After this defeat the remaining Italian forces were weary and discouraged and for the first time even Eritrean soldiers, who had previously been the most loyal colonial troops, deserted in large numbers.113 There still remained important strategic objectives to be secured, but thoughts could begin to turn to how the campaign might end.
CHAPTER 9
A THIRD FRONT
The Patriots
WHILE CUNNINGHAM’S FORCES had enjoyed a relentlessly paced advance from the south and Platt’s divisions had fought and won their decisive action in the mountains, the final element of Wavell’s grand plan had also played its part. Providing support for the rebellion in Ethiopia had involved a much lower level of activity and the results were nowhere near as significant as some later claimed, but credit was still due. What this did was to open up a third front in the war for Italian East Africa as mobile attacks on isolated posts and ambushes along the main routes helped to create ‘a deep sense of insecurity in the minds of Italian forces’.1 The defending troops came to fear the possibility of being captured by the irregular forces that increasingly swarmed around them and their real value lay in this psychological distraction. In sponsoring the use of these forces Wavell demonstrated once again his formidable understanding of warfare and the degree to which the greatest weapon was not always bullets and bombs but something a little more sophisticated.
Having entered Ethiopia in the late summer of 1940 Sandford had continued his planning and preparations to expand operations. In this he was subsequently supported by a young Royal Artillery officer who had served on Wavell’s intelligence staff in Palestine and clearly made an impression on him.2 Major Orde Wingate quickly forged a key role for himself and eventually acted as an adviser to Haile Selassie while also leading insurgent forces into battle against the Italians.3 Indeed, he proved particularly effective in this latter role at the head of his men who he called ‘Gideon Force’ – a name he chose based upon his biblical knowledge since he intended them ‘to smite the enemy hip and thigh’.4 As one of those who served under him in Burma later wrote, ‘his genius will be a topic as long as military history is studied’; he described Wingate as an ‘unusual man, gifted as a tactician, whose life was based on the belief that anything is possible if the effort is sufficient; one whom we all respected, disliked, but were prepared to serve, [and who] still casts a strange influence over thoughtful historians who study the profession of arms’.5 Another contemporary pronounced him ‘a dynamic leader and a magnetic personality’ but noted that he was also needlessly offensive to his juniors as well as to more senior officers, ‘and his showmanship was carried to rather silly extremes’.6 Wilfred Thesiger, who had been born in Addis Ababa and had a close personal attachment to Ethiopia, served under Wingate, and whilst he recognised there was something inspiring about him he also struggled to work with a man who was ‘ruthless and uncompromising, an Old Testament figure; brutal, arrogant and assertive’.7 Such observations, and much worse, were commonly shared at the time, and Wingate was fortunate at this stage of his career that he had the patronage of Wavell to protect him.
Wingate arrived in Khartoum in October and quickly set to work. Whereas Sandford’s approach had been based more around mentoring and a slow build-up of the insurgency, Wavell had decided that a more active basis was now to be adopted. With Platt’s agreement, Wingate started preparing the Ethiopian refugees already in the Sudan for battle. He established Operational Centres for this, each being commanded by a British officer supported by five sergeants, and these small training teams took responsibility for 200 new recruits. Eventually there were ten of these centres led by men who ‘disliked the formal side of regimental life, or were merely bored with garrison duty and in search of adventure’ – men such as ‘Billy’ Maclean, Basil Ringrose and Bill Allen, former journalists, hunters, bushmen and adventurers who would all go on to have distinguished wartime careers carrying out irregular warfare.8 These men lived and fought alongside the Patriots in a difficult environment and shared in all their sacrifices. Wingate’s involvement brought about instant results and, aside from the revised training schedule, he helped ensure that more supplies and arms were made available to his expanding forces. When they eventually crossed back into Ethiopia each man carried an American rifle and 200 rounds of ammunition, and plentiful supplies of three-inch mortars were also distributed amongst the various groups.9 To transport them they had 15,000 camels; although these were traditionally suited to carrying baggage, the troops were trained to ride them, allowing for more rapid movement over the harsh terrain, though only fifty-four animals survived the campaign.10
As part of his preparations, in November Wingate flew to meet with Sandford who had continued his harassing operations despite there being ‘a heavy price on his head’ as the Italians conducted sweeps searching for him and his small group of insurgents.11 This hazardous flight to Gojjam was piloted by a volunteer, Flight Lieutenant Reginald Collis, who was subsequently awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross, and the plane landed on a roughly cleared bush strip at the Mission 101 camp.12 The pilot described his passenger’s appearance as being ‘like a missionary with a big hat’, remarking later that he had never seen anybody who looked less like a British Army major. All Wingate carried with him was some money ‘for bribery and corruption’ along with ‘an alarm clock and half a loaf of bread with a big slice of cheese on the top and an onion sitting on top of it’.13 Returning safely to Khartoum having discussed their plans, the following month Wingate presented his proposed strategy to Wavell and the senior staff. The general confirmed that he still supported the idea of a rebellion but he was worried that there was no sign of massed desertions amongst Italy’s African troops, and questioned what effect could be achieved by the Patriots.14 He believed that they needed the stimulus of British and Commonwealth forces first winning a few battles before they would commit to serious activity, and it seemed clear to him that any major revolt would have to follow rather than precede victories gained by regular British forces. Wingate’s response was to propose that his insurgents should spearhead the operation from inside Ethiopia as, with Sandford’s approval, it had been agreed to establish an advance base from which arms, ammunition and manpower could be distributed, allowing the various small groups to operate effectively.15
Once again Wavell was at odds with the leadership in London who wanted the revolt to begin in advance of the British offensive, hoping that Selassie’s early return to the country would confuse and disorientate the Italians. Platt, however, agreed with his commander in Cairo and was concerned that if this action were premature it could potentially have negative results, as he knew that the emperor was not yet supported by all of the Ethiopian chiefs.16 There were great internal rivalries within the country and objections to Italian rule varied significantly between the different leaders. The Kaid later acknowledged that whilst the Patriot forces were ‘capable of great endurance for a sufficient prize and fanatical in their gallantry’, at the time he had, at least initially, advised Wavell against this aspect of his strategy and wanted, at a minimum, for the attacks to be co-ordinated.17 As Platt later confirmed in one of the post-war lectures he gave at the Staff College at Camberley, he had believed that the ‘Ethiopian pot of revolt should be encouraged to simmer, and fed for simmering, but should not be allowed to boil until the might of the British Army and Air Power was ready in sufficient strength to strike in support’. Ultimately, Selassie was able to cross the border only because of Churchill’s direct intervention; as he later wrote to the emperor, ‘Your Majesty was the first of the lawful sovereigns to be driven from his throne and country by the Fascist-Nazi criminals, and you are now the first to return in triumph.’18 It was Platt, however, who won the battle in terms of the exact timing of this action, and it was only after his main force had already begun its attack that the Patriots moved across the frontier in any numbers.
To co-ordinate his strategy, Wingate relied upon a small number of men for support. One w
as Major Tony Simonds whom he had first met in Palestine. He had been commissioned into the Royal Berkshire Regiment in 1931 and five years later was serving on Wavell’s intelligence staff when he was selected for a key wartime role. By the autumn of 1940 Simonds had joined Wingate in Khartoum and, crossing the frontier on Boxing Day, he attempted to establish a route for motor transport and to make contact with Sandford.19 This did not go well and he was forced to abandon his four trucks and continue on foot, but by the first day of January 1941 he had made contact with and taken command of No.1 Operations Centre, which was marching into Ethiopia from Roseires. Eighteen days later this group established contact with Sandford and, as the colonel was leaving to link up with Selassie to act as his personal adviser, Simonds took charge of Mission 101. Over the following four weeks he secured control of all the insurgent activities in this area, capturing Engibara on 20 February. Wingate arrived the following day and assumed command, with Simonds being given a separate role operating independently on the left wing where his leadership was noted for its ingenuity and bluff. With an ultimate objective of Dessie, his more northerly thrust towards Lake Tana was known as Begemder Force, named after the province in which it did most of its work, and his experiences were typical of the small group of British and Commonwealth men who fought as part of the successful insurgent campaign.
As for the emperor, he had crossed the Dinder River the day after Platt’s forces, raising the Ethiopian flag on 20 January at the small village of Um Idla, about 250 miles from Khartoum, with his son Crown Prince Asfa Wossen standing beside him.20 With Sandford and Wingate now with him, as he began his advance small numbers of insurgents joined him and this expanding force moved on to the Gojjam plateau in the direction of its capital Debra Marcos. Progress was slow but steady, although Selassie was frequently frustrated by the rate of the advance, as Wingate, who had been given a temporary promotion to lieutenant-colonel on taking command, was looking to pursue an Italian force ten times his size. Having been harried for weeks, the enemy finally turned to face him on 6 March and fought on the banks of the River Bir at Burye. According to one account, this was the first time since the Battle of Maychew nearly five years before that an Ethiopian unit commanded by the emperor had engaged with Italian forces.21 After a series of skirmishes, and despite the loss of a quarter of his already small force, Wingate was eventually able to celebrate his first major victory – won by just 450 men with four mortars and a few anti-tank rifles who defeated 5,000 men fighting with supporting artillery and cavalry. A last concerted effort to push Gideon Force back followed. Ras Hailu, one of the local leaders opposed to Selassie, had raised an army of several thousand men and joined the Italians. General Nasi ordered his regular forces, in conjunction with these Ethiopian irregulars, to retake Burye and cut off the Patriots’ escape route. Wingate chose not to withdraw but instead fight on, and his largely Sudanese battalion proved to be a skilled and aggressive body of men against an often disorganised opponent. Ras Hailu’s forces, which were completely lacking in discipline, proved no match and deserted the Italians, who were left with little alternative other than to abandon the attack.22
7 Advance of Patriot forces.
The unfortunate Italian commander in the field, Colonel Leopoldo Natale, now changed his plans and, instead of making a further stand as had been ordered, fell back towards the east.23 The unconventional tactics of Gideon Force supported by an active propaganda unit made him believe that they were being attacked by a much larger opponent. Wingate later wrote that he ‘laid down as an essential point for propaganda that it should follow the lines of David versus Goliath, the strength of the unarmed man versus the man-at-arms’.24 In reality he had fewer than 300 men but they pursued their enemy all the way across the Gojjam. In the capital, the Italians had concentrated their remaining troops from across the area, as many as 12,000 of them including mountain artillery and some aircraft, along with their own colonial and irregular forces. Even so, Nasi ordered the city to be abandoned and Selassie entered five days later, on 6 April; this was the first regional capital he had liberated in person and, having established his authority, it was here he waited, reluctantly, only 100 miles from Addis Ababa, as events developed around him.25 From this point onwards more and more Ethiopians joined the emperor, and they were increasingly prepared to risk themselves in attacking the Italians. The final major battle fought at Agibar on 17/18 May is perhaps the best example of how this small, irregular but professionally handled force dominated the Italians. Wingate later described the surrender scene when altogether 14,000 men under the command of Colonel Saverio Maraventano, who had replaced the unfortunate Natale but who was no more successful, ‘marched in order of battle, while to receive them stood thirty-six Sudanese . . . [they continued] over the edge of the valley where they found myself with Ras Kassa and a few patriots’.26
The Italians seemed paralysed by the rebellion. In February 1941 Aosta had himself concluded that the British would be looking to make best use of the insurgency in the Gojjam but it still appeared to have struck at least some of his troops with an almost devastating psychological blow.27 From the earliest days of their occupation there had been a strong and understandable commitment to protect the large European civilian population but this had become a dominating concern that hampered the possibility of conducting a more aggressive response to Wingate’s forces. When this was added to the direction from Rome to adopt a broadly defensive posture, it helped to critically undermine the morale of the troops and eroded their willingness to fight. So bad did this become that Italian units sought out British forces when defeat seemed imminent as there was a huge fear of retribution from the vengeful Patriots.
This was not misplaced. Following the fall of Addis Ababa there was some suggestion that the insurgents were getting out of hand; as one senior officer who witnessed them in action concluded, ‘they were all over the place, no more under control than wasps in wall-fruit’.28 Another of those who met them on the battlefield recalled their commander as being ‘a very haughty man with a blue cape on [and] nice white bush hat’ but with ‘no control whatsoever’ over his irregular ‘natives’.29 This observer witnessed the legs being cut off Italians to get at their boots and the women being murdered, and his unit intervened to try and restore some order. Wingate may not have had much control but he was, however, ideally suited to the task of spreading revolt in favour of a dethroned emperor for whom he held considerable respect; he was ‘a man with the singular objective to defeat the Italians and secure the freedom of Ethiopia’.30 His force never exceeded 20 officers, 50 NCOs and 1,600 troops, half from the SDF and the remainder only partly trained Ethiopians, but they battled hard against superior Italian forces and grew in stature and confidence as the campaign progressed.31
Whilst it makes for a fascinating story, arguments remain about the overall military contribution the insurgency actually made, and there are various assessments of just how many Italian troops were diverted from elsewhere. The official War Office publication pointedly made a distinction between Mission 101 and Gideon Force when it claimed that the former tied down the equivalent of fifty-six battalions of Italian and colonial troops who were deployed in an attempt to counter the uprising.32 Once the fighting had begun, another account referred to four Italian brigades’ worth of Aosta’s combat power being drawn away from Platt’s forces as they began their northern advance.33 It was certainly true that during the decisive battle for Keren an entire regiment of the elite Savoia Grenadiers were left in Addis Ababa solely in the event of a Patriot attack on the capital. Not only were they unable to join the defenders in the mountains where they might easily have delayed, or even helped push back, the British and Indian troops, but they also played no part in the fighting that followed and the advance towards the Red Sea.34 The official history perhaps best sums up the role played by Wingate and the men who followed him when it concluded the value could not ‘be precisely assessed, but there is no doubt that it was considerable an
d that it reached its climax at exactly the right moment’.35 It was also probably true to claim that, although the British and Commonwealth forces ‘might have prevailed eventually, it would have taken more time to achieve’.36 Wavell’s main biographer, however, concluded that, whilst the Patriots had contributed to the campaign’s success, it was because of their having fixed large numbers of Italian forces in northern Ethiopia that otherwise would probably have gone to assist the troops fighting in Eritrea. Having examined the general’s extensive papers to reach this assessment, it was not exactly an enthusiastic endorsement of their role.37
This question of effectiveness is certainly difficult to answer. Although the Italians were vastly superior in numbers, Platt later remarked that ‘there was another weapon in [his] armoury [so long as it was] used in the right way and at the right time, “Insurrection” by native inhabitants in Italian East Africa’.38 In the post-war lectures he delivered to a largely military audience, he recalled that the ‘more [the Patriots] roamed and the more they stung, the less often the Italians left their defences – they put up more wire instead’.39 Yet, only a few years before, after the campaign had ended, he held a different view about unorthodox forces and their value – his comment was that ‘the curse of this war is Lawrence in the last’ – and had a fractious relationship with Wingate, reportedly saying he disliked him ‘more than the devil himself’.40 The general later concluded that the Patriots as a whole ‘did just about as much as I expected they would and no more’, something of a cryptic comment and, coming from an individual who was closely involved with their initial development, not exactly a wholehearted endorsement.41
Much the same degree of ambiguity is evident from Cunningham, who had fully supported Wavell’s proposals for irregular warfare when they were first presented to him but faced significant local challenges in achieving any real success. The people living in southern Ethiopia were happier with Italian rule than their central and northern counterparts and, in the main, better off, leading to a lack of motivation to assist in any uprising. To overcome this, the Brocklehurst Mission was sent out by the War Office in December 1940 but, with no prior consultation with Wavell or his headquarters, it proved to be a disaster. This late addition to Sandford’s and Wingate’s efforts was poorly received by Selassie, who had heard about it through his sources in London. The emperor distrusted its purpose as it proposed to operate outside of his area of operations and provide assistance to groups within the country that did not necessarily support him.42 The two principals, Henry Brocklehurst and Esme Erskine, were both former military officers who had spent the inter-war years in the Colonial Service and knew the region well. Although Wavell liked the former, the latter held some strong views about the future of Ethiopia and the role of the Galla and he antagonised the general in Cairo who, in his own words, ‘took a strong dislike to him’ and saw him as ‘an intriguer’.43 Wavell therefore made it clear that the ‘F.O. gaffe’ (which was how he later privately referred to the Mission) could carry out work in Italian Somaliland but was not to be allowed to operate in Ethiopia. Eventually he had Erskine recalled back to Britain.44
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