The other main anomaly in the divisional system was that of the Second Division. Judging from his correspondence, it would seem that Wellington ultimately envisaged the structure of Hill’s quasi corps as comprising four British and two Portuguese brigades. Since the initial 1810 formation contained only the Second Division of three British brigades, and the two-brigade Portuguese Division, the brigades of Karl von Alten and then of Kenneth Howard were envisaged as forming the fourth British brigade. Both of these brigades included light infantry units, otherwise absent from Hill’s command, and would have been posted to the Second Division in lieu of Hoghton’s Brigade.45 Although Alten’s Brigade was present at Albuera, it ultimately joined the Seventh Division instead of the Second; meanwhile, the losses sustained in that battle caused the Second Division’s original three brigades to be condensed into two, such that when Howard’s troops did transfer from the First Division, they served only to return the brigade structure of the Second Division to the status quo ante. Accordingly, the sixth brigade for Hill’s command ultimately came in the shape of more Portuguese troops.46 Because of the inefficiency of the Portuguese commissariat, Wellington did not consider it viable to maintain large formations of Portuguese troops or to have divisions containing more Portuguese troops than British, which explains why, when Ashworth’s Brigade of Portuguese troops, previously independent, joined Hill, it became part of the Second Division rather than the Portuguese, even though this created two divisions of abnormal size.47
The other anomaly that needs addressing is the conception that the Seventh Division was intended by Wellington to be a second Light Division. The case in favor of this is summed up by Alistair Nichols in his history of the Chasseurs Britanniques, who reminds his readers, “It was formed with a preponderance of light infantry battalions and also had attached to it horse, rather than foot, artillery.”48 Yet this is essentially the sum total of the evidence, and even this does not stand up to great scrutiny. As Nichols himself points out, the Chasseurs Britanniques, name notwithstanding, were never formally trained as light infantry, and retained a standard line organization with flank and center companies.49 This being so, only six of the original eleven battalions were lights, which, whilst a higher proportion than in the other numbered divisions, was hardly an overwhelming preponderance. Furthermore, if this surmise of Wellington’s intentions is correct, then it is hard to see why the KGL light infantry was originally slated to join Hill’s command, or the Brunswick Oels Light Infantry, which ultimately formed part of Alten’s Brigade, was originally posted to the Light Division; only later were these battalions redirected to form part of the new Seventh. Since the Seventh Division was formed almost entirely from reinforcements, one can perceive a triumph of necessity over choice in the assignment of battalions, which in turn suggests that the division got Captain Alexander MacDonald’s E Troop, RHA, as its divisional battery simply because that unit was also newly arrived and unattached.50
Wellington had realized at an early date the utility of providing each division with an organic contingent of light infantry, and this was certainly apparent by early 1811, when the Seventh Division was being assembled, as it also played a part in the choice of reinforcements for Hill’s command. This realization was also reflected by the removal of the Brunswickers from the Light Division and the distribution of their Jäger companies amongst the army’s infantry brigades in the same manner of those of the 5/60th—a measure that ultimately ensured that every British brigade included a company of riflemen.51 This wider distribution of the available light infantry units not only argues against a desire to duplicate the existing Light Division but also explains why the 1813 reorganization further reduced the number of light battalions in the Seventh Division by transferring two of them to the First Division—the only formation lacking such units by this stage in the war—replacing them by battalions of the line.52 If Wellington did initially consider establishing the Seventh Division as a predominately light formation, this thinking was soon dispensed with. Nevertheless, this confused and intermediate status may go some way toward explaining the poor light in which the Seventh Division was viewed by members of other divisions, to the extent that it has been suggested that the Seventh Division’s changing organization and slow gestation were responsible for an identity crisis that would dog the formation throughout its existence.53
At the same time as more infantry divisions were being formed, Wellington’s cavalry was also expanding in numbers, although throughout the war the brigade remained the basic operational unit. The single initial division spawned a second in 1811 to encompass the cavalry serving in the southern theater, although this was only formally designated as the Second Cavalry Division on June 19 of that year.54 Cotton, who replaced Payne at the head of the cavalry in 1810, retained administrative control over both cavalry divisions whilst commanding the First in person, and reabsorbed the entire cavalry into a single division when the army was reunited for the 1813 campaign. The increasing distribution of the army as it fanned out into southern France in 1814 therefore made Cotton’s job far more an administrative post than a combat one; indeed, the cavalry seems to have functioned perfectly adequately in the Vitoria campaign with no divisional commander at all, Cotton then being on leave. During the last eighteen months of the Peninsular War, cavalry brigades were parceled out to the various wings and columns of the army, with the more senior amongst their commanders on occasion assuming command of more than one brigade. Most of these organizations were temporary and ephemeral, but as of March 1814 Major General the Hon. Henry Fane formally assumed command of all the cavalry of Hill’s Right Wing. Fane henceforth led not only his own brigade, command of which passed to Lt. Colonel Arthur Clifton of the 1st Dragoons, but also that previously under Major General Hussey Vivian, who had gone home and left it under Lt. Colonel Patrick Doherty of the 13th Light Dragoons.55 Although the shifting nature of the war during its final months speaks against any need to formalize the organization of the cavalry brigades, there remains a lingering suspicion that the failure to re-create multiple divisions of cavalry may have been due in part to the lack of suitable officers to command them; other than Fane, it is hard to see who else could have been trusted with more than a brigade even by 1814. Even when there had been two cavalry divisions, the Second was commanded for most of its existence by the terminally incompetent Lt. General Sir William Erskine, who was assigned to it largely as a means of keeping him out of greater trouble elsewhere.56
During 1810 and into early 1811, Wellington’s peninsular command was reinforced by a steady stream of new troops, which allowed him to complete the divisional system outlined above. However, for the most part these reinforcements were integrated into the existing order of battle rather than used in their entirety to create new formations. The only division formed entirely from scratch was the Seventh, the organization of which was not completed until well after the 1811 campaign was under way.57 Where possible, however, new divisions were created by mixing new and seasoned troops. Thus, when two brigades of British reinforcements arrived in Lisbon over the winter of 1810–11, they did not simply form a single new command. One new brigade—Dunlop’s—was assigned to the existing Fifth Division, releasing one of the Fifth Division’s two Portuguese brigades to form part of the new Sixth. Logically, one might have expected the Portuguese to be combined with the other new British brigade, Erskine’s, but instead a more sophisticated approach was chosen. In order to spread experienced troops more widely across the army, Erskine’s Brigade was posted to the First Division, displacing Pakenham’s Brigade which went in turn to the Fourth Division so that Major General Alexander Campbell’s veteran British brigade could be transferred to the new Sixth. Here, it would be joined in the new year by another new British brigade under Colonel Robert Burne. The new division therefore had one British brigade of veterans and one of new troops, plus a battle-tested Portuguese brigade. Campbell, who had had acting command of the Fourth Division during the Talavera campaign, was
promoted to lead the new formation on a permanent basis.58 The favoring of the double-transfer, rather than simply posting Pakenham’s Brigade to the Sixth Division, was no doubt to ensure that Campbell would have troops he knew and trusted to become the nucleus of his expanded command.
This combining of new and experienced troops was a key element in Wellington’s success, and was continued throughout the war. No new division was formed after early 1811, and, except in the cavalry, which continued to expand to 1813, very few new brigades were formed either. Up until 1811, reinforcements frequently arrived as organized brigades, complete with commanders, which could then be fitted directly into the expanding structure as was done during the reorganizations that created the Sixth Division.59 Thereafter, new infantry regiments came out individually and were added to existing brigades as reinforcements or to replace units that had been sent home. New cavalry brigades did continue to arrive as fully organized formations into the early spring of 1813, but most of these were soon reorganized to acquire at least one veteran regiment. When Le Marchant’s Brigade of heavy cavalry was sent out over the winter of 1811–12, for example, the raw 4th Dragoon Guards were soon replaced with the veteran 4th Dragoons.60 Similarly, in 1813 Colonel Colquhoun Grant’s Hussar Brigade had its worst performing regiment taken out and combined into a new brigade with the veteran 1st KGL Hussars. The new brigade commander, Major General Victor Alten, made it explicit to the officers of the offending 18th Hussars that this had been done for the benefit of their regiment: “The duties of hussars in the field are so various & require so much practice & experience that too many opportunities cannot be taken, even in cantonments to instruct the men in them, and the Major General will find great pleasure in giving that assistance which his experience may enable him to do.”61 The reaction of the officers of the 18th was mixed, but the reorganization had the desired effect.
After mid-1811, the continued arrival of infantry reinforcements a battalion at a time enabled Wellington to maintain the divisions as balanced entities, both with regard to their strength and to the balance of unit experience within them. Since large-scale reorganizations had to be avoided to maintain cohesion and morale, significant changes to the army’s order of battle had to be delayed until active campaigning had finished for the winter.62 Because, in practice, Wellington’s forces had few extended breaks from active service, a full redistribution of forces in order to achieve a completely uniform organization was never possible; nevertheless, the lengthy operational hiatus after the retreat from Burgos allowed for extensive changes that brought the infantry divisions very close to what seems to have been Wellington’s ideal. The peninsular “Marching Strength” of May 25, 1813, detailing British and Portuguese forces, demonstrates that this ideal had very nearly been achieved by the outset of the Vitoria campaign.63 All the three-brigade divisions have a total Anglo-Portuguese strength of around 7,000 all ranks whilst the First, Light, and Portuguese Divisions all muster around 5,000 in their two brigades; these figures do not include Lambert’s absent brigade, which, if added, would raise the First Division to the ca. 7,000-man standard. For the Second Division, on the other hand, the four-brigade organization gives a grand total of no less than 10,834 all ranks. The line divisions were therefore largely uniform in size, with the disparity of the large Second Division making sense when understood in conjunction with its operational pairing with the smaller Portuguese Division.
Something approaching a balance had also been achieved insofar as the level of experience of the various divisions was concerned, although here a greater disparity remained. Looking at British units only, the progression may be tracked throughout the war by taking an average of how many months each component battalion had served in the theater. Data in table 8 is for the month of April, which generally marked the end of reorganizations and the beginning of active service, although this choice of date has the added advantage of also catching the army in the final month of its existence. The second, bracketed, figure for the First Division in 1814 includes in its total the five battalions of Aylmer’s Brigade, which, though nominally independent, operated in practice as part of the division.
As the table demonstrates, although divisional strengths had become roughly equalized by the beginning of 1813, a distinction in terms of experience remained between the original five divisions and the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Divisions raised later. This disparity may largely be put down to the fact that the Seventh, and to a lesser extent the Fifth, were initially formed out of what was available, being composed largely of battalions posted back to the peninsula after service in Walcheren or of weak second battalions. By contrast, the Sixth Division began life with a good proportion of veteran units, as we have seen, but lost out in the 1813 reorganizations.
Table 8. Average Unit Experience (Months) of Peninsular Divisions
Source: Figures refer to months since arrival in the peninsula; data largely derived from McGuigan, “Origin of Wellington’s Peninsular Army,” 39–70; and Oman, Wellington’s Army, 343–373.
The need to acclimatize these newer divisions, and build up their strength, explains their limited commitment to serious combat prior to 1812. Wellington’s deployment of his army at Fuentes de Oñoro makes this need particularly explicit, with the three new divisions out on the extremities of the line and the tested First, Third, and Light Divisions holding the vulnerable center. Although this deployment did not save the Seventh Division from heavy fighting as a result of Masséna’s flank attack, its intention is plain. In like fashion, the newer divisions were largely held back from the horrors of the storming of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz, and the Fifth and Sixth Divisions would only receive their real baptism of fire at Salamanca.64 Only from 1813 did matters appreciably change; after the reorganizations of the previous winter, the distribution of veteran and untried regiments across the army was as balanced as it would ever be, and the distinction between new and old divisions less marked. By this stage of the war, it also needs to be understood that the value of the monthly experience figures used here begins to deteriorate as many of the longest serving units had by now absorbed substantial drafts and transfers of manpower. Conversely, many of the nominally inexperienced first battalions had in fact taken in a core of veterans from departing junior battalions. Accordingly, the qualitative discrepancy implied by these figures may overstate the case a little.
One could well argue that a reorganization to create this state of affairs might ideally have been implemented earlier, but this argument begs the question of at what other point the strategic situation would have permitted a large-scale overhaul. As it was, a rearrangement of some brigades when the Fifth and Sixth Divisions were created, and minor changes thereafter, created a system that was workable for the campaigning of 1810–12 but that favored the senior divisions and in turn forced a greater reliance on them. Later, with time available, larger changes enabled a more balanced organization to be implemented. The structural development of the divisional system should therefore be read as being a steady progression toward an ultimate organizational goal, which had largely been achieved by the commencement of the march out of Portugal that would lead to Vitoria and ultimately to Toulouse.
The slow evolution of the system of command and control that has been outlined above was somewhat unusual for the era, where divisional assignments increasingly remained unchanged for years on end in most continental armies, most obviously that of France. This slow growth also had an effect on the choices of commanders for higher formations in the peninsula, complicated by the fact that the few officers who possessed the requisite experience in 1809 were unable to serve as they were senior to Wellesley. In the long term, the knock-on effect of this lack of senior commanders was to advance the careers of younger, more junior, officers who found themselves serving in posts typically filled by senior men. One only has to compare the two main field armies in 1809 to see the extent that this was the case. Chatham had a lt. general as his second-in-command, and all bar one of his di
visional commanders also held that rank; the exception—Thomas Graham—was filling in for the absent Lt. General Sir John Cradock. Conversely, Wellesley’s army at Talavera contained only three officers of lt. general’s rank, all of whom, including Wellesley himself, were junior to the men commanding Chatham’s divisions. Almost all of Chatham’s brigades had a major general in command, but the same could be said of only two of Wellesley’s, who did, however, have two more officers of that rank commanding divisions whilst Alexander Campbell filled the last divisional vacancy as a brigadier general. Of the two major generals left at brigade level, one was Cotton, a cavalryman, and the other was Christopher Tilson, an incompetent. A small number of more senior officers did come out to the peninsula early on, expressly as divisional commanders—notably Sherbrooke and Payne, who completed the Talavera trio of lt. generals, and also Sir Brent Spencer, who returned in time to command the First Division for most of 1810 and 1811. However, by the time the divisional system was complete in mid-1811, all divisional commanders, with the exception of Spencer who was also the nominal second-in-command of the whole army, had risen from having previously held brigade commands either in the peninsula, on Walcheren, or both.
Sickness, Suffering, and the Sword Page 24