by Paul Seager
Despite the potential for social loafing, groups are formed on a daily basis to perform a number of tasks that individuals couldn’t perform on their own. They are asked to make decisions that have the potential to transform the lives of many others. With this is in mind, psychologists have studied closely how groups make such decisions.
Group decision making
It is not unreasonable to assume that if you put a bunch of clever people together, you will get a good decision from them; even if you put a group of average people together, for example, in the form of a jury, you might expect an average decision. However, this is not necessarily the case.
Spotlight: Reducing social loafing
Working in a group can lead to a ‘drop-off’ in the performance of an individual. Potentially, this can be reduced by:
• ensuring individuals work in small groups;
• taking care to assign individuals to tasks that they find interesting;
• making sure that the members of a group work with others they like or respect;
• explaining that contributions from each person are unique and important;
• ensuring that each individual’s contribution can be identified;
• individuals expecting their co-workers to perform poorly;
• working with others from cultures where a group is valued more highly than an individual.
Some of these factors are controlled more easily than others, but the more that are employed, the less likely social loafing is to occur.
One of first people to recognize this formally was a researcher called Stoner (1961) who asked business students to make judgements about a number of hypothetical situations (known as ‘choice dilemmas’). They were first asked to do this alone, then as part of a group formed at random, then on their own again. At each of these three stages, they were given the same choice dilemmas. For example, in one dilemma they were told that an engineer could stick with his current job which pays a modest but adequate salary, or he could consider changing to a new job which offered a potentially higher salary in the future but which had uncertain long-term security. The individual, or group, was asked to judge the lowest acceptable risk for them to advise the character in each dilemma to try the risky alternative.
Stoner found that the decisions made by the groups were nearly always riskier than the average of those made by individuals prior to group discussions. In addition, based on the post-group individual decisions, instead of returning to the levels of the pre-group decisions, most individuals continued to make riskier decisions. This led Stoner to conclude that this ‘risky shift’ (as it became known) appeared to be internalized.
Key idea: The risky shift
The tendency for groups of individuals to make much riskier decisions than they would on their own.
Other researchers refined this work, and using the same ‘choice dilemma’ methodology, found that whilst there was a tendency for groups sometimes to make riskier decisions than they would as individuals, there was also the possibility that group decisions would be more cautious than individual decisions. They termed this phenomenon ‘group polarization’, and it is a fairly robust finding that has been noted in a wide variety of populations. Generally, the size of the group polarization shift correlates with the average individual starting position: if the individuals in the group were more extreme initially, then the group’s decision became even more extreme.
These findings were not confined to the slightly artificial choice dilemmas. For example, Moscovici and Zavalloni (1969) asked French students to state their attitudes towards both General DeGaulle and America (at the time in France, DeGaulle was very popular, and America was very unpopular). When these individual students were randomly assigned to groups and asked to debate their attitudes again (on the same two topics), it was found that they became even more pro-DeGaulle and more anti-America.
Key idea: Group polarization
The tendency for groups of individuals to make more extreme decisions, both riskier and more cautious, than they would on their own.
However, these findings were not without their critics. For example, it was pointed out that these randomly formed groups were ‘ad-hoc’, were without any form of history or possible future, and the decision was a hypothetical one. Other research using existing groups found no such polarization in their decisions.
Nevertheless, given that group polarization is a fairly frequently occurring phenomenon, researchers set about determining why it might happen. Three possible explanations have been put forward.
1 POLARIZATION THROUGH COMPARISON
This explanation, referred to as ‘social comparison theory’, and championed by Sanders and Baron (1977), claims that polarization occurs because people wish to maintain a positive self-image, and this is possible by ensuring that their beliefs on important social values accord with those of others. Therefore, the key to doing this is to understand the position of other group members with regard to the social value in question. Initially, each individual believes that their position is representative of the feeling of the group, but when they discuss it with others, they are more likely to see that their position is in fact a more moderate one, and that others endorse the social value much more than they do; therefore the individual will shift their position (polarize) to present a more favourable image of themselves.
2 POLARIZATION THROUGH PERSUASION
The second theory claims that it is not the comparison with others that is important, but instead, it is the content of the discussion that is crucial. This ‘persuasive arguments theory’ was championed by Burnstein and Vinokur (1977), and assumes that any issue being deliberated is much more likely to produce a preponderance of arguments in one direction than another. Each individual does not automatically have access to all of the arguments, and only through discussion will they do so. Once all facts are discussed openly, individuals will shift their position (polarize) in the direction where the majority of the arguments lie.
3 POLARIZATION THROUGH INTERGROUP DIFFERENTIATION
The third theory claims that the important issue is not the content of the argument, but from whom the argument comes. They key process in this theory is social identification with a group. When a group discusses an issue, members are more likely to conform to the group’s position to maintain a positive identity, and this position will be more pronounced if the issue being debated makes group identity more important. The group position becomes more extreme (polarizes) when they are not only trying to emphasize ingroup values, but where they are also trying to differentiate themselves from an ‘outgroup’.
Each of these theories has their strengths and weaknesses. For example, group polarization was found to occur when individuals didn’t know the true views of the others in the group but the strength of the argument was high, thus supporting the persuasive arguments view. However, this view assumes that new information always emerges in a group discussion, and other research has shown that this is certainly not always the case: groups tend to spend a lot of time discussing the information they already have rather than trying to discover new information. Similarly, intergroup differentiation theory works well to explain polarization when there is clearly an ‘outgroup’; however, this isn’t always the case (e.g. a jury). Brown (1999) concludes that the first two theories are more likely to hold sway when we don’t know too much about our fellow group members and where the decision we have to make is a novel one, and the third theory is much more persuasive for existing groups.
Of course, just because a group’s decision is more polarized than that of an individual, doesn’t make the decision an incorrect one. However, there have been a number of occasions when a group’s decision has turned out to be quite disastrous, and this prompted Irving Janis (1972) to put forward a theory to explain why groups sometimes make bad decisions: he called his theory ‘groupthink’.
Groupthink
Using a series of case studies of American governmental decisions (see Case study bel
ow), Janis constructed a three-stage model of poor decision making. The stages are:
1 Antecedents
2 Symptoms
3 Consequences
Antecedents are conditions that exist prior to groupthink occurring. These include:
• Group cohesiveness
• Structural faults of the group, namely:
– Lack of impartial leadership
– Member homogeneity
– Group isolation
– Lack of procedural norms
• Stressful situational context
Cohesiveness refers to members all having similar views and opinions, and thus rejecting anyone with a deviant viewpoint. Janis conceived of cohesiveness as referring to interpersonal attraction as opposed to task cohesiveness (see Chapter 10).
The structural faults in the group referred to a directive leader making it clear about the decision that he wanted the group to make, the members of the group being far too similar in their outlook and background, being isolated from other groups and possible dissenting views, and a lack of a systematic procedure to make decisions. The stressful situational context may lead to urgency overriding accuracy and the need for the best possible decision to be made.
Case study: Irving Janis and groupthink
Janis based his original model (1972) and his revised model (1982) on a number of case studies involving foreign policy decisions by the American government that went wrong. These included:
• The Bay of Pigs (failed attempt to invade Cuba)
• The Korean war
• The Vietnam war
• Pearl Harbor
• Watergate
He also included case studies illustrating when correct decisions were made, showing how groupthink can be avoided. These included:
• The Cuban missile crisis
• The Marshall plan
The symptoms of groupthink include:
• Overestimation of the group: this includes an illusion of invulnerability whereby a tide of over-optimism can lead to extreme risk taking. It also includes an unquestioned belief in the morality of the group, and the tendency to ignore ethical and moral consequences of any possible decisions.
• Closed-mindedness: the group is far more likely to engage in a collective rationalization wherein they discount warnings or fail to consider other information that might have a bearing on their decision. It also indicates a simplistic tendency to stereotype outsiders, such as believing that enemy leaders are simply evil, or not capable of countering any actions decided upon by the group.
• Pressures towards uniformity: a tendency towards self-censorship whereby group members feel inclined to minimize, or rationalize away, any doubts that they might have. There is also an illusion of unanimity where the assumption is made that each individual agrees with the majority (group) view. Anyone daring to question the group’s decision has pressure put on them to desist, and ‘mindguards’ are appointed to protect the group from such dissenters.
The consequences of groupthink inevitably include defective decision-making and a high likelihood of a bad decision. These consequences come about due to an incomplete survey of possible alternative decisions, an incomplete survey of the objectives of the group, and a failure to examine the risks associated with the group’s preferred course of action. Additionally, a failure to reappraise initially rejected alternatives, a selective bias in processing information pertaining to the decision, and a failure to draw up contingency plans, are also factors leading to the likelihood of a bad decision being made.
’Groupthink refers to a deterioration in mental efficiency, reality testing, and moral judgements that results from in-group pressures.’
(Janis, 1982, p. 9)
On the face of it, the groupthink model has an intuitive and pleasing feel to it. Subsequent high-profile decisions, such as the Challenger space shuttle disaster and possibly the decision to invade Iraq, have been flagged as being due to groupthink. Some experimental evidence, mainly testing antecedents such as cohesiveness, has also given credence to the model. Another advantage to the model is that it gives us clear guidance on how to avoid bad decision-making: simply reversing the symptoms and consequences provides a list of good practice for group decision making, such as appointing a ‘Devil’s advocate’ to argue against any decision the group reaches (the opposite of a ‘mindguard’) and the employment of ‘last chance meetings’ to overcome a failure to reappraise initially rejected alternatives.
However, critics of groupthink have pointed out that any model based mainly on anecdotes and case studies does not have a strong foundation. Similarly, not all aspects of the model have been empirically well-tested (either alone or in combination), and there seems some doubt as to whether the model can be applied to the decisions of everyday groups, as opposed to governmental decisions. Additionally, there are areas of the model that lack clarity, such as exactly how many antecedents need to be present, and indeed which ones, in order for groupthink to occur. Nevertheless, despite these objections and reservations, the model remains a popular one.
Summary
It appears then that there is more to groups than meets the eye. Their effect on an individual can be a two-edged sword – if the individual is good at what they do, then their performance may be enhanced, but if not… then the individual had better beware. It also seems possible to predict when a group will be more suited to complete a task than an individual and this can help with resource planning. Similarly, if we are aware of the possible decline in an individual’s performance within a group, and can understand why this might be so, it may be possible to plan in order to reduce or remove the effect.
When we take a group as a whole and look at how the individuals combine to make decisions, we see a distinct shift from how they might act as individuals: group decisions may become more polarized and the decisions reached may not be optimal ones. Understanding the effects of groups, and how they work, can have many practical applications for us as individuals on a daily basis (for example, students can use social facilitation effects to ensure that their exam performance is optimal) that we would ignore this research at our peril.
Food for thought
Imagine you are responsible for organizing the production of a pantomime (or any other kind of theatrical production or event) in your local community. How would you use the information in this chapter to ensure that everyone performed to their maximum potential (e.g. no social loafing, no stage fright, etc.)?
Dig deeper
Baron, R. S. & Kerr, N. L. (2004) Group Process, Group Decision, Group Action. Second Edition. Open University Press.
Brown, R. (1999) Group Processess. Second Edition. Wiley-Blackwell.
Forsyth, D. R. (2013) Group Dynamics. International edition. Wadsworth Publishing Co.
Janis, I. (1982) Groupthink. Houghton Mifflin
Fact-check
1 Who coined the term ‘social facilitation’?
a Floyd Allport
b Norman Triplett
c Robert Zajonc
d James Steiner
2 Which of the following is not true with regards to Zajonc’s explanation of social facilitation?
a The presence of others causes an instinctive arousal which leads to a drive
b The drive facilitates the performance of an individual when the dominant response is the correct one
c The drive impairs the performance of an individual when the dominant response is incorrect
d All of the above are true
3 An alternative explanation for social facilitation is due to arousal being caused by the splitting of attention between the audience and the task. This is referred to as:
a Mere presence
b Evaluation apprehension
c Distraction-conflict
d None of the above
4 According to Steiner’s task taxonomy, when a group’s output is equal to the output of a selected group member, this is called what type of task?
&nb
sp; a Additive
b Disjunctive
c Conjunctive
d Compensatory
5 Three track teams with four runners each compete in a 400m race. The times for team A are 46 seconds, 47s, 47s, 49s; the times for team B are 44s, 45s, 49s, 53s; the times for team C are 45s, 45s, 46s, 51s. If the race is set up as a conjunctive task, which team wins?
a Team A
b Team B
c Team C
d It’s a tie!
6 One explanation of social loafing claims that people loaf in a group because they are unclear as to what is expected of them. This is referred to as:
a Output equity
b Evaluation apprehension
c Matching to standard
d Social impact theory
7 Which of the following isn’t a way to reduce social loafing?
a Ensure individuals work in slightly larger groups than normal
b Assign individuals to tasks that they find intrinsically interesting
c Ensure that each individual’s contribution to the group output can be identified and measured
d Assign individuals to groups containing people that they like and respect
8 Group polarization is the tendency for groups of individuals to make more extreme decisions than they would on their own. One theory suggests that this is because they pay attention to the content of the discussions that they have with other individuals in the group. This is referred to as:
a Social comparison theory
b Persuasive arguments theory
c Didactic engagement theory
d Intergroup differentiation theory
9 Which of the following is not an antecedent of groupthink?