It must, however, be said that none of the foreign travellers who toured the Monarchy in the first half of the nineteenth century, and published records of their experiences, appear to have been molested. Many of them have complaints of ‘impudent’ inn-keepers, postmasters and drivers, but all seem to have come through their adventures unscathed.
89 This seems to have been due to the dangerous situation then prevailing in Russia.
90 They were detained without trial for eighteen months, after which six of them were sentenced to death (although not, in the event, executed) and several others to long terms of penal servitude.
91 Libényi’s act seems to have been rather personal than political in its motives. Libényi’s father had been hanged in 1849. A large number of Hungarians were arrested when it occurred, but no connection between any of them and Libényi was ever proved.
92 A big police swoop in Styria in the spring of 1852 was quite unconnected with the general political situation: it was directed against the sect known as the German Catholics.
93 Havliček was put on trial before a jury for alleged subversive activities. The jury acquitted him, but he was then arrested under an administrative order and deported to Brixen.
94 The representatives of this school of thought afterwards (after 1866) called themselves ‘Sztanczyks’ (from the name of Sigismund III’s Court jester) because they could not at first venture to express their unpopular opinions except in satirical form. Their opponents, the Lemberg Democrats, who even after 1866 refused to abandon hope of a resurrected Poland, were known, from the name of a comic paper, as the ‘tramtradists’. 95 Goluchowski’s success in this respect was probably due largely to the severe economic crisis into which the land reform and other factors had plunged the middle and small Galician landowners.
96 Strangely enough, Goluchowski was regarded by his own fellow-countrymen as a Ruthenophile, a judgment which must appear entirely incomprehensible to anyone who has never tried to fit Polish spectacles on to his nose.
97 See above, p. 284.
98 The same policy was (unfortunately for himself) followed by another Governor of Galicia half a century later; see below, p. 802.
99 Some of the sufferers were Piedmontese citizens, and the consequent quarrel ended in Cavour’s breaking off diplomatic relations with Austria.
100 It is, however, fair to say that Radetzky abstained from mass physical retaliation against the population, and it is also fair to record that the act which brought Haynau (‘the hyaena of Brescia’), and thus Austria, into such particular disrepute, and for which he just escaped a ducking in the Thames at the hands of the workers in Watney’s brewery, had not been unprovoked. He had had certain women of Brescia stripped and publicly flogged during the 1848 campaign. These trollops had, however, been escorting Italian cut-throats round the hospitals and pointing out to them which of the wounded were Austrians. Those unfortunates had then been butchered in their beds. 101 Cavour actually warned the Austrian Government against the 1853 plot.
102 One of these was the delay in appointing accredited civilians at the head of the five Provinces; the choice of the word ‘adviser’ for those who were appointed was allegedly made deliberately to suggest the provisional nature of the division. It is said that the rejection of the Slovaks’ petition for an autonomous territory was due to the influence of the Old Conservatives.
103 The staffs of two Counties (Sáros and Pozsony) survived the screening entire.
104 The reference was to an elaborate pseudo-Magyar uniform, complete with flowing cloak, high boots and spurs, which Bach designed for them and made them wear. These uniforms, adorning the persons of honest Czech or Slovene post-masters’ or small tradesmen’s sons, were a constant subject for mockery by the Hungarians and incidentally, no less antipathetic to their unfortunate wearers, who found them extraordinarily difficult to put on and off, and to wear with dignity, besides eating up a substantial proportion of their salaries.
105 One of them who spent several years in Hungary left humorous reminiscences of his experiences. On the morning after his arrival he found almost the entire adult male population lined up outside his office. They had been sentenced to prison for their conduct in 1849, but as the jail could not hold them they lived in their own homes and drew a daily dole in lieu of the prison fare with which they should have been provided.
106 In 1847 the yield of direct taxation in Hungary had been 4,280,000 fl. and of indirect, 5,300,000; the corresponding figures for 1857 were 41,500,000 and 65,600,000. There were a number of riots against the tobacco duty.
107 Mack had announced himself to be acting in Kossuth’s name, but it is to this day uncertain exactly how far Kossuth had had fore-knowledge of the plans. He denied ever having heard of Oszlopy.
108 Ferenczy, Deäk Élete, II. 233, writes that in the early 1850s ‘most men believed that the new Austria … had finally succeeded; only Deák kept alive confidence and hope in the nation’s strength’.
109 He had been sent with Batthyány on a mission to Windisch-Graetz early in 1849, had been cut off by the advance of the Imperial troops and had thus been unable to rejoin the Diet. He had been court-martialled, but acquitted on the ground that he had taken no part in any treasonable activities.
110 Beer, op. cit., p. 256, quotes Baumgartner’s statement to this effect to a Ministerial Council; and cf. Hübner’s report from Paris (cit. Corti, The House of Rothschild, p. 347) that when the veto was reimposed ‘a kind of coalition was formed on the bourses of Paris and London, its object being to damage Austrian credit’. The veto was, apart from the Eastern question, ‘the sole topic of conversation in Paris’, and James Rothschild was ‘beside himself’.
111 The Communal Councils were allotted quotas and ordered to raise them. When they failed to do so, the money was raised by forced sales (Charmatz, Bruck, p. 124).
112 The Südbahn was sold for 91 m.g., about one-third of what it had cost the State to construct it.
113 At a later date Deák’s party became that of ‘1867’ (of the Compromise of that year) while the nationalist opponents of the Compromise appropriated the name of 1848.
114 It is said that in 1859, 156,000 troops were stationed in Hungary, being largely engaged in collecting arrears of taxation, which then amounted to 32 m.g.
115 The Archduke took over only the civilian side of Radetzky’s functions. The Military Commander (F. M. L. Gyulai) came under the direct orders of Vienna.
116 The visiting pair’s little daughter died in Buda while her parents were in East Hungary. Elisabeth then went back to Vienna, while her husband finished the tour alone.
117 Rogge, op. cit., II. 461, writes that this was ‘the turning-point’. Before it, relatively small concessions would have satisfied Hungary, but this was no longer so after it.
118 On 28 May, Francis Joseph told a Ministerial Council that the whole policy of the ultimatum had been based on the assumption that the war would not remain localized (Redlich, Franz Joseph, p. 241). He had faced this prospect with equanimity, and when Bruck objected that the country’s finances would not stand a general war, had replied that the financial sacrifices would have to be made (Corti, Mensch und Herrscher, p. 227). Buol had said earlier that ‘it was unimaginable that in a war against France Prussia would fail to stand by Austria’ (id., p. 213), and when Bruck pleaded the financial difficulties and both Grünne and Gyulai, to do them justice, warned Francis Joseph that the diplomatic situation was dangerous and the Army weak, Buol thought that there was ‘no danger’ (id., pp. 208, 216).
119 Gyulai began his operations with five Army Corps and one Cavalry Division. Two more Corps arrived at the beginning of June and two in July.
120 The open condition which Prussia had laid down was that the Prince Regent should command the armies on the Rhine. This Francis Joseph refused to consider. But according to Redlich (op. cit., p. 248), the Prince Regent ‘was only prepared to fulfil the obligations which, in Austria’s view, devolved on him un
der Bund law, if the leadership of Germany was, on this occasion, left to Prussia and Austria declared herself willing to withdraw from the Bund, as much as possible’. See on this also Friedjung, Die Kampf um die Herschaft, II. 28 ff; J. Joll in The New Cambridge Modern History, X. 506. Prussia had been annoyed by the relatively trivial incident in 1856 when Austria refused to help her re-assert her rights in Neuenburg when it severed its connection with Prussia.
121 The quotations for them in Frankfurt fell in four weeks from 81⅞ to 38. The Rothschilds were extremely hostile to the war (see Corti, The House of Rothschild, pp. 370 ff.).
122 Among the few voluntary subscribers were members of the Imperial family, including the ex-Emperor, Ferdinand.
123 Kossuth’s own account of these negotiations is given in his Memoirs of My Exile, vol. I. His ‘instructions’ to Hungary are on pp. 97 ff.
124 An interesting feature of these preparations was an agreement concluded between Klapka and Prince Couza, Prince-Elect of Moldavia and Wallachia, under which Couza undertook to help the Hungarians in Transylvania, while Hungary was to help the Roumanians to recover the Bukovina. Serbia’s co-operation was to be secured, the final goal being ‘the confederation of the three Danubian States, Hungary, Serbia and Moldo-Wallachia’. See Kossuth, op. cit., pp. 300 ff.
125 The number of desertions is put at fifteen thousand – six per cent of the troops involved.
126 This sounds incredible, but a serious British historian (F. A. Simpson, England and the Italian War of 1859: Historical Journal, 1962, pp. 111 ff.) agrees that ‘it was in fact Kossuth who, far more than any single Englishman, kept England out of the war’. It was, of course, only a question of tilting a nicely balanced structure by applying the right pressure at one or two key points; but even so it is impossible to withhold astonished admiration from the achievement.
127 Almost all writers describe this agitation in quite general terms as ‘domestic unrest’, but the description of it given in Redlich (op. cit., pp. 256–7), which I have summarized here, shows quite clearly the particular character of the circles behind it, and its particular direction.
128 In this respect, again, Francis Joseph had been over-precipitate, for on 14 June Prussia had, after all, ordered the mobilization of six army corps. The Prince Regent certainly had no intention of fighting a serious war for the sake of Austria’s beaux yeux, but the news had seriously alarmed Napoleon, and if Francis Joseph had been less impatient and less irritated by Prussia’s earlier haggling, he might have salvaged more than he did out of the wreckage.
11
Eight Years of Experiment
It was on the morrow of Villafranca that Francis Joseph began the retreat from absolutism which was to end, eight years later, in the constitutional settlement known as the Compromise. The road to this goal was not only long, but tortuous, and littered with the wreckages of unsuccessful experiments, for Francis Joseph did not willingly give way at all: each concession was wrung from him painfully, by overwhelming pressure. Nor were the forces with which he ultimately ‘compromised’ – those of Viennese business and Hungarian nationalism of the Deák brand – by any means those most congenial to his spirit. If he had had to ally himself with any forces at all, he would have preferred different ones. But this very fact that other solutions to the problem of the Monarchy were tried, and failed, is in itself proof that the final settlement, so reluctantly reached, was not the mere accident or trick as which it is so often represented, but possessed the essential virtue of resting on what were in fact the strongest forces of the day. That the balance of forces inside and outside the Monarchy changed later, making the settlement anachronistic, does not alter the truth that when concluded, it was historically inevitable.
It should be emphasized that Francis Joseph’s changes of policies were not due to any spiritual conversion, but simply to forced recognition that the methods which he had employed thitherto were not effective to achieve his ends. Furthermore, his policies in 1859, and at least up to 1866 – more hesitantly, after that still – were characterized by no sort of resignation. Even the consolidation of the Monarchy within the frontiers accepted at Villafranca was in the last instance less an end in itself than a means to foreign political ends; first, the reversal of the decision in Italy itself, and when that had at least to be postponed, then the recapture of the secure hegemony in Germany.
*
We can date the retreat as beginning after Villafranca, for the replacement of Buol by Rechberg two months earlier had been unconnected with the internal situation.1
But the Ministers’ report, and Rechberg’s own representations (which included a warning that the throne itself was in danger) had also convinced Francis Joseph that he must make some concessions to his critics at home. Accordingly, when, on 15 July, having returned from Italy, he issued to his peoples a Manifesto2 communicating to them the signature of the preliminary peace, he added to it a promise that he would use the ‘leisure’ which peace would give him to place Austria’s welfare on a solid basis ‘by appropriate development of its rich spiritual and material resources, and by modernizing and improving its legislature and administration’.3
The first steps which he took to translate this vague assurance into concrete terms were, however, short and typically uncomprehensive; they were, incidentally, announced only after six weeks, which had been spent in consultations on which, since they were conducted almost entirely in private,4 we have little information. It was early decided that some changes of personnel would be necessary, and Bach and Kempen seem to have been given notice of dismissal in July,5 but it was not so easy to find the new men or the new policies. Rechberg began consultations,6 at first à deux with Thun, who, however, then brought in his brother-in-law, Heinrich Jaroslav Clam-Martinic, at the time Statthalter in Cracow.7 Their prescription was a slightly modernized form of feudalism, which would have transferred most of the effective power from the Crown and its servants to the Provincial landed magnates. Neither Rechberg, nor Francis Joseph, would accept this, and Clam retired in dudgeon, resigned his official post, and set himself to carrying his fellow-Bohemian aristocrats back into political life. Since he possessed energy and ability, as well as family connections, he carried this task through with great speed and success.
A very different course was preconised by Bruck, who, immediately on the Emperor’s return, had sent him a detailed memorandum on ‘What Austria must do’,8 afterwards arguing his case in a long audience at which the Archduke Rainer was present. In his memorandum Bruck used bold language, denouncing strongly ‘the obstacles which hamper the spiritual, confessional, social and political development of the Monarchy’, and pleading for a far-reaching liberalization of the Monarchy’s social, economic and intellectual life and a re-modelling of its structure to promote the interests and influence of the middle classes. Religious freedom and equality of rights must be granted to the Protestant and Greek Churches, and there should be a Constitution, based on ‘sound municipal and communal institutions’, but also allowing for Landtage and a central organ in the form of a re-organized and enlarged Reichsrat.
Another set of persistent and vigorous representations came from Hungary – not, of course, from the Kossuthists, nor even from the Deàkists (Deàk seem to have kept silence at this juncture). But as soon as Kossuth’s renewed agitation gave them their cue, the Old Conservatives had begun again where they had left off eight or ten years earlier, arguing that Hungary did not want Kossuth, and could be made completely loyal by the appropriate concessions. Rechberg, who had personal connections with them, and believed that the proper policy for the Monarchy was to take them into partnership, had approached the men who were now their leaders, Josika (his confidant in chief) and Szécsen, almost on the morrow of Villafranca, and had elicited from them a memorandum, the work of Emile Dessewffy.9 This was, indeed, no very modest document: it asked for the restoration of Hungary’s ‘historic rights’ and territorial integrity, cancellation of the absolutist system and
re-installation of the old administration, and early convocation of the Diet, as well as concessions over recruits, taxation, etc.
It is probable that Francis Joseph also received advice from many other quarters, of which no record remains.10 At all events, it was not until 21 August that the composition of the new Ministry was announced. Rechberg Thun (who once again swallowed his scruples) and Bruck retained their Portfolios, Bruck taking over the agenda of the Ministry of Trade and Communications, which was wound up. The new Minister of the Interior was Goluchowski, an appointment which surprised everyone, for he was the first Pole to be given a high appointment outside Galicia, and was not generally reputed a great light, but he was unimpeachably loyal, and had taken Rechberg’s side against the Bohemians over the issue of State versus feudal authority. Hübner, back from Paris, who (again for unexplained reasons) had been in on the Rechberg conversations almost from the start, took Kempens’s place, and there was a new Minister of Justice, Joseph von Lasser. The interests of the defence forces were to be represented by the Archduke Albrecht, qua head of the Supreme Army Command, a post which had been created for him.11
The Habsburg Empire (1790-1918) Page 79