Table 5. Peninsular Provisional Battalions
Source: Data from Monthly Returns, TNA, WO17/2470–2476. The short-lived 4th Provisional Battalion has not been included in the averages.
By this stage, Wellington had already been forced to break up the 4th Provisional Battalion, and plans to create a 5th out of two weak single-battalion light infantry units, the 51st and 68th, were shelved so as not to provoke further complaints from Horse Guards. From Wellington’s point of view, however, his decision was justified by the campaign performance of the three remaining provisional battalions. Looking at the period from the formation of the 2nd and 3rd Provisional Battalions in December 1812 through to the end of hostilities in April 1814, the results show an improvement over the average in a variety of areas, emphasizing Wellington’s belief in the value of acclimatized veterans over troops fresh from Britain.
Whilst the overall averages for the provisional battalions, as shown in table 5, work out as consistently better than for the body of regular infantry, there are two partial qualifications. Firstly, the performance of the 3rd Provisional Battalion is worse than the average so far as the maintenance of a good effective strength is concerned. However, a closer examination of the monthly data for this battalion offers something of an explanation, since this unit began its life with a higher number of sick than did the other two provisional battalions.59 Heavy casualties at Orthez also skew the totals.60 Regrettably, unlike the 1st and 2nd, no inspection returns for the 3rd Provisional Battalion survive to corroborate these assumptions, but this combination of a lower effective strength to begin with, and higher combat casualties, seem between them to fully account for the discrepancy.
The second qualification relates to the way that this data should be interpreted, since a comparison with Wellington’s infantry as a whole gives the deceptive impression that the provisional battalions were more effective than all other battalions. This was simply not the case, for the average figures given in the table include data from strong, experienced battalions on the one hand, and weak, sickly, units on the other. That said, direct comparison with other units does demonstrate that the provisional battalions were a good bargain for Wellington and certainly vastly to be preferred to the manner of battalion that would have replaced them if he had sent them home. For example, to take a sample of long-serving regular battalions then with Wellington, the 1/7th averaged an effective strength of 62 percent of its total manpower over the same period as the provisional battalions were in existence, whilst the 1/11th averaged 65 percent, the 1/45th averaged 64 percent, and the 1/71st averaged 68 percent. All these figures fall in the same region as those for the provisional battalions, although these units had not had the same opportunities to send their ineffectives home, and their figures are therefore skewed by the presence in the line battalions of a greater proportion of convalescents still on the unit strength in-theater.
Comparing the provisional battalions with the sort of battalions that would have likely replaced them is a rather more abstract exercise, since they were retained in the field and no direct replacements were sent out. However, we can compare figures for battalions that did join Wellington in the last eighteen months of the Peninsular War, on the assumption that they typify the units likely to have replaced the provisional battalions. Because these new battalions spent only the last few months of the war at the front, it is impossible to produce an equivalent monthly average for comparison. However, sample figures for this time demonstrate the limited effectiveness of these units, which were mostly those for which Aylmer’s Brigade was formed as a “nursery.” In April 1814, the 76th had just over 54 percent of its rank and file fit for duty, and the 2/62nd, only 52 percent—neither having seen much in the way of heavy fighting since their arrival at the front. What was more, these represented drastic reductions over a short period of time—the effective strength of the 2/62nd dropped by four hundred rank and file between October 1813 and April 1814—whereas the ratio of effectives in the provisional battalions, battle casualties excepted, remained steady over the same period. Quite evidently, they were not troops in the same class as those in the provisional battalions, and this would seem, on the face of things, to justify Wellington’s retention of his veterans.
The problem with this reasoning is that it addresses only the problems facing Wellington in the peninsula, rather than the global demands that York and Bathurst were dealing with. Looking at the three-sided struggle between these men, a feel for these wider issues soon becomes apparent that also opens up the question of just where the real power lay within Britain’s military hierarchy. No single individual emerges from the controversy with an unblemished reputation, but it is impossible not to feel that York was rather more sinned against than sinning, in particular so far as the modern interpretation of events is concerned. From Oman onward, historians have worked from the assumption that Horse Guards was collectively too inflexible to react to the demands of nineteenth-century warfare, and that York’s stance over the provisional battalions exemplified this.61 Following this line of thinking, it then becomes logical that Wellington, in creating provisional battalions against the wishes of Horse Guards, was acting in a manner that was entirely right and proper, even though such analysis takes no account of Britain’s military manpower needs across the rest of the globe. Even Rory Muir, addressing Britain’s global strategy, states that in wanting to bring battalions back from the peninsula, York was correct only “in theory,” and accuses the commander in chief of a lack of flexibility “given the state of affairs in 1813,” quite as if there were no other competing demands for troops.62
In fact, when the reasons behind York’s stance are taken into account, the reasonable nature of what he was proposing, and the extent to which he was willing to compromise, suggest a far more balanced and objective appraisal of the situation than do Wellington’s arguments at the time or those of York’s detractors since. York’s response to Wellington is usually presented via the garbled and paraphrased rendering created by Oman, which is by no means a fair representation of the commander in chief’s stance.63 Having begun by acknowledging his receipt of Wellington’s notification that three provisional battalions had been created against his wishes, York went on to concede that he would be
extremely sorry to withhold my concurrence from an arrangement which your Lordship has already carried into effect, particularly where an immediate objection would tend to reduce your effective force in the field. But when I state the grounds upon which I consider this formation detrimental to the well being of the regiments included in it, I trust your Lordship will see, that while I have every disposition to support and agree to any arrangement of yours, I could not possibly concur in the expediency of the present measure consistently with the opinion I entertain of what is essential to secure the continued efficiency of the army in general; and that you will not be surprised that I should strongly urge the recall of the detachments forming these provisional battalions, when I have the means of proposing an adequate reinforcement for their relief.64
York then went on to explain what the knock-on effects of such a policy would be, noting,
Experience has shown that in every instance wherein a battalion has been brought home a skeleton, composed of its officers, non-commissioned officers, and a certain foundation of the old and experienced soldiers, the greatest success has attended its re-formation for any service within a short period; and this is fully exemplified in the case of the 29th regiment, which is now complete in numbers and ready for foreign service; but if a corps reduced in numbers be broken up by the division of its establishment, it is quite impossible but that such an interruption must be occasioned in its interior economy and esprit de corps as a regiment as would effectually prevent that speedy completion of numbers and reorganization which I look to as the only means of providing for the demands for foreign service.65
There was certainly logic in York’s stance so far as the big picture was concerned, but when he went on to argue
against the provisional battalions as a concept in their own right, his logic was rather more dubious since it was grounded on the unfortunate experience of the 85th’s first peninsular deployment when, as York reminded Wellington, “Five companies of this corps were sent to the Peninsula, and the other five were retained as skeletons in this country. A degree of irregularity, contention, and every species of indiscipline, ensued from this division of the officers and establishment, and which can only now be rectified by the adoption of a very strong measure against the whole corps.”66 But as York must have been aware, considering the need for his intervention into the matter, the problems in the 85th stemmed from poor leadership and internal squabbling amongst the regiment’s officers. Although the battalion had ultimately been sent home as numerically ineffective, this was hardly a fair comparison with the weak battalions that Wellington sought to retain for the 1813 campaign since they, unlike the 85th, were being paired into provisional battalions. York’s argument also took care to ignore the successful deployment of the 2/23rd and 1/71st without all ten of their companies, neither of which by any means represented a failure. York also ignored the successful precedent set by the pairing of the 2/31st and 2/66th, although his language earlier in the letter suggests that he may not have been fully aware of this organization until Wellington chose to place it on the same formal footing as the other three provisional battalions. In any case, if York was attempting to discredit the utility of the provisional battalions as a workable concept in the field, he was struggling for a convincing argument.
York concluded his reply by seeking to convince Wellington that a minor local advantage in the short term would not be worth the wider long-term problems: “I am aware that it has been, and is justly urged, that men who are seasoned to the climate and experienced in the field are more valuable than a greater number Fresh from England without these advantages; and I concur with your Lordship in the opinion you have expressed to such an effect: but I think it would be inexpedient and improvident, for the sake of a present, and comparatively trifling advantage, to sacrifice the only foundation upon which we can look to the eventual efficiency of the army.”67 Because of this need to focus on the bigger picture and longer term, York believed that Wellington would have to give up the bulk of the battalions that he had sought to retain, keeping only the 2/31st and that only until the 1/31st might be transferred from Sicily to replace it. He instead sought to demonstrate that the established regimental system, as it stood, could solve the perceived manpower shortfall in the peninsula: “I transmit herewith, for the purpose of more easy reference, the copy of the last return of your force, made up at the Adjutant-General’s office, with the present means of reinforcing the different corps. And your Lordship will perceive that, according to the present effective strength of the regiments you have proposed to retain as provisional battalions, no great sacrifice will be made by their return to England; and you will also bear in mind, that if once my object of giving you 1st battalions only could be attained, you would never be required to part with any experienced soldiers.”68 York’s accompanying figures show that although Wellington’s infantry were some 12,609 men short of their full establishment strength, much of this shortfall could be made up by drafts taken from regimental depots and/or second battalions. With York still maintaining as a long-term hope the expectation that the field army in the peninsula be composed entirely of first battalions, Wellington’s interference was counterproductive and, in York’s eyes, served to delay, rather than advance, the moment that Wellington’s forces could be brought to maximum efficiency.
Of equal significance, however, were York’s points relating to the difficulties in rebuilding units, for it was in this regard that Wellington’s scheme began to cause problems for the regimental system. York’s choice of the 29th to exemplify this point was apt. As we have seen, that battalion had to be recalled from the peninsula in mid-1811 after having been reduced to a state where its numbers prevented it from functioning as an independent unit, but, as York pointed out to Wellington, by the end of 1812 it was again available for service. True, the 29th was not immediately fit to take the field, but by posting it to Cadiz it was in turn possible for the 2/59th to leave that station and join Wellington. York was trying to make Wellington see that by hanging on to weak but experienced battalions in the short term, he was hazarding the availability of reinforcements being available in the future. Furthermore, Wellington’s unilateral decision to suspend the British Army’s systems of manpower rotation had the potential to do harm well beyond the confines of the peninsula, since cutting off the stream of attenuated battalions going home to be rebuilt further limited the already-small pool of battalions available for deployment from the home station. Having made such a good case, it is hard to see why York waited so long before exerting his authority on Wellington over this issue. Although he achieved an early success in obtaining the return of the 2/30th and 2/44th, it was not until January 1814 that he gave a direct order to break up the remaining provisional battalions. Even then a caveat meant that Wellington need not do so until it could be achieved “without inconvenience to your present operations,” with the additional proviso that men from these battalions could remain in the peninsula if they could be persuaded to volunteer into other regiments.69 With this loophole, Wellington was able to retain the provisional battalions until the end of the war.
York’s January 1814 order also permitted Wellington to retain the 2/53rd, since a draft had been assembled at the regiment’s depot large enough to enable the battalion to again take the field as an independent entity. Tellingly, however, such a restructuring was not possible for any of the other five battalions that Wellington had held on to, although York’s order did nevertheless permit his retention of the 2/58th, so that its rank and file could be drafted off into the 1/58th once the senior battalion could be reassigned from Catalonia.70 Reinforcements were unavailable for any of the other units involved in the provisional battalion project, and, since the 2/31st and 2/66th had been awaiting such augmentation for two and a half years, they were unlikely to be forthcoming. Prioritization of the first battalions of the regiments concerned certainly did not help—although the 2nd, as a single battalion regiment, could hardly use this excuse—but the cadres sent home by Wellington were for the most part too weak to recruit effectively for the men left behind.
Conversely, the two battalions that York had recalled in January 1813 were both able to recruit successfully once reunited back on the home station. Indeed, when York ordered the breakup of the three remaining provisional battalions, the constituent units of the erstwhile 4th, although by no means at full strength, were certainly fit for further employment with the 2/44th already on active duty in the Netherlands and the 2/30th about to embark on the same service. With this in mind, it is hard to escape the conclusion that York’s rejection of the provisional battalion concept was correct, and that the dislocation to the regimental system as a whole more than outweighed the small advantage gained for Wellington’s field army.
Since York was never fully able to force the provisional battalions issue until it was too late to matter, the commander in chief had to find other ways of keeping the system functioning in the face of what was rapidly developing into a manpower crisis to match that of 1809. With new demands for troops for northern Europe, and an escalation of the fighting in the Mediterranean and North America, the British Army was being pulled in several directions, and York, whose correspondence throughout the period shows a marked concern with unit strengths, potential reinforcements, and drafts going overseas, was beset by conflicting demands from different quarters and obliged to make difficult choices in which his own military judgment was not necessarily the primary influence.71 That said, the first demand for troops to be sent to northern Europe in July 1813 did not create too great a burden; indeed, sending second-rate battalions to the Baltic could be seen as a positive measure that would ultimately enhance the effectiveness of the units in question and make the
m available for more extensive deployment. Thus, of the battalions sent with Gibbs to Stralsund, the 33rd and 54th were single-battalion regiments recovering from long service in the Indies whilst the remainder were junior battalions of regiments whose first battalion—or first three, in the case of the 4/1st—were already on active service elsewhere. Whilst rather weak, the two single-battalion regiments were effective enough, with Gibbs characterizing the 54th as “a very good serviceable body of men with very few young boys,”72 and the 2/73rd, which fought at Gohrde, was also a good unit. The three other battalions, however, were in rather worse condition, with inspections of the 4/1st and 2/91st identifying major flaws. In the former case, the rank and file were sound enough, but Gibbs found fault with both the officers and NCOs, many of whom were either worn out or newly appointed and raw. Unsurprisingly, the battalion’s ability to maneuver was inadequate.73 Conversely, the 2/91st could maneuver with some competence, but its rank and file were “very bad, with the exception of about two hundred stout able men” and the NCOs again poor.74 These two battalions were initially retained in Germany when the other four redeployed to the Low Countries, effectively confirming that they were the worst of the six. Conversely, the other four units would later perform well in the field and so evidently made good use of the opportunity to put themselves into readiness.
Sickness, Suffering, and the Sword Page 19