In Britain’s earlier wars, the creation of loyalties and identities that were theater-specific rather than directed toward the British Army as a whole prevented many of the tactical and operational lessons of these conflicts from being applied more widely, and so too were many of the lessons of 1808 to 1815 dismissed, ignored, or forgotten. Ironically, whereas in 1763 and 1783 lessons were discounted as representing a colonial anomaly, after 1815 many of the lessons of the previous two decades seemed out of place in an army fighting small wars around the British Empire. The discontinuing of standing brigades and divisions prior to the 1850s, and the distribution of the army by battalions and regiments, is a case in point and was resisted by those who had experience of the effectiveness of such methods before 1815.47
This trend of forgotten lessons is particularly apparent when the issues of manpower are considered. Even at the time, Wellington felt that his temporary manpower solutions could be expanded upon and incorporated into the established system. During the controversy over provisional battalions, he submitted a proposal to Bathurst for forwarding to York, proposing the universal adoption of similar methods. In the proposed system, whenever a unit on active service fell below 350 effective rank and file, it would send company cadres home to recruit up to strength and then rejoin; in the meantime, the cut-down battalion remaining in the field would form part of a provisional battalion.48 Wellington’s proposals had merit, and would surely have been less damaging if widely established than Bathurst’s counterproposal, which involved sending understrength battalions home but drafting off to other units any volunteers who wished to remain in the theater, as was already done with units leaving the Indies.49 But it would be another decade before a juggling of companies within units similar to Wellington’s proposal, albeit without the creation of provisional battalions from the residue, became accepted practice, and even then this was implemented primarily as part of a policy to produce more, smaller, battalions for colonial service.50 This system, and those that followed it, retained the onus of recruitment and manpower administration securely at the regimental level.
Because ultimate victory seemed to endorse existing practices, little thought was given to the narrow margin by which that victory had been obtained. By 1813, the amount of flexibility in the early part of the period, made available through manipulation of the system, had come to represent a double-edged sword. On the one hand, this flexibility enabled Britain’s military to function successfully throughout most of the period of this study. On the other hand, this success hid the limitations of what was, for all its positives, in many ways an outdated system. Only when events toward the end of the Napoleonic Wars pushed that system as far as it could go did its failings become apparent, but because there was no major disaster an element of complacency entered the equation. In truth, the effects of the manpower crisis of 1813 and 1814 were such that the British Army had still not fully regained its former levels of effectiveness even by the time of Waterloo. The forces sent to the Netherlands in 1813, and retained there after the peace, had a function that was primarily political rather than military, but their lack of quality and numbers precluded their obtaining Britain any great advantage during the closing months of hostilities or giving it any political leverage during the peace settlement. Indeed, with the bulk of its regiments either worn down after long service or shifted to North America, Britain was forced to enlist French support during the Vienna negotiations in order to give its position some level of military credibility, with Liverpool insisting, “It would be quite impossible to embark this country in a war at present.”51
Just as the European war had precluded serious military endeavors in North America before 1814, so did the shifting of focus across the Atlantic now prevent Britain from using its military resources on the continent. The peace settlement at Ghent thankfully allowed for a renewed European commitment during the Hundred Days, but by no means one on a par with the forces that Britain had fielded two years previously.52 Not only was the army that fought at Quatre Bras and Waterloo organizationally incomplete, but it contained elements—British as well as foreign—whose dubious performance escaped notice only because of the eventual triumph.53 The Waterloo campaign saw an unusually high level of officer casualties, right up to the senior level with one British divisional commander and three brigadiers killed at Waterloo, as compared to two and eight respectively for the whole Peninsular War.54 Other than the exploits of the heavy cavalry, the epics of the fighting in 1815 were essentially defensive, which, in conjunction with the high level of officer casualties incurred through the need to lead by personal example, suggests a definite awareness of relative inferiority. Yet this situation is only to be expected when the strain under which the system had been placed over the previous eight years is taken into account, and the depth of the crisis in which it had fallen little more than a year before the final victory. Wellington’s “nearest run thing”55 can be applied to more than just a single day in June 1815.
The military system with which the British Army fought the Napoleonic Wars was that of the eighteenth century. When Fortescue sums up the workings of the system during the campaigns of Marlborough, many of the points that are made with regard to manpower could be taken word for word and inserted into this analysis.56 But it is easy to seek commonality, and far harder to identify those areas where change was taking place. A system that had given problems throughout the eighteenth century was, by the end of the Napoleonic Wars, rapidly approaching the end of its useful life. That the system had survived for so long, and that its vestiges in terms of regimental identity linger to this day, represents a fair tribute to its motivational benefits, and in the Napoleonic Wars these benefits did, by and large, enable it to overcome the organizational drawbacks that became more and more apparent as time went on. But the fact remains that by the end of this period the individual soldier was becoming far more aware of his place in the system and his place in the world. The British Army was forced to recognize the rank-and-file soldier as a man rather than a cog in a machine or as a figure on a return, a recognition that is attested to by the institution of a Waterloo Medal for all ranks and, much later, by the belated award of the Military General Service Medal in 1847.57
Perhaps the greatest legacy of the period 1808–15 was that it served to imprint the regimental system yet more firmly on the British Army, thus doing much to shape the nature of that force for the remainder of the nineteenth century and beyond. Organizational flexibility during the Napoleonic Wars enabled the British Army to fight above its weight, but only to a point and never to the degree that it could ever expect to compete on equal terms with the continental military heavyweights. In the context of broad British strategy, this military inequality was not a detriment because British gold, ploughed into subsidies for its allies, meant that the British Army was almost always operating within a coalition framework. That the British Army performed as well on campaign as it did between 1808 and 1815 is nevertheless tribute not to the system itself, but to the men who made it work. But by making an outdated system function, they gave it a new lease of life and institutionalized it to a degree that would bedevil their successors for much of the nineteenth century. For Britain and its allies, it was essential that the British military system held together long enough to contribute to the final victory, but this success was not necessarily beneficial for the future development of the British Army.
Appendix 1
DETAILS OF DATA SAMPLE
Data was sampled from a total of eleven theaters of war, utilizing a total of 345 individual monthly returns. The selection includes all theaters where significant campaigning took place, but also incorporates adjacent secondary and garrison stations. In part, this inclusion allows comparison between inactive and active stations in similar climatic conditions, but it also enables track to be kept of units being rotated between major and minor theaters. Data for Europe is taken from September 1808, the first month for which data from the peninsula is available, until
July 1815 when hostilities finally ceased. Data for North America has been taken from January 1812 until July 1815, allowing the transition to and from hostilities to be tracked. The full data is now available online, courtesy of the Napoleon Series website.
Peninsula (main army): September 1808 to June 1814 (70 months). Data from TNA, WO17/2464–2465, 2467–2476.
Sir John Moore’s army in Spain: November and December 1808 (2 months). Data from TNA, WO17/2464.1
Cadiz: April 1810 to July 1814 (52 months). Data from TNA, WO17/1486–1488.
Gibraltar (includes detachments at Ceuta and Tarifa): September 1808 to July 1815 (83 months). Data from TNA, WO17/1796–1801.
East Coast of Spain: April 1813 to April 1814 (13 months). Data from TNA, WO17/2478.
Walcheren: August to November 1809 (4 months). Data from TNA, WO17/2479.
Canada: January 1812 to July 1815 (43 months). Data from TNA, WO17/1516–1519.
Nova Scotia (includes Newfoundland and Bermuda): January 1812 to July 1815 (43 months). Data from TNA, WO17/2241–2243.
American Coast (including forces on passage): June 1814 to February 1815 (9 months). Data from TNA, WO17/1218.
Germany: July to December 1813 (6 months). Data from TNA, WO17/1773.2
Flanders (includes march on Paris): December 1813 to July 1815 (20 months). Data from TNA, WO17/1773, 1760.
Within this sample, in addition to detachments of artillery, engineers, and train troops serving in all stations, data was taken for the following selection of units. For each of these, data for the whole period has been collected into a unit-specific spreadsheet.
British infantry: 133 battalions, plus 6 sub-battalion detachments.
British provisional units: ten battalions, in some cases composed of units also listed individually under the previous heading.
British cavalry: twenty-six regiments, plus one subregimental detachment.
British garrison units: six battalions, plus three sub-battalion detachments.
Foreign infantry: eighteen battalions (of which one is provisional), five sub-battalion detachments, and two independent companies.
Foreign cavalry: six regiments, one subregimental detachment, and one independent troop.
Foreign garrison units: one battalion and one independent company.
Canadian provincial units: six battalions, plus three sub-battalion detachments.
Royal Marine units: two battalions and one artillery company.
Appendix 2
MEN RETURNED AS SICK AFTER THE CORUNNA CAMPAIGN
Note: Figures are taken from monthly Battalion Returns in TNA WO17/64–219, 806–808, and refer to those sick in hospitals.
Appendix 3
SAMPLE OF RETURNED DESERTERS IN THE PENINSULA
Note: Data derived from Monthly Returns in TNA, WO17/2465, 2470–2471. “British” is taken to include all units that were part of the regular line. Although it is appreciated that the 5/60th and 97th did contain substantial numbers of foreign nationals, and that other “British” units did also recruit foreigners, the nature of the data prevents this sort of distinction being made. “Foreign” deserters are therefore those belonging to KGL and émigré units.
Notes
Introduction
1. Sherer, Recollections, 5.
2. Reproduced in Austin, 1812: The March on Moscow, 398–399.
3. Bowden, Napoleon’s Grande Armée.
1. The British Army and Its Campaigns
1. See Linch, “Recruitment.”
2. A more detailed account of the system, with case studies based on Moore’s activities in 1808, can be found in Muir and Esdaile, “Strategic Planning,” 1–90; see also Haythornthwaite, Armies of Wellington, 12–21, 267–268.
3. Muir, Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon, 44–45.
4. Gregory, No Ordinary General.
5. Partridge and Oliver, Handbook, 5–9; Linch, “Recruitment,” 246–247.
6. Muir and Esdaile, “Strategic Planning,” 8.
7. Petty, “Wellington’s General Orders,” 145–146.
8. There are thus two “monthly” returns for June 1809, but for the purposes of statistical analysis, these have been consolidated using the strengths from June 25 and combining the losses of both returns to cover the period from May 1 to June 24, 1809.
9. Adjutant General’s Office, General Regulations, 266; see also ibid., 267–271 for detailed instructions as to how the forms were to be completed and what additional information was to be included.
10. See, for example, GO of October 9, 1810, in Gurwood, General Orders 2:179–181. Regarding Cadiz, see notes to the Monthly Returns for Portugal of April 25 and August 25, 1810, TNA, WO17/2465.
11. Adjutant General’s Office, General Regulations, 261; italics in the original.
12. Adjutant General’s Office, General Regulations, 260, 262.
13. Green, Soldier’s Life, 17.
14. Sherer, Recollections, 5.
15. Adjutant General’s Office, General Regulations, 279–288.
16. See, for example, Campbell to Calvert, July 3, 1811, TNA, WO27/102, part 2; Campbell to Calvert, September 15, 1812, TNA, WO27/111, part 1.
17. Haythornthwaite, Armies of Wellington; Partridge and Oliver, Handbook, 1–90.
18. Holmes, Redcoat, 106.
19. Haythornthwaite, Armies of Wellington, 274.
20. Haythornthwaite, Armies of Wellington 76–77; Fortescue, British Army, vol. 4, bk. 2, 931–934.
21. Oman, Wellington’s Army, 178–179.
22. Haythornthwaite, Armies of Wellington, 274.
23. MacArthur, “British Army Establishments: Part 1,” 154–159.
24. Glover, Peninsular Preparation, 232.
25. Sherer, Recollections, 180–181.
26. Adjutant General’s Office, General Regulations, 72–78; see also Wellington to Bentinck, July 20, 1813, in Gurwood, Dispatches 10:552–555.
27. Grattan, Adventures, vi.
28. Inspection Report on 2/89th by Major General Burgoyne, June 29, 1811, TNA, WO27/102. For examples in Britain, see Inspection Report on 2/9th by Major General Manningham, May 4, 1808, TNA, WO27/92; and Inspection Report on 2/86th by Major General Anson, May 19, 1814, TNA, WO27/127, part 2.
29. Linch, “Recruitment,” 42–55.
30. Returns of 2/91st, TNA, WO17/212, recording the dispatch of men to the first battalion.
31. Battalion Returns, TNA, WO17/146, 157. But see also “Troops Embarked from Cork under Lieut. General Sir Arthur Wellesley KB,” TNA, WO17/2464, which gives slightly different figures and would imply that, at least on paper, these men were entered first into the respective second battalions.
32. Glover, Peninsular Preparation, 228–229; Fletcher, “A Desperate Business,” 20.
33. McGuigan, “Origin of Wellington’s Peninsular Army,” 40–41.
34. Cannon, Historical Record of the Ninth, 43–44.
35. Holmes, Redcoat, 52.
36. Dempsey, Albuera, 238.
37. See “Return of Deserters from the French Army enlisted in Portugal for the Undermentioned Corps to the 4th of July 1810,” TNA, WO1/246, 155.
38. Wellington to Bathurst, November 9, 1813, in Gurwood, Dispatches 11:272–273.
39. Partridge and Oliver, Handbook, 93.
40. Glover, Peninsular Preparation, 81–93; Kiley, Artillery of the Napoleonic Wars, 157–180; Leslie, Services of the Royal Regiment of Artillery.
41. Monthly Return of August 25, 1809, TNA, WO17/2464.
42. Glover, Peninsular Preparation, 103–109; Haythornthwaite, Armies of Wellington, 114–117. On the Staff Corps of Cavalry, see Urban, Man Who Broke Napoleon’s Codes, 256–257, 265–266.
43. Haythornthwaite, Armies of Wellington, 119–122.
44. Figures from TNA, WO17/2814.
45. Fortescue, British Army 6:41–47.
46. Glover, Peninsular Preparation, 184–185.
47. Gregory, Sicily. See also Fortescue, British Army 5:253–255; and Hall, British S
trategy, 86–87.
48. Hopton, Maida; Fortescue, British Army 5:338–355; 6:5–27.
49. Muir, Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon, 37.
50. Fortescue, British Army 6:102–104, 113–115, 185–199, 122–137; Muir, Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon, 43–47; Oman, Peninsular War 1:220–300; Weller, Wellington in the Peninsula, 29–58.
51. Oman, Peninsular War 1:263–290, 625–628; Fortescue, British Army 6:235–250; Muir, Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon, 51–53.
52. Oman, Peninsular War 1:123–205, 334–375, 630–645; Muir, Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon, 60–62; Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, 612–625.
53. Summerville, March of Death; Oman, Peninsular War 1:486–602. On the exploits of Paget’s cavalry, see also Fletcher, Galloping at Everything, 90–100.
54. Times (London), January 9 and 10, 1809. The confusion was between Marshal Lefebvre, Duke of Danzig, and Général de Division Charles Lefebvre-Desnouettes, who was captured at Benavente.
55. Times (London), January 28, 1809. See also Fortescue, British Army 7:28–31; and Muir, Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon, 87.
56. “Recapulation of Provisions and Stores, Lost, Taken, or Destroyed during the late Campaign in Spain; as far as can be ascertained from Documents in the office of John Erskine Esq. Commissary-in-Chief,” House of Commons Parliamentary Papers 1809 11:252.
57. See Monthly Returns in TNA, WO17/2464.
58. Memorandum of March 7, 1809, in Gurwood, Dispatches 3:181–183.
59. Bond, Grand Expedition; Burnham, “The British Expeditionary Force.”
Sickness, Suffering, and the Sword Page 36