Sickness, Suffering, and the Sword

by Andrew Bamford

  It was for this reason that the maintaining of an up-to-date appreciation of the strength and fitness of the various regiments and battalions became a matter of vital importance, and, by keeping himself up to date, the commander in chief was far more effectively positioned to turn the demands of government into practical military operations. A prime example of military statistics being used to this end is in the exhaustive scouring of manpower to put together the Walcheren expedition of 1809, for which Dundas was quickly able to call upon a detailed and accurate account of the state of the troops then in Britain. Conversely, as we shall see with regard to the years 1813 and 1814 in particular, misunderstanding or misinterpreting the information contained in these returns could lead to troops being sent overseas in a manifestly unfit state. The equal significance of these reports, states, and returns for a commander in the field are obvious. Wellington utilized them to keep an extremely close account of the state of his forces in the peninsula, and used Warren Peacocke, commandant at Lisbon, to carry out additional inspections of newly arrived units so as to instantly gauge their fitness.7

  Commanders needed to know two primary things about any given unit—its strength and its quality. The first was in many ways the most important—not least because it provided a partial answer to the second—and each regiment, battalion, or detachment on active service was required to provide a complete return once a month. Until June 1809 this return was to be completed on the first of the month, but this was then changed to the 25th.8 From that date, the regulations required these returns to show “[T]he exact state of the Corps, in which every Officer, Non-commissioned Officer, and Private Soldier, belonging to the Corps, is to be accounted for. . . . The casualties which have occurred from the 25th day of each Month to the 24th day of the Month following, both days inclusive, must be accurately inserted in the respective Columns.”9 Although the regulations went on to state that copies of this return be sent to the “General Officer under whose Command the Regiments may be serving,” as well as to the adjutant general back in London, the latter practice does not seem to have been much followed; certainly, few examples have survived to be incorporated into the National Archives. However, barring the need for occasional reminders to jar recalcitrant units into getting their paperwork in, and some confusion in the case of detached commands, such as Cadiz, as to which general officer the returns should be sent to, theater commanders seem to have generally been able to obtain regular monthly returns for units under their command.10 This was of course vital for their own understanding of their forces, but also necessary in that it gave them the data to provide, as they were required by regulation to do “A Return, as soon as it can be made up after the 25th of each month, of the Troops, and of the General and Staff Officers employed at each Station.”11 This return was to be sent not only to the adjutant general but also to the secretary of state for war and the colonies and to the secretary at war, although the copy for the adjutant general required, in addition, details of all regimental officers present and absent.

  The exact manner in which these returns were made out differed from theater to theater, and their format also changed over time with, for example, an initial distinction made between those ill but still present with their unit, and those in hospital, later being replaced by a single total of the unit’s sick. At no point, it should be stressed, was any distinction made between the ill and the wounded—all came under the heading of “Sick.” Another innovation, first seen in June 1810, was the listing of men sent home, alongside those lost through death or desertions, whilst Canadian-raised units serving in that country, being able to send men on leave, made considerable use of the “Furlough” column that was, necessarily, generally left blank in returns from other theaters. The main columns, however, which remain constant throughout and which have been the most heavily used in the preparation of this work, are those giving the rank-and-file strength of each unit, broken down into “Effective,” “Sick,” and “On Command,” plus the running totals of deaths and desertions; for mounted units, or those employing draught animals, the total number of horses and the number dead since the last return must also be added. The meaning of these various headings should be self-explanatory, with the exception of “On Command,” which may be best understood as a catchall term for men actively employed in the service but away from their parent unit. In practice, this category could variously encompass anything from a handful of men overseeing some small task under the supervision of an NCO to several companies detached on an expedition, as well as most things in between. With such a level of detail, one can glean a great deal as to the effectiveness of the unit in question from these returns, including the general state of its health and, if stationed at home, the progress of its recruiting. It is data from these returns, their coverage detailed in appendix 1, that form the statistical backbone of this study.

  Nevertheless, it is apparent now as it was then that only so much could be gleaned from statistical data alone. Accordingly, the General Regulations for the British Army also contained the requirement that all units, at home or overseas, be subjected to a biannual inspection by a general officer.12 In theory, these inspections were to take place in May and October, although the dictates of active service meant that the latter was frequently delayed until the end of active campaigning. At home or on active service, an inspection was an occasion of some importance, and even those memoirs that otherwise touch little on military matters tend to mention them in some detail. One can imagine that the preparations, no doubt entailing much cleaning and polishing, and punctuated by the curses of harassed adjutants and angry sergeants, made quite an impression on those concerned. John Green remarked in his account of life in the ranks of the 68th that when the battalion was due to be inspected whilst still on home service, the extra drills required to perfect the battalion’s evolutions began some three weeks before the appointed day.13 The day itself was also evidently a lengthy one; the men of the 2/34th were under arms from five in the morning for their inspection by Brigadier General Catlin Craufurd at Lisbon in 1809, although this may well have represented an unusually early start due to the need to complete proceedings before the hottest hours of the day.14

  The reports of these inspections were to be forwarded to the commander in chief via the general officer commanding the district or station in which the inspected unit was serving, and were required to be wide-ranging in their scope. The unit commander, field and company officers, staff officers, and NCOs were all to be reported upon, with particular attention to their fitness for their roles. With respect to the rank and file, attention was also to be paid to health, cleanliness, and general bearing, as well as to the arrangements for their messing and provision of clothing and other necessaries. Details of recruiting on the one hand, and of men discharged on the other, were also to be provided, and particular attention was to be given to the standard of drill and field exercise. For mounted units, detailed information was also to be provided for the horses. Lastly, record was to be made of all courts-martial held since the previous inspection and an opportunity given for any complaints to be noted. These two latter elements form a valuable resource, even if the historian is frequently left wishing for more detail on some of the more unusual cases, where the dry reportage keeps the human element tantalizingly beyond reach. The written report was required to be accompanied by a detailed return, of a similar nature to those already provided on a monthly basis but with the addition of greater detail covering such things as the age, origins, and terms of enlistment of the rank and file.15

  Had all reports been completed to the degree of detail required by regulations—or, in some cases, completed at all—the historian would have a truly invaluable resource; as it is, many inspections were either never carried out, or, if they were, the records have not survived. Understandably, the greatest discrepancies and omissions are of those units with which we are most interested here: those engaged in active service. However, there are also many cases where although a r
eport has survived, the level of detail required by the regulations is absent. Typically in these cases, all that is to be found is a repetition of the same stock phrases—that the men are well-drilled and healthy, or that such and such an officer has conducted himself in accordance with regulations—and it is not uncommon for a single letter to contain reports on three or four units from a particular brigade or garrison with the descriptions of each couched in broadly the same terms and thus effectively useless as an aid to understanding the state of the units concerned. On the other hand, many inspecting officers did carry out their duties in closer accord with the spirit of the regulations, and their reports, as we shall see, frequently provide detailed and thoughtful comments on the units in question. Some inspecting officers even received subsequent admonishment for using their reports to make suggestions that fell outside the remit of what they were required to comment on—Lt. General Sir Colin Campbell, commanding at Gibraltar, seems to have found repeated fault with his subordinates in this regard, and their reports are frequently accompanied by cover letters to the adjutant general containing Campbell’s own, alternative, opinion of units in question.16

  Military Organization: The Regiments

  In 1808, Britain was able to field a total of 197 regular battalions of infantry, divided amongst 103 regiments of the line. In addition to these, there were also three regiments of Foot Guards totaling seven battalions, ten battalions of the King’s German Legion recruited from Hanoverian refugees, and five other assorted foreign line regiments. To this may be added several irregular or sedentary foreign infantry regiments, nine West India regiments, twelve Royal Veteran battalions and eight garrison battalions.17 During this period there was little change, but for the addition of a further regular regiment when the New Brunswick Fencibles were taken into line as the 104th Foot, and the creation of a 13th Royal Veteran Battalion and the 1st Foreign Veteran Battalion. In 1810, the troops of the exiled Duke of Brunswick were also taken into British service, forming an infantry battalion and a hussar regiment. Conversely, the number of garrison battalions was steadily reduced and one West India regiment disbanded, whilst the peace of 1814 saw widespread cuts in the number of veteran and foreign units, and of the second and third battalions of line regiments. Although infantry regiments ideally maintained two battalions, some, generally those of good reputation, raised a larger number. The 1st Foot had four in 1808, and the 1st Foot Guards and the 27th Foot three each, whilst the 14th and 56th Foot, along with the 95th Rifles, would each also raise a third during the period covered by this book. Conversely, some thirty-eight regiments fielded only one battalion in 1808, although several subsequently increased this to two. There was also the special case of the 60th Foot—still nominally, and at one time actually, the Royal Americans—which had by this time taken on something of the character of a foreign legion. It had in 1808 six battalions, of which four were line troops earmarked for colonial service and the remainder light infantry or rifles; two more would be added by the end of the period.

  Traditional British practice in all wars up to and including that against revolutionary France had been to augment its army through the raising of new regiments rather than augmenting old ones. Accordingly, prior to 1803 very few infantry regiments had numbered more than a single battalion. On the one previous occasion that a widespread creation of second battalions had occurred, during the Seven Years’ War, these units, once established, had rapidly been re-designated as regiments in their own right.18 Indeed, this practice had continued on a smaller scale up until 1802, when the second battalion of the 52nd Foot, raised four years previously, became the new 96th Foot.19 The advantages of creating new regiments rather than augmenting existing ones were considerable in terms of the potential for patronage, creating lucrative colonelcies and allowing for the rapid promotion of officers who brought in men for the new regiments. Yet whilst the number of marching regiments was pushed as high as 135 during the French Revolutionary Wars, the bulk of these units served only to absorb valuable manpower without ever firing a shot in anger. Accordingly, the bulk of them were disbanded in one of the Duke of York’s first reforms upon becoming commander in chief, and their manpower drafted into those regiments that remained.20 Upon the resumption of hostilities in 1803, rather than repeat this error, the sensible decision was therefore taken to do away with the old methods, and increase the forces by means of adding additional battalions to the ninety-six infantry regiments already in existence.

  This move was at the heart of Castlereagh’s reform of the manpower systems, being based on an accurate appreciation that too many men had previously been tied up in home defense roles, as part of the Militia, Volunteers, and Fencibles, to the detriment of the British Army itself. When hostilities recommenced in 1803, only the 1st and 60th Foot had more than a single battalion; now, by using manpower from the Militia and Army of Reserve, second battalions were authorized for the fifty infantry regiments then stationed in the British Isles.21 Whilst invasion remained a possibility, these battalions would continue to fulfill the same home defense roles as the units from whence their manpower had come, but if the threat were to diminish they would be available for other duties. This policy was further extended as time went on, although initially not to the exclusion of forming some new regiments. However, after the raising of the 101st Foot in 1806, all new battalions formed part of preexisting regiments; the addition of the 102nd through 104th Foot represented existing unnumbered battalions being taken into the line rather than the creation of new units.22 Usually commanded by a lt. colonel, a battalion was ordinarily established with an organization of ten companies of which two—light and grenadier—were designated as elite “flank companies,” and the remainder, distinguished by number, were collectively known as center companies. Whilst the number of companies remained constant, ensuring that there was always a cadre to expand upon, their established size could range from 33 to 120 rank and file depending on the role and station in which the battalion was intended to serve.23

  The primary result of Castlereagh’s reforms was to free up sufficient troops to create a disposable force that could be sent on active operations overseas without unduly weakening Britain’s defenses at home. Furthermore, greater utility was obtained from the Militia by making it not only the primary defense against threats—domestic and foreign—within the British Isles but also by using it as the first stage for a soldier’s progression through the military hierarchy. The hope, which to some extent was realized, was that many of those called up by ballot for the Militia would develop a taste for soldiering and subsequently be willing to volunteer for a line regiment. In theory at least, time in the Militia would have already prepared a man for service in the regular forces should he be persuaded to transfer. Thereafter, service in the second battalion of a line regiment would complete his training and ultimately fit him for active duty overseas with his new regiment’s first battalion.

  Junior battalions were not, in the first instance, envisaged as being sent on active service overseas at all. The domestic duties of the home station were to have formed their main employment while they simultaneously acted as reserves of manpower to keep the senior battalions up to strength. Recruits would be trained in the second battalion before being posted to the first, and newly promoted officers would, in theory, be posted to the second battalion to obtain experience in their new rank before ultimately moving back to active service in the first battalion.24 Unfortunately, although an excellent concept in theory, this was not always the most practical system when the demands of war caused second battalions to go overseas too, and all the more so if the battalions of a regiment were left widely dispersed as a result. An extreme case is exemplified by an episode from Moyle Sherer’s service with the 34th Foot. In late 1811 he reached sufficient seniority as a lieutenant as to warrant a posting from the 2/34th, in Portugal, to the 1/34th in India. Accordingly, he returned to England in December 1811 to await a passage to his new battalion, but, before this could be arrange
d, he was promoted to captain; thus, being the regiment’s junior officer in that grade, Sherer was again posted to the 2/34th, which he rejoined in August 1812. Sherer doubtless enjoyed his leave, and was grateful that he had “escaped my banishment to India,” but his regiment had been deprived of his services for nine months to no useful end.25 In like fashion, when multiple battalions of a regiment were overseas, the first battalion had priority for drafts of recruits, although in practice an element of common sense seems to have been employed here with regard to occasions when the senior battalion was in some distant garrison and the second or third on active service and quite patently a priority. The 3/1st and 3/27th both benefited from this approach and were accordingly able to serve lengthy stints in the peninsula, with the former going on to fight at Waterloo as well.

  A similar flexibility was incorporated in the General Regulations to enable newly promoted officers to remain with their former battalions in their new rank if that battalion had fewer officers than its establishment. In practice, however, this loophole seems to have been used to the advantage of first battalions at the expense of their junior counterparts, particularly if the former were on active service and the latter in garrison.26 Not surprisingly, many officers preferred the potential for distinction with an active unit, with the newly promoted Lt. William Grattan making stringent, and for a long time successful, efforts to use this regulation to enable him to stay in the peninsula with the 1/88th rather than return to his rightful posting in the second battalion. As a result, although Grattan became a lieutenant on April 12, 1812, he did not join the 2/88th until a year later when the first battalion had enough of its own lieutenants present for duty.27 This system was all very well for the senior battalions, which were, after all, supposed to bear the brunt of active service, but meant that junior battalions were frequently left extremely short of officers, to the extent that there were too few for some units even to be effective in a garrison role. In an extreme case, the 2/89th at Gibraltar in 1811 lacked any company officers of its own at all, and had to borrow some from other regiments in the garrison, but second battalions in Britain were also left short at times, or with too many young and inexperienced officers, to the detriment of their training and state of readiness.28