Certainly, Wavell’s compelling leadership style and the skilful manner in which he moved forces around this vast theatre were decisive elements in the British and Commonwealth success. Wavell’s willingness to do this has been described as ‘inspired strategic juggling which by its timing and finesse was to suggest to the Italians that the same British soldiers were defeating them in simultaneous battles a thousand miles apart’.15 The manner in which he deployed his forces during Operation ‘Compass’ was both bold and inspired and he persisted in managing his command as a whole rather than as a series of isolated theatres.16 For one commentator who fought in East Africa, this decision required ‘imagination, faith and a plenitude of moral courage’; as it was, it proved a successful gambit and could well rank alongside ‘major military decisions which have set the course of history’.17 Keeping with the idea of the East Africa campaign being an early example of a modern battle, the official history was correct to claim that it was the only ‘completely successful [joint] campaign during the Second World War before 1943’, recognising the significant role played by land, air and naval forces.18 This was no more than a reflection of the conclusion that had been put forward in Westminster debates following the capture of Addis Ababa, when it was said that the achievement would ‘probably come to be regarded as the first brilliant example of the use, in co-operation, of all three arms’.19
Despite such accolades, the victory never quite received the acclaim it deserved, due largely to events that followed elsewhere – most notably relating to the catastrophic defeats in Greece and Crete along with the later failures in the Western Desert – but Wavell had demonstrated his significant military acumen and intellect. Before the war he had given three lectures on generalship to a small, largely military audience at Cambridge University. Largely overlooked at the time, in these he had offered a wide-ranging explanation of his approach to soldiering, particularly the essentials he thought were needed for a senior officer. A good general, he told the audience:
must know how to get his men their rations and every other kind of store needed for war. He must have imagination to originate plans, practical sense and energy to carry them through. He must be observant, untiring, shrewd, kindly and cruel; simple and crafty, a watchman and a robber; lavish and miserly; generous and stingy, rash and conservative. He should also[,] as a matter of course, know his tactics; for a disorderly mob is no more an army than a heap of building stone is a house.20
Wavell had followed these principles at all times throughout the battles fought in East Africa and had proved himself to be one of the leading military commanders of his age.
His guidance was decisive in terms of the campaign’s success, but the same could not be said of the immediate impact it had on his career. Like all British military operations throughout the war following Churchill’s appointment as prime minister in 1940, the planning and conduct of military operations in this region were liable to his interventions and whims, and from very early on he demanded that some form of offensive action be taken. He grumbled constantly about the size of the forces that had been kept in Kenya and it often appeared that he hoped Wavell’s calls for action ‘would waste away if ignored and blockaded’.21 Writing after the war about the subsequent operations and the comprehensive success they secured, he still chose to argue that the ‘results showed how unduly the commanders on the spot had magnified the difficulties and how right we were at home to press them to speedy action’.22 Even though it was nine years after the events had occurred, Churchill’s recollections offered a clear and withering indictment of the apparent lack of confidence he had at the time in his generals’ abilities to effectively translate tactical victories into strategic success. Cunningham complained to the official historian that such claims were ‘quite untrue’, and there were others prepared to say the same, but the former prime minister’s semi-official account had a huge, global readership and it did clearly ‘give the impression that Archie Wavell and I were unwilling horses requiring to be kicked over the fence by the Churchillian Spur before we would advance’.23
Driving Britain’s wartime leader in the writing of this narrative was the unfortunate impression he had formed of Wavell in August 1940 as a somewhat taciturn individual who was reticent and prone to overstating the difficulties he faced. The military commander was intuitive enough to realise that their first meeting had not gone well and prophetically commented shortly afterwards, ‘I do not think Winston quite knew what to make of me and whether I was fit to command or not.’24 More than a decade after Wavell’s death, his biographer John Connell wrote to Ismay, who had been on good terms with both Wavell and Churchill, to ask him about the campaign in East Africa. In this correspondence Connell argued that, back in 1940, the prime minister had ‘tended to look at small scale maps, and ignore the size and the difficulty of the country’.25 The two men agreed that Churchill had not understood the vast nature of the region and ‘his contempt of the fighting qualities of the Italian Army’ had clouded his views.26 Such was his loyalty, however, that even twenty years later Ismay still would not challenge the decisions that had been taken at the time.
Within this brief exchange of information the events that had taken place in British Somaliland were overlooked. The protectorate’s loss exemplified the tensions that existed in the relationship between Wavell and Churchill and it was undoubtedly poisoned by what happened. Britain’s wartime leader entirely failed to acknowledge the political constraints that had been imposed on planning, the small size of the garrison and the only limited firepower that had been made available to aid its defence.27 In draft notes prepared for his post-war history, it was stated that the pre-war policy had been ‘to evacuate Somaliland, which was regarded as an uncomfortable commitment in a theatre of minor strategic importance’, but, largely at Dill’s urging, in December 1939 this had been changed to mounting a defence.28 Desperate for a British victory in the summer of 1940, the politician subsequently blamed his general and his subordinate commanders for the defeat, despite there being a series of factors over which they had had little or no control. Wavell’s own dispatch put the blame on successive governments which had, through their inaction, contributed to what had happened. The original draft of this document was submitted in October 1940 and it was clear then that its tone and ‘frank criticism’ could only add to existing tensions.29 As it was, the dispatch, along with all the others produced during the war, was retained until after its end. When it was finally published the War Office still took the unusual step of including an introduction which attempted to offer some defence of the policies that had been followed, although it did also acknowledge that political constraints had played a pivotal role in the defeat.30 There was, of course, no reference to the acrimonious exchange of telegrams about ‘a big butcher’s bill’ and it ‘not necessarily [being] evidence of good tactics’.31 One of the prime minister’s wartime advisers was very much of the view that Wavell’s defence of the low casualty numbers suffered in Somaliland was never forgiven by Churchill, who ‘raged, but could think of nothing to say in return’.32 He could, however, remember the exchange and take the necessary steps the following year to exact retribution.
Wavell had better fortune in the relationships he enjoyed with the men who worked for him. Although he did not select either of his two principal subordinates, Cunningham and Platt, they nonetheless formed a highly effective working relationship and the influence this had on securing the campaign’s final outcome cannot be underestimated. As The Times put it, he ‘had had two competent and determined commanders who took to this quick-moving warfare as ducks to water’.33 Wavell himself put the victory down mainly to the boldness and skill in execution of his generals, the quality of their subordinates and ‘the dash and endurance of the troops’, privately noting that it was ‘fully justified in the end’.34 He set the targets and provided the resources but then gave them considerable discretion in deciding how they went about fighting the campaign.35 In terms of who was bett
er, having read Wavell’s account The Times’s military correspondent concluded that ‘No comparisons are called for. Let both divide the crown, with their subordinate comman-ders and troops, who served them so well.’36 This was not the only such accolade: writers in Britain at the time constantly referred to the fighting qualities of these two generals and their ‘dash, stamina and enthusiasm’.37
Cunningham was the more charismatic of the two operational-level commanders. One leading historian has described how ‘in eight weeks he seemed to have marched half across Africa; his speed and dash delighted the British public’.38 The general later wrote that the Italians had relied upon the extremely difficult terrain to protect them and it was the shock of finding that his forces could cross country they considered impassable which fatally weakened their morale and any willingness to continue the fight.39 As he noted, prior to the war the opinion on all sides had been that an advance across the deserts along the frontier between Kenya and Ethiopia was ‘a military impossibility’, yet he thought differently. He also appeared to have confidence in his subordinates and apparently did not meet his two divisional comman-ders from early February to the middle of May but let them get on with the battle, providing support and encouragement as it was needed.40 The rapid exploitation of the successful engagement on the River Juba offered an early demonstration of Cunningham’s agility and offensive spirit and the subsequent advance showed that in this war a small, well-led force, with a strong, aggressive spirit and the will to win, could overcome a numerically superior enemy.41 He was also modest in recognising the extent of what he had achieved, later describing the campaign’s success to Wavell as down to ‘a bit of luck, two first class commanders, and troops with their tails right up’.42
Cunningham’s reward would come with a call from Auchinleck to travel north to take charge of the newly forming Eighth Army, although this proved to be a bitter one as he was relieved of command just days after the start of Operation ‘Crusader’, its first battle.43 On Cunningham’s return to England on medical grounds, Churchill, who had in any case initially preferred somebody else for the role, ruled that he was not to be put in charge of troops again. Brooke believed he had been badly treated and found him a role as Commandant at the Staff College, although one of his peers believed that he had ‘hardly the intellectual qualities needed to stimulate the ideas of our future staff officers’. In the opinion of a post-war writer working on the South African official histories, this was far from the case, and ‘if anything Cunningham was too alert; as Napoleon would say he “saw too many things at once”’.44 After his spell in purdah, which also included a period as the senior officer in Northern Ireland, Cunningham finished the war as GOC Eastern Command and in November 1945 it was announced that he was being sent abroad as High Commissioner and Commander-in-Chief Palestine and Trans-Jordan.45 Churchill was gone but even so the victor of East Africa still had his critics; Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery wrote personally to the then Secretary of State for the Colonies questioning the decision, describing Cunningham as somebody who ‘inspires no confidence’ and suggesting there must be better alternatives.46 This proved not to be the case, and his performance was well received. He lived until the age of ninety-five, which made him the last surviving senior officer to have fought in Africa. This was fitting for the commander who had largely overseen the British Commonwealth’s first victory in this vital strategic theatre.
As for Platt, he summed up his achievements in a lecture he delivered in 1951 at the Staff College in Camberley, during which he told his audience that, ten years before, ‘the soldiers and airmen of all races and creeds who fought from the Sudan and East Africa can fairly claim to have been the bright light in a dark year, and to have laid the foundation not only for victory in Africa but in the world’.47 He went on to say that good pilots and technically superior fighters (once South African Hurricanes had arrived), in combination with a much superior tank and the fighting spirit of his troops, had provided a critical advantage.48 Platt’s northern column also had a shorter distance to cover, 450 miles from Kassala to Amba Alagi, and, although this was completed in four months, it did include the siege at Keren. Platt’s troops managed to take positions from the Italians in the north which they had had every intention of holding, and this led them increasingly to withdraw forces from the south in order to concentrate their defences and retain their grip on the vital Eritrea. In turn, Cunningham liked to make the point in private that the victory in the mountains could not have been achieved without the rapid advance by the men under his command as it was this which actually helped draw away Italian forces from further north. However this was viewed, what was clear was that the two operations were ‘complementary’, so had to be viewed together. The two senior officers in fact seemed to enjoy a good working relationship throughout the campaign.49
The end of the fighting would eventually result in Platt’s appointment to take charge of the new East Africa Command. This covered Ethiopia, Italian Somaliland, British Somaliland, Uganda, Kenya, Tanganyika, Northern Rhodesia, Madagascar and other assorted Indian Ocean islands, an area comparable to that which Wavell had overseen. Other than undertaking the capture of Diego Suarez and Madagascar and an ‘invasion scare’ during the summer of 1942 when it was feared Japan might launch a raid on the east African coast, this proved to be a largely administrative posting. Perhaps the most important role was the training and preparation of the African forces that were sent out to fight in Burma, and in this Platt proved extremely effective.50 The former Kaid also lived a long life and after he died at ninety years of age his lengthy obituary referred prominently to him as having been the ‘victor of Keren’.51 It also offered an anecdote he apparently liked to tell of how he had responded modestly to congratulations from King George VI following the victory in Eritrea, referring to the engagements his troops had fought as ‘bows and arrows’ compared to the battles in the Western Desert. The men who had fought there knew that the experience had actually been far more difficult than that.
For the Italians the campaign was nothing short of a disaster. As one of the official histories summarised the outcome: ‘The Empire which Italy took seven months to gain was lost in four . . . [and] resulted in the complete destruction of an Italian army of 300,000 men.’52 The question was asked both at the time and subsequently as to why they had done so badly in the land battles. Despite its being a largely barren desert, the capture of British Somaliland in August 1940 should have acted as a catalyst in seizing the initiative, as the Italians had gained an additional 450 miles of coast with a harbour to be developed at Berbera and the opportunity to build airbases that would have allowed them to target Aden. Instead it marked a disappointing high point as they subsequently dug in and waited for an attack which six months later obligingly came. Whilst they often fought bravely at the tactical level, poor decisions, inactivity and incompetence at the operational and strategic level lost them the engagements that they did fight.53 One contemporary assessment offered by a junior Indian officer identified four critical areas in which the Italians had failed. These were: poor morale; superior British training, determination and initiative amongst junior officers, NCOs and the ordinary ranks; successful use of the bayonet; and a lack of Italian confidence in their cause.54 To these could perhaps be added the degree to which they were unprepared for the war they would have to fight, with a legacy of fighting irregular warfare and poorly equipped opponents during their previous regional campaigns. Accordingly they had no real answer to fast advancing columns and well-trained and highly motivated professional troops, and did not understand armoured warfare. Theoretically, Ethiopia was an easy country to defend against invasion, given the near impossibility of movement except on the very few primitive roads, the almost total lack of communications and the great distances involved. Ultimately it was shown that these severe restrictions applied equally to the defenders as to any invading force. The British and Commonwealth troops, however, proved far more adept at overcoming
the resulting logistical challenges, showing themselves time and again to be able to move over poor terrain at great speed and keep their opponent uncertain of their strategy.
From his position as an intelligence officer, George Young concluded that the mystery of the Italian collapse was not a particularly profound one:
The generals were rather old perhaps but well versed in the history and lessons of war. There was nothing wrong with their actual ability to handle masses of men according to a plan. They were well up in the science of what is now called logistics. But they did not want the war, they had made up their minds that war would mean the loss of their Empire, if they did have a war then Mussolini and his German friends could do the fighting. They proposed to content themselves with putting prepared plans into effect.55
The First Victory Page 28