The defenders had certainly used their time well to prepare the defence both by strengthening natural positions and taking steps to slow the progress of the advancing troops, meaning the attackers spent a great deal of time clearing obstacles. Gazelle Force had been delayed by the demolition work carried out on the Ponte Mussolini, a large bridge twelve miles east of Agordat on the Keren road, where the access road was heavily mined and damage to the structure meant that advancing vehicles could not cross. The brave and resilient engineers took only eight hours to complete repairs and showed just how crucial they were in helping keep the attack moving forward. It was during the initial move from Gallabat that Second-Lieutenant Premindra Singh Bhagat, an engineer in the 5th Indian Division, won the war’s first Victoria Cross to be awarded to the Indian Army.50 He had lifted over a hundred mines and his personal carrier had been twice destroyed in the process. Forty miles to the east of Agordat the retreating Italian troops reached the Dongolaas Gorge and just a few miles from its entrance further demolitions destroyed several hundred yards of cliffside roads. One of the main routes was also found to be blocked by 300 vehicles with artillery and machine guns all of which had been abandoned during the retreat. According to an eyewitness, ‘the guns stood ranged wheel to wheel across the valley, like a picture of a battle of a hundred years ago in an old Christmas coloured supplement’.51 As maintaining their tempo was so important to ensure his enemy had no time to regroup, Platt later wondered if, without these delays, his troops might have got to their main objective before the Italians could have properly organised their defences.52 Wavell had certainly hoped that it might have been possible to capitalise on the initial success and had even hoped that Asmara could be taken within a couple of days, but this did not happen.53
Despite the frustrations they had encountered, the pursuit nonetheless reached Keren, with Gazelle Force amongst the first to arrive. By this stage Platt’s army was very much a multinational force, numbering about 13,000 troops, with fifteen Indian battalions, three English and two Scottish, added to which there were even a small number of Free French and Belgian troops.54 Forming a broad semicircle, the defences they encountered had been constructed on what was referred to as ‘interior lines’, which meant that any area that was attacked by the British and Commonwealth forces could be easily reinforced by the Italians. Platt’s plan called for one of his two Indian divisions to clear these, allowing the other to exploit the opening and take the town which lay beyond. With only the single road and no space to move, the standard tactic of outflanking manoeuvres using mobile forces was not possible here; indeed with the advancing columns unable to bypass the fixed defences, the battle that developed quickly became an entirely attritional one. In order to defeat the Italians it would be necessary for the attackers to find a way to dominate the high ground and then concentrate overwhelming fire support, a throwback to the kind of strategy that had been employed in many of the battles of the First World War.
Making this even more difficult, the lack of pack transport, which had previously been identified as a serious concern, meant that until the gorge was reached supplies could only be brought forward by using the main road as there were no practical alternative routes. For several miles it was exposed to Italian artillery fire which meant the troops faced considerable danger even before they reached the battlefield. Once there, the mountain conditions placed a tremendous strain on the attackers and it demanded enormous effort, ingenuity and bravery to overwhelm the defences. Savory’s troops, along with the rest of the 4th Indian Division, had ‘chased the enemy from Gallabat to Keren’ but one of the commanders who led the 11th Indian Infantry Brigade in from the north described what followed as ‘six weeks of hard slogging’ before the Italians were finally worn down.55 Its combination of outstanding terrain and key strategic position meant it was in Keren that Frusci gathered his most capable forces and most of his remaining firepower. This represented the last stand as defeat at this apparently impenetrable fortress would mean that there was little to prevent a continuation of the swift advance by the British and Commonwealth forces and final victory. Both sides were set on fighting a decisive encounter which would, in large part, determine the outcome of the entire campaign.
CHAPTER 8
TRIUMPH IN THE MOUNTAINS
The Battle of Keren
CUNNINGHAM HAD ENJOYED huge success on the southern front and initially Platt had also advanced from the Sudan with ease. Wavell sensed that the Italians were in increasing disarray. He ordered the British and Commonwealth troops to now quickly push on towards Asmara but to reach it they would first have to pass through Keren. This town was important to both the Italian and British and Commonwealth forces as road and rail routes through it afforded access to Asmara, the capital of Eritrea some forty-five miles to the east, and to Massawa, the main port in the southern Red Sea. To capture it, Platt’s two Indian divisions would have to confront the best Italian troops remaining in East Africa. It was estimated in late February that in the whole of Eritrea there were still more than 14,000 Europeans and 44,000 colonials, approximately two-thirds of whom were now concentrated at this key position.1 The Italians had actually assembled slightly fewer, forty-two battalions or approximately 31,000 men, including elements from the Bersaglieri, Alpini and Savoia Grenadiers, but these were the best they could muster. To begin with, they also outgunned their opponents with 144 artillery pieces, twenty more than the British had, and with better transport to move them around.2 Some of the guns were of an ancient vintage but they were ideal for mountain warfare because the shells could be fired almost vertically over the steep hills to reach the enemy positions below, something the British 25-pounders were not able to match with their flat trajectory.3 Even the Italian mortars outranged the British versions and could also be moved more easily by their mules. With such a potentially decisive advantage in firepower the defending garrison appeared poised, at least at the outset, to dominate this battlefield.4
Perhaps most significantly, facing the attacking forces was an accomplished Italian commander who was highly motivated and prepared for a fight. General Nicolangelo Carnimeo had been an army officer for more than thirty years and viewed each of the peaks that made up the Keren defences as an opportunity to halt the British and Commonwealth troops. His confident outlook helped bolster the garrison’s morale and there is no doubt that the men he led throughout the battle were well disciplined and a much more formidable opponent than any of the units being encountered by Cunningham’s forces on the southern front.5 This extended to the Italian colonial troops; as had been seen elsewhere, they were generally reliable but needed strong leadership, and this was now provided by Carnimeo. The Eritreans were particularly inspired by him, at least initially, to stand fast and help defend this position.6 The Italian general also proved adept at organising the defenders to exploit the natural advantages offered by the terrain. His forces dominated the key high ground and exploited this to the fullest extent.7 Fortifications were added and trenches and inter-communicating trails prepared which allowed reinforcements to be quickly moved to any threatened position.8 Although there is little evidence of any clear strategic vision besides the attrition of the enemy, the resulting tenacious Italian defence nearly proved decisive as Wavell came very close to calling a halt to the entire campaign.9
The battle, which lasted for nearly two months, can be divided into three phases. The opening involved just a single Indian infantry brigade that had led the advance from Agordat. This was Savory’s 11th Indian Infantry Brigade which consisted of battalions from the Camerons and the Rajputana Rifles along with the 2nd Battalion, 5th Mahratta Light Infantry, a late replacement but, according to the brigadier, ‘a magnificent lot’.10 They had tried to force their way through the position on 3 February to capture Brig’s Peak and Mount Sanchil, and to begin with this attack looked as if it might succeed. Despite the loss of the gunner officer who was supposed to provide coordinates for the artillery, the first objective was capture
d within twenty-four hours. He had been killed as soon as he reached the crest of Brigadier’s Peak, later referred to by all of the troops as Brig’s Peak and reportedly named after Savory. His loss meant that throughout their assault the Indian and Scottish infantrymen had limited support from the heavy guns.11 Artillery rounds consequently flew over the top of the Italian positions, missing them, and landing often several miles to the rear. The attackers had, however, pushed on and held the initiative at this stage.
5 Battle of Keren (the opening phase).
Fortunes now changed and, as the British and Commonwealth forces headed towards Mount Sanchil, the Italians began to push them back using the recently arrived reinforcements they had been able to move up. A regiment of the Savoia Grenadiers had joined the garrison two days before, having been rushed on trucks from Addis Ababa, and this made all the difference. One writer has said of these men that only the German parachute division that fought in North Africa and Italy and the Japanese troops in Burma proved more of a challenge to British or Commonwealth troops.12 The Indians were slowly forced back, although they managed to hold on to Cameron Ridge, named after 2nd Battalion, The Camerons who had been the first onto it at the beginning of the initial battle. This was just in front of Mount Sanchil, which completely dominated the ridge, and the Scots and the Indians managed to retain a tenuous hold here for the next six weeks, occupying what would subsequently prove to be a critical position in determining the final outcome of the battle.13 It was during this early fighting, on 8 February, that Subadar Richpal Ram won the second Victoria Cross of the campaign when acting as second-in-command of the leading company of 6th Battalion, Rajputana Rifles. He led a bayonet charge to seize a position, which he then held against six enemy counter-attacks before finally being forced to withdraw.14 There was no shortage of gallantry on each side but Platt’s concerns about the delays his advance had encountered were already proving correct.
The fighting continued without a break and the next move involved an attempted flanking manoeuvre further east against the Acqua Col which it was hoped could avoid the main Italian defences.15 Men from 5th Indian Infantry Brigade now joined the assault as Beresford-Peirse committed the best part of two brigades in an attempt to find a route through the defences to the east of the gorge and press forward from Cameron Ridge. These efforts unfortunately failed: one reason was a lack of machine guns, which meant that the attackers were unable to put down sufficiently heavy suppressing fire against the Italian positions. Had this been available the outcome might well have been different; as it was, the defenders were able to wait for the artillery barrage to finish, emerge from their cover and shower grenades onto the climbing infantry below. On the night of 10 February another attempt was made and once again the attack might have succeeded if it had been possible to get enough troops and supplies forward to help hold the positions that were captured on and around Brig’s Peak. The attacking troops, however, ran out of ammunition and with no means of resupply they had to fall back. It had been another story of great bravery but, with some of Platt’s attacking units sustaining losses of twenty-five soldiers killed per day, and to no apparent significant advantage, the general concluded it was ‘a rate we could not afford’.16 A pause was urgently needed and, whilst Platt refused a suggestion to withdraw to a better defensive position, orders were given to halt and hold what ground had been captured while fresh supplies and reinforcements were brought forward. At the same time some of the men, including the Worcestershire infantry who had been rushed up to support that attack, were now withdrawn back to Tessenei, where they trained for mountain warfare and the battle ahead.17
The Italians had already put up a much stiffer fight at Keren than had been anticipated and it would require some real thought from the British commanders about how best now to proceed.18 As it proved impossible to find a way around the defences, the conclusion was that a frontal attack involving both divisions appeared to offer the only prospect of success. Lengthy preparations followed throughout the next month as the men consolidated their positions while the lengthy resupply line was shortened. For the remainder of February and into March, the troops also cleared wells and dug boreholes to improve access to water, and improved the existing mountain tracks at the same time as trying to create new ones. The railway that ran from Agordat to the gorge was refurbished in order to increase the amount of supplies it could carry forward, but huge amounts of manpower were still required for the final leg of the journey as there were no pack animals and motor transport could progress only to the edge of the Italian artillery’s range. As Savory had anticipated, approximately one-quarter of each battalion continued to act as porters, carrying everything on their shoulders up the extremely steep slopes to their forward positions. Water in two-gallon tins, rations in sacks, ammunition, barbed wire, first aid equipment and anything else needed to conduct the battle were carried several miles in hot, dusty and difficult conditions. These supplies were then dotted around the hillsides in dumps as the British and Indian troops made ready to attack.
In the middle of March two Cypriot mule companies finally arrived and provided some relief but they were insufficient in number to allow the men to shift their focus away from bringing up supplies. There were also times now when stampeding mules, terrified by the gunfire around them, were themselves a danger to the men moving along the narrow mountain tracks.19 So bad did the situation become that the rear elements of the battalions were stripped of any available personnel, including those who usually worked in transport or clerical roles. This had to be done to ensure there remained enough troops to retain the key ground that had been won right at the beginning of the battle. Throughout this period two battalions sat on Cameron Ridge halfway up the hill as well as on the extension that ran to its west which was sometimes called Mahratta Ridge. Every morning and evening the Italians fired mortar and artillery rounds at these positions but the men held on in desperate conditions. Despite their best efforts to keep the battle-space around them as tidy as possible, they ‘got used to the heavy, sweetish, carrion smell of the dead since it was never out of our nose and lungs’, and the millions of flies that gathered around the bodies of hundreds of men and mules which it was impossible at this point to bury.20
This was a particularly arduous and difficult period for the British and Commonwealth troops; one brigade major who was present throughout the campaign and fought throughout the entire war later wrote that he knew of no worse battle either in the Middle East or in the Far East.21 Another of those involved described it as ‘really a hell especially from the physical point of view. In the nine months I served in western Europe as the commander of my company I assure you that I have never encountered such unendurable and exhausting days like those of Keren.’22 Even men who later took part in the assault on the Italian monastery fortress of Monte Cassino in Italy described this battle in Eritrea as having been more arduous.23 Aside from the generally exhausting nature of making all the preparations, life was made more difficult by the stark nature of the terrain which was almost entirely barren and interspersed with the same hard scrub as had been encountered elsewhere. The soil around the boulders crumbled easily, dislodging the smaller rocks, and the steepness of the big climbs to reach the summits meant that the task for the attackers appeared almost impossible.24 Added to this was the lack of cover or shade; one of the commanders who was present later noted that thirst and the resulting exhaustion were major factors in the initial failures to dislodge the Italian defenders.25 The rations were not much better and, as their counterparts on the southern front had found, the biscuits were too hard to eat and merely aggravated the thirst. The preferred alternatives were packets of spearmints and chocolate, often in an almost liquid state, which were far more pleasant, especially with the luxury of a mug of hot tea. Physically, this battle was a shattering experience for the British and Commonwealth forces and unlike anything that had been encountered during the war.
The attacking forces also had no option but to
conduct their stockpiling of supplies in full view of the enemy, as they were restricted to the single approach road they had followed from Agordat and Barentu and no alternative could be found.26 The Italians, commanding the high ground, were able to observe the events taking place below them and the British commanders were astounded that they did not take better advantage of a position which appeared to offer such an enormous benefit to them. Other than the regular artillery fire and some raiding aimed at Cameron Ridge, little else happened during this consolidation phase and it was only deserters who penetrated British-held lines.27 Frusci’s decision to pull his forces back towards Keren had considerable merit but he failed to do far more to harass his opponent, who was clearly set on mounting an attack against him. Carnimeo was restricted in terms of what his orders allowed him to do and, whilst there was some pressure applied against his opponent, there was no sign of any real offensive intentions.28 Certainly, during the early part of the build-up, the attacking forces would have been extremely vulnerable to a concerted counter-attack but the Italians preferred to wait. In many respects this proved to be the most critical of their many military mistakes as, by allowing the British commanders to concentrate their forces in front of them, they effectively sealed their fate, not just at Keren but for the campaign as a whole.
The First Victory Page 20