Nor, it must be said, had Austria been in a hurry to turn the other cheek. She was still at loggerheads with Italy over the Rome question, and thought little or nothing of her military value as an ally. The alliance came about because Italy’s resentment against France (chiefly, although not solely, owing to France’s occupation of Tunisia in 1881) was so strong that she approached Germany, and Bismarck, while glad of another ally against France, insisted that Italy must agree with Austria, which obeyed only with great reluctance. The negotiations ended in the three States signing (on 20 May 1882) the Triple Alliance, under which (after a preamble describing the purpose of the Treaty to be the preservation of peace and the maintenance of the Monarchic principle and of social and political order), each party promised to preserve peace and friendship towards the other two, and to enter into no alliances or agreements directed against either of them. Germany and Austria promised to support Italy, and Italy, to support Germany, in the event of an unprovoked attack by France, and the casus foederis was extended to all partners if one or two of them was attacked without provocation by two or more Great Powers. If one of the partners made war on a fourth Power which menaced its security, the other two promised it benevolent neutrality.15
In 1883 had followed an alliance with Roumania, whose resentment against the Dual Monarchy for containing so many Roumanians within its frontiers was not perhaps outweighed, but balanced by anger against Russia for the treatment accorded by her to Roumania in 1878 after the help which she had received from Roumanian armies. The loss of Southern Bessarabia, for which the Dobruja seemed a totally inadequate compensation, was bitterly resented, and not only Roumania’s German King, but her Premier, Bratianu, feared that Russia had designs on Roumania’s independence itself.16 On 30 October 1883, then, Austria and Roumania concluded a treaty (to which Germany adhered the same day17) providing that neither party should enter into an alliance directed against the other, that Austria should come to Roumania’s help if the latter were attacked without provocation, and Roumania to Austria’s if she were attacked without provocation ‘in a portion of her territories bordering on Roumania’.18 This treaty, again, was valid for five years, but renewable.
All these agreements were still in force in 1903. The Triplice, although modified in 1889–90, had been renewed in those years, and in 1900; the Roumanian Treaty, to which Italy adhered in 1889, regularly, as it was until 1914; the Serbian economic treaties, in 1889 and again in 1893. But all of them had been concluded with Monarchs, or Governments, not with peoples, and none of them was popular in the country concerned. The Treaty with Roumania had been concluded with the King. Its very existence was unknown except to a handful of men,19 and it certainly did nothing to prevent popular feeling against the Monarchy, especially Hungary, from continuing to grow, while relations between the two countries were further disturbed by a tariff war which lasted from 1886 to 1891 and did considerable damage to the economies of both.20 Serbia’s treaty relationship with the Monarchy was favourable enough to the Serbian peasant, who was able to get rid of most of his exportable surplus at reasonable prices, but the dependence on the Monarchy which it expressed was unpopular in the nationalist circles represented by the Radical Party, now rapidly becoming the strongest in the country, and the military societies, all of which bore an implacable grudge against the Monarchy for having occupied Bosnia. The dynasty – both Milan and his son, Alexander, who succeeded to the throne when Milan abdicated in 1889 – remained loyal to the Austrian connection21 but the country was against them. One effect of this, which was to prove fatal to poor young Alexander, was to create a nexus between the unpopularity (already considerable on other grounds) of the dynasty and the Austrophile orientation.
As to Italy, the Austrian alliance had from the first been an offence to romantic spirits, who had carried on a fairly unbridled agitation against it, and against Austria, in their Press. But the first leaders of this agitation were also subversives, even Republicans, in domestic politics, and the Government was chary of encouraging them, if only in the interests of inter-Monarchic solidarity, which was, after all, one of the declared objects of the Triple Alliance and one of those features of it which made King Umberto a loyal and convinced supporter of it, although even in those years, no Italian statesman would have dared (or wished) to make an open and sincere renunciation of all irredentist claims on Austrian territory. And the situation soon got worse, in respect both of public opinion and of official policy. For when Italy, having completed (except as regards the Monarchy) her internal unification, began, as it was de rigueur for European States to do in that age, to look round her for directions in which to expand, she cast her eyes, not only on Africa, where Austria had no ambitions of her own, but also on Turkey in Europe. Once she had thus entered her name on the list of claimants for the heritage of the Porte in the Balkans, Austria had only the choice of rejecting her claim, at the risk of seeing her combine with Russia, or of reaching an accommodation with her. In 1887, when the Triplice first came up for renewal, the tension between Germany and France, and between Austria and Russia, put Italy in a strong position, and she extracted from Austria an important concession: the two Powers pledged one another to use all their influence to prevent any territorial change ‘in the East’ detrimental to either of them. Should, however, the maintenance of the status quo in the Balkans, on the Ottoman coast or in the islands of the Adriatic or the Aegean prove impossible, and should either party find ‘itself forced to undertake a long-term or permanent occupation’ [of any parts of these areas], this was to take place only after previous consultation with the other party, and on the basis of ‘mutual compensation for any territorial or other advantage, over and above the present status quo, achieved by either party and satisfactory to the just interests and claims of both’.
Concluded in 1887 as a separate bi-lateral agreement between Austria and Italy, this undertaking was incorporated into the main Treaty in 1891, as its seventh article, and subsequently Austria made a further concession, promising Italy that if and when the Albanian State envisaged in the Austro-Russian understanding of that year came into being, Italy should have a predominant influence in it: this promise, given by Goluchowski verbally in 1897, was put into writing in 1900.
These agreements, however, still left Italy smarting under a feeling that Austria was standing in the way of her realization of what she was now beginning to regard as objectives vital to her security, while Austria, on the contrary, regarded Italy as an interloper into fields traditionally Austria’s own. The understanding was, moreover, incomplete, for while Austria believed herself to have stipulated that the annexation by her of Bosnia-Herzegovina was not to be regarded as altering the status quo, in a sense entitling Italy to compensation, Italy had not formally accepted the reservation.22
Almost simultaneously with this emergence of a fresh source of international rivalry between the Monarchy and Italy, the direct irredentist campaign took a new turn. The romantic and extremist furore, after reaching a peak about 1886–7, ebbed away but it was succeeded by a new agitation which was much more systematic and much more dangerous, for two reasons. Firstly, it appealed to wider circles, and most important, having discarded its one-sided Republican and Oppositional character, it could, and did, enlist adherents from among supporters of the Government and Conservative circles. Secondly, it asked for more. Most of the old national idealists had only clamoured for genuinely Italian territory: the Trentino as far as Solurn, and Friule. The new school raised ‘natural’, historical and strategic claims: to the Brenner frontier, to Trieste, to Istria, to Dalmatia. After Mazzini had voiced these claims in his Unità Italiana in 1866, they became the tacit programme of the great Dante Alighieri Society, founded in 1887, an institution which was nominally unofficial, but was publicly patronized by politicians of the Government party, high-ranking civil servants, and Generals. To support the Italian cause inside the Monarchy, another society was founded, the Lega Nazionale, the purpose of which was to support
every aspect of Italian life within the Monarchy.
Even now the official encouragement received by this agitation was not constant. Crispi, the Sicilian, when he was Minister President, found it a hindrance to his African plans, discouraged it, dissolving some of the associations and dismissing his own Minister of Finance for an incorrect utterance. But things changed again after Crispi’s fall, and after the assassination of King Umberto in 1900. His successor, Victor Emmanuel, was no friend of the Triplice, and when the government came into the hands of Zanardelli, a native of Brescia, and Prinetti, an old and declared enemy of the Triplice, the agitation ‘assumed almost threatening forms’.23
The Triplice had become a completely artificial conception, which was in no way endorsed by Italian public opinion. Italy was held to her alliance simply by the prospect which it offered her of support for her colonial ambitions, and in the event of a clash with France. But the latter possibility, very real in the early 1890s, diminished swiftly after 1897, when Visconti-Venosta initiated a rapprochement with the French Ministers, Delcassé and Barrère, and in 1900 concluded with them agreements which practically eliminated Italy’s fears on this point. In the spring of 1902 Britain gave her consent to Italy’s African designs. In June of that year Prinetti again renewed the Triplice, this time unchanged, but almost simultaneously exchanged Notes with Barrère pledging Italy to strict neutrality even if France took the initiative in declaring war, provided that she did so in defence of her honour or her security, in consequence of a direct provocation. The declaration was carefully worded to avoid literal conflict with the text of the Triple Alliance, but its practical effect was to make Italy far rather a potential partner, in a European war, of her allies’ enemies, than of her allies.
It remains to be added that her support of him in 1886 had brought Austria into friendly relations with the new Prince of Bulgaria. Ferdinand, however, was too rusé to put all his money on one horse, and balanced successfully between the two groups of Powers.
1 The change had, of course, begun, more hesitantly, before 1871, but now it became final. The parallel with Maria Theresa’s conversion after the Peace of Dresden is interesting.
2 See above, p. 82.
3 Cf. Wertheimer, Andrássy, II. 24.
4 See below, pp. 740, ff.
5 Andrássy had resigned on 22 September 1879, saying in his frivolous way that statesmen, like opera singers and dancers, ought to retire when their powers and their popularity were still at their height. In fact, however, he had been vexed by the opposition to his policy raised by some Court circles and by attacks made on it in both Austria and Hungary. He had wanted to resign when the Congress of Berlin closed, but had stopped on to see the treaty with Germany through.
Haymerle himself died prematurely on 10 October 1881. His successor, Count Kálnoky, was a Hungarian aristocrat, but unlike Andrássy, no Hungarian nationalist. His contemporaries describe him as personally disagreeable and arrogant, but hard-working and able. The documents do not altogether bear out this last adjective.
6 This was Agenor Goluchowski, fils, son of the former Minister of State. Kálnoky had offended the Hungarian Minister President, Bánffy, by countenancing a visit to Hungary by the Papal Nuncio, Agliardi, who had allowed himself to criticize publicly Hungary’s anti-clerical legislation.
7 Goluchowski is strongly reproached for not having done so by Hantsch, Graf Berchtold, I. 10.
8 The suggestion had come first from Aehrenthal, then Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in Petersburg.
9 See below, p. 626 f. A convenient short account of this pseudo-crisis is given by Miss Wiskemann in her Czechs and Germans, chapter VI. The German documents are in Grosse Politik, 13, Kap. LXXXVII. It is obvious that in fact Badeni had never thought of his language ordinances, which sparked the trouble off, as affecting the Monarchy’s foreign political orientation at all, nor was Goluchowski in the least trying to change sides. A lot of people lost their heads, not least so the German Emperor.
10 Between 1884 and 1892, 87% of Serbia’s exports went to the Monarchy, and 66% of her imports came from it.
11 It was afterwards agreed that this veto did not apply to non-political treaties concluded with Powers other than Russia.
12 For full details of this and the Monarchy’s other secret treaties, see Pribram, Geheimverträge.
13 The form of words excluded the Sanjak of Novi-Bazar.
14 The refusal was, indeed, largely motivated by fears of Russian objections.
15 Italy stipulated that the Treaty was in no case to apply against Great Britain.
16 Another motive was probably fear lest the Monarchy should become too intimate with Bulgaria.
17 This arrangement seems to have been made at Bismarck’s wish, partly to spare the susceptibilities of the German Emperor, who was still very hostile to the idea of commitments against Russia.
18 This phrase was substituted for the word ‘Russia’, again out of consideration for the German Emperor.
19 It is even arguable that it was invalid, as incompatible with the Roumanian Constitution, but a case to the contrary can be made out; see R. W. Seton-Watson, History of the Roumanians, p. 365.
20 This broke out because when a new treaty was being negotiated in 1885 to replace its predecessor (which had been distinctly favourable to Roumania), Roumania refused to submit to the veterinary regulations required by the Austro-Hungarian negotiators, and when they refused to relax the regulations, applied her (very high) autonomous tariff to her industrial imports from Austria. It is true that the Hungarian cattle-breeders were desirous of reducing competition from Roumania, but also true that strict inspection of Roumanian cattle was absolutely necessary. The ‘war’ reduced the Monarchy’s exports to Roumania by about 50% and Roumania’s exports by some 80%.
21 When Alexander succeeded, the Regents (he was a minor) renewed the secret political Convention in 1895.
22 Cf. Fellner, Dreibund, p. 28. Inexplicably, Kálnoky did not ask Italy directly for this assurance, but told Berlin his Government’s point of view and contented himself with Herbert Bismarck’s reply that Italy had given satisfactory assurances on this point, and on Austria’s other condition, that the Trentino and Trieste could never be traded as compensation for any acquisition in the Balkans. In fact, the assurances had been verbal ones, given by the Italian Ambassador in Berlin, and the Austrian request had never been forwarded to Rome. On Art. VII, Burian’s opinion (op. cit., chapter VI) is interesting. He describes it as ‘the Archimedean point for giving effect to Italy’s national and Balkan policy in the World War … What was capable of being read into Art. VII was a revelation to us.’ To this clause, again, Austria had agreed only with great reluctance and under pressure from Germany.
23 Fellner, op. cit., p. 51.
14
Cis-Leithania under Dualism
I FROM AUERSPERG TO TAAFFE 1871–1890
The dismissal of Hohenwart meant that Francis Joseph had renounced the idea of replacing Dualism as the outer bracket of the formula defining the relationship of the Lands and peoples of the Dual Monarchy towards the Crown and with each other. Once having taken the decision, he adhered to it with complete rigidity. In the third and last of the periods into which, as we have suggested, the history of the Monarchy under Dualism falls, plans for substituting something else for Dualism were, as we shall see, again in the air; but it was Francis Joseph’s heir presumptive who was considering them, and even he had no thought of putting his intentions into action until he should have succeeded to the throne. So long as Francis Joseph lived, Dualism had to be accepted; and awareness of this was so general that, as one who knew him writes, no one of his entourage even dared whisper in his presence the idea of modifying it ‘for this would have brought the man who ventured it into lasting disgrace with the Emperor’, and of that, everyone was afraid.1
This assumption that, given Francis Joseph’s attitude, the Dualist system was a noli me tangere seems to have extended from the Emperor’s en
tourage to the politicians of Cis-Leithania, and even to most of its thinkers. They, too, accepted the irrevocable, and up to the dawn of the third period, not only made no attempt to change it (if they had, they would immediately have encountered, not only the Emperor’s displeasure, but also his veto) but, while grumbling against it, hardly even discussed what might be put in its place; devoting themselves exclusively to their own mutual relationships within its framework. This being so, one would logically have expected the political history of Cis-Leithania after 1871 to be one of Parliamentary government in accordance with the ‘Constitution’ of 1867; and also, in accordance with Beust’s and Andrássy’s premise, to which the Emperor seemed to have reverted, of the political hegemony of the Germans in the West, balancing and supporting that of the Magyars in the East.
It did not, in fact, bear out either of these presumptions. The abandonment of the Hohenwart experiment had, indeed, brought with it, perhaps for the same reason of consciousness that the Emperor would not tolerate it,2 also the dropping of any serious attempt to alter radically the inner structure of Cis-Leithania. Many adjustments, not all of them enjoying a legal basis, were made in the relationship between the central authorities and the Lands, but these never went beyond adjustments, not all of which were given a constitutional basis. The essential dichotomy of the whole and the parts remained unaltered. Nevertheless, although the tendency of the adjustments was, on balance, towards more centralization, and although many of them were actually initiated, in their own interest, by the Germans, yet the Germans lost their political hegemony after less than a decade, and never recovered it completely; when, after that, they were represented in a Government, it was only as one party in a coalition.
The Habsburg Empire (1790-1918) Page 96