“The General fire of the Line Lasted an hour & forty minutes,” Sullivan recounted, “fifty one minutes of which the Hill was Disputed almost Muzzle to Muzzle in Such a manner that General Conway who has Seen much Service Says he never Saw So Close & Severe a fire.” At Sandy Hollow, “on the Right where General Stephen was,” facing the Jägers and British light infantry, Sullivan said, “it was Long & Severe & on the Left Considerable—when we found the Right & Left oppressed by Numbers & giving way in all Quarters we were oblidged to Abandon the Hill we had So Long contended for,” significantly adding, “but not till we had almost Covered the Ground between that & Bremingham meeting House with The Dead Bodies of the Enemy.”225
Here again, a combination of actual British casualties, together with the British light infantry repeatedly dropping to the ground and holding firm, plus poor visibility as a result of the terrain, heavy smoke, clouds of dust, and sun glare—as by now the sun was making its protracted descent in the western sky, shining through the battle haze into the faces of the American forces—all contributed to the perception that British casualties were covering the ground. In the woods, late-afternoon sunlight streaming through full-leaf foliage and white smoke casts everchanging beams and shafts of light as well as lengthening shadows. Because of this, together with the stress and mayhem of combat, visual distortion is a common feature of warfare and was one of the main reasons for the colorful uniforms and large battle flags of the period.
As the American line broke, General Howe, who had been observing the initial advance from Osborne's Hill, moved forward with his staff. Emmor Jefferis, a local farmer who owned the farm west of the Brandywine at Jefferis's Ford, “was compelled to guide the British Army towards Birmingham Meeting” earlier in the afternoon. “After the retreat commenced, Howe moved on after the army, taking Mr. Jefferis some distance with him.” As they came near the fighting, “the bullets from the Americans whistled so sharply by him, that he could not refrain from dodging his head, as they passed.” The terror exhibited by this middle-age Quaker countryman was so amusing that, “Sir William observing, called out very encouragingly—‘Don't be afraid Mr. Jefferis, they wont hurt you.’ Mr. J. however, took the earliest opportunity to quit the scene, and return home.”226
“As usual, the General exposed himself fearlessly on this occasion,” von Münchhausen noted with admiration. “He quickly rushed to each spot where he heard the strongest fire. Cannon balls and bullets passed close to him in numbers today.” An old light infantryman himself, Howe's personal bravery under fire was, like Washington's, extraordinary, sometimes even foolhardy. “We all fear that, since he is so daring on any and all occasions,” the Hessian aide commented apprehensively, “we are going to lose our best friend, and that England will lose America.”227
But the battle was far from over. “At half after four O'Clock, the Enemy attacked Genl Sullivan, and the Action has been very violent ever since,” Washington told Congress at 5 P.M. “It still continues.” He informed John Hancock that at Chads's Ford, “there has been a Scattering loose fire between our parties on each side of the Creek, since the Action in the Morning, which just now became warm,” and “a very severe Cannonade has begun here too.” The intensity of the gunfire was such that he was moved to say, “I suppose we shall have a very hot Evening.”228 It proved to be one of the hottest evenings of the war.
“We remained in presence of the whole Rebell Army from Nine in the morning till after four in the afternoon,” Grant wrote about the day at Chads's Ford, with “constant skirmishing or rather poping & frequently a Cannonade from both sides.” He lauded his commander by saying, “Genl. Howe surely deserves great Credit for the Move, his Disposition was masterly, & He executed his Plan with ability.” Not one to miss an opportunity for self-congratulation, Grant asserted that the plan had worked brilliantly, in his humble opinion, thanks to him, even though von Knyphausen was in command of the column. “Washington having no intelligence of the Disposition of the Army, was convinced that our whole force was opposite to Him,” the Scottish general boasted, “& was confirmed in that opinion, by Detachments which I made in the course of the Day of the 4th, 5th, & 27th Regts. with Artillery to keep possession of the Heights upon our Left & to prevent the Rebells from passing the River upon that Flank,” referring to Sullivan's aborted crossing at Brinton's Ford. “Those Regts. He consider'd as so many Brigades detached in order to pass the River in different Columns & was so much convinced of it, that He took no Care of his Right & only sent detached Corps to defend the Fords in my Front.”
But the waiting took its toll on nerves, even those of the high and pompous. “I expected the Action to begin about two o'clock,” Grant informed his friend. “I had made my mind up to that, but from two to four I became anxious,” he admitted. “The minutes were Hours, I was uneasy & impatient.”229
“Presently a total silence ensued,” Captain Downman of the Royal Artillery wrote of the midafternoon at Chads's Ford, “General Knyphausen ordered us to leave off.” The tension grew as the minutes ticked by. “We began to be uneasy about General Howe” after Sullivan's Division pulled away from Brinton's Ford, “for a great force of the rebels marched from the hills and woods before us towards him.” Two hours later, “our doubts were eased, for we heard a firing on our left, at first gentle, but in a little [while] very heavy indeed both of cannon and musketry.” About an hour after the firing started, “we saw the rebels,” remnants of Sullivan's shattered division, “running in multitudes out of the woods. We now began again with all our artillery to play on the flying scoundrels; the fire was returned by them from all their batteries.”230
In pursuit of Sullivan's retreating troops were the rapidly advancing Guards and Col. William Medows's 1st Grenadier Battalion, supported by the 16th Light Dragoons and followed at a distance by the slow but steady Hessian grenadiers. The Guards and British grenadiers had been gradually separating ever since they crossed the Street Road. The Hessian grenadiers were supposed to fill the gap, which was several hundred yards wide and growing at every step.
Then, as Sullivan's Division scattered, the two Guards battalions separated. The 1st Battalion swung wide to the right and swept along the heights of the Brandywine, with the 16th Dragoons in support, while the 2nd Battalion continued straight ahead. The three Hessian grenadier battalions lumbered on, attempting to fill the widening space between the Guards and the British grenadiers. “The Guards who formed the right wing and were supported by the Minnigerode Battalion in the 2nd line engaged the enemy,” reported a Hessian officer of the Lengerke Grenadier Battalion, “and sent them flying through wood and field, over mountains and valleys until we joined the Knyphausen Corps at nightfall.”231
The terrain was difficult, with one high, rocky climb and descent after another, though woods and soggy bottoms of creeks that emptied into the Brandywine floodplain. “In passing through a cornfield” somewhere in the midst of the retreat, Col. Samuel Smith of the 4th Maryland “discovered a flanking party of the enemy, which he checked by two fires from his small number and received one from them, by which he lost one man who was shot in the heel.” In the ensuing confusion, “some of the men left him; and he retired, almost alone, to the top of a high hill, on which he halted, and collected nearly one thousand men; formed them into Companies; and remained until near sunset.”232
Just beyond the road connecting Brinton's Ford and the village of Dilworth, “one Battalion of the Guards [the 2nd Battalion], the three Battalions of Hessian Grenadiers, and the first Battalion British Grenadiers halted, having in their Front a Ravine, and a woody rocky Hill almost impassable.” These troops had reached the 270-foot precipice above Brinton's Run, about half a mile east of the ford. “The 16th of Light Dragoons who were on the right with the Guards, and who could never have an opportunity to charge from the closeness of the Country, were halted,” swung to the left, “then marched up the Road to Dillworth to the left of the Army,” two miles away.233
On the
right, the 1st Guards Battalion, with Osborn's grenadiers and light bobs leading the way, filed to the right down a road that crossed Brinton's Run at the Brandywine floodplain halfway between Brinton's Ford and Chads's Ford. “We now saw our brave fellows under Howe push out of the woods after the rebels,” Downman reported when the Guards appeared near Brinton's Ford. “We renew our fire from the artillery to scour the woods,” pelting the retreating Marylanders with 12-pound shot ricocheting through the trees and 8-inch explosive shells from the royal howitzers. “They fly from all quarters,” Downman wrote with enthusiasm, though, according to Jacob Nagle of the Continental Artillery, “While at a distance, the Brittish shells that they hove from their howetors never busted, which saved a good many men.”234 Down near Proctor's battery, Nagle witnessed “one shell, while the fuse was burning, a soldier run and nocked out the tube which provented it from bursting.”235
“Our battery Soon opened about 600 or 700 Yards from theirs, when a very Warm thundering began,” James Parker wrote. “The Rebels fired grape & exploding shells. Capt. Steuart who Commanded at our battery kept a warm fire for near a half hour.”236 Joseph Clark, the deputy muster master of Stephen's Division, confirmed that “the Batteries at the middle Ford opened upon each other with such fury as if the Elements had been in convulsion, the valley was filled with smoke, and now I grew seriously anxious for the Event: for an hour and a half, this horrid sport continued.”237
Shortly after the report to Congress was written, Washington ordered Greene to pull his division, which consisted of Weedon's and Muhlenberg's Brigades, nearly all Virginians, away from Chads's Ferry and move toward the rear and right to reinforce Sullivan. Initially leaving Wayne, Maxwell, and Nash to hold Chads's Ford, the commander in chief himself headed up toward the trouble spot. “On the commencement of the action on the right,” wrote Capt. John Marshall of the 15th Virginia, “General Washington pressed forward with Greene, to the support of that wing.”238
Washington ordered the 2nd Brigade, Muhlenberg's, to take another route, as it could not “be up in time for service.”239 Weedon's Brigade headed east, then north toward Dilworth. Consisting of the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 10th, and 14th Virginia Regiments and Col. Walter Stewart's Pennsylvania State Regiment, Weedon's troops made one of the all-time record-setting quick marches in military history. “I marched one brigade of my division, being upon the left wing, between three and four miles in forty-five minutes,” Greene recounted, the troops double-timing up the same steep, winding roads that Stirling and Stephen had taken earlier. “When I came to the ground,” the plateau southwest of Dilworth, “I found the whole of the troops routed and retreating precipitately, and in the most broken and confused manner.”240 Brig. Gen. George Weedon of Virginia wrote, “About 6, General Green's Division arrived to cover the Retreat.” He added laconically, “One of his Brigades (Weedon's) gave the Enemy such a check as to produce the desired Effect.”241
Before Washington headed to the right, Pickering recalled, “he charged me with an order, to deliver it to Genl. Nash of the No. Carolina brigade, at Chads’ ford.” The adjutant general did not say what was in the message, but it was probably orders for Nash to send his brigade to the right. “I delivered the order,” Pickering remembered, “and just then fell in with Col. Fitzgerald, one of the Generals’ aids, and we galloped to the right where the action had commenced, and as we proceeded, we heard heavy and uninterrupted discharges of musketry (and doubtless of artillery) but the peals of musketry were most striking.”242
Sullivan's whole wing was now in full retreat from Sandy Hollow back toward Dilworth. “The weather was very warm, and tho’ my knapsack was very light, was very cumbersome, as it swung about when walking or running, and in crossing fences was in the way so I cast it away from me,” wrote Sgt. John Hawkins of Hazen's regiment, one of the last units to fall back, “and had I not done so would have been grabbed by one of the ill-looking Highlanders, a number of whom were fireing and advancing very brisk towards our rear.” The faint skirl of bagpipes may have pierced the din as McPherson's Company of Royal Highlanders in the 1st Light Infantry Battalion pursued the Americans, as did the two companies of Fraser's 71st Highlanders in the 2nd Light Infantry. “The smoke was so very thick that about the close of the day I lost sight of our regiment,” Hawkins lamented.243
No sooner did Greene pull away from the Chads's Ford area than the lower jaw of Howe's pincers began to close. “At 4 o'Clock by an uninterrupted firing of Musketry, first we discovered the Commander in Chief's Approach & Attack upon the right of the Ennemy,” von Knyphausen reported to Lord Germain. The Hessian general ordered two 12-pounders and two 6-pounders to be placed “near the Creek to cover the going over of the Troops.”244 At the same time, the attack column of nearly 5,000 troops was formed: the 4th and 5th Regiments in front, about 700 men; followed by the 2nd Battalion of the 71st Regiment, consisting of nearly 350 of Frazer's Highlanders detached from the other two battalions, who remained guarding the baggage; Ferguson's Riflemen and the Queen's Rangers, badly shot up and now numbering less than 300; and the 23rd Royal Welsh Fusiliers, numbering about 350. Behind them was “the Remainder of the 1st & 2nd Brigade,” about 2,000 men, as well as a handful of “Light Dragoons, & Major General Stirn's Brigade” of four Hessian regiments, nearly 2,000 strong.245 “Lieut. Genl. Knyphausen push'd his Troops (which had been assembled under cover of the Woods) across Chad's Ford, the 4th Regt. leading,” Captain Robertson noted on his map.246
“About half after five in the Evening, a heavy Column of the Brittish Troops crossd Chads ford, at the Place on which our Division Genl. Waines solely was stationd,” Lt. Col. Adam Hubley of the 10th Pennsylvania told his brother.247 The British crossed the Brandywine both at the ford and the ferry, and then had to pass through more than 200 yards of swampy area east of the crossings, all the while under fire from Proctor's guns and Maxwell's light troops. “The Fourth Regiment led the Column and the Queen's Rangers followed,” Sgt. Stephen Jarvis of the Rangers wrote, “the battery playing upon us with grape shot, which did much execution. The water took us up to our breasts, and was much stained with blood.”248
“The 4th & 5th Regt., the 2nd Battaillon of the 71st, the British Rifflemen & Queens Rangers having pass'd the Ford, which was about thirty Paces broad, continued their March on the Road,” von Knyphausen explained.249 Robertson wrote that “as they were obliged to advance in Column along the Road on Account of the Morass on their Flanks, they were galled by Musketry from the Woods on their right and by round and grape Shot from two Pieces of Cannon and an 8 inch Howitzer from the Battery in their Front.”250
The troops, “when they came near the Battery, drew up to the left, & attack'd the ennemy in such a Manner as forced them to quit it,” von Knyphausen reported.251 The battalion companies of the 4th Regiment led the assault on the guns. “As the 4th Battalion (being the first) forded the River, under a heavy fire of Musquetry,” Sgt. Thomas Sullivan of the 49th revealed that “the Enemy's Cannon missing fire in the Battery as they crossed, and before the Gunners could fire them off, the men of that Battallion put them to the Bayonets, and forced the Enemy from the Entrenchment.”252 James Parker told his friend in Edinburgh, “The 4th the 5 & the Queens Rangers Crossed the Creek & in 11 Minutes after they had parted with us they was in the Rebel fort. The 10th Regt. Cross'd next. I went with them.”253 Sergeant Jarvis of the Queen's Rangers recalled, “Immediately after our Regiment had crossed, two Companies (the Grenadiers and Capt. McKay's) was ordered to move to the left and take possession of a hill which the enemy was retiring from, and wait there until further orders.”254
From another hill somewhere behind the American lines, “about sunset I saw a Collumn of the Enemy advance to one of our Batteries & take it,” Joseph Clark observed. “Under cover of their Cannon they had crosed at the Ford & were advancing in a large body.”255 Using the base of the hill as cover (as the light infantry had done on Birmingham Hill), redcoats and greencoats moved below the muzzles of the
guns around the front to the left of the battery and stormed it on its right flank. “The British advenced to the very works, though our artilery made a clear lane through them as they mounted the works, but they filled up the ranks again,” Continental artilleryman Jacob Nagle wrote. “One noble officer,” possibly Capt. John Rawdon of the 4th, “mounting the works, cried out, ‘Come on my Brittons, the day is our own.’ At that moment, one of Capt. Joneses brass 9 lbr. [sic; 4-pounder] went off, and he was no more, with a number more.”256 None of the British officers killed in the battle were in that area at that time; Rawdon, the only 4th Regiment officer listed as a casualty, was wounded, but he survived.
Capt. James Moncrieff of the British Engineers “was in the front of a column which advanced to a redoubt,” according to John Graves Simcoe, who was wounded at Brandywine. “There was a howitzer in it, loaded with grapeshot, pointed directly toward the column and a man standing by it, with a lighted match in his hand.” Simcoe related that “Moncrief, with his usual presence of mind, called out ‘I'll put you to death if you fire.’ The Man threw down the match and ran off.” Ironically, “had he fired he could equally have escaped.”257
“When we began to retreat,” Nagle recalled, “while the infantry covered us, we had a mash [marsh] or swampy ground to cross with the artillery to get into the road, and the horses being shot, the men could not drag the peaces out. Therefore we had to spike two pieces and a howetor [howitzer].” In the chaos of the fight, a fallen officer's horse caught Nagle's attention. “In the retreat I saw a beutiful charger, all white, in a field next the road with an elegant saddle and holsters, and gold lace housing, and his bridle broke off, and his rider gone. I made an attempt to ketch him, but he was skared, and the enemy keeping up a constant fire, I thought it best to leave him.”258
The Philadelphia Campaign Page 31