Much worse even than lack of equipment, the greatest problem facing Wavell’s senior officer in Nairobi was the lack of troops available to him. The KAR’s main role prior to the outbreak of war was to provide internal security, guarding in particular against raiding bandits attacking across the Kenyan frontier. It was also to form the core of an army in the event of any mobilisation in which the proportion of Africans to British in each of the battalions was about sixteen to one.49 Dickinson initially only had five of these battalions and one other from the Kenya Regiment although many of the men in the latter were far from fully trained as the war began.50 They were all short of equipment, lacking transport and guns but, according to one of the British officers serving with them, his African troops were ‘best suited to mobile offensive operations in bush country; all their instincts and natural training are in favour of the attack’.51 There was little hope of reinforcements arriving from overseas as, even before he had arrived in East Africa, the general had been told that ‘naval escort difficulties’ entailed that, for several months, he would have to be self-sufficient.52 This meant, for example, that it was only with the arrival of an Indian mountain battery on 11 September 1939 that he gained his first artillery unit.53
By the following month the situation had already improved and the headquarters of the 1st East African Infantry Brigade, covering the south of the colony, had been established in Nairobi with the available infantry and artillery split between the capital, and Mombasa and Malindi on the coast. A second brigade was based around Nanyuki in the Kenyan highlands, with companies in Jinja, Wajir and Moyale, which meant there were now six fully equipped battalions.54 The last of these locations, the headquarters of one of the province’s administrative districts, was about five miles beyond the Northern Frontier District’s scrub desert where the Boundary Commission of 1908 had established the frontier between British and Ethiopian territory.55 Before the First World War, the KAR had built a tower and a fort with very thick walls which were considered to be resistant to small arms fire. A company from the 5th Battalion held the position but they were equipped only with four Vickers machine guns, one Bren gun and a number of old training Lewis guns.56 Its nearest neighbouring unit, another company from the same battalion, was at Wajir ninety miles away. Described as ‘the loneliest outpost of the British Empire’, Wajir was also a vital source of water and once again had an old fort, this time with white walls, a Union Jack flying within its square keep and a tiny cemetery of graves containing soldiers who had already made the ultimate sacrifice.57 The wells were forty to fifty feet deep and the water was reasonably pure but, even when boiled, it could still contain sharp crystals of undissolved mica and gypsum. These were the source of great pain for a number of unfortunate troops, and ‘Wajir clap’ was remembered long after the fighting had finished.58
Both of these remote, tiny outposts were in fact critical to Dickinson’s thinking as he looked for ways in which he could weaken any future Italian offensive. On his opponent’s side of the frontier water was plentiful, but on his own it was confined to this very narrow strip, after which 250 miles of waterless desert to the south acted as a powerful natural barrier. It therefore seemed sensible to use his limited manpower resources in an attempt to defend key strategic points which both dominated local transport and allowed him control of these vital sources of water. At the same time, however, it was always recognised that it would not be possible to hold these forward isolated positions for long, such were the challenges involved in keeping the garrisons adequately supplied. Nonetheless, occupying them was seen as a means of ‘showing the flag’ both to the local Africans and to the Italians across the border, and Dickinson resolved that the costs were worth bearing, hoping that, if they were lost, the desolate terrain would form a buffer. Given the lack of troops and equipment, the only other strands to Dickinson’s strategic vision were the establishment of small mobile columns to harass the Italian units based in southern Ethiopia and, as had been proposed in the various appreciations produced in Cairo and London, to support a locally raised rebellion. Other than this, and with his priority – perhaps understandably – being the preparation of as many defensive positions as possible, the British commander did little to pursue the orders that had been sent to him from London to investigate how he might eventually conduct an advance into Italian East Africa.
Limited as the activity might have been on the British-held side of the frontier, far less was taking place on the other. Along the border between Kenya and Italian Somaliland there was some evidence of trenches being dug and mines being planted but everything was still considered to be ‘very quiet and friendly’.59 Reports from district officers in the north of Kenya in September 1939 consistently referred to the troops on the other side of the frontier as being ‘absorbed with their own internal problems’ as they continued to battle with the rebels fighting their guerrilla war.60 These reports also referenced the friendly relations that existed with the Italians, who were at this point taking only ‘normal’ precautionary measures such as the stopping of leave and the calling up of reserves. To such observers, themselves administrators tasked with the smooth running of colonial territory, it seemed clear that the Italians did not want a war which could only adversely affect their already delayed schedules for completing their imperial ambitions. In many respects such conclusions were correct, as Mussolini never strayed from his initial vision of creating a settlement for surplus population. This had led him to invest money in Italian East Africa at a far greater rate than anything ever attempted by the other European powers as part of their imperial experiences.61 His entire gold reserve allegedly ended up being spent in this pursuit, where it purchased everything from guns and tanks to mineral water and more than 3,000 miles of sealed roads.62 High levels of taxation along with the seizing of livestock on what were viewed as unreasonable terms, however, led to the local Ethiopians adopting an increasingly pro-British attitude. Despite this being exactly what the generals in Nairobi, Cairo and London wanted, in October a British officer based on the frontier went so far as to express some sympathy for the European settlers on the other side who were ‘at an unfortunate point in their colonial career, when their faults are still obvious and the benefits of their civilization not yet appreciated’.63
There was clearly a certain apathy concerning war aims. When Charles ‘Fluffy’ Fowkes, another officer with a great deal of previous military experience, arrived in Nairobi the following month to take command of a brigade, he found the colony ‘completely unprepared for war’.64 So bad was the situation, he concluded, that the chance of mounting a successful defence in the face of overwhelming Italian forces was ‘a forlorn hope’. Dickinson was desperately trying to make best use of whatever he could find but the senior figures in London still appeared to show very little interest in the perilous situation facing him, or even any willingness to accept that it existed. A report produced in late November by the Joint Planning Sub-Committee went so far as to conclude that in Kenya and British Somaliland reasonable risks could continue to be taken.65 This view was based upon the assessment that although there were up to seven Italian divisions within their East African territories, there was unlikely to be an attack on British or French forces due to the inability to send reinforcements through the Suez Canal. In many respects a reasonable conclusion, it led to the decision that the existing forces would probably be sufficient to mount the defence and that there would no reinforcements. Raising indigenous troops to distract and divert the Italians, and also requesting South African military support, was instead recommended as the best, and indeed only, possible course of action that could be pursued at this stage. The committee also considered Dickinson’s idea of creating a Colonial Division drawing entirely on troops from across the continent, but this was rejected, and it was made clear, once again, that he would have to rely upon troops already in Kenya, and, as had previously been agreed, a brigade which would be sent from West Africa. Such was the sense of denial about the
perilous nature of the threat facing the British Empire’s East African territories that when this far-reaching report did make passing reference to Wavell’s concerns about the Red Sea, it took the form of a brief discussion about the potential wider impact of Italy joining the war and not the impact it might have on the region.
Kenya was not, however, the only focus of British and Commonwealth regional activity. For an area that was more than half the size of India, the main defending forces in the Sudan consisted of only three British battalions of regular infantry. There was also the Sudan Defence Force (SDF), which contained a further 5,000 men organised into groups of mounted and regular infantry and motor machine-gun companies, although initially they had no tanks or artillery, which limited their military effectiveness.66 As was the case in other British-held territories across the region, there were very few sealed roads and during the rainy season from June to early October it was impossible for motor transport to operate in many areas. The only port was Port Sudan and a main rail line ran from it to Atbara, with key branches from there to Khartoum and Kassala on the border with Eritrea. Although this represented a crucial means of movement, both of troops and equipment, the track was a single line and liable to disruption from sandstorms and floods.67
Shortly after the outbreak of war in Europe, it was proposed that the size of the available forces in the Sudan be increased by the raising of an extra SDF battalion. The energetic local commander also began preparations for conducting further operations in neighbouring Italian territories.68 This was William Platt, a professional soldier who had been commissioned from Sandhurst in 1905, joining the Northumberland Fusiliers, after which he had fought on the North-West Frontier of India and was awarded a DSO. He served throughout the First World War, during which he was wounded on four occasions but also repeatedly promoted. After the war he was posted to various home commands, including Ireland, and completed two-year tours in both Egypt and the War Office before being appointed aide-de-camp to the king.69 In late 1938 he was promoted to major-general and took up the appointment in Khartoum as the SDF’s commandant, a role which carried the Arabic title of al-qa’id al-’amm, ‘the Leader of the Army’, often referred to more simply as ‘the Kaid’. According to one of his junior officers, Platt was a ‘stick of dynamite in a hot fire when there was a job to be done’, and he also, fortunately, proved to be a commander who was not overwhelmed by the size of the opponent facing him.
The Italians had assembled in Eritrea and northern Ethiopia nearly 70,000 men, 300 artillery pieces, 36 tanks and 24 armoured cars. Whilst this included a regular division of white soldiers and a number of Blackshirt militia battalions, most were colonial forces and local troops. The Italian officers commanding these units were renowned for their courage and skilful leadership and worked particularly well in combination with the Eritreans, who were on the whole loyal, intelligent, brave and, except in their fire discipline, good soldiers. The Ethiopians could be much less consistent, at times displaying considerable gallantry and skill and holding up positions or counter-attacking if dislodged, but on other occasions offering little or no resistance and surrendering when the first chance arose. All of the equipment was relatively modern except for the largely obsolete artillery, the value of which was reduced still further by its defective ammunition. Even so it was possible for these guns to be used along with heavy mortars which had a range of 4,000 yards, far greater than anything available to Platt. The Italians were limited, however, in their ability to use their tanks and armoured cars. In the summer of 1940 they still had large stocks of general supplies and materiel, including petrol, but a shortage of tyres meant the mobility of these vehicles was much reduced. This was largely unknown to the British commanders, who focused on defensive preparations and ordered the regular infantry to protect the key locations of Khartoum, Port Sudan and Atbara.70 Even with the SDF formed into mobile striking forces which would attempt to slow down any invading columns as they advanced, Platt and Wavell accepted that the frontier towns would have to be evacuated.
This was of course still the period during which Europe was gripped by the ‘phoney war’ and the lack of any actual fighting produced a stupor in some quarters that extended to the Middle East and Africa. Further staff talks held with the French in early November 1939 only served to highlight the fact that in certain quarters there was no desire to change preparations across the region. The possibility of launching military operations against Italian East Africa was rejected, noting that there were still only ‘very small bodies of troops’ in Kenya, the use of which was ‘quite impracticable’ for such purposes.71 With the manpower position not much better in the Sudan, a possible attack launched from French or British Somaliland was viewed as having ‘most undesirable effects on Italian opinion’ and the suggestion was dismissed completely. Even the French proposal to establish a joint command for the Red Sea area was rejected as having ‘possible repercussions’ on Mussolini. The only agreement reached was that the existing headquarters were adequate for the moment and, so long as Allied forces were spread thinly, the talks concluded that it would be a mistake to ‘mortgage’ them as part of a campaign in eastern Africa. Two months later Wavell wrote to his old friend John Dill, then commanding I Corps in northern France, and revealed that he had still yet to receive notification of any definite policy from London about how he should proceed.72 He also complained that British prestige remained low in Egypt because the locals felt that ‘anyone who let the Italians, whom even they regarded with contempt, outface them, can’t really be very formidable’. The failings of pre-war diplomatic policy were being felt and, whilst reserves were slowly being built up ‘in the usual solid Anglo-Saxon way’, this had begun some months late and he was still short on manpower and very concerned about the lack of aircraft.
The experience of West African Field Force provided an excellent illustration of the existing complications. Although no longer present to lead them, Giffard’s pre-war organisation of the forces under his command now appeared to be of considerable value for Dickinson. His predecessor had been able to oversee the establishment of four infantry brigades on both sides of the continent. Whilst the two in West Africa were not quite at full strength – only one battalion in each brigade was fully manned and equipped and the others depended upon the addition of reserves once war broke out – it meant that at least potentially there were some additional forces available beyond the KAR and locally raised troops.73 The suggestion had been made in London that they might be used in the Sudan, and Dickinson, then in Khartoum on his way to take up his post in Nairobi, had been asked for his views.74 He challenged the idea, writing to Cairo that the ‘West African contingent are first class fighting material but are affected physically if exposed to cold . . . any offensive from Sudan must take them into mountainous country where cold might be too much for them’. He hoped that instead they would be made available primarily for use in Kenya, or in British Somaliland.75
Wherever they were to be sent, the original plans had called for the troops to be dispatched within fourteen days of mobilisation, but this soon slipped, in large part because of the lack of available shipping.76 Some thought had been given throughout the summer to alternative methods of moving the men by road from Nigeria to the Sudan and then on by rail or river steamer and road to Kenya.77 There was also the potential for transporting all or part of the brigades by air, but as the RAF could spare only six bombers, and the bare minimum number of troops and equipment weighed about six tons, the idea was not pursued.78 Eventually ‘cost and administrative difficulties’, not to mention the distances involved, meant that the overland route was also abandoned and it was confirmed that the troops would have to be moved by sea.79 At the end of December London finally issued a warning that this was likely to begin soon, as the War Office had authorised the sailing of the first contingents towards the end of the following month.80 In the event this did not happen and all these plans were cancelled without any date being given for when the m
ove might eventually begin. It was not until May that the code-word ‘Tempest’ was, at last, issued, and Nigerian troops boarded troopships in Lagos the following month.81 These men would go on to play a significant role subsequently, but it had taken more than nine months to complete something that had been planned for well in advance, and if the Italians had seized the initiative and exploited their opponent’s weakness, the eventual outcome of the campaign could have been very different.
During this long delay reinforcements did arrive from elsewhere on the continent. By the end of December 1939, troops from 1st Battalion, North Rhodesian Regiment had been transported along with their equipment in a convoy of 200 trucks which travelled 700 miles from Broken Hill; accompanied by their own mobile workshops to make repairs on the way, they lost only a single truck.82 For some reason this movement of Commonwealth forces was not reported in London until the following March when it was described as the longest trek of the war.83 So great was the number of African volunteers that recruiting had been stopped after just a couple of weeks and a second battalion was already fully manned. The newspaper article that revealed the move also confirmed details of the contribution being made by both Rhodesian territories. No.1 Squadron, Southern Rhodesia Air Force had in fact been in Kenya for some months; the first six aircraft, along with thirteen officers and fourteen other ranks, had actually mustered a week before war was declared and set off more or less at once for Nairobi to supplement Mrs Wilson’s pilots.84 After some local training at Isiolo, at the base of the Kenyan highlands, they had then quickly started operations patrolling the north of the colony.
The First Victory Page 6