The 8/60th never saw active service, going to Gibraltar when Cadiz was vacated, but the 7/60th served in Nova Scotia and Maine, remaining in Halifax on garrison duties until disbanded in 1817. But if the composition of these battalions was suspect, worse still was that of the final body of foreigners recruited from the captives and cast-offs of the Grande Armée. These were the five Companies of Independent Foreigners, established from July 1812 out of French prisoners and deserters. The measure was prompted as much by lack of suitable prisoner accommodation as anything else, but their indiscipline caused more problems than it solved, and they were hastily disbanded upon the coming of peace after achieving a characterization as “desperate banditti.”101 The employment of the First and Second Companies of Independent Foreigners in the expedition to Hampton Roads, during which at least two murders were committed along with several cases of rape, is a particular stain on the honor of the service during the period.102 Whilst such conduct cannot be justified, it should however be seen primarily as an indication of how short of manpower Britain had grown that such manner of troops were employed in active service, even on a minor expedition in a secondary theater.
The year 1813 also saw a sizeable draft of foreign manpower into another British regiment, the 102nd Foot. However, as with the 60th, the 102nd’s British status was largely nominal; the regiment had begun life as the New South Wales Corps, and still retained something of the character of a colonial regiment. Under these circumstances, the drafting in of German volunteers to bring the battalion up to strength for garrison duties on Bermuda makes perfect sense.103 In May 1814, its German element numbered 189, or 26 percent of the strength, and it was noted that these Germans were “the best conducted men in the Battalion,” something reflected in the fact that fourteen of them had gained NCO rank. By then, other battalions were benefiting in a similar fashion, albeit on a smaller scale and without the sanction of Horse Guards. The first instance of this practice came in the peninsula, where in 1812 Wellington authorized the recruitment of a limited number of Spaniards into understrength battalions. Subsequently, this practice was extended to all British battalions serving in the theater, which, assuming all reached Wellington’s quota of 100 Spaniards per battalion, would have added 4,100 recruits. In practice nothing like that figure was achieved, since numbers were small in the first place and many of those who did enlist subsequently absconded; September 1812, for example, saw the 2/31st recruit three Spaniards but have seven desert.104 The majority of those who did stay, estimated at no more than 300, served primarily in the Light Division; they were considered able soldiers, but they were far too few to make much difference to the grand scheme of things.105 Gibbs’s battalions in the Baltic also began to add foreigners to their strength, with an inspection of the 2/91st finding ten Germans—“good sized stout men”—amongst the battalion’s rank and file in October 1813.106 Nor was this practice restricted to the 2/91st, since a return for the troops joining Graham in February 1814 includes “100 Foreign Recruits for the 33rd Regiment.”107 The exact fate of this draft is unclear, for the total strength of the 33rd increased by only sixty-one men between February and March 1814, and the battalion was expecting fifty recruits to join from its depot as well as this draft of foreigners.108 Nevertheless, when the 33rd was inspected in April 1814, it had seventy-eight foreigners in the ranks, including two sergeants, a corporal, and a musician, although sixty-nine of them were “not yet supplied with arms.”109
At the same time as measures were being undertaken at the instigation of local commanders, Castlereagh was advocating a more significant increment to Graham’s army by proposing to Lord Clancarty, ambassador to Holland, the large-scale enlistment of Dutchmen.110 Since Castlereagh sought to add a hundred men to each of the fifteen British line battalions then either serving with Graham or earmarked to do so, this was something on a par with Wellington’s planned enlistment of Spaniards, although the relative weakness of Graham’s battalions would have ensured that a greater percentage of the total force were foreigners. Castlereagh recognized that adding too many new recruits would have an adverse effect and likely render the battalions ineffective, but did not specify how the language barrier was to be overcome. In any case, the Dutch took an unsurprisingly dim view of British attempts to recruit their nationals and nothing came of the project, which Graham considered provocative and unworkable from the start.111 On the other hand, Graham was keen to recruit foreign deserters from the French service, informing Bathurst, “There are, however every day considerable numbers of deserters coming in at different posts. I should suppose there w’d be no objection to my enlisting the Germans &c & incorporating them in some of the very weak Battn’s here—I shall detain those who are willing to serve with us at Willemstadt till I receive your L’dship’s directions.”112 In the end, nothing came of this either, and the only battalions under Graham’s command with substantial numbers of foreigners in the ranks by mid-1814 were the 33rd and 2/91st, both of which had already started recruiting Germans whilst in the Baltic.113
Nevertheless, the fact that such measures were even considered makes it clear that the bulk of the battalions deployed in 1813 were weak and unfit for service, to the extent of having to take pretty much any available manpower. In a particularly poor state were the two new battalions raised during late 1813, and Cooke’s report on 2/37th makes a specific condemnation of deploying battalions as raw as these.114 That the other new battalion in the field, the 3/56th, was less badly off would seem to be due largely to the exertions of its commander, Lt. Colonel John Browne.115 In Britain, meanwhile, another of the new units, the 2/86th, was still in such a state of organizational flux that its sick had had to be left in the care of a Militia regiment in the same garrison due to a complete lack of medical staff, and was clearly in no fit state to go overseas.116 York’s attempt to force the system to suit his purposes had failed, and more drastic measures were therefore required if the manpower embodied into these new battalions, and that remaining in the home depots of other regiments, was to be employed effectively.
These steps, however, were to be taken in conjunction with another move that would represent an even greater shift away from the army’s established methods of manpower management, and which would in turn indicate an increasing belief in the failure of those systems. This was the introduction of a bill into Parliament on November 4, 1813, to allow the Militia to volunteer for service in Europe. The policy was not well received by Horse Guards or by Wellington, and it indicated that, for the first time in thirteen years, the British Army’s own established methods had failed to meet the country’s needs for active military manpower. Bathurst initially hoped for some 20,000 militiamen to volunteer into the line, but explained to Wellington that although this remained the preferred option in the long term, it would take some time to implement.117 If, as was hoped, existing Militia battalions could be deployed on active service as complete units—as they had been during the Irish Rebellion of 1798, although that had technically still been home service—then this would get men into the field more readily. Yet one can well understand that the scheme did not sit well with York. Sending the Militia overseas did not simply circumvent the regimental system; it circumvented the country’s whole military organization.
In practice, Militia volunteering fell far short of the levels expected, and no one Militia battalion was deployed as such, with the only units going overseas being three provisional battalions formed into a brigade under Major General Sir Henry Bayly, ready for service in March 1814. Such a limited response stood in stark contrast to the favorable results achieved in 1800–1801 when the Fencible infantry was called upon to go overseas and sent units as far afield as Portugal and Egypt.118 In conjunction with the reduction in the numbers of militiamen prepared to volunteer directly into the line, the difficulties inherent in finding sufficient manpower to form the Bailey’s three battalions in turn raises questions as to how far the war-weariness and overstretch existing in the regular army by this
time also extended back to the home front. Initially earmarked to join Wellington, the Brigade of Provisional Militia was briefly reassigned to the Netherlands before this order was also countermanded and its original assignment restored; the three battalions eventually reached Bordeaux on April 12, a day after the news of Napoleon’s abdication.119 Each provisional militia battalion was built around men from a single core unit, topped up with volunteers from others, but this arrangement introduced complications, with Colonel Sir Watkin Wynn obtaining command of the 3rd Battalion, largely drawn from the 2nd West Yorkshire Militia, because the 135 volunteers from his own Royal Denbigh Militia refused to serve under anyone else. Since George Canning described Wynn as the “worst man of business” he had ever met, either the colonel’s military talents were considerably greater than his political ones or those 135 Denbighshire men came at a potentially high cost—the more so when it transpired that although armed as riflemen they were lacking instruction in the drills for such weapons.120 Politicking of this degree—Henry Torrens claimed the three Militia battalions were “more troublesome than the whole army put together”121—and fears over the response of the rank and file ensured that the militiamen were retained as a distinct brigade. Since they mustered 2,450 rank and file when they prepared to re-embark in May 1814,122 this represented an appreciable infusion of manpower, but meant that as a body their potential combat value was considered by Wellington to be fairly negligible.123
With the Militia schemes failing to have the desired effect by the spring of 1814, and demands for reinforcements from all theaters still coming in, Bathurst was forced to turn to York for new ways of getting men into the field. After the failure at Bergen op Zoom, the Netherlands once more became the focus of Bathurst’s attentions. One result of this was the soon-to-be-rescinded decision to redirect the Brigade of Provisional Militia from Wellington to Graham, provoking a petulant outburst from the former.124 The other result was that pressure was put on York to find more men. York’s acceptance of the inevitable came on March 14, 1814, when he presented his compromise plan for the creation of detachment battalions at home.
In reference to the conversation I have had with your Lordship respecting the necessity of sending a reinforcement to Holland, I have to acquaint you, that, exclusive of the Brigade of Provisional Militia, now embarked at Portsmouth, there is no alternative but to make up weak Battalions of the Line by Detachments from other Corps which, although injurious to the service generally, I cannot hesitate to recommend to the Prince Regent under the present emergency.
The following is the force proposed to proceed on this service
3 Provisional Battalions–2,400
Foot Guards–3 Companies–300
5th Foot–4 Coys.–400
63rd Foot–3 Coys.–300 } 800
39th Foot–1 Coy.–100
14th Foot–5 Coys.–500
86th Foot–2 Coys.–200 } 800
4th Foot–1 Coy.–100
22nd Foot–5 Coys.–500
9th Foot–1 Coy.–100 } 800
19th Foot–2 Coys.–200
Total 5,100125
Within York’s 5,100-man total, the three companies of Foot Guards were drafts already under orders; the “Provisional Battalions” refer to the Militia then embarked at Portsmouth, not the new battalions whose composition York then details. York’s initial draft has the 22nd providing four companies only, giving just seven hundred men for the last detachment battalion, but this figure has subsequently been scored out and the totals changed to those given above.
Not only did York submit the proposal under protest, stressing that it was “injurious to the service generally,” but also, even in extremis, he did not abandon entirely the tenets of the regimental system. In no sense does the proposal imply a return to the hated eighteenth-century practice of permanently drafting men from one regiment to another, although logically one might expect the three battalions central to the scheme—the 2/5th, 3/14th, and 2/22nd—to have absorbed the smaller detachments. Clearly, so far as York was concerned, the proposed organization of these three battalions was a temporary step only, and the detached men would ultimately return to their units. The maintenance of distinct, regimentally based companies within these detachment battalions emphasizes the importance placed on maintaining unit identity, ironically mirroring the similar arrangements in Wellington’s provisional battalions. In effect, York was seeking to bring in extra manpower as a way of advancing the readiness of the three “core” battalions, thereby retaining the intention to revert to normal methods as a long-term objective, and the central role of these units was emphasized by their each being called on to provide two of the three field officers assigned to each provisional formation.126
The scheme indicates York’s acceptance that battalions of three hundred to five hundred men required some form of augmentation before being put into service. This in turn signals a realization, after the poor performance of the 2/37th and 3/56th, that his newly created battalions were not fit for service in their own right, hence the utilization of two of them—2/22nd and 3/14th—as core units in this scheme. Far from being fit on its own, the last of York’s new battalions, the 2/86th, was called upon to contribute only two companies. The number of men actually available in each of the units concerned, including where appropriate those in the regimental depots, is shown in table 7.
As the figures indicate, York’s proposal was by no means unreasonable. The 2,400 men required were easily available, and although a comparison between the numbers demanded by York and the effective strength of the units finds the 2/22nd badly deficient of its required total and the 2/63rd and 2/86th slightly so, other battalions still had men available over their quotas. Only when the required figures are compared with the numbers “fit for immediate service” does the proposal begin to fall down, with the total fit strength of all nine units amounting to barely two-thirds of the numbers required. Additionally, the figures for the 2/5th transpired to be out of date, and the battalion had fewer men available than York had initially believed.127 To make the scheme work, men who were not thought fit do so by their units would therefore have had to go overseas, but by no means to the same degree as had been the case in the battalions sent to Holland the previous December. There were some men who certainly could not have gone—the 2/39th’s eight pioneers, for example, listed as “Unfit for active service but essential for depot purposes.”128 Equally, in a time of maximum effort, there is no reason why the sixty-nine men variously excepted by the 2/9th as being “Corporals, Taylors, Officers Servants, &c, &c.” should not have been called upon—indeed, all three categories might be deemed essential for the effective functioning of the detachment.129
Table 7. York’s Provisional Battalion Scheme
Source: Unit strengths from Battalion Returns for February 1814, TNA, WO17/274, 275, 277, 279, 281.
Eventually, by way of compromise, the strict quotas were abandoned and units unable to meet their targets instructed to send “all such Recruits as were equal to the fatigues of a Campaign” to Colchester, where the three “Detachment Battalions of the Line” were assembled under the superintendence of Major General Acland.130 In order to partially address the manpower shortfalls, the 2/4th had its quota doubled to two hundred men, and the depot of the 29th Foot was ordered to supply the same number; when the latter proved impossible, the order was rescinded and the 2/15th, on Jersey, was called upon instead.131 Despite such problems, and difficulties in arming and equipping some of the detachments, the three battalions were brought together surprisingly quickly. It was nevertheless recognized that the initial hoped-for strength was unlikely to be attained, and when Graham was informed that these units would be joining him their combined strength was set at a more achievable 2,000.132 When peace intervened, the detachment battalions were essentially complete in their modified form, awaiting only the men from Jersey, but it was no doubt with some relief that York was able to authorize the breaking up of these units before they had the ch
ance to see any active service, the orders being sent within days of the news of Napoleon’s abdication.133
For a scheme produced at short notice and against the opinions of its author, much can be said in favor of York’s scheme, both in conceptual and practical terms. As one would expect, it also shows that York, the professional, was far more conversant with the subtleties of the monthly returns than his political master. Unlike Bathurst, putting together his initial proposal for Graham’s command, York’s proposal indicates a far more realistic grasp of the significance of the information contained in these documents—tempered, perhaps, with a slight element of optimism as to how many men the 2/22nd might recruit. All in all, the scheme suggests a measured approach and a careful weighing of short-term gains against long-term problems. Most probably, York would not have proposed the scheme without pressure from Bathurst. Nevertheless, his responding to political demands in this way indicates a flexibility of mind and approach not traditionally associated with York’s management of the British Army; Calvert’s staff work, in ensuring that the scheme was so speedily enacted, also merits praise. Unlike Bathurst, seeking only to get numbers overseas, and unlike Wellington, seeing only the local picture, York’s response to the problems of 1813–14 imply a mind well aware of the qualities required to enable a unit to function effectively, but also of the wider strategic imperatives that inevitably forced a compromise when political and military priorities clashed.
Sickness, Suffering, and the Sword Page 21