June 2017: When Paris Was Lost
Negotiations on climate action, spearheaded by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), have exhibited a similar delusional approach from the very beginning and can be summarized as follows: The so-called ‘developed countries’ of the world have industrialized on coal, contributing the most to climate change. These same countries now expect developing nations, who still suffer from large-scale poverty including energy poverty, to renounce coal and find alternate pathways for their development. Moreover, the developed nations don’t want to provide financial or technological assistance in this seemingly herculean task.
At the third UNFCCC Conference of Parties in Kyoto, Japan, in 1997, member nations institutionalized the term Common but Differentiated Responsibility (CBDR). 23 The Kyoto Protocol, as it came to be known, acknowledged the historical responsibility of the developed world towards climate action by drawing up a list of developed countries—then referred to in Annexure 1—which committed themselves to targets for cutting or slowing their emission levels. 24 However, the protocol was hamstrung thanks to a resolution in the US senate according to which Congress would not ratify any international commitment where developing countries were omitted. 25 Thus despite the US signing on to the protocol under President Clinton, it was not ratified by Congress. 26
Up until 2 June 2017, the biggest setback to climate diplomacy came at COP (Conference of Parties) 15 in Copenhagen. The developing world was left bitterly disappointed at the dropping of the global target of reducing emission by 80 per cent by 2050. 27 To make matters worse, the target of limiting rising global temperatures to 1.5 degree Celsius too was dropped. 28
President Obama’s statement that developing countries should be ‘getting out of that mindset’ of looking at previous agreements which made a distinction between developed and developing countries served as a serious blow to developing nations, who had for years tried to uphold the provisions of CBDR and Kyoto Protocol. 29
At the other end of the spectrum, COP 21 at Paris was climate diplomacy’s finest hour in almost two decades. The agreement ticked all the boxes—over 190 signatories, check; 30 mention of not just 2 degree Celsius, but also 1.5 degree Celsius as a target, check; 31 making USD 100 billion the minimum amount and acknowledging that far larger sums are needed for climate action, check; 32 and, most importantly, bringing back CBDR, check. 33
However, the glory days of COP 21 were short lived. On 2 June 2017, Trump withdrew US support to the Paris Accord, claiming he was elected President of the citizens of Pittsburgh and not Paris. He made his contempt for climate action, global governance and multilateral diplomacy clear in one go. 34
Like in the case of the Iran deal, the withdrawal from the Paris Accord too was a campaign pledge the President had made to his support base. To win the presidential election, Trump had promised to bring back the jobs the coal miners had lost due to environmental regulations imposed by Obama. The pull-out from the Paris deal along with a host of domestic measures was therefore Trump’s way of delivering on his campaign promise. The fact, however, remains that these efforts have little to no impact and the jobs Trump tried to recreate are nowhere in sight. Like many of his decisions, this renunciation of the Paris Accord too is steeped in delusional thinking. 35
With the US out of the Paris Accord, the future of climate negotiations looks bleak at best. While India and China have stepped in, each in their own way, and taken leadership of global climate action, how much can be achieved without the world’s largest polluter, 36 which also happens be the world’s largest economy? 37
More worryingly, from the perspective of a developing country, a consensus seems to have emerged from the inability of the world to unite behind the Paris Accord, particularly CBDR. A report—published by the Climate Action Network—which ranks fifty-six countries (along with ranking EU as a separate supranational entity), highlights that it is not just the United States that has failed Paris. Europe, the supposed leader in climate action has not done nearly enough. For instance, Germany (ranked twenty-two, eight places below India) ‘still has relatively high GHG emissions with nearly no improvements regarding GHG trends within the last years and is rated low in this category.’ EU as a whole is ranked twenty-one, seven places below India, and the report suggests, ‘the EU rates medium in emissions, renewables and energy use. EU experts emphasize the union‘s constructive role in international climate diplomacy but criticize the slow progress in putting in place new and more ambitious policies and targets’. 38 Other nations of the Atlantic system such as Japan, Canada, Republic of Korea and Australia, have all received poor rankings and have been placed under the ‘very low’ performing country category.
The inability of the developed world to commit towards a globally agreed framework for climate action, where those who have polluted the most take up the larger responsibility, points to the fact that in their constituencies the only response to climate change is poverty. For the time being, it suggests the developed world has reached the consensus that to limit the dangers of rising global temperatures the developmental efforts of the developing world must be constrained. This line of thinking is delusional at best and dangerous at worst.
Actors Governing the Globe
In some respects, this has been the most difficult section of this book to write. I do so with some trepidation and after anguished introspection.
I served as the permanent representative of India to the United Nations in Geneva and New York. I sat in the Security Council meetings when some of the most controversial and sensitive decisions of the past decades were made. At the time of writing this book, I have already spent a total of forty-three years in the profession of diplomacy. If you add to that a dozen or so years when I was witness to the evolution of other events, as the son of a diplomat, that is a long time indeed.
A significant part of my career has been dedicated to an institution which was born in the aftermath of war, created to prevent war and whose legitimacy faltered when faced once again with precisely these conditions. It is the only institution under whose ambit I can envision peace. But it is also an institution that has allowed itself to be steered off course by management failures and mechanisms completely out of line and unresponsive to the challenges of the twenty-first century.
This section is an honest attempt at a realistic appraisal. It is also a reality check on whether there is at all any possibility in today’s day and age to rebuild confidence in the United Nations. Its detractors have long believed that it is not central to the conduct of global governance. By virtue of the dominant position the strong find themselves in, they have less regard and need for the multilateral system. They think they can act unilaterally or build and act as part of a ‘coalition of the willing’. But can they, really?
A clearing of the global cobwebs at the very outset appears to be called for. The world today is admittedly in disarray and in an advanced stage of entropy. Does this pose a greater danger than those posed by earlier crises? This requires context setting. What are the potential and real dangers for the outbreak of hostilities and war among declared nuclear-armed states. Why does the need for a discussion on global governance assume such critical urgency today?
The current system of global governance was designed as World War II was concluding. It is entirely possible that representatives at San Francisco might have delayed adopting the charter of the United Nations had they been convened in peacetime. The ongoing World War II, in other words, provided an urgent context setting. The first draft of the charter was prepared in the US Department of State. 39
The charter, cast in a post-Westphalian state-centric model is balanced by the far-sighted and visionary provision ‘We the Peoples’. The full significance of this is beginning to be comprehended more than seventy years after the adoption of the charter.
The electoral victory of Donald Trump has had a significant impact on this chapter, and indeed this book, as it marks a significant
shift in what has come to be known as a post-war world order. A caveat needs to be entered, however, into the narrative at this time. There are other significant and decisive influences on the shaping of the post-war order. The rise of China is a major factor.
There is a growing sense within America that the ‘perilous interventions’ of the past decade have not only made the country more unsafe, but they have come at the cost of American tax dollars.
The Trump presidency in a way is the legacy of those interventions and by electing Trump, the United States of America has made it clear that it no longer wants to underwrite international security and is no longer the guarantor of economic prosperity.
The following quotes from President Trump shed a glimpse on what he and his support base think of the country’s strongest alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO):
‘I have been very very direct with secretary Stoltenberg and members of the alliance in saying NATO members must finally contribute their fair share and meet their financial obligations.’
‘But 23 of the 28 member nations are still not paying what they should be paying and what they are supposed to be paying for their defence.’
‘This is not fair to the people and taxpayers of the United States and many of these nations owe massive amounts of money from past years. And not paying in those past years.’ 40
Despite President Trump and his angry proclamations against Global Governance, I would like to urge caution against those claiming an American ‘retreat’—the United States is still the world’s largest economy, with a GDP of over US 18 trillion, 41 and an industrial military complex that is capable of producing and arming governments and insurgents alike in most of the global trouble spots.
Having said that, there is no doubt that there is a temporary retrenchment on part of the United States as the global leader of security and prosperity, and several actors are trying to fill this space. The foremost among these is the People’s Republic of China.
Speaking at the World Economic Forum’s annual summit in Davos, the Chinese Premier Xi Jingping made official what many knew was inevitable—the rise of the dragon:
‘At present, the most pressing task before us is to steer the global economy out of difficulty. The global economy has remained sluggish for quite some time. The gap between the poor and the rich and between the South and the North is widening. The root cause is that the three critical issues in the economic sphere have not been effectively addressed.’ 42
Such a statement from the leader of both the People’s Republic of China and of the Communist Party of China would have been inconceivable a few years ago. So, what’s changed?
After two decades of double digit growth, largely predicated on export-focused manufacturing, China as of 2017 is a USD 12.38 trillion economy, 43 with a per capita income of USD 8,826.99. 44 This economic might has allowed the People’s Republic of China to embark on a mission to create a Sino-centric world order, often dubbed the ‘Beijing Consensus’.
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which is supposedly a regional connectivity project aiming to link East Asia with the Eurasian landmass, Africa, and ultimately to the markets of Western Europe, is at its core, a geo-political project to establish Pax Sinica.
The Sri Lankan Hambantota port, 45 the Gwadar port, 46 and the larger China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), 47 are just some of the examples of how, under the garb of ‘win-win’ and ‘pragmatic cooperation’, the Chinese model looks to create a world order wherein nations are dependent and beholden to the Middle Kingdom. It is not just hard, on-the-ground, infrastructure that the dragon seeks. By establishing institutions such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank, and Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, the People’s Republic of China has entered the fore of creating norms and rules around geo-economics, and geo-politics.
Perhaps the clearest indication of China’s ambitions to be the leading Asian, if not global, power, was illustrated in the recent stand-off between Chinese and Indian troops at Doklam, Bhutan. China, in an attempt to change the ground realities, started road construction and military patrol of the tri-junction separating China, Bhutan, and India. 48 When faced with the prospects of confronting Indian troops, China launched a vicious media and psychological campaign which reached their peak when the CPC’s propaganda outlet, Global Times, called the Indian Foreign Minister a ‘liar’. 49 Its outright rejection of the verdict by an international tribunal on illegal expansion in the South China Sea, 50 and its support to North Korean nuclear ambitions are further proof of China’s disregard for multilateralism. 51
While the US is retrenching and the PRC’s is growing, two other actors, Western Europe and the Russian Federation, seem to be acting somewhat contrary to their historical roles as global rule-makers.
The European Union faces an existential crisis. Once the promoters of what came to be known as ‘European Values’, the continent today witnesses widespread bigotry, racism 52 and a complete disregard for human rights, of those fleeing from ISIS strongholds in West Asia. 53 The ‘otherization’ of resident Muslims, even second and third generation Muslims, has resulted in a wave of support for ISIS-like organizations, and tragic ‘lone-wolf’ attacks in France and Belgium. Add the economic crisis of 2010 when the PIIGS countries, Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, Spain, almost went bankrupt, 54 and the recent Brexit referendum result, means Europe must set its own house in order, even as it attempts to shape the world order of the twenty-first century. Post the collapse of the USSR, this is perhaps the first time in twenty-eight years that the EU faces this dual challenge. An entire generation or more of Europeans have lived in an era of unprecedented peace and prosperity. How the present generation responds to the dual challenge it faces today, will shape the internal and international future of the continent.
The case of Russia too is unique. At USD 1.578 trillion, its economic size is much smaller than that of the United States, Western Europe, and ranks ahead of only South Africa amongst the BRICS countries. 55 There has been little to no expansion of Russia’s domestic industry and it does not feature in too many geo-economic conversations. 56 And yet, thanks to its military prowess, it remains a critical actor in global governance.
No global conflict today can be resolved without Russian participation, as the ISIS challenge illustrates. Moreover, if allegations about its involvement in the American electoral process have any basis in fact, then, at the very least, it shows that Russia is not opposed to intervention in the domestic affairs of other countries.
Russia’s ‘democratically’ elected leader, Vladimir Putin, can certainly not continue with this quasi-hegemony for too long. Having won his second consecutive bid for the presidency (and fourth overall), Putin will soon have to address the economic concerns of his people. As the world enters the fourth industrial revolution, the solutions to decades of economic neglect, might not be as easily forthcoming.
Demise of Multilateralism
It is evident from the preceding analysis that bilateralism or even unilateralism is gaining traction. Member states’ façade of a preference for multilateral solutions to global problems has fallen.
Several trends that gave the UN its credibility are now in reversal. In the public’s eye—in the eyes of those outside the tight-knit UN community and even some within—the UN appears to be losing the effectiveness and legitimacy it once had. The lexicon now features phrases such as ‘greatest humanitarian crisis since World War II’ and the ‘notion of inter-state and intra-state conflict have blurred and there is no linear path to peace’. 57 Violent extremism and global pandemics race to infect as many minds and bodies as possible.
These are not confined within a state’s borders. The interdependency and interconnectedness invited by globalism has made sure of that. When the world is desperately calling out for increased burden-sharing to deal with the multiple crises at hand, faith has been lost in the institution that was created for this very
purpose.
In matters of peace and security—the most important of the three founding pillars of the UN—the institution is floundering at best. Created for the purpose of saving future generations from the scourge of war remains, after seven decades, it has become impotent and largely helpless on the major crises facing the world: Iraq, Libya, Syria, North Korea, Yemen and Ukraine, to name a few. The real danger lies elsewhere. Nowhere in these crises does the UN itself believe it has a durable and worthwhile solution to offer.
In December 2015, I wrote ‘Multilateral organizations are struggling to adapt to the breadth and pace of the multiple and multi-layered crises. The drafters of the UN Charter could, in all fairness not have anticipated many of the challenges of today’s world. The UN is being tested as never before.’ 58
But, in a sense, it is not the UN that is at a crossroads. There are three UNs out there, not one. The 193 member states, the UN Secretariat and civil society, NGOs, think tanks and a vast array of other organizations that collectively shape humanity’s consciousness on human rights, humanitarianism, environment and an ocean full of other issues that culminated in the successful negotiations of the Sustainable Development Goals and the adopting of the 2030 Agenda.
If the UN is to remain relevant, the question is whether the UN is fit for purpose as it nears seventy-one years of its existence. The answer is not a straight ‘yes’. In many respects, the UN’s problems are the creation of its member states, or at least some of them.
In June 2011, participating in an Informal Thematic Debate on ‘The United Nations in Global Governance,’ I had said:
Let me place before you four propositions. These four propositions, or rather self-evident truisms, apply, to a certain extent, to all organizations created and manned by human beings. First, that organizational lethargy begets structural blind spots. Second, that lessons of history will remain lessons of history if not properly learnt and understood. Third, reform or step aside. Fourth, denial is not a governance response. 59
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