With the fighting nearly over, in the middle of June Cunningham’s headquarters had returned to Nairobi as there was no longer any need for him to be forward.76 The focus had already turned to various post-conflict matters, the first of which related directly to Kenya where there had been growing tension in recent months.77 The military successes further north had initially been well received amongst the local African population, particularly because of the prominent role played by the KAR, although there were some concerns that once the war was over the authorities would seize land and give it to British soldiers as a reward. By mid-April the situation had changed: enemy broadcasts in Swahili referred to heavy losses at Keren, Mogadishu and Kismayu were said to have been recaptured already, and the retreats were explained as a trap to lure in the British. In every case it was stressed that the Germans would soon complete their victory in Europe and the Italian losses therefore did not matter: all that had been lost would be recovered, and more. These threats led to reports of an increase in defeatist views and fear of what the future might hold.78 Not until the arrival of prisoners, sent back to the colony from the battlefields in Italian East Africa, along with the removal of blackout restrictions, was this seen by many as proof of the victory that had been won by British and Commonwealth forces and any doubts were dispelled.79 But by June, Moore was writing to London to report that with the end of Italian resistance in sight, and with Kenya likely ceasing to be an operational area, the white civilian population not in uniform, particularly the farmers, were inclined ‘to feel a sense of frustration’.80 The governor proposed that more be done back in Britain to help and suggested that the purchase of more Kenyan produce would encourage a sense that the colony was contributing fully to the wider war effort. This correspondence between the leadership in Nairobi and the Colonial Office in Whitehall seemed much more concerned with local political issues and prospects for the future than anything else. Already it seemed that the military campaign was a distant memory even though it was not yet over.
This was a relatively minor concern for Cunningham as he began to grapple with the biggest issue facing him: what would happen next in Ethiopia at the political more than the military level. Prior to his return home Selassie had tried repeatedly to conclude a treaty with the British to re-establish formal relations, but with no real success. There was, however, widespread interest in his plight in Britain, both in the media and the House of Commons. During an August 1940 Westminster debate one parliamentarian had urged Churchill to tell ‘the Abyssinian people that we want them to be free, that we will help them to be free, and that we ask them to fight for their freedom and for the world’; the rhetoric had not resulted in any firm commitment to support the emperor’s position.81 This became clear on 4 February 1941 when Eden stood before the same chamber and welcomed the reappearance of an independent state with Selassie restored to the throne.82 Whilst the Foreign Minister also stated that there were no territorial ambitions, an important caveat was added insomuch as it was expected there would be consultation with the authorities in London.83 As it was also stipulated that any future Ethiopian military operations would need guidance and control, this left doubts amongst Selassie’s followers as to whether the British government could be trusted.84
These doubts were not misplaced. While British and Commonwealth troops were still marching, there were some within the War Cabinet who were opposed to restoring the emperor if it meant giving him back the whole of his country. The argument was that it was an entirely artificial creation formed following the Italian defeat at Adowa, and that it did not respect the rights of those living within its borders. A leading opponent was Leo Amery, who campaigned ‘against restoring Amhara tyranny’ and proposed that whilst Selassie be given back his tribal kingdom, the Galla regions could be left to the Italians or brought under an enlarged British Somaliland.85 Smuts also continued to favour some measure of post-war international control for the country although, as yet, there remained no direct suggestion that Pretoria wished to be involved.86 Whilst he was willing to agree that there should be some supervision, Eden was, however, committed to restoring ‘the integrity and independence of Ethiopia’.87 In the first instance, this meant that a Military Administration was established, a British Military Mission to Ethiopia, with Major-General Philip Mitchell, referred to in Nairobi as ‘the big political man’, appointed as Wavell’s Chief Political Officer.88 This, along with the accurate but also rather cynical statements from the likes of Amery, only added to tensions amongst Selassie’s followers as to Britain’s true intentions.89
The adoption of an approach that seemed at times almost antagonistic ran counter to the argument that had first been put forward as to why the Patriots would be prepared to fight. It also helped strengthen increasing doubts amongst the emperor’s supporters about his intended future role.90 Although it was later insisted that Selassie’s leadership had never been in question, it was actually some time before there was a general acceptance that only he could hold together the proposed uprising and lead the country. Cunningham was aware of the tensions that had developed and he worried about the ‘fractious Selassie’ and the potential for trouble.91 He had maintained good relations with the emperor throughout his advance and kept him fully informed of how operations were progressing while also providing clear directions as to the role he wished his Patriot forces to fulfil.92 Following the liberation of Addis Ababa, the British commander had, however, chosen deliberately to keep Selassie away from the capital until he could improve the local security situation.93 This had created some further tensions as the emperor was anxious to assert his authority and regain control of his throne in the face of challenges directed at him from some senior Ethiopian figures.
It was the Defence Committee in London which actually took the decision that he should be allowed to enter the capital as soon as possible, although after he had first been reminded of the terms announced earlier in the year.94 Churchill remained adamant that the emperor be restored to power, his concern being that ‘political circles’ – presumably other exiled governments and allies who had sought refuge in London – had always assumed Selassie would be returned to power as soon as possible and not to do so now ran the risk of British motives and aims being questioned. The prime minister’s support did, however, come with the assumption that, in governing his country, Ethiopia’s restored leader would ‘no doubt tak[e] advice from us’, and any future assistance could be limited to food and money without the need to leave any large garrison of military forces.95 It was this in combination that resulted in Selassie being able to return to his capital on 5 May, exactly five years after the conquering Italians had seized it from him. As the first monarch to be toppled from his throne by one of the Axis powers became the first to be restored, the great stone eagle that had been placed on top of his palace by the first Italian viceroy was destroyed by his excited supporters.96
In Nairobi, Sir Henry Moore also appeared to have doubts about what the future would hold. Relations between herdsmen and villagers who lived on either side of the frontier between Kenya and Ethiopia had always been volatile, with long-standing disputes. Moore wrote back to London in May to warn that there could only be ‘peace on the borders’ if the outstanding issues relating to grazing and waterholes were resolved.97 The governor urged that now was the time to settle these with Selassie, before he became ‘more intractable’ and while he was still dependent on British military support. The following month Cunningham returned to Addis Ababa where he was awarded the Star of Solomon, which only the emperor himself and George VI had previously received. A discussion followed during which his aide speculated that the general had reminded his host ‘he had got to do what he was told’.98 Blewitt had continued to be particularly forthright in his criticisms of the relationship with Ethiopia and, almost immediately following the capture of Addis Ababa, he had worried about ‘a Gilbert and Sullivan position which would be funny were it not for the amount of stuff which it still keeps tied up in thi
s place’.99 He continued privately to share his dislike for the emperor who, he believed, was set on making things very difficult, writing that it was ‘a tragedy handing the country back to him and the popular idea that the public have at home that we are restoring a popular and democratic ruler to the country from which he had been kicked out by the wily and brutal Italian is quite definitely wrong’.100 Evan Wavell had shared similar feelings back in May when he had mused on the idea of using the threat of withdrawing financial support and troops as a means of exerting pressure on Selassie.101 By the middle of July, Cunningham confessed that he was looking forward to being out of a job which was becoming more and more political. He also did not agree with the policy being carried out in Ethiopia, ‘which comes from our Dictator himself and therefore which has to be carried out at any rate at the moment’ – this was presumably a reference to Churchill who remained adamant that Selassie’s position was to be guaranteed.102
The immediate issue became exactly as Amery had suggested would be the case: the Galla looked to Britain to provide protection but at the same time managed to arm themselves with thousands of Italian rifles and large quantities of ammunition and other supplies. The fear amongst the local British military was that this would be used at some future stage if they were ‘required to submit themselves again to the Amhara’ and there was a potential for civil war.103 This would remain a long-term concern although there were different interpretations of what it meant for Britain. In October Amery wrote once again to Eden highlighting his fears about what would happen if the emperor was not given sufficient recognition and could not therefore exercise authority or keep control.104 According to Lady Mary Barton, whose husband had been the British Minister in Addis Ababa at the time of the Italian invasion, whilst Selassie was ‘often very difficult and inclined to be truculent’, she believed he needed support from somebody who understood him and whom he trusted. This was not in her opinion Sandford, who had remained one of the emperor’s most trusted counsellors following his return to the capital. She thought he was excellent as a farmer and guerrilla leader but was not the right man to act as a political adviser. Eden dismissed these concerns, but he did confide that he also had misgivings about how things were shaping up in the country.105 Churchill nonetheless continued to provide reassurance to Selassie but it was only in December that a draft agreement was signed between him and Mitchell that was acceptable to both sides.106 Confirmed on the last day of January 1942, this limited direct British control within Ethiopia to certain Reserved Areas, including the vital railway link to the frontier with Jibuti, but even with this the 12th African Division remained in the country until April of the following year ensuring that tensions also remained.107
A further complication for Cunningham was that his unprecedented success had led to a requirement not merely to administer vast swathes of conquered territory but also to provide security for the large Italian civilian population.108 Even before his advance had begun he worried about what might happen in Ethiopia where he feared many civilians could be murdered, leading to ‘shrieks to us to get them out of trouble’.109 Despite the atrocities committed by the Italians during their occupation and the local hatred of them, there was in fact no serious breakdown in order.110 The advancing troops had often found themselves pressed into an impromptu peacekeeping role and this had, for the most part, been sufficient to prevent trouble breaking out. According to his aide the general quickly formed the view that the Ethiopians had ‘behaved extraordinarily well on the whole’ and there had only been ‘a few massacres of stray Wops’.111 The same was true in the capital, where as many as 35,000 Italians were still living and most of the key municipal activities remained in their hands.112 The British intention had been for these civilians to be repatriated, which had been calculated as taking the best of a year to complete, but it soon became clear that there was no great rush to move this forward.113 It was later agreed that 500 technicians would remain until suitable replacements from elsewhere could be found, but in early November 1941 the War Cabinet reiterated the decision that all Italians were to be evacuated from Ethiopia. This was something that Selassie and a majority of his newly liberated people had initially demanded, but the local authorities in Addis Ababa decided at the last moment to retain a large number of their former occupiers.114 In many cases they even went so far as to hide them, and generally make every effort to prevent their deportation. The truth was that many of the Italians made an essential contribution and were prepared to stay and help with the country’s future development. Even the authorities in London quickly came to share a similar view; by November 1942 fewer than 30,000 Italians had been repatriated or moved elsewhere in the region.
Cunningham was finding himself tied down by often highly complex civil/military issues but there were also questions still to be resolved about the French position. It had been possible to put these to one side while the fighting continued but, both locally and back in London, pressure was now growing for decisions to be taken. Relations had been complicated ever since December 1940 when the Free French forces of General Charles de Gaulle had drawn up a scheme to capture Jibuti.115 Unfortunately this plan for a brigade attack, Operation ‘Marie’, was not fully shared with senior British officials until a very late stage and it was abandoned only when it seemed clear that there would be no rapid surrender. Although Churchill once again favoured military action, Wavell, Dill, Eden and even the Free French commander in the Middle East concluded that the best strategy was to negotiate with the authorities in Jibuti about allowing the use of the port in exchange for the blockade, which had begun the previous year, being partially relaxed. Over the months that followed there was little progress in reaching an agreement, and throughout the summer confusion remained about how to proceed. Hopes that the Vichy leadership was on the point of surrender came to nothing, but there were also insufficient forces available to launch an attack against strong defences, and the knowledge that the Vichy French troops had made preparations to destroy the port rather than see it surrendered intact.116 During a late June visit to inspect some of the Senegalese troops at the customs post of Douanle, Cunningham observed a Free French aircraft dropping pamphlets over the town and being fired upon. This led his aide to comment that ‘it makes one realise what a difficult time the French are going to have after the war whichever side wins’.117 As it was, tensions continued until November 1942 when, following Operation ‘Torch’ and the Allied landings in North Africa, a large section of the garrison finally deserted and fled to British Somaliland. The following month, the acting governor signed an agreement in which he at last agreed to side with the Free French, thus removing the final potential threat facing the British Commonwealth in East Africa.
With this range of political challenges distracting him, a major military development during the summer appeared almost to slip by Cunningham and everybody else in the region. On 8 June Wavell advised London that six brigades would be the maximum force required to garrison the British administered and occupied Italian territories in eastern Africa. With the priority still remaining the moving of troops north, the War Office tentatively accepted this proposal although it insisted that the troops must be colonial, from the SDF and the East and West African divisions. This agreement proved to be the final contribution made to the campaign by the senior military officer in Cairo as, less than two weeks later, following the failure of Operation ‘Battleaxe’, Churchill removed Wavell from his role. Ismay, who knew him well, was one of the many who felt some sympathy and he later concluded that Wavell had ‘shown strategic genius of the highest order’ as he tried to conduct ‘five campaigns at once and the same time, much as a juggler keeps five balls in the air at once’.118 This did not stop him from endorsing the prime minister’s decision and dismissing the ‘groundless’ accusations that Wavell had been made a scapegoat for the reverses that had taken place in the Western Desert and Mediterranean. His wartime military assistant was recorded at the time as saying that his general�
��s transfer had come as a great blow to him and was, he thought, the result of Churchill’s resentment of his popular success; Rommel was reported to have rated him as ‘the most redoubtable’ of the opponents he faced.119 There was, however, some recognition that the defeats might have been ‘a subsidiary cause’ but he made no reference to the argument which had begun the previous August about British Somaliland or the impact of the subsequent tensions that developed about how the East Africa campaign was being fought.120 Whatever the exact cause, Wavell’s new posting to take charge in India, then seen as a non-fighting command, was considered to be ‘very humiliating’. When the news was received at the headquarters in Nairobi there was some shock, but it had also been heard that his replacement, General Claude Auchinleck, was ‘a first class man and the war simply carried on’.121
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