Having been slow to begin, the opening moves in the East Africa campaign were now largely complete. For the British commanders, the weekly intelligence summary issued on 18 July already offered a much more detailed assessment of the enemy activity than had been available even a few months before.61 In both the north and the south the Italians had fully demonstrated their overwhelming superiority both in troops and equipment but there was little evidence of this being used in a decisive manner. The report concluded that the attacks had actually been on a minor scale, with Kassala described as a raid and the remainder simply incursions into British-held territory which ‘held a nuisance value’. There had been very limited advances and, with no knowledge of the orders that had been given to Aosta and the defensive posture he had been forced to adopt, there was some confusion as to what this might mean. At this stage the conclusion was that the results of armistice negotiations with Vichy France were being awaited and the planners assumed that this would determine what happened next. Nonetheless, the small garrisons of British-led colonial forces, supported by the few regular units that had been sent to the region, had for the large part successfully carried out the plans prepared by Wavell and his senior generals and had managed to keep the frontiers of the British Empire more or less intact.
There was, however, an additional front that the British commander had been considering for some months and which would increasingly come to attract his attention. There were few more unforgiving imperial territories than British Somaliland, an arid plateau covering 68,000 square miles with sandy plains running from the shoreline, in some cases to a distance of sixty miles into the interior. Behind this was a range of hills and mountains 4,000 feet high on average, and rising at times to more than double this height. There was little cultivation and the 1939 population of 320,000, mainly nomadic Somalis, lived for the most part in the interior, where they survived on the livestock they kept, and on the coast in the main population centre of Berbera.62 This was surrounded by low-lying desert with a little scrub; during the colder months its population reached about 30,000 but during the hot season it could be as little as half this. It was also the chief port for the protectorate although it had an almost complete lack of decent facilities, a failing that had been highlighted repeatedly prior to the war but about which nothing had been done. It did, however, provide good anchorage, with loading and discharging then being carried out by small boats. Described appropriately as a ‘mostly thirsty region’, the port was entirely lacking in water; this had to be brought in by a nine-mile-long pipe which produced ‘a lukewarm, briny fluid’.63 Between June and August a very hot strong wind called the Kharif blew, making it even more difficult to load and unload as it was impossible to work in the heat. It was reportedly said by those who tried to live in Berbera ‘that no one could live there for an entire year and be regarded as completely sane thereafter’.64
The protectorate had previously been the scene of a long military campaign as Britain fought one of its lesser known imperial wars. The opponent was Mohammed Abdullah Hassan, ‘a Moslem religious warlike fanatic’ referred to popularly as the ‘Mad’ Mullah.65 In the face of continuing raids by his dervishes, which had grown stronger and more sustained over the course of a decade, in April 1910 the garrison had been compelled to withdraw from the interior of the protectorate and seek shelter in three coastal towns which could be more easily defended.66 Here, in ‘one of the disturbed corners of the Empire’, the remaining troops clung on throughout the First World War until, ten years and four campaigns later, the insurgency was ended when the now much-diminished dervishes were finally overwhelmed by a combined attack involving local forces, a battalion of the KAR and even some British aircraft.67 Once again, the climate became the enemy, and Berbera was deemed such an inhospitable town that military commentators believed white officers could only be posted there for a few weeks at a time before they became operationally ineffective.68
The peculiar arrangements for administration of the territory made for further complications. Since 1905, following a brief period under the control of the Foreign Office, the Colonial Office had been responsible for British Somaliland.69 Representing London locally, the senior figure in Berbera was the governor and, in 1939, at the outbreak of the Second World War, this was Vincent Glenday, only forty-nine years old and in his first appointment at this senior level. He had spent his career in colonial administration, having previously been Provincial Commissioner in Kenya where he had gained a good reputation during many years spent working in the colony.70 In addition to being governor, Glenday was the nominal commander-in-chief of the locally raised forces, the Somaliland Camel Corps. The Colonial Office paid for and organised all administrative tasks and because there was widespread sympathy for the governor’s view that war was unlikely, it was reluctant to commit any of its budget to military activity.71 Indeed, restrictions were placed on the amount of expenditure made available for defence despite Wavell’s concerns about local security.72 These were based on simple geography, as the Italian occupation of Ethiopia had left British Somaliland entirely surrounded along its 750-mile frontier except for about forty-five miles which bordered French-held Jibuti. This was thought to make the protectorate vulnerable, and a secret plan had been conceived in 1938 to evacuate forces in the event of an attack. Glenday’s predecessor, Sir Arthur Lawrence, had bitterly rejected this proposal, writing back to the authorities in London after the signing of the Munich agreement with a reminder that money and lives had already been spent.73 Whilst he realised that it was ‘an insignificant fragment of the vast territories under British administration’ and one that could ‘scarcely be expected to come prominently into the reckoning’, he nonetheless argued that it should still be possible for more to be done.
Lawrence had argued that there were three alternative courses of action available.74 The first was to make no pretence of conducting a defence and effectively demilitarise the territory. Secondly, it could be abandoned altogether. His preference, not surprisingly, was the final option, which had been suggested to him by Lieutenant-Colonel Arthur Chater, the senior military officer and commander of the Camel Corps. Prior to his secondment he had been a Royal Marine and his only experience of working with British infantrymen was limited to three months during the Gallipoli campaign.75 Since taking up this role, Chater had gained a huge knowledge of the troops he commanded and, despite limited reinforcements and a small amount of funding, he argued that an adequate defence was still possible. The intention was to hold up an invasion for at least twelve days and allow for reinforcements to be sent from India. Despite the governor’s support this proposal was rejected and, in August 1939, the evacuation plan was revised on the basis of two possible situations arising. In the first, and with the French holding their positions in Jibuti, a withdrawal would be conducted towards them to combine the available defending forces. If, however, they had also been driven back, British and Commonwealth troops would withdraw into the hills and await instructions.76
In line with the discussions that had been held in Paris and London throughout the year, at this stage all defence preparations were based around joint agreements with the local French commander, Brigadier-General Paul Legentilhomme, who it was also intended would take overall charge in the event of war.77 Whilst Chater liked his counterpart, ‘an exceptionally pleasant man, and I think a very able soldier’, he had grave concerns about the plans. With the declaration of war against Germany a number of key positions were manned in anticipation of an Italian attack, which fortunately never came. If it had done, the Camel Corps’ military commander wrote later in September, the protectorate would have been thrown ‘into a state of panic and disorder, with the result that administrative control of our tribes would probably be lost before a shot had been fired by the enemy’.78 Chater also now submitted a candid report to the Middle East Command describing local conditions and complaining about the recent confusion and uncertainty.79 This suggested that, since the Italian invasion of Eth
iopia, the Chiefs of Staff had seen British Somaliland as nothing more than ‘a tiresome commitment’ which they would ‘gladly be rid of’, an assessment that was probably not far from the truth.80
As the months of the phoney war dragged on, Wavell agreed privately that British-led forces should not come under French control until it became necessary for them to withdraw towards Jibuti.81 This, in effect, gave Chater a free hand in how to mount his defence but with the caveat that he was still also committed to close co-operation with his French counterpart. The British officer now proposed, as a bare minimum, that detachments be left to protect the two largest up-country towns of Burao and Hargeisa even though these would struggle even to resist weak raiding parties; in the event of a meaningful attack their orders were to delay any advance and then withdraw towards the hills. At the same time he was drawn to the vital strategic significance of a semicircle of hills which effectively dominated the main route from the French colony towards Berbera. As there were just six passes these vehicles could use to reach the flat coastal plain beyond, both he and his French counterpart agreed that all of them would have to be held, both to safeguard defence and to provide sufficient room from which to begin any subsequent offensive.
In both London and Paris, however, there was still a great deal of confusion about how any local defence might be conducted, and in December 1939 the British Chiefs of Staff once again changed their collective minds.82 They now confirmed that there should be a more active policy, issuing orders that British Somaliland was to be defended against an Italian invasion and Berbera was not to be abandoned but held as long as possible.83 This radical shift in thinking reflected a growing fear that prestige would be lost, both locally and more generally across the British Empire. Wavell had also warned that making no attempt to hold the protectorate in fact ran counter to the agreements about regional defence reached previously with the French and on the basis of which they had constructed strong defences in Jibuti. These comments also touched on some of the problems now facing Legentilhomme who had increasingly found himself at odds with his superiors in Paris about how to proceed. There were tensions within the Anglo-French alliance and these had played a part in the rejection of the French general’s requests to fortify the two passes at Jirreh and Dobo. According to his superiors at home, whilst these both may well have fallen within his area of command, they were considered to be too far away from French territory to warrant further work being undertaken.84
Military responsibility for the protectorate was only handed to Wavell in January 1940; it was not until ten days before Italy declared war that he was finally also given administrative control. Almost immediately he visited one of his more remote commands and, seizing on the decision by the Chiefs of Staff to make a stand, a series of recommendations was sent back to London later that month which outlined the changes he believed to be necessary to mount a defence.85 All of Chater’s proposals for reinforcements having previously been rejected, at the beginning of 1940 the Somaliland Camel Corps contained just 33 British officers, 22 NCOs and 576 African troops scattered around five different locations, supported by a very small group of police in Berbera.86 This limited force relied upon a mixture of rifles, machine guns and anti-tank rifles for their firepower, and had 29 cars and trucks, 122 horses and 244 camels for transport.87 Their weapons included 2,000 .475 calibre Belgian rifles that had been manufactured in Maastricht in the previous century with 1.4 million rounds of ammunition of an uncertain quality.88 For the most part the men were held in high regard; in fact, an excellent description of the Somalis was provided by one of the British officers serving in the KAR.89 He found them, individually, to be ‘intelligent, handsome and fanatically Moslem. They are also hot-tempered, proud, quick to resent any insult, real or imaginary and have remarkably long memories.’ Another writer in The Listener referred to them as ‘the most interesting . . . and most intelligent tribesmen’ he had met during his African travels, but they now faced a daunting challenge.90
Wavell now requested that an additional battalion of the KAR be provided to take up forward defensive positions and allow the Somalis to roam more freely conducting patrols of the frontier. It was believed this would strengthen the existing thinly held defences, help improve the ‘very shaken confidence’ of the local population and allow Chater to also form two mechanised companies drawing upon extra manpower from local recruits who would be used alongside the officers and NCOs who had just arrived from Northern Rhodesia. If morale was to be restored, and for there to be any belief that Britain intended to mount a proper defence, in addition the commander in Cairo proposed that a second battalion and another artillery battery be made available; but even then, this would still mean that there was no more than an ‘absolute minimum’ defending force. The defences would also need to be as strong as possible; Wavell told Legentilhomme that the French General Staff had been asked again to fortify the Jirreh and Dobo passes, as the British general recognised that these potential openings were a strategic oversight in the otherwise excellent defensive preparations.91 Notwithstanding this renewed intervention, it was through these very passes that, eight months later, the Italians launched their main advance.
Despite the improvements, the revised strategy was based almost entirely around deterrence and the hope that the Italians would not see the protectorate as worth making the big effort needed for its capture.92 Wavell had told his French counterpart that his intelligence branch could find no indication of anything other than a defensive outlook from their potential opponents. This was actually not entirely true, as Wavell had been given a detailed intelligence assessment in early January which considered what form an attack might take.93 The conclusion was that a speedy advance could be made on British Somaliland, which would be the easiest of the Anglo-French territories to overrun. It was, however, hoped that ‘apart from the prestige value of its capture, its occupation would not be of any great military advantage to the Italians’, and they would not choose this option as Jibuti remained the most tempting target. With the British planners in Cairo also assuming that, in the worst case, an attack would employ no more than a brigade, the authorities in London accepted the revised plan and by February preparations were being made to send reinforcements, more than 1,100 men in total, including another 46 officers, although they were not due to arrive until mid-May.94 This was certainly a much better situation than a few months before, but nevertheless the protectorate was still being left vulnerable and exposed.95
The inherent weakness was still clear to Chater, who remained uncertain about how he was to proceed; in early March he asked Cairo whether he should train his troops for conducting an active defence or an evacuation. There were no staff in his headquarters and very few officers, and the continuing ambiguity made it ‘difficult to keep up interest especially amongst the Rhodesians’.96 He was also worried about medical facilities as there were only two doctors in the whole territory. More generally, there was considerable confusion: one thing concerning him was the lack of maps, and with no facilities for printing and reproduction these had to come from London.97 There also remained the questionable support that could be counted on from the civilian departments in Whitehall which continued to exert a strong influence on military policy. The Foreign Office had only agreed to the proposals to send reinforcements provided that the Italians were told of the move and many in the Colonial Office still refused to accept that there was any actual threat from Italy.98 Although he could see the militarisation that was taking place, Glenday also continued to display a general nervousness about any action that might anger his neighbours and argued for a delay in sending the much-needed reinforcements.99 This led Chater to complain to Wavell’s headquarters that the information the governor received from London was ‘in some cases the direct opposite of what he gets from you’.100 The local military commander had also previously warned that the Colonial Office’s control of administration entailed a minimum of three months’ waiting for approval of his requests, e
ven for the most urgent items and requirements. This had led him to conclude ‘we shall never get anything done’, and there remained no indication that the proposed defence was being taken seriously.101
As one of Wavell’s senior staff officers who visited Berbera in May 1940 put it, whilst the official policy had changed from ‘scuttle’ to conducting an active defence, Chater had been left to try and implement this action with inadequate resources and questionable support from the civilian authorities.102 Only when the evacuation from Dunkirk was well under way did Glenday finally appear doubtful about the defending garrison’s prospects.103 As the European women and children and the families of the KAR troops were evacuated to Mombasa and Bombay, he was reassured that a general military withdrawal towards Berbera would only happen in the face of superior numbers and equipment.104 He was not told of a revised appreciation, detailing the likely nature of any Italian attack, which estimated that in the region of 40,000 men were poised on the frontiers and likely to launch simultaneous assaults on British Somaliland and Jibuti, supported by tanks and artillery.105 Events elsewhere were moving quickly and, as the War Cabinet in London considered ‘plans to meet a certain eventuality’ – what might happen were the French to surrender – there was no more than a brief reference to the specific impact this might have on eastern Africa.106 It was assumed that if the strategic situation did change this area would be occupied immediately by the Italians, but the British position would not ‘materially’ be affected by ‘a wasting asset’ that could not be reinforced other than by air so long as the Suez Canal was held. The Chiefs of Staff therefore recommended that no special action be taken. The following month, with the French armistice signed, the assessment from Cairo was that there remained two possible alternatives for British Somaliland: to try and hold as much territory as possible or to withdraw to a more restricted area around the port while defending the passes that controlled its approach. Legentilhomme had promised to refuse to surrender his troops, fighting on under Wavell’s command, but local opinion in Jibuti was weakened by the Royal Navy’s attack on French naval vessels at Oran on the Mediterranean coast. Once General Germain arrived on 15 July, having been sent by the new French authority in Vichy to take charge of the colony, the right flank was opened up and the defenders’ strength halved.107
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