Hearing the firing from Picket #4, down the hill on his right more than half a mile away, Wayne realized that the British attack was coming from that direction. He ordered the 1st Pennsylvania Regiment, “which always takes the right,” to wheel to the right and move into a narrow strip of woods between the camp and the upper Long Ford Road.130 He detached the thirty-man light infantry company under Capt. James Wilson, who moved farther down the road to support Picket #4, whose men were falling back up the hill, firing as they retreated. Picket #3, commanded by Capt. John Doyle, was posted on the right of the camp, just over the crest of the South Valley Hill and across the Long Ford Road from the strip of woods where the 1st Pennsylvania was forming.
After annihilating Fitz Randolph's post, “General Grey then came to the head of the battalion and cried out, ‘Dash, Light Infantry!’ Without saying a word the whole battalion dashed into the wood,” Hunter reported, “guided by the straggling fire of the picket that we followed close up.”131 St. George told his fiancée, “We rushd on thro a thick wood and receivd a smart fire from another unfortunate Piquet”—Picket #3, at the top of the hill—“as the first, instantly massacred.”132
Wayne directed the artillery, which was posted on the right, to evacuate out the left, followed by the twenty or so baggage wagons parked in a line along the rear of the camp. He ordered the rest of the force to wheel by subplatoons to the right, and then march by files out the left side of the camp and take the road to the White Horse Tavern. Several lines of fences, which had been left up because of Washington's repeated orders, stood between Wayne's camp and the evacuation route to the White Horse. Openings had been made in a few fence sections the previous day, and the infantry proceeded out the left front as the artillery drove quickly down the back side of the camp, disappearing into the darkness. The head of the infantry column, with the 4th Pennsylvania Regiment of Col. Richard Humpton's 2nd Brigade in the lead, also vanished into the shadows. Wayne rode over to the right flank, where the 1st Pennsylvania, about 200 strong, was posted in the strip of woods to support the pickets and cover the withdrawal.
“By this Time the Enemy and we were not more than Ten Yards Distant,” Wayne told Washington the next day. “A well directed fire mutually took Place, followed by a charge of Bayonet—Numbers fell on each side.”133 But the British weren't firing; the pickets and Wilson's light infantry were firing and falling back, and the 1st Pennsylvania evidently fired a volley at their own men, just as André had predicted would happen in the confusion. Worse yet, by firing, the 1st Pennsylvania had exposed its position in the woods, and the men were now desperately trying to reload in the dark.
Most of the 1st Pennsylvania were riflemen, and Wayne had tried repeatedly for months to exchange the rifles for muskets and bayonets. “In that Regiment there was Upwards of 200 Men, 60 of them had Bayonets,” said Wayne.134 Even in broad daylight, a rifle took considerably longer to load than a musket, because the tight-fitting ball had to be carefully forced down the barrel onto the rifling with a wooden ramrod and the help of a greased patch. Two types of powder—one for propellant and very fine powder for priming—from two different powder horns were required and had to be carefully measured, whereas only a single cartridge was needed for a musket. In the dark, with light rain falling and a silent enemy approaching steadily with fixed bayonets, the riflemen had no realistic chance at making a stand.
Back in camp, the 1st Brigade had wheeled into column behind the 2nd Brigade but for some reason had stopped moving. The campfires still flickered, silhouetting the line; the men were facing toward the left, their backs to the strip of woods on the right. The British light infantry silently trotted up the upper Long Ford Road, faced right, charged bayonets, and let out a terrifying “HUZZA!” It was “such a cheer as made the woods echo,” according to Lieutenant Hunter.135 They charged into the woods, and the 1st Pennsylvania fell back, scattering into the camp.
“Majr. Maitland being advanced Attack'd the picket guard with bayonets, who fired & fell back to their main body, part of whom were paraded, to have attack'd our rear at two oClock,” James Parker wrote, “but this nocturnal Visit totally disconcerted their scheme.”136 The light infantry hit the rear of the column, which was revealed by the glow of the campfires. “They Came up upon our Right and left and by the light of our fires which was both in front and Rear of the line I Discovered the Enemy by their Clothes close after the infantry,” Maj. Samuel Hay of the 7th Pennsylvania, the regiment at the rear of the column, wrote. “I then Ordered the Plattoons that was faced to fire which they did…but the Enemy got up Round us and wounded An officer and some of the Privates on the Parade before we Stired.”137
“The enemy were completely surprised, some with arms, some without, running in all directions in the greatest confusion,” Hunter wrote. The young lieutenant was among the few British casualties: “Captain Wolfe was killed, and I received a shot in my right hand soon after we entered the camp. I saw the fellow present at me, and was running up to him when he fired. He was immediately put to death.”138
Hartley's Additional Regiment was in the column ahead of the 7th Pennsylvania. “The Seventh Regement having no Front towards the Enemy as well as my own Regiment—were attacked in their flank & Rear,” Col. Thomas Hartley testified, “& tho’ there were attempts made to form them with another Front, yet the Enemy were so amongst them that it was impracticable.” The panic escalated as the men pushed and shoved those ahead of them in the stalled column through the opening in the fence. Many broke and ran into the woods in front of or behind the camp; others ended up pinned against the fence and bayoneted while madly scrambling to climb over it. “Confusion followed,” Hartley wrote. “The Troops in the Rear pressed on those in the Front & the Passage on the Left being narrow sacrificed many of the Troops.”139
The Battle of Paoli became known as the “Paoli Massacre” because of the atrocities committed by some of the British troops, such as frenzied, multiple bayoneting of Wayne's men and hacking some to pieces with swords after they had surrendered. “The greatest Cruelty was shewn on the side of the Enemy,” Lt. Col. Adam Hubley of the 10th Pennsylvania, who was momentarily taken prisoner, noted with fury. “I with my own Eyes, see them, cut & hack some of our Poor men to pieces after they had fallen into their hands and scarcely shew the least Mercy to any.”140
A Scottish light infantry officer, Capt. Sir James Baird of Frazer's Highlanders, was leading the 71st Light Infantry into the fray. The size of the regiment allowed for two light companies, dressed in full Highland kit, with Highland caps and kilts (“belted plaids”), and armed with broadswords in addition to muskets and bayonets.141 “Here that Gallant Young Officer Sr. Jas. Beard, the scourge of Rebelion, had a very narrow escape,” James Parker wrote, revealing one reason for the slaughter. “He push'd a rebel musket past his breast, which killed a Sergent behind him.” Rage and fury took over Baird; armed with a Scottish broadsword, in addition to a fusil and bayonet, “he paid them, for he put 16 of them to death with his own hands.”142
Behind the light infantry came a dozen troopers of the 16th Light Dragoons, charging across the camp, with the 44th Regiment fanning out to the left and into the rows of booths with another 350 bayonets. “Then followed a dreadful scene of Havock,” Lieutenant St. George wrote. “The Light Dragoons came on sword in Hand. The Shreiks Groans Shouting imprecations deprecations, the Clashing of Swords & Bayonets &c &c &c…was more expressive of horror than all the Thunder of the artillery &c on the Day of Action.”143 Colonel Hartley recalled, “The Men were extremely intimidated with the Noise of the Enemys Horse.” He also commented, “The Enemy [was] pressing so close on the left of the Retreat, which was chiefly my Brigade [the 1st], & so many Interuption of Fences that it was impossible to rally Any Men ’till we had got to some Distance from the Enemy.” The four- or five-rail fences were stout, and the Continentals used them to form firing lines to cover the retreat; “at the Fences considerable opposition was made by some of the best Men,
” Hartley concluded, “but many of them suffered.”144
Why was the front not moving? The artillery had galloped down the back of the camp and out onto the road along the left flank. The head of the infantry column reached the road at the same time and stopped to let them pass, when one of the guns broke down in the road, temporarily blocking the escape route. “One of the Pecies met with Misfortune near the field of Action” is how Wayne described the episode to Washington, “which Impeded us a Considerable time.”145 Lt. Col. Adam Hubley mentioned “[I] fell in with one of our field pieces (the carriage of which had lost the hind wheels).” After some delay, he was able to hitch a horse to the broken gun and drag it away, thereby freeing up the escape route. But by that time, the rear of the stalled column was disintegrating under a wave of cold steel. “The Enemy upon us, in our rear, and with their charg'd Bayonets, we push'd forward and got into a field adjoining the one in which we were Attacked,” Hubley continued. “The Enemy being then almost mix'd with us, at the same time calling out ‘No quarters!’ &c, which in my humble Oppinion caused our Men to make a disparate and indeed obstinate stand. A most severe Bayoneting was the consequence.”146
But the worst was yet to come. From the dark strip of woods on the right of the camp, a throaty, roaring shriek suddenly ripped through the night air in a terrifying counterpoint to the wail of bagpipes, as more than 600 Royal Highlanders of the 42nd advanced in two battalions without breaking ranks. In their first direct encounter with Wayne since June, when Wayne's Brigade and Morgan's Corps had peppered the British rear guard at Brunswick Bridge, the Royal Highlanders were about to take revenge. A veritable wall of bayonets swept across the field and camp, accompanied by a bloodcurdling chorus of Highland war yells.
The British “rushed in upon their Encampment, directed by the light of their fires, killed and wounded not less than 300 in their Huts and about their fires,” Sgt. Thomas Sullivan of the 49th wrote. “The 42d. sat fire to them, as many of the Enemy would not come out, chusing rather to suffer in the Flames than to be killed by the Bayonet.”147 Lieutenant Hunter recalled that “the camp was immediately set on fire; the Light Infantry bayonetted every man they came up with.” Hunter, who later served in India and the Napoleonic Wars, rising to the rank of lieutenant general, said, “This, with the cries of the wounded, formed altogether the most dreadful scene I ever beheld. Every man that fired was immediately put to death.”148
“Fortune has not been sublime to our Division,” Colonel Hartley wrote sorrowfully the next day. “The Enemy last Night at twelve oClock, attacked our little Force with about 4000 Men—Horse and Foot— accompanied with all the Noise and Yells of Hell.” Hartley was mistaken; only 1,200 British troops were in the attack. Darkness, surprise, and panic provided the rest. He described the chaos: “The Impetuosity of the Enemy was so great—our Men just raised from Sleep, moved disorderly—Confusion followed,” then horror, as “Swords and Bayonets were the Weapons,” and “many were killed on both sides—some times by Enemys and some Times by Friends,” referring to the friendly fire on the right flank. “The Carnage was very great. This is a bloody Month.”149
At the head of the column, Wayne rallied a few regiments around the 4th Pennsylvania, which was drawn up in some woods to provide cover fire. “Halt, boys, and give these assassins one fire!” shouted Maj. Marion Lamar of the 4th Pennsylvania.150 Capt. Benjamin Burd saw Lamar “bayonetted on horseback a few yards from him.”151 The major fell from his horse, mortally wounded, the highest-ranking American killed at Paoli. The 4th then retired through some woods to a rise near the road to the White Horse Tavern and set up a line of defense, where Wayne hoped to rally the men.
Smallwood's 2,100 militiamen and three iron guns were coming up the road from the White Horse and were within less than a mile of the camp when the attack began. Prudently sizing up the situation, the general turned his badly armed, poorly trained, and skittish troops around and fell back to “about a Mile to an Advantageous Ground.” As the force marched, they were fired upon by the enemy.152 Some of the British light infantry had kept their weapons loaded upon the assurance of their commanding officer, Maj. John Maitland, that they would not fire. But now that the chase was on, they could not be restrained. “For two Miles We drove Them now and then firing scatteringly from behind fences & trees &c.,” St. George wrote. “The flashes of the pieces had a fine effect in the Night.”153
They had a fine effect on the militia, too. “One of our Men about the center of the Main Body was shot Dead by some of their Stragglers,” Smallwood told Governor Johnson, “which threw great part of our Line in great Consternation, many flung down their Guns & Ran off, & have not been heard of since.” In the confusion and panic, Smallwood was nearly killed by friendly fire as he tried to rally the militia. “The Rear taking us for British light Horse fired a Volley on us within 15 or 20 Foot, wounded several, and killed a light Horseman alongside of me in waiting for Orders,” the general wrote. The horseman, Pvt. Jones Dean of Bland's Dragoons, was listed in the payrolls as “killed by the Militia 20th Septr.” He was owed $8.33 for one month's pay.154
The Maryland Militia force all but disintegrated, despite Smallwood's and Gist's efforts. Hundreds of men threw away their muskets and equipment and disappeared into the countryside; more than 1,000 out of 2,100 deserted. “If our wrong headed Assembly cou'd only be here to see these Mens behavior,” Smallwood complained to the governor in disgust, “and be a little pestered in restraining and regulating their conduct.”155
Most of Wayne's force escaped, as did his four guns, and the men rendezvoused the next morning at the Red Lion Tavern in Uwchlan Township, nine miles from the scene of carnage. But nearly 300 Americans had been killed, wounded, or captured, about 15 percent of Wayne's force; British losses were 3 dead and 8 or so wounded. Lieutenant Colonel Hubley wrote the next day that he sent Maj. Caleb North of the 10th Pennsylvania, “with 4 of our Horsemen on the field who counted our Dead bodys; the enemy's were taken off, they were inform'd, in large numbers.” The British took away their dead and wounded, as well as many of the wounded Americans, who were left at houses nearby. Two days later, Hubley told his friends in Lancaster, “We bury'd our Dead next day in the field of Battle, (52 brave fellows) All kill'd by the sword & Bayonet.”156
British estimates of Wayne's losses tended to run higher. “500 were in a very little time put to rest without the least noise on our side, & 110 prisoners brought off,” James Parker wrote. “It being night their Canon could not be found. The loss on our side was Capt. Wolf of the 40th, a sergeant & a private.”157 The British did take prisoners—between 70 and 80, most accounts state. Some of them were wounded, a few suffering a dozen or more stab wounds. Their experiences and condition provoked outrage and demands for revenge among the Pennsylvania troops.
The Battle of Paoli, or Paoli Massacre, had many other names immediately afterward, such as the “Attack near the White Horse” or “Action at the Warren,” referring to two other taverns nearby. The British called it “Wayne's Affair,” or the “affair of Peoli,” in Sir George Osborn's words. The terms “massacre,” “midnight slaughter,” “bloody Highlanders,” and “British barbarity” all became part of the Battle of Paoli lexicon. Capt. John McGowan of the 4th Pennsylvania, whose men were first hit at Picket Post #4, referred to it as the “Payola Batle or Sticking Night.”158 Lt. Martin Hunter wrote, “The Americans ever after Wayne's Affair called us ‘The Bloodhounds.’” He added with trepidation, “I don't think that our battalion slept very soundly after that night for a long time.”159
Musgrave's force, the 40th and 55th battalion companies posted near the Paoli Tavern, did not engage in the battle. But at Wayne's home, Waynesborough, about a mile from the tavern, Wayne's brother-in-law Abraham Robinson told the general, “A number of the British troops surrounded your House in serch of you, but being disappointed in not finding you they took poor Robert & James.” Remarkably, the British “behaved with the utmost politeness to the Women and s
aid they only Wanted the General.” Even more astonishing is the fact that “they did not disturb the least Article.”160
The brutality of the night attack inspired much comment. “The affair of Peoli, which has struck more teror than any we have yet had, was conducted by Genl. Gray with the 42nd, 44th and one Battn. of Light Infantry, only in the same manner of the Hereditary Princes at Zerenburgh in 1760, without permitting a man to load,” Sir George Osborn told his brother John. “It was a fair surprize in the night and the slaughter was exceeding great.”161 James Parker told Charles Steuart, “Genl. Wean, tho’ an Old [fox?] but a Young General, taught now by experience, it is to be hop'd,” he sneered, “will keep further from our rear.”162
A few hours after Grey's force returned to Tredyffrin, the Royal Army broke camp and marched north to Valley Forge. “At 5 this morning the Army moved, marched 3 miles to the Valley Forge and 2 more to Moor[e] Hall making 5 miles and there encamped,” Montrésor wrote. Moore Hall was the mansion and estate of seventy-eight-year-old Judge William Moore, the notoriously cantankerous chief justice of Chester County for more than forty years under the crown and a die-hard Loyalist. But this was only the center of the British camp, where Howe established headquarters in a house just east of Moore Hall on Pickering Creek. The head of Howe's army continued another three or four miles west on the Nutt Road in Charlestown Township until it reached French Creek Bridge, which led to the Reading Road. “We found the houses full of military stores,” the chief engineer observed, stores that had been hastily removed from Philadelphia and placed far and wide in the countryside. “This country abounds with Forage, but the cattle drove off.”163
“We marched by the Valley Forge to Charles Town upon the Schuylkill, a very difficult Creek indeed much more formidable than the Brandy Wine if it had been defended,” General Grant commented.164 Just prior to this movement, Howe sent a trumpeter to Washington with a message requesting American surgeons to care for the captured wounded from Paoli, who were left at houses and taverns in the Tredyffrin area. The messenger took a long, roundabout route, going by way of Valley Forge and Moore Hall to Long Ford, then riding through most of the American camp to Washington's headquarters at Thompson's Tavern, across the Schuylkill in Norriton Township. “The main reason for sending this trumpeter off, probably was not only to acquaint Washington with the bad news,” von Münchhausen speculated, “but also to have the trumpeter secure information on the depths of the water at Valley Forge.” Moreover, “Giving Washington the news of Wayne's defeat before he might learn it himself, might induce him to leave his position and allow us to cross the Schuylkill unopposed.”165
The Philadelphia Campaign Page 40