The search for an agreed definition stumbles on two issues. ‘The first is the argument that any definition should include states’ use of armed forces against civilians. The second objection is that people under foreign occupation have a right to resistance and a definition of terrorism should not override this right.’ 9 In the latter case, as the saying goes: ‘One man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter.’
The inability of member states to agree on an anti-terrorism convention, including a definition, has prevented the United Nations from ‘exerting its moral authority and from sending an unequivocal message that terrorism is never an acceptable tactic, even for the most defensible of causes’. 10 Nevertheless, there is a question of what impact a universal definition will have on ground realities.
While the debate over a definition of terrorism may continue, there ought to be no ambiguity on what constitutes ‘acts of terrorism’ and strict implementation of a universal zero-tolerance norm. Overall, consensus on the pre-eminence of universal non-tolerance for deliberate attacks on non-combatants regardless of any justification should surpass the technicalities of a definition.
The Politics of Terror
No matter where the arena, I find it inconceivable that any terror outfit can outgrow its modest beginning without external assistance. Such assistance more often than not is provided by a group of individuals/another state or other entities because it is perceived that provision of such assistance will help further any one or more set of causes: the furtherance of human rights, minority rights, etc.
Sri Lanka offers an interesting case study.
Having enjoyed what was perceived as an unfair advantage in government jobs on account of access to the English language, Sri Lanka’s Tamil minority began to witness a turning of the tide and a slow but sure erosion of minority rights following the passage of the Sinhala Only Act in 1956. 11 The political class in New Delhi failed to fully comprehend the implications of the act and initially viewed it as a ‘coordination of anti-imperialist sentiment’. 12
After being subjected to a systematic trampling of their minority rights in subsequent years and the anti-Tamil riots in Colombo in 1983, there was little doubt left in the mind of the average Sri Lankan Tamil that the Sinhala state had decided to provide a cover for the anti-Tamil riots, the colonization of Tamil areas and the not-too-infrequent rape of their women. This is usually the point at which ‘fact’ and ‘fiction’ merge and fuse. The Sinhala state, was at the very least, viewed as acquiescing the erosion of Tamil minority rights. This could not in and of itself provide justification for Tamil groups in India, the state government of Tamil Nadu and/or agencies of the central government in New Delhi to begin considering the financing of an enemy of the Sri Lankan state. And yet, this is precisely what happened. The rest is history. The Sri Lankan government maintains, for good reason, that absent support from India, they could have resolved their ‘Tamil problem’ much earlier.
There was significant evidence of delusional politics on both sides. At a social function hosted by High Commissioner Jyotindra Nath Dixit in Colombo, I recall someone asking Sirimavo Bandaranaike—the wife of S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike and herself a former prime minister of Sri Lanka, and the mother of Anura Bandaranaike and Chandrika Kumaratunga—an interesting question: What would you have done, and how would you have resolved the Sri Lankan ethnic crisis, or the Tamil issue as it is called. The response was instructive: I would have called my sister (meaning Indira Gandhi) and asked her to look the other way.
There was no subtlety, no ambiguity. A clear statement indicating the mindset of using force.
How much more delusional can one get? On the one hand, the Sri Lankan state’s use of force to wipe out a struggle for minority rights and, on the other, the decision by elements in India to encourage the taking up of arms to unravel a sovereign state and its duly elected government.
Assigned to the Court of St. James (as the deputy High commissioner of India in London from January 1999 to March 2002), I was personally witness to and often articulated my frustration with interlocutors in the host government because of the visible double standards in play on issues relating to terrorism. It is so very easy to take pride in one’s democratic institutions and the freedom these provide. It is also tempting to turn a blind eye to the reality that this freedom is being misused to the detriment of others. It is also counterproductive. As Hillary Clinton famously observed later (in the context of Pakistan), ‘You can’t keep snakes in your backyard and expect them only to bite your neighbours.’ 13
Traditionally, Western political theory regards the ‘state’ as an all-powerful and often repressive entity and the individual as helpless, weak and vulnerable. The human rights discourse has been anchored almost entirely on the presumption that it is only this state that commits human rights violations.
London shut its eyes to what was being preached in the mosques, and the JKLF assassination of Ravindra Mhatre, India’s representative in Birmingham in 1984. The active participation of British Muslims of Pakistani origin in violence perpetrated in South Asia was only the precursor. The ‘use of force’ in Libya and Syria in essence sealed the deal and the birth of ISIS heralded the coming of age of the non-state military actor.
Because the UK ignored the rising radical sentiment in its own backyard for so long, it is now faced with an even greater challenge—online radicalism.
The Internet, which has allowed a conglomeration of deviants, does not respect geographical boundaries. Earlier, vulnerable youth had to walk to their neighbourhood mosque to get radicalized but now all they have to do is log on to the Internet and click on a few tabs to join global jihad.
It is a shame that only after a spate of ‘lone-wolf’ terror attacks on its soil, and across Europe, that the UK decided to finally shed some of its delusions. It recently set up an exclusive police counterterrorism unit which flags content that is deemed going against UK’s legislation, with online platforms. Through a collaborative exercise, the police unit and the online platform take down such content.
However, there is still a long way to go on how Her Majesty’s government views non-state military actors, particularly those who have their origins in South Asia. Its past history with Pakistan blinds it to the ground realities—organizations such as Jamaat-ud-Dawa are no different from ISIS. In fact, the ISIS has arguably drawn inspiration from a country like Pakistan, which uses non-state actors as a proxy for achieving geopolitical goals.
Delusional Politics at Its Best
The Counter-Terrorism Committee of the United Nations Security Council held a special meeting on 28 September 2011 to mark the tenth anniversary of the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1373 and urged ‘all Member States to ensure zero tolerance towards terrorism and take urgent action to combat terrorism in all its forms and manifestations.’ 14 As the chair of the committee, I presided over this special session in which the ‘zero-tolerance’ norm was adopted.
Two developments helped change that narrative: reaction to 9/11, and the use of military force in Iraq in 2003 and Libya in 2011.
It became abundantly clear that organized terror outfits or non-state military actors cannot exist without the active arming and funding by some states, or at the very least acquiescence by them. ISIS, for example, is the unwanted child of a failed, incompetently handled and neglected occupation (in Iraq).
There is a widespread tendency to underestimate the deep emotional and ideological reasons that prompt young men and women to take up arms and even lay down their lives for a cause they believe in, or have been persuaded to embrace. Radicalization and violent extremism need to be understood if they are to be countered effectively. Locking up unemployed and radicalized youths only helps incubate Al-Qaeda in jails.
Much of the global counterterrorism effort is delusional. It is laying the foundation for deeper polarization and radicalization that will make the world less safe than it already is. Why do I make this claim? Well a closer look at the
two approaches used in the war against terror reveals that they both fit the delusional category.
First, erosion of the rule of law. As already touched upon briefly, it is now widely accepted that the American-led invasion of Iraq was illegal. 15 There were no weapons of mass destruction, and despite Saddam Hussain’s violently dictatorial regime, many more lives were lost as a result of the US invasion of the country. By disregarding international law and without giving due consideration to the international ramifications of such an invasion (the United Nations Security Council was largely ignored prior to the misadventure) the US and its allies created the monster that we today refer to as ISIS. My previous book was on this very subject and studied the cases of Libya, Syria, Yemen, Crimea and Sri Lanka. It was aptly titled Perilous Interventions.
The second approach, a spectacular failure, is that of arming terror outfits. Often done under the garb of promoting democracy, the real motivation here is regime change for geopolitical gains. The American-led support to militant political Islamic organizations is well documented, with its crowning glory being Al-Qaeda.
As General William Odom, director of the National Security Agency under President Ronald Reagan, said: ‘By any measure the U.S. has long used terrorism. In 1978-79 the Senate was trying to pass a law against international terrorism—in every version they produced, the lawyers said the U.S. would be in violation.’ 16
And it is not just Western nations which are complicit. Other countries in the region such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE, Iran and Turkey, have also played their part. Turkey is known to provide a safe haven to ISIS fighters, particularly those joining the terror organization from Europe and UK. 17 And the rise of Pakistan’s ISI (the mastermind behind terror attacks in India) is predicated on importing Saudi Arabia’s Wahhabism, along with a large helping of financial and technical resources. 18
Moving forward, violent extremism and terrorism can be better countered if it is approached through the prism of dialogue and discourse, and state responsibility.
The war on global terror can only be won through a process of dialogue among nations where the discourse is focused on the international repercussions of what is an international security threat. Such a discourse, which is anchored in human rights, but not constrained by it, must transcend national interest and look at terrorism for what is—a threat to delicately balanced peace and security architecture, effectively established post the devastation of World War II.
In the absence of an agreement over the definition of ‘terrorism’, what must be made clear is that there is no such thing as a ‘good’ terrorist, and responsibility for the tragic loss of life and property as a result of this ‘good’ theory must be affixed on states supporting these claims. Terror plots only come to fruition with the help of governments/agencies that, under the garb of ‘non-state’ actors, propagate proxy wars and use terror as a tool for achieving their geostrategic goals. Just as no terror plot would be successful without this government support, no Countering Violent Extremism strategy will be successful without state responsibility. Name and shame is, in the words of Victory Hugo, an idea whose time has come.
Annexure I
International Conventions
Fifteen major legal instruments and additional amendments addressing terrorism exist within the UN context, as follows:
1963 Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed On Board Aircraft (Aircraft Convention) 19Applies to acts affecting in-flight safety.
Authorizes the aircraft commander to impose reasonable measures, including restraint, on any person he or she has reason to believe has committed or is about to commit such an act, where necessary to protect the safety of the aircraft.
Requires contracting states to take custody of offenders and to return control of the aircraft to the lawful commander.
1970 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (Unlawful Seizure Convention) 20Makes it an offence for any person on board an aircraft in flight to unlawfully, by force or threat thereof, or any other form of intimidation, [to] seize or exercise control of that aircraft or to attempt to do so.
Requires parties to the convention to make hijackings punishable by ‘severe penalties’.
Requires parties that have custody of offenders to either extradite the offender or submit the case for prosecution.
Requires parties to assist each other in connection with criminal proceedings brought under the Convention.
1971 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation (Civil Aviation Convention) 21Makes it an offence for any person unlawfully and intentionally to perform an act of violence against a person on board an aircraft in flight, if that act is likely to endanger the safety of the aircraft; to place an explosive device on an aircraft; to attempt such acts; or to be an accomplice of a person who performs or attempts to perform such acts.
Requires parties to the Convention to make offences punishable by severe penalties.
Requires parties that have custody of offenders to either extradite the offender or submit the case for prosecution.
1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons (Diplomatic Agents Convention) 22Defines an ‘internationally protected person’ as a head of state, minister for foreign affairs, representative or official of a state or international organization who is entitled to special protection in a foreign state, and his/her family.
Requires parties to criminalize and make punishable ‘by appropriate penalties which take into account their grave nature’ the intentional murder, kidnapping, or other attack upon the person or liberty of an internationally protected person, a violent attack upon the official premises, the private accommodations, or the means of transport of such person; a threat or attempt to commit such an attack; and an act ‘constituting participation as an accomplice’.
1979 International Convention against the Taking of Hostages (Hostages Convention) 23Provides that ‘any person who seizes or detains and threatens to kill, to injure, or to continue to detain another person in order to compel a third party, namely, a State, an international intergovernmental organization, a natural or juridical person, or a group of persons, to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit or implicit condition for the release of the hostage commits the offence of taking of hostage within the meaning of this Convention.
1980 Convention on the Physical Protection of the Nuclear Material (Nuclear Materials Convention) 24Criminalizes the unlawful possession, use, transfer, or theft of nuclear material and threats to use nuclear material to cause death, serious injury, or substantial property damage.
Amendments to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
Makes it legally binding for states parties to protect nuclear facilities and material in peaceful domestic use, storage as well as transport.
Provides for expanded cooperation between and among states regarding rapid measures to locate and recover stolen or smuggled nuclear material, mitigate any radiological consequences or sabotage, and prevent and combat related offences.
1988 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation (extends and supplements the Montreal Convention on Air Safety) (Airport Protocol) 25Extends the provisions of the Montreal Convention (see No. 3 above) to encompass terrorist acts at airports serving international civil aviation.
1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (Maritime Convention) 26Establishes a legal regime applicable to acts against international maritime navigation that is similar to the regimes established for international aviation.
Makes it an offence for a person unlawfully and intentionally to seize or exercise control over a ship by force, threat, or intimidation; to perform an act of violence against a person on board a ship if
that act is likely to endanger the safe navigation of the ship; to place a destructive device or substance aboard a ship; and other acts against the safety of ships.
2005 Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation Criminalizes the use of a ship as a device to further an act of terrorism.
Criminalizes the transport on board a ship of various materials knowing that they are intended to be used to cause, or in a threat to cause, death or serious injury or damage to further an act of terrorism.
Criminalizes the transporting on board a ship of persons who have committed an act of terrorism.
Introduces procedures for governing the boarding of a ship believed to have committed an offence under the Convention.
1988 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf (Fixed Platform Protocol) 27Establishes a legal regime applicable to acts against fixed platforms on the continental shelf that is similar to the regimes established against international aviation.
2005 Protocol to the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf 28Adapts the changes to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation to the context of fixed platforms located on the continental shelf.
Delusional Politics Page 16