Philadelphia on the eighteenth, Dr. Benjamin Rush told Anthony Wayne, “The Accounts we receive daily of the Strength, discipline, and Spirit of our Army give us great pleasure. I need not add, that we expect [to] hear that the Pensylvanians will show us the ‘metal of their pasture’ in the day of tryal.” With some provincial pride, Rush added, “Let not Virginia bear away from us the palm of Military glory. I am sure our men are made of as good Stuff for soldiers and officers as any men on the continent.” He concluded, “As for yourself my dear friend—may you be glutted with well earned fame,” adding a friendly needle at Wayne's well-known vanity, “‘for if it be a Sin to covet honor,’ I am sure ‘you are the most offending Man alive.’ God bless you.”118
Incredibly, this force of some of Europe's finest troops—part of the largest overseas expedition mounted by the British Empire up to that time—found itself surrounded and almost cut off from its main base by small, determined bands of militia, frontiersmen, and Continental regulars, few of whom were regarded as real soldiers by European standards. Here was the genesis of the new United States Army, conceived in desperation just before Princeton, born in conflict, now nurtured in vengeance. Within the year, it would be baptized by fire at Brandywine, grow through hard experience at Germantown, and come to maturity at Valley Forge. If Washington can be described as the army's father, Howe might aptly be described as its nanny.
In the midst of all the plundering, skirmishes, and ennui, an episode of “heroics” occurred that served to lighten the moment. Col. Timothy Pickering of Massachusetts, a thirty-two-year-old Harvard graduate, was Washington's newly appointed adjutant general and had just arrived at headquarters to take up his duties. On June 18, his first full day on the job, he noted that “two lieutenants of grenadiers, taken by the Jersey militia, were brought to head-quarters, and twelve privates were taken the same day.”119 The taking of prisoners was usually unremarkable, even the capture of low-ranking officers. But in this case, the plot was thicker than the mere capture of two British officers, as the trail of comments through both armies reveals. Howe's deputy adjutant general, Col. Stephen Kemble, wrote, “We lost about half a dozen men, and two Lieuts. of 55th Grenadiers, supposed Prisoners, as they were known to have had an Intrigue in that Quarter.”120 The details of the “intrigue” were revealed in Captain von Münchhausen's diary: “Something very unpleasant happened, which made General Howe very angry…. Two well-behaved young English grenadier lieutenants went about 50 paces beyond our pickets to see two sisters whom they knew during the last campaign, when we held most of Jersey. A third sister, supposedly because she was jealous, sneaked away and brought back a detachment of rebels, who made these two sons of Mars their prisoners.”121
The episode was noteworthy as a warning to all officers; years later, in his Treatise on Partisan Warfare, Capt. Johann Ewald referred to the two hapless “sons of Mars” (on a mission to Venus!) in a chapter titled, aptly enough, “On Ambushes”: “Officers will also fall into your hands now and then, among whom there are always some who, despite the strictest prohibition, will risk everything to look for a girl…. This way two English officers were caught in the…camp near Millstone.”122
Then, without warning, after all the “gasconading” and maneuvering, “at daybreak on June 19 the English army marched back to the heights of New Brunswick,” Ewald reported. “On this march all the plantations of the disloyal inhabitants, numbering perhaps some fifty persons, were sacrificed to fire and devastation.”123 Some minor skirmishing and much marauding took place on the return march. “General Howe decamped with the greatest precipitation from Millstone, and retired to Brunswick, his troops burning seven or eight houses on their way, and having plundered all the houses where they had been,” Col. Timothy Pickering wrote. “Extreme caution marked the whole of Howe's conduct.”124 The royal forces marched “without beat of drum or sound of fife,” General Knox noted. “When his army had gotten beyond the reach of pursuit, they began to burn, plunder and waste all before them. The desolation they committed was horrid, and served to show the malice which marks their conduct.”125
“The Enemy notwithstanding their great Threats and preparations have return'd again to Brunswick,” Colonel Frazer wrote home. “We have constant parties attacking them,” he noted, observing, “They are very much afraid of Us, every Motion shews it, their Cannon are constantly brought up if but ten men attack them.” In horror and disgust, he told Polly, “They have in many instances behav'd very cruel to the Inhabitants where they pass'd. A respectable woman they Hung by the Heels so long that when they took her down she liv'd but a few Minutes. Plunder and Cruelty Mark their steps where there is scarce a soul but Tories.”126
This odd maneuver succeeded in baffling many people. “We traced out 4 redoubts at Middlebrook [Middlebush], and one to cover the Bridge at Hilsborough, most of which were nearly finish'd, when, to our astonishment, we received orders to retire to Brunswick,” Major Stuart informed his father, Lord Bute. “I am convinced that, from the redoubts built…and the pontoon bridge we incumbered ourselves with, we intended to establish a magazine there, and pursue our way to the Delaware…[but did not] for the fear of our escorts being attacked bringing provisions from Brunswick.” Stuart went on to point out, “The risk which all armies are liable to was our hindrance here, and has absolutely prevented us this whole war from going 15 miles from a navigable river.”127 Of Howe's tactics, “What reason he cou'd have for making this strange march into the Jersies I cannot conceive,” the major told his father. “Indecision alone can be an excuse for it.”128
It seems inconceivable that the purpose of the march was to move thousands of troops and tons of equipment ten miles, build three large forts, and then abandon them. It is harder to believe that Washington's force was so formidable that Howe felt his army to be in mortal danger. And it is incomprehensible that a commander would allow his supposedly disciplined forces to commit the sort of marauding guaranteed to do nothing but further infuriate the population, rouse armed opposition, and provide factual basis for enemy propaganda. Yet this is what occurred in mid-June 1777 in East Jersey.
It was all part of the campaign plan, according to Gen. James Grant, and there never was any British intention of marching to the Delaware. “As Washington h
ad it still in his power to cross the Delawar at Easton or Alexandria, it became evident that moving to Flemington, Prince Town, Trenton or Penington would not have the desired Effect of drawing the Rebells from their fastnesses,” he told General Harvey in England. “Remaining longer in the Jerseys could of course answer no good End, as we did not intend to pass the Delawar in Boats,” even though boats were constructed in New York at great expense and brought along with much trouble. “It was therefore thought expedient to return the 19th to Brunswick & to proceed from thence on the more important operations of the Campaign.”129
In Philadelphia, the news that Howe's forces had “skulked back to Brunswick” was devastating to the Loyalists. “The Tories in this Town seem to be in absolute Despair,” John Adams gleefully reported. “Chopfallen, in a most remarkable Manner,” he added. “The Quakers begin to say they are not Tories—that their Principle of passive Obedience will not allow them to be Whiggs, but that they are as far from being Tories as the Presbyterians.”130
What was next? On June 20, a bright, clear day, Nicholas Cresswell left New York City by sloop and headed for New Brunswick to see the British Army in the field. After passing through the Narrows at the mouth of New York Harbor and turning west into Princess Bay, “We were entertained with one of the most pleasing and delightful scenes I ever saw before. Four hundred sail of ships, brigs, schooners and sloops with five sail of the Line [large warships] all under-way and upon a Wind at once, in the compass of two miles.” He was witnessing the beginning of the next phase of the campaign: “They are all bound to Perth Amboy, it is said, to take the Troops on board.”131
Two days later, on June 22, the Crown Forces evacuated Brunswick and marched eastward to Amboy, where the transport ships awaited them. “The Retreat of our Troops from Jersey will give the Rebels great Encouragement, and strengthen their cause much,” a puzzled and anxious Stephen Kemble wrote from headquarters in New York. He quickly added, on a hopeful note, “But [I] have that Confidence in our General as to think his measures right, for few can know his Reasons and judge of the propriety of the Steps he has taken.”132
The Philadelphia Campaign Page 6